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Abstract 
The academic literature is quite rich in exploring Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in 
developed markets and to a lesser degree in emerging markets.  However, seldom 
one can find research on IPOs in start-up stock exchanges.  Such is the case of the 
Cyprus Stock Exchange which was inaugurated in March 1996 and this thesis looks 
at IPOs that took place over a period of six years (1997-2002).  Therefore, the first 
motivation is to explore this setting for IPOs.  Moreover, the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
is probably the least researched stock exchange in the European Union. Out of the 12 
countries that joined the European Union between 2004 and today, only Polish, 
Bulgarian and Hungarian IPOs are researched.  Due to the comparatively young age 
of the Cyprus Stock Exchange and the Capital Markets in Cyprus in general at the 
time of the sample, the various players (underwriters, auditors, regulators, investors) 
were relatively inexperienced vis-à-vis the IPO process and outcomes of their actions 
(or rather their lack of action) affected the development of the primary market.  
Therefore, the second motivation stems from the specific institutional and regulatory 
characteristics of the CSE at the time of the sample.  
 
Cyprus, a start-up stock exchange with a relatively new but comparably densely 
populated market for listed companies (150 listed companies), poses an interesting 
research case.  In particular, the institutional characteristics that existed in the 
Cypriot capital market over the period 1997 to 2002 (a novice stock exchange, 
inexperienced market participants, lack of investment options available and 
restrictions in capital flows, a weak legal and institutional framework) combined 
with a number of socioeconomic and political factors at the time make IPOs in the 
CSE an interesting subject for empirical research.  This ‗cocktail‘ of inexperience, 
inadequate regulation, and limited equity culture provided the platform for the 
formation of a large IPO ‗bubble‘ which eventually imploded. 
 
Therefore, the motivation for the study develops the following research questions: 
1. What is the level of first-day  returns for Cypriot IPOs and how does that 
compare with the available literature? 
2. What are the explanations for the level of short-run underpricing recorded? 
3. What is the long-run (12-, 24- and 36-months) aftermarket performance of 
these IPOs and how does that compare with the available literature? 
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4. What are the explanations for the documented long-run aftermarket 
performance? 
5. Did CSE IPO firms employ income increasing accruals prior to the IPO? 
6. What is the level of understanding of Cypriot Managers of the IPO process in 
relation to the extant literature? 
 
This thesis consists of three inter-related empirical studies on companies that were 
listed on the Cyprus Stock Exchange during the period 1997 to 2002.  In particular, 
this thesis investigates the short- and long-run IPO performance of these companies 
(chapter 1).  The variables employed are grouped into four categories namely 
advisor/certifier-, market/institutional-, issuer-, and IPO-specific.  It is observed that 
CSE IPOs over the sample period offered investors the highest returns in a European 
market and one of the highest in the world.  Following the establishment of these 
ultra-high returns, and the independent variables that are related to this spectacular 
performance, the thesis investigates whether these CSE IPO companies engaged in 
income increasing accruals before their IPOs (chapter 2).   
 
In Chapter 2, both univariate as well as multivariate tests are employed to test the 
hypothesis that these firms actually employed earnings management pre-IPO using 
income increasing accruals which reversed after the 1st year of listing.  In order to 
establish also the relationship between the short- and long-run performance of IPO 
firms, the latter are regressed with the earnings management variable which takes the 
form of discretionary accruals, total accruals or the components of accruals which are 
creditors, debtors, inventory, depreciation and cash flow from operations.  The 
results show that both the short- as well as the long-run performance are also affected 
by the earnings management variable together with the other variables that are found 
to affect IPO performance in chapter 1.   
 
Having examined the two aspects of CSE IPOs, i.e., short, long performance and 
earnings management, the thesis presents also the results from a questionnaire survey 
which aims at revealing managers of CSE listed IPO companies level of 
understanding of the IPO process and IPO ‗anomalies‘ (chapter 3) and comparing 
this with the extant academic literature and also with the responses of managers in 
the US. Great effort, both theoretical and empirical, has been made to understand 
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managerial decision-making in the initial public offering (IPO) process.  Most 
empirical IPO research relies on publicly available stock return data.  However, there 
is a need to extend the literature by examining how well managers‘ motivations for 
conducting IPOs and understanding of the IPO process correlate with existing 
academic theories. By surveying managers in an emerging market to obtain a real-
world perspective on the IPO process, their beliefs and experiences can be compared 
to both academic theory and the findings from empirical research.  Cypriot 
managers‘ responses in an emerging/novice market such as the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange can also be compared with those of managers in a highly-developed 
market such as the US. The combination/integration of the above elements makes 
this study, the first of its kind for Initial Public Offerings in the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange. 
 
The results from the first study indicate the following: 
a. The existence of ultra-high first-day  returns. 
b. The existence of a hot issue period. 
c. Long-run under-performance of IPOs over a three-year period. 
d. Significant institutional deficiencies. 
 
Specifically, it is observed that  IPOs in the CSE offered investors initial (first day) 
returns that are among the higher in the world even after adjusting for the hot issue 
period of 1999.  IPOs ‗younger‘ in age, offered higher short-run returns than ‗older‘ 
ones.  Furthermore, smaller IPOs as measured by the size of gross proceeds perform 
better in the short-run than larger IPOs.  Moreover, IPOs in certain industrial sectors 
offered investors the highest initial returns. It is observed that gross proceeds, the 
time from application to listing, the capital structure of the IPO firm (leverage), the 
standard deviation of market returns 21 days after the listing, and return on 
shareholders‘ equity provide a highly explanatory model of raw initial returns.   
 
It is also found that Cypriot IPOs underperform in the long-run as the majority of 
IPOs in academic studies do.  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are negative 
for all years in the sample period during the 24-, and 36-month periods.  In contrast, 
the 12-month period average CARs over the sample period are all positive.  
Moreover, IPOs in the ‗hot‘ issue period have worse performance than the rest of the 
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pack which confirms that findings of many researchers that IPOs in ‗hot‘ periods 
have a worse performance than the rest in the long-run. 
 
The standard deviation of returns 21 days after the listing of  the IPO, the capital 
structure of the IPO firm (leverage), the return on equity of the IPO firm prior to 
listing and its sales growth prior to listing offer a satisfactory explanatory model of 
36-month cumulative average returns. 
 
Cypriot firms exploited a ‗window of opportunity‘ that was opened in the market for 
listing.  However, the high inefficiencies that existed and continuous changes that 
took place in the regulatory and institutional framework of the market as reflected 
predominantly by the large time span between application and listing (probably the 
longest in the World), had as a result huge delays in listing.  Consequently, IPOs 
were caught up by the declining returns in the secondary market and the majority of 
them after the third quarter of the year 2000 opened below their offer price. 
 
In summary, the findings suggest that the institutional and market aspects of the 
Cypriot capital markets affected the CSE IPO returns in a manner that produced 
astonishingly high returns. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by 
demonstrating that start-up stock exchanges with institutional and regulatory 
deficiencies offer a platform for highly abnormal IPO returns, which fade away 
though, in the long-run. 
 
The results of the second study point out to the fact that earnings management cannot 
be ruled out for CSE IPO firms over the sample period.  Specifically, using both 
univariate and multivariate tests it is observed that both discretionary accruals and 
total accruals rise within the prospectus time frame (pre-IPO) and reverse post-IPO.   
Moreover, change in profitability measures, namely return on sales, return on assets 
and return on assets net of cash, demonstrate significant statistical difference when 
compared pre-IPO and post-IPO.   
 
Finally, when the IPOs price performance (short and long) is regressed against a set 
of independent variables and among them, a variable for earnings management 
which takes the form of discretionary accruals, or total accruals, or the components 
  
v 
 
of accruals over the same period it is observed that  discretionary accruals have a 
positive relationship with short-run returns, meaning that as accruals rise, 
underpricing increases.  This can be attributed to the faster adjustment by 
underwriters of valuations to take into account income increasing accruals, and at the 
same time the inability of investors to revise with the same degree and speed their 
valuations due to the high levels of exuberance that existed in the market as these 
were manifested by the high level of secondary as well as primary returns as well as 
possibly their lack of sophistication to do so.  Moreover, it is argued that the 
components of accruals explain well the long-run stock price performance. 
  
The third chapter of this thesis presents the findings from a questionnaire survey of 
managers of listed companies in the Cyprus Stock Exchange.  It is suggested that in 
some areas, there is harmony between managers‘ beliefs and academic theory. 
Nevertheless, in other key areas, managers‘ perceptions diverge from traditional 
academic theory.  It is also evident that Cypriot managers‘ overall views coincide at 
large with views of US managers, a country with arguably the most advanced capital 
market in the world. 
 
Several general implications can be drawn out of this thesis for academics, regulators 
and policy makers, investors, professionals such as security analysts and certifying 
agents and companies aiming at listing their shares.  Specifically:  
 The academic community, which could utilise the findings from the study to 
understand better the role of institutional setting on IPO ‗anomalies‘ as well 
as the ‗maturity‘ of stock exchanges on IPO price performance behaviour. 
 Policy makers and regulators alike to assist them in drafting improved laws 
for the future as well as avoiding mistakes of the past.  Specifically, the laws 
must aim at protecting the minority shareholders and making more 
accountable certifying agents and managers of IPO firms.  
 Investors and portfolio managers who will be more educated and informed on 
making better decisions in the future regarding IPOs especially in newly 
formed equity capital markets.  In particular, stock exchanges that lack strong 
institutional framework could offer excellent opportunities for ultra-high 
short-run returns. 
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 Professionals (such as corporate financiers, accountants and lawyers), 
especially those dealing with IPOs who will be able to draw on the findings 
of the study to improve the knowledge and professional practices when 
dealing with issuers.  Principally, certifying agents to become more wary of 
firms that employ accruals aggressively to enhance valuation parameters and 
achieve higher gross proceeds.  
 Prospective issuers to become more educated on matters involving avoiding 
the boosting accruals and consequently IPO valuations as this is a short-lived 
trick of becoming unpopular with market participants. 
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Abstract 
Many studies have documented that Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are substantially 
underpriced.  This paper provides evidence on underpricing in the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange (CSE) over a period of six years (1997-2002).  Given the institutional and 
market deficiencies that existed at the time in the novice Cypriot capital market and 
the transformation of the Cypriot economy and society as a prelude to entry in the 
European Union, these had profound effects on the proper functioning of the primary 
capital markets.  With a sample of 79 IPOs it is observed that the ‗hot‘ market of 
1999-2001 produced exceptionally high first day returns, which are amongst the 
highest in the world and the highest amongst European countries.  Investigation of 
factors influencing the initial performance of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
shows that market and institutional variables together with issuer-specific variables 
were the main drivers of this performance.  In particular, the length of time between 
application and listing, the standard deviation of returns 21 days after the listing, the 
degree of leverage of IPO firms, their return on equity as well as their size, were the 
main statistically significant variables.  It is also evident that Cypriot IPOs 
underperform in the long-run, with those IPOs in the ‗hot‘ market having the worst 
performance.  Their long run underperformance is influenced mainly by the standard 
deviation of IPO returns during the first 21 days after the listing, the level of leverage 
and their return on equity as these are calculated from their last audited accounts 
found in the prospectus.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Whether or not to 'go public' is probably the most important decision in the life cycle 
of a company and its shareholders.  Going public involves having the shares in a 
company quoted on a stock exchange, and companies usually go public via an initial 
public offering (IPO) of their shares to prospective investors.  Stock exchanges serve 
two main functions, namely, to facilitate the raising of new equity capital, and to 
enable trading in shares and other securities to take place.  The capital raising 
function is usually referred to as the primary market and the subsequent trading as 
the secondary market.  It is important for an economy that both markets operate 
efficiently.  If going public is a relatively easy and inexpensive process, then this will 
increase the availability and lower the cost of equity finance.  Even if new equity 
capital is not required, and the original investors simply want to sell part, or all, of 
their stake in a company, the ability to do this efficiently will encourage 
entrepreneurship and, ultimately, economic growth.  Similarly, a liquid and 
transparent secondary market will encourage investors to participate in the stock 
market and should again increase the availability of equity capital and lower 
investors‘ required returns. 
 
To minimise certain risks involved in the public sale of their securities, firms retain 
underwriters who undertake the pricing and selling of the new securities. The 
conditions under which new securities are offered to the public and the role of the 
underwriter are both affected by the regulatory and institutional environment of the 
local IPO market. 
 
The academic literature on IPOs has grown quite rapidly over the last decade.  
Numerous studies have investigated unseasoned new issues, especially in the United 
States of America (despite the fact that European IPO activity has overtaken U.S. 
IPO activity during the late 1990s (Ritter, (2003b)).  This was brought about by the 
introduction of ‗equity culture‘ which was also fostered by privatisation programmes 
and the convergence of listing requirements, reporting rules and pricing mechanisms 
across Europe).  Much of this literature has focused mainly on three empirical 
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patterns: (i) initial (or short-run) underpricing; (ii) long-run (under)performance and 
(iii) cycles in the number of IPOs and in the average first day-returns.  
 
First, there is now overwhelming international evidence of initial underpricing.  That 
is, the shares of companies that go public are offered to investors at prices 
considerably below the prices at which they subsequently trade on the stock market.  
Researchers offer several theories that argue that underpricing of IPOs is an 
equilibrium phenomenon in an efficient capital market.  The important implication 
for initial underpricing is that it can be thought of as raising the cost – to the original 
owners – of raising equity finance. 
 
When shares are sold at a price below that at which they subsequently trade, the 
initial owners essentially ‗leave money on the table‘ for the investors who purchase 
the shares at the IPO.  In the case of sales of secondary equity, the wealth loss 
associated with underpricing is obvious; the original shareholders could have sold 
their shares at a higher price had they retained them and sold them in the after-
market.  In the case of primary equity sales, the wealth loss occurs via the dilution of 
the original shareholders‘ stakes in the company.  Initial underpricing of the IPO will 
mean that the new investors will have acquired their stake in the company for less 
than it was worth, to the detriment of the original shareholders.  Put another way, in 
the absence of underpricing, the company could have raised the same sum of money 
by selling fewer shares, and thereby would have avoided diluting the holdings of the 
original investors. 
 
The range of underpricing varies considerably amongst countries but it is evident in 
different national markets with various degrees of development and diverse 
regulatory and institutional regimes.  For example, initial returns range from 4.2% in 
Russia to 137.4% in China
1
, 149% in Jordan and 264.5% in Saudi Arabia (see 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydgvist (2013)).  Underpricing seems to fluctuate over time.  
                                                 
1 Underpricing of A shares in the Shanghai Stock Exchange is reported to be very high.  Mok and Hui (1998) find 
underpricing to be 289% whereas Su and Fleischer (1999) show that underpricing could exceed 948% if IPOs 
from earlier years were included in the sample.  Also Tian (2011) using a sample of 1387 IPOs over a period of 
12 years (1992-2004) finds that the average underpricing in Chinese A shares is 247% and the median 122%. 
Tian finds that this severe underpricing comes mainly from government intervention and d some investment risks 
such as lock-up risks, grabbing risks and tunneling risks found in Chinese IPOs.  
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Since 1960, the price discount has averaged around 19%, but with considerable 
fluctuations, averaging 21% in the 1960s, 12% in the 1970s, 16% in the 1980s, 21% 
in the 1990s and 40% in the 4 years since 2000 (Ljungqvist, 2005).  The level of 
underpricing was even stronger in the late 1990s and in the first years of the new 
millennium, coinciding with the Internet IPO boom. 
 
The second anomaly that has generated much research is the evidence that the shares 
of companies that go public appear to suffer long-run underperformance. That is, 
relative to other quoted companies, investors appear to lose out by continuing to hold 
the shares of companies that have recently gone public. As a result, the immediate 
gain that investors typically make as a result of the underpricing of IPOs tends to be 
accompanied by poor relative performance thereafter. Such underperformance seems 
to last a surprising length of time, with some studies suggesting significant poor 
returns up to five years after the initial floatation. However, this anomaly has not 
been empirically found in all markets. For example, in Finland, the return over a 3-
year period is underperformance of 61.5% whereas in Greece over the same time 
window the return is over performance of 38% (see Gajewski and Gresse (2006) and 
also Boutron et al. (2007)). 
 
Early researchers show that there are pronounced cycles in the number of new issues 
per month and also in the average initial returns per month.  Further, there appears to 
be a lead-lag relation between the two series.  It seems that, periods of high and 
rising initial returns tend to be followed by spurts of IPOs, which are themselves 
followed by periods of lower initial returns.  This is the third anomaly surrounding 
the IPO literature. 
 
IPOs were the hottest financial act of the late 1990s in many countries around the 
world.  Cyprus followed suit and the inauguration of the official Cyprus Stock 
Exchange (CSE) in March 1996 signalled a new era in the Cypriot capital markets.   
Because of the restrictions that existed at the time in the Cypriot economy on capital 
flows, Cypriot investors and households could only invest their money in deposits, 
shares and real estate in Cyprus.  When in mid-1999 the IPO boom began lasting 
almost 2 years, it had as a result, a total of 103 new listings, the emergence of 
numerous brokerage houses and the doubling in the direct ownership of listed 
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equities by Cypriot households.  The Cypriot population engaged at large in a frenzy 
of share trading which saw it through the ‗boom and bust‘ of the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange General Index in the years 1999-2001.  Many IPOs ‗left considerable sums 
of money on the table‘ and subsequently their shares went on a down-spiral that 
resulted in the CSE losing 69.4% of its capitalisation within two years (end of 1999 
to end of 2001).  All these ‗anomalies‘ constitute the IPO phenomenon in Cyprus, 
which had its share of winners and losers.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how the underpricing of IPOs is affected 
by a number of institutional factors that were present over the sample in the Cyprus 
capital markets during the period examined.  Moreover, another aim of this chapter is 
to examine whether both short- and long-run IPO share price performance 
documented in the United States and other developed markets also applies to a start-
up capital market such as Cyprus. 
 
Cyprus, being one of the smallest economies in Europe with a relatively new but 
densely populated stock exchange (150 listed companies), poses an interesting case.  
In particular, the institutional characteristics that existed in the Cypriot capital 
markets over the period 1997-2002 (a novice stock exchange, inexperienced market 
participants, lack of investment options available and restrictions in capital flows, 
weak legal and institutional framework vis-à-vis capital markets) combined with a 
number of socioeconomic and political factors at the time make IPOs in the CSE an 
interesting subject for empirical research. In particular, researchers such as Yung et 
al. (2008) argue that an exogenous positive shock to an economy can lead to a 
greater number of firms going public and this wave of IPOs exhibits high 
underpricing.  
 
Moreover, the Cypriot economy is heavily dependent on family enterprises.  These 
comprise 85%-90% of the total number of enterprises (which is one of the highest in 
the EU) whereas this estimate includes more than half of the listed companies
2
.  In 
the family-business literature, an IPO is usually described as a solution to solve two 
main types of problems: lack of capital, and succession. Empirical research on IPOs 
                                                 
2 Overview of Family Business Relevant Issues, Country Fiche: Cyprus, 2008, European Commission Report 
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has concentrated mainly on financial aspects. Funding is one of the challenges family 
businesses face. Many family businesses fail because of insufficient capital and 
heavy debt loads (Peterson, Kozmetsky, and Ridgway (1983); Wucinich, (1979); De 
Visscher, Aronoff and Ward, (1995)). According to some authors, the most important 
reason for going public is to infuse a significant amount of investment capital into 
the firm (Arkebauer, (1991)). Going public, in fact, allows firms to access external 
financial resources. These resources can be used either to compensate for a lack of 
capital or high debt/equity levels, or as means to seize and finance growth 
opportunities (Harvey, Evans, (1995); Mahérault, (2000)). Compared with a private 
placement, the capital that can be collected on the market is usually larger and less 
expensive, and it involves less dilution. In the long run, also, the access to the stock 
market increases the company's borrowing power and enhances its bargaining power 
for the reduction of borrowing costs (Krips-Newman, (1985)). Moreover, since 
stocks are more easily transferable, banks will be more willing to accept the stocks as 
collateral. 
 
Another important group of reasons for a family business going public pointed out by 
literature, concerns succession, family dynamics and continuity of the firm. As 
generations go by, the number of shareholders increases, and their ties to each other 
and to the company loosen. The fragmentation of the ownership increases the 
probability that a family shareholder wants or needs to sell or to exchange stocks. 
The evaluation of the shares often creates problems: if a company is listed, however, 
its stocks are negotiable at any given moment on an open and free market, where the 
prices are public and official (Ravasi, D. and G. Marchisio, (2000)). In a public 
company, governance and executive roles tend to be assigned according to personal 
competencies, without regard to dynastic matters. For this reason, listed family 
businesses are better able to attract professional managers, thus ensuring a most 
effective strategic direction. 
 
Moreover, Ravasi and Marchisio (2000) site yet another set of reasons for family 
firms going public.  They argue that family firms go public as a way to improve their 
reputational and social capital, with beneficial effects on their capacity to access 
external resources and opportunities for new entrepreneurial ventures. Their study 
reveals that besides the usual financial motives, the decision to go public is 
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increasingly stimulated by a search for a higher visibility and is seen as an important 
step in the expansion and reinforcement of the network of relationships that sustains 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Research shows that the quality of a country‘s legal framework, as measured by its 
level of investors‘ protection, the overall quality of its legal system and its level of 
legal enforcement reduces the level of underpricing significantly.  Also, increased 
protection of shareholders and greater accounting transparency contribute negatively 
to variations in underpricing.  Research also shows that underpricing is higher when 
the majority shareholders have more leeway to repress minority owners.  Minority 
and other investors who generally enjoy only security benefits are reluctant to invest 
in companies with weak investor protection.  Stronger investor protection leads to a 
decrease in investment risk. Poor legal environments raise the cost of capital for 
firms through greater underpricing. 
 
Clearly, the above regulatory and institutional deficiencies of the Cypriot capital 
markets have had a negative effect on the primary market and the quality of services 
offered since they hindered the proper functioning of the capital markets.  The long 
time span between application and listing, the high volatility levels that existed in the 
market, the fact that due diligence was not a requirement for a firm going public 
coupled with the short-time life span that the CSE was in existence, the strong 
competition that existed amongst underwriters (who were mainly brokers), and the 
relatively inexperienced investors and regulators, were factors that contributed to the 
improper functioning of the primary markets. 
 
The Cyprus Stock Exchange is probably also the least researched stock exchange in 
the European Union.  Out of the 12 countries that joined the European Union 
between 2004 and today, only Polish, Bulgarian and Hungarian IPOs are researched.  
Therefore, Cyprus makes an interesting case being the second smallest country
3
 
member of the European Union.  In fact, one could argue that by studying IPOs in 
the CSE, one could observe how developed stock exchanges behaved in so far as 
                                                 
3 Malta is the smallest country member 
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unseasoned equity offerings are concerned in the very early days of their history.  It 
is like taking a journey back in time, the primordial roots of equity primary markets.   
 
The aim of this chapter is four-fold.  First, to record the level of first-day returns for 
Cypriot IPOs over a recent and relatively long period (January 1997 to December 
2002) and compare it with available literature.    
 
The second objective is to explain the level of short-run underpricing recorded.  
Several explanation models derived from the theoretical and empirical literature will 
be employed towards this end.  The investigation will focus on the cross-sectional 
distribution of these returns (e.g., underwriter reputation, auditor reputation, firm 
size, firm age, issue size, market performance, institutional factors, etc.). 
 
The third objective is to measure the long-run (36 months) aftermarket performance 
of these IPOs.  The aim is to detect whether it has been possible to earn significant 
positive abnormal returns by purchasing the issues at the close of the first day of 
aftermarket trading and holding them for up to 36 months. 
 
The fourth objective is to give some explanations for the documented long-run 
aftermarket (under) performance. 
 
Overall, it becomes apparent that CSE IPOs offered ultra-high first-day returns 
coupled with the existence of a hot issue period and long-run underperformance over 
a three-year period.  Cypriot firms exploited a ‗window of opportunity‘ that was 
opened in the market.  However, applications for listing got congested as the 
inefficiencies of the legal and regulatory framework were exacerbated by the 
continuous changes that took place and were reflected predominately by the large 
time span between application and listing which is probably the longest on record in 
any market. 
 
In summary, the findings suggest that the institutional and market aspects of the 
Cypriot capital markets affected the CSE IPO returns in a manner that produced 
astonishingly high returns. This chapter of the thesis contributes to the existing 
literature by demonstrating that start-up stock exchanges with institutional and 
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regulatory deficiencies offer a platform for highly abnormal IPO returns which fade 
away though in the long-run as the various ‗players‘ evolve and mature and the 
deficiencies are corrected. 
 
To the best of the author‘s knowledge, there is no other study of Initial Public 
Offerings in the Cyprus Stock Exchange, which approaches the subject from almost 
all angles i.e., the short- and long-run performance, earnings management and survey 
of the managers of IPO listed firms to compare practice with extant academic 
research.  Therefore, this is the most important contribution of this thesis.  Most of 
the studies made are on the US and UK stock markets which dominate empirical 
applications.  These stock markets are very large and highly liquid, with turnover 
ratios well exceeding 100% each year.  Moreover, these markets are quite 
transparent, the law protects minority shareholders, and mechanisms exist such that 
underwriters, issuers and investors alike can device effective buy-sell strategies (e.g., 
short sales, lock-ups, green shoe options) which can benefit the market by reducing 
excessive returns.  Also, listing of unseasoned equity takes place quite fast and 
‗waiting in the queue‘ is only a matter of few weeks and not months (or even years).  
On the other hand, the CSE is a start-up stock exchange, with a market capitalisation 
less than 1% of that of the UK or US, and its turnover ratio has been on average circa 
29.9% during the period of the sample.  It demonstrates regulatory and institutional 
inefficiencies (at the time of the sample period) and the key players are 
inexperienced.  It is thus of interest to ascertain whether the key theories that have 
been developed to explain the patterns of IPO pricing in developed markets also 
apply in the context of a small island economy with a novice stock exchange. 
 
In part II of this chapter of the thesis, the extant literature on IPO short- and long-run 
performance is reviewed followed by part III which provides a brief introduction to 
the Cyprus Economy. This is followed by Part IV which describes the prevailing 
regulatory and institutional framework of going public in the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange.  Part V then follows which presents the research design, and part VI gives 
the data analysis including the empirical results.  The chapter ends with part VII 
which is the conclusion. 
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II. Literature review 
A. The going public decision 
 
A large volume of researchers demonstrate that investors purchasing initial public 
offerings (IPOs) of common shares earn a large positive abnormal return in the early 
aftermarket period.  Such IPO underpricing is widely documented and appears to be 
internationally omnipresent.  Researchers also document that IPOs tend to 
underperform in the long run.  However, international evidence on the long-run 
performance of IPOs is less extensive than the one on underpricing, and less 
unanimously conclusive.  Ritter and Welch (2002) divide existing theories on this 
aspect of IPOs in Life Cycle and Market Timing theories. 
 
i Life cycle theories 
 
The first formal theory of the going public decision appeared in a paper by Zingales 
(1995).  He observed that it is much easier for a potential acquirer to spot a potential 
takeover target when it is public.  Moreover, entrepreneurs realise that acquirers can 
pressure targets on pricing concessions more than they can pressure outside 
investors.  By going public, entrepreneurs thus help facilitate the acquisition of their 
company for a higher value than what they would get from an outright sale.  In 
contrast, Black and Gilson (1998) point out that, entrepreneurs often regain control 
from the venture capitalists in venture-capital-backed companies at the IPO.  Thus, 
many IPOs are not so much exits for the entrepreneur as they are for the venture 
capitalists.  Brau, Francis, and Kohers (2003) using U.S. data examine the choice 
between an IPO and selling the firm to a publicly traded buyer, conditional on 
wishing to sell the company, having no data on companies that stay private.  Private 
firms are more likely to choose the IPO route over a takeover, the larger their 
transaction size and the lower the market-to-book ratio in the industry. 
 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) develop the more conventional wisdom that IPOs 
allow more dispersion of ownership, with its advantages and disadvantages.  Pre-IPO 
‗angel‘ investors or venture capitalists hold undiversified portfolios and, therefore, 
are not willing to pay as high a price as diversified public-market investors.  There 
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are fixed costs associated with going public, however, and proprietary information 
cannot costlessly revealed.  Thus, early in its life cycle, a firm will be private, but if it 
grows sufficiently large, it becomes optimal to go public. 
 
Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa and Simonov (2008) argue that a less diversified 
shareholder has more to gain from taking the company public and would be more 
willing to accept a lower price for the sale of his shares, i.e., tolerate higher 
underpricing.  They study a sample of all the 124 IPOs that took place in Sweden in 
the period 1995-2001.  They also obtained detailed information on the portfolio 
composition of all the investors in the companies being taken public, both before and 
after the IPO, as well as the portfolio composition of investors in similar companies 
not taken public (in terms of size, market-to-book ratio and industry).   They show 
that companies held by less diversified shareholders are more likely to go public and 
suffer a higher underpricing.  The authors also show that, as predicted, the degree of 
diversification explains a significant (both economically and statistically) part of the 
probability of going public, and may account for between one third and one half of 
the reported underpricing. The authors suggest that the degree of diversification of 
controlling shareholders should play a prominent role in the discussion of the process 
of going public. 
 
Public trading per se has costs and benefits.  Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) point 
out that a high public price can attract product market competition.  Public trading, 
however, can, in itself, add value to the firm, as it may inspire more faith in the firm 
from other investors, customers, creditors, and suppliers.  Being the first in an 
industry to go public sometimes confers a first-mover advantage. 
 
Demers and Lewellen (2003) examine the impact of IPO underpricing on website 
traffic, which is a direct measure of product market performance for internet firms.  
They find that web traffic growth for the month after the IPO is positively and 
significantly associated with initial returns, and the effect is economically significant.  
They also investigate media reaction to initial returns for a broader sample of IPOs.  
Their results suggest that the marketing benefits of underpricing extend beyond the 
internet sector and the ‗hot issues‘ market of the late 1990s. 
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Chemmanur and He (2011) develop a model where two firms with differing 
productivity levels compete in an industry with significant probability of a positive 
productivity shock.  They find that even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund 
their investments may go public driven by the possibility of their product market 
competitors going public.  Their model also predicts that IPO waves may arise in 
equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. 
 
ii. Market-timing theories 
 
Lucas and McDonald (1990) develop an asymmetric information model where firms 
postpone their equity issue if they know they are currently undervalued.  If a bear 
market places too low a value on the firm, given the knowledge of entrepreneurs, 
then they will delay their IPOs until a bull market offers more favourable pricing.  In 
Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993), firms avoid issuing equity in periods where few 
good-quality firms issue.  The authors find that firms tend to increase equity 
offerings more frequently in expansionary periods.  Lowry and Schwert (2002) argue 
that recent first-day share performance of firms going public leads other firms to 
decide to go public.  Ҫolak and Günay (2011) develop a model that shows that high 
quality IPO firms may benefit from strategically delaying issuance to obtain more 
info about the market conditions.  They show that pioneering IPOs are usually not 
the best ones within an expanding IPO cycle and actually the opposite may be 
happening.  Their model also partially explains IPO clustering.  They find that as the 
first successful IPO comes to market economic and market uncertainty is lifted, 
investors become more knowledgeable and all the remaining waiting firms, which 
were strategically delaying their issuance, are entering the market in a massive scale.   
 
Other theories have argued that markets provide valuable information to 
entrepreneurs who respond to increased growth opportunities signalled by higher 
prices (Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999); Schultz (2003)).  Using long-run returns, 
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) posit that firms time their IPOs to take 
advantage of ‗windows of opportunity‘ that allow them to get the most attractive 
offering prices. 
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Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that in addition to the above theories for IPO 
volume fluctuations, a plausible semi-rational theory without asymmetric 
information can also explain cycles in issuing activity.  Entrepreneurs‘ sense of 
enterprise value derives more from their internal perspective, their day-to-day 
involvement with the underlying business fundamentals, and less from the public 
stock market.  Sudden changes in the value of publicly traded firms are not as 
quickly absorbed into the private sense of value held by entrepreneurs.  Thus, 
entrepreneurs adjust their valuation with a lag.  As a result, even if the market is 
driven by irrational public sentiment or the entrepreneur‘s price is driven by 
irrational private sentiment, entrepreneurs are more inclined to sell shares after 
valuations in the public market have increased. 
 
iii. Evidence 
 
Ritter and Welch (2002) assert that evidence on these theories is hard to test and this 
is because researchers usually observe the set of firms actually going public.  They 
do not observe how many private firms could have gone public.  There are certain 
researchers though e.g., Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) that escape this 
criticism and using a unique set of Italian firms find that larger companies in 
industries with high market-to-book ratios are more likely to go public and 
companies going public seem to have reduced their credit risk.  They also find that 
IPO activity follows high investment and growth and vice-versa.  They also find that 
IPOs are undertaken to maximise the incumbents‘ proceeds from an eventual sale of 
the company. 
 
Lerner (1994) also finds that the industry market-to-book ratios have substantial 
effect on the decision to go public.  His study focuses on the U.S. biotechnology 
industry. 
 
Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004) using a sample of 330 private German firms that 
between 1984 and 1995 announced their intention to go public in the short- or 
medium-term find that the average sample company took more than two years from 
announcing its IPO intention to actually go public.  Importantly, they also find that 
there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the time-to-IPO. Boehmer and 
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Lundgqvist (2004) also find that controlling for private benefits, increases over time 
in measures of firms‘ investment opportunities and valuations have significant and 
sizeable effect on the likelihood that firms will complete an IPO.  They also show 
that these effects are distinct from factors that increase firms‘ demand for outside 
capital more generally.   
 
Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (2005) introduce a model where the entrepreneur at 
each point in time chooses between selling equity to well diversified outside 
investors and remaining private.  The trade-off is between the higher valuations 
diversified outside investors are willing to pay from which the entrepreneur only 
benefits when the firms is public, and private benefits of control which he only 
enjoys when the company is private.  Ceteris paribus, as long as the entrepreneur‘s 
private benefits exceed the cost of being under-diversified, he will choose to remain 
private.  Outside investors‘ valuations vary over time as market conditions and the 
firm‘s cash flows and prospects change, and therefore, so does the case for going 
public. 
 
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) also study the timing of IPOs, but emphasize the 
importance of changes in valuations as captured by returns rather than valuation 
levels.  All else being equal, firms are more likely to go public following recent 
improvements in market conditions, regardless of the level of valuations in the 
market.  Boehmer and Lundgqvist (2004) also find that recent returns matter more 
than the level of market-to-book ratios, which supports this emphasis on changes 
than levels.  Pastor and Veronesi (2005) further predict that more firms go public 
when uncertainty about their future profitability is high.  
 
The existing literature on IPO timing focuses on the aggregate of time series 
behaviour of IPO volume.  Lowry (2003) studies the time series of IPOs in the U.S., 
showing that the main determinants of fluctuations in IPO volume are changes in 
firms‘ demand for outside capital and proxies for investor sentiment.  Helwege and 
Liang (2004) argue that firms going public in periods of high IPO volume do not 
differ in any key characteristic from those going public in low volume periods.  Cook 
and Kieschnick (2004) using data on the incidence of going public and going private 
transactions in the U.S. from 1989 to 1992, document that IPO volume increases in 
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industry profitability, stock valuations and a measure of the value of control rights.  
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) find that ‗IPO Waves‘ coincide with peaks in stock 
market returns, increases in aggregate profitability, positive revisions to analysts‘ 
long-term earnings growth forecasts, and higher volatility. 
 
B. The initial underpricing of Initial Public Offerings  
 
The initial underpricing phenomenon of IPOs refers to the positive average abnormal 
return found over a short period of time after the issue. The initial abnormal returns 
are typically measured between the offering price and the closing price at the end of 
the first day or the first week after the IPO (5
th
 trading day). Since the initial return 
period is very short, the returns are generally not adjusted by any benchmark
4
. The 
first major academic study reporting a positive mean initial return of IPOs is 
Ibbotson (1975). On a sample of 120 IPOs during 1965-69, he finds an average 
initial return of 11.4% from the date of issue to the end of the offering month. Most 
of the following studies measure initial returns during the first day of trading. 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) report an average initial return of 16.8% using a much 
larger sample in a similar period. Ritter (1984) finds an initial return of 18.8% for a 
sample of 5,162 IPOs. A summary of the results from these and other studies can be 
found in Appendix A.  
 
Additional studies documenting positive initial returns are Miller and Reilly (1987), 
Carter and Manaster (1990), Tinic (1988), and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988).  
The latter find a 16.4% average initial return for a sample of 8.668 IPOs during the 
period 1960-87
5
. The initial underpricing phenomenon is not limited to U.S. IPOs. 
Various studies on IPOs in different countries have confirmed that the positive initial 
return is found virtually in all markets, although the size of underpricing varies 
substantially from country to country.  For example, Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez 
(1993) report that IPOs in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico had average initial returns of 
78.5%, 16.3%, and 33.0%, respectively.  Dawson (1987) reports a 17.6% initial 
                                                 
4 Depending on market volatility 
5 The study is being updated by Professor Ritter (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/pbritter.htm) and the latest 
finding is that over a period of 52 years (1960-2011) the underpricing of US IPO stocks stands at 16.8% i.e., 
much unchanged from the original result. 
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return for IPOs in Hong Kong, and Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1991) find an initial 
return of 79.0% for the Korean IPOs and Chan, Wang and Wei (2003) find an 
average initial return of 178% and 11.6% for Class A and Class B shares of Chinese 
IPOs respectively.  Su and Fleisher (1999) find that Chinese IPOs of A-shares exhibit 
an ultra underpricing of 948.6%.  A study by Huang and Levich (2003) shows that 
the initial returns for non-OECD countries average 65.9% while for OECD countries 
initial returns average 11.1%. 
 
Among the European countries, initial returns ranging from 12.0% to 39% are found 
in Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom by several studies including 
Rydqvist (1993), Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) and Levis (1993).  Schuster (2003), for 
a sample of 973 European IPOs offered between 1988 and 1998 in the six largest 
continental markets (Germany (219 companies), France (323), Italy (77), 
Netherlands (75), Spain (88), Sweden (148) and Switzerland (43)), finds 
considerable underpricing which is time varying and related to proxies of uncertainty 
such as age or sector.  Specifically, the average initial return is found to be 16.52% 
and the median 7.14%.  Gajewski and Gresse (2006) based on a sample of 2104 IPOs 
from 15 European countries between 1995-2004, find an average initial underpricing 
of 22%. 
 
The evidence on IPOs for state-owned firms is consistent with that on privately- 
owned firms, also revealing underpricing (Jenkinson and Mayer, (1988), Perotti and 
Guney, (1993), Vickers and Yarrow, (1988)). Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) 
explicitly compare state-owned IPOs with privately-owned IPOs in eight countries 
including both well-developed capital markets (Canada, France, Japan, and the UK) 
and less- developed capital markets (Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, and Thailand) and 
do not find significant differences in the degree of underpricing between the two 
types of firms, except in the UK, where privatizations were more underpriced. They 
also find that underpricing tends to be higher in regulated industries, when compared 
with unregulated industries, before again confirming that underpricing is more severe 
in less developed capital markets. 
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A number of theoretical explanations for the puzzling result of IPO underpricing 
have been formulated.  Many of them rely on the assumption of information 
asymmetries: that there are differences in information known by the various parties 
that are involved in an IPO; namely, the issuer, the underwriter, and the investor.  
 
One of the most important explanations for the underpricing of IPOs is the adverse 
selection model presented by Rock (1986).  Rock divides investors into two groups: 
the informed investors who will attempt to buy shares only when an issue is 
underpriced and the uninformed investors who will buy shares in all IPOs, whether 
the issue is underpriced or overpriced.  As a result, when an issue is underpriced and 
thus subscribed by both types of investors, the uninformed investors will be allocated 
only a fraction of the issue.  On the other hand, when an issue is overpriced, the 
uninformed investors will ‗win‘ the entire issue.  The partial allocation of the 
‗bargain‘ issues and the complete ‗winning‘ of the ‗rip-off‘ offerings produce a 
‗winner‘s curse‘ problem. Recognizing this adverse selection problem, the 
uninformed
6
 investors are attracted to the IPO market only when they are 
compensated for their allocation bias problem in the form of the average 
underpricing of the issues. An implication of Rock‘s model is that riskier issues 
should be underpriced to a greater extent.  This finding is supported by Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) who extend Rock‘s model by showing that the level of underpricing 
increases with the degree of ex ante uncertainty about the value of the firm. This 
implication is tested empirically, and the results confirm this relationship (Beatty and 
Zajac, (1994); Welbourne and Cyr (1999)).  Firms with more uncertainty about 
growth opportunities, for example, on average have higher levels of underpricing 
than other ﬁrms (Ritter, (1984)).  More recently, Loughran and McDonald (2013) 
argue that IPOs with high levels of uncertain text in their S-1 form in the first SEC 
filing, have higher first-day returns, absolute offer price revisions and subsequent 
volatility.  Their findings support those of Beatty and Ritter (1986) ex ante 
                                                 
6 Leite (2007) demonstrates that the strict separation between informed and uninformed investors is not required. 
If there are plenty of heterogeneously informed investors, the winner‟s curse occurs when the least informed 
investor willing to participate in the offering (the marginal investor) is allocated a  disproportionately high 
fraction of overpriced issues relative to the rest of the participating investors who all are better-informed than the 
marginal investor. 
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uncertainty since more uncertainty about an IPO‘s valuation produces higher first-
day returns.   
 
While Rock (1986) considers an information asymmetry problem among investors, 
Baron and Holmstrom (1980) argue that it is the investment bankers who have 
superior knowledge about the issues compared to the issuing companies.  They 
deliberately underprice the offerings expending less effort to market the new issues 
and to favour their buying clients.  Although this argument may be conceivable, and 
is somewhat supported by the empirical findings in Baron (1982), Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989) find that the investment banks underprice themselves by as much 
as other IPOs when they go public.  If the investment bankers were, in fact, 
informational advantaged, one would not expect to find them underpricing their own 
shares at IPO.  
 
Although the Rock  model assumes a  ﬁxed pricing offer  with pro-rata allocation 
rules, the model predicts lower underpricing if information is distributed more 
homogeneously across investors (Michaely and Shaw,  (1994)).  One solution is to 
switch to a different introduction method than ﬁxed price offers. Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) offer a dynamic information acquisition explanation for the 
underpricing phenomenon.  In their model, IPO underpricing induces regular 
investors to reveal information about their valuations of the new issue during the 
preliminary prospectus stage. The revealed information is then used to determine the 
issue price. Empirical findings that support this argument are reported in Hanley 
(1993), Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Aggarwal, 
Prabhala and Puri (2002).  Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) formalise this within the 
context of the winner‘s curse model and show that a pure bookbuilding method leads 
to less informational asymmetry, reduces the winner‘s curse, and consequently leads 
to lower underpricing. 
 
Some theoretical models involved a signalling equilibrium where the issuers 
underprice the IPOs in order to charge a higher price in subsequent seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs).  In the signalling models developed by Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989), high quality firms may 
underprice their IPOs in order to signal their high valuations.  The reduction in IPO 
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proceeds would then be recovered in subsequent seasoned offerings (SEOs).  Welch 
(1989) does find evidence that more IPO firms conduct a SEO within a few years 
after going public than an average firm.  However, the signalling hypothesis is 
generally not supported in Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993).   
 
Although, Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) find some relation between IPO 
underpricing and favourable conditions for SEOs, underpricing is not the uniquely 
necessary factor for the favourable conditions. In particular, they find that the 
aftermarket returns can predict successful SEOs, concluding that the issuers need not 
rely on costly IPO underpricing to create better SEO conditions. 
 
Behavioural theories of underpricing assume either the presence of ‗irrational‘ 
investors who bid up the price of IPO shares beyond true value, or that issuers are 
subject to behavioural biases and therefore fail to put pressure on the underwriters to 
have underpricing reduced. 
 
Welch (1992) argues that the IPO market is subject to information ‗cascades‘.  In his 
model, an investor‘s demand for the issue not only depends on his/her valuation, but 
also on the demand by other investors. As a result, there may be a case where some 
investors who otherwise would subscribe for an issue may decide not to do so when 
they discover that the issue is not demanded strongly by other investors. In order to 
avoid this problem, issuing companies may underprice their offerings to attract the 
first few buyers, thereby inducing a positive ‗cascade‘ effect in which all subsequent 
investors join their ‗instigators‘.  
 
An interesting implication of the informational cascades explanation in conjunction 
with Benveniste and Spindt‘s model (1989) is that positively sloped demand curves 
can result.  In Benveniste and Spindt‘s model, the offering price is adjusted partially 
upwards if regular investors indicate positive information.  Other investors, knowing 
that this will only be a partial adjustment, correctly infer that these offerings will be 
underpriced.  These other investors will consequently want to purchase additional 
shares, resulting in a positively-sloped demand curve.  The opposite is also true; 
because investors realise that a cut in the offering price indicates weak demand from 
other investors, cutting the offer price might actually scare away potential investors.  
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However, cascades are not inevitable.  In bookbuilding, cascades do not develop 
because the underwriter can maintain secrecy over the development of demand in the 
IPO book.  Therefore, less underpricing is required.  Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsch 
(2003) analysis of demand and allocations in Israeli IPOs supports Welch‘s (1992) 
prediction that demand is either extremely low or there is oversubscription, with few 
cases in between. 
 
A central tenet of behavioural choice holds that decisions are influenced by how 
choices are framed.  Considerable evidence derived from controlled experiments 
supports these claims and suggests other systematic deviations from expected utility 
maximisation.  These findings provide the foundation for Kahneman and Tversky‘s 
(1979) formulation of prospect theory.  Prospect theory asserts that individuals make 
choices under uncertainty by maximising a value function that evaluates wealth 
changes, rather than an expected utility function that ranks choices according to the 
level of expected utility.  The value function is positive and concave in the domain of 
positive changes and negative and convex in the domain of negative changes. 
 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) assume that the decision-maker‘s initial valuation beliefs 
are reflected in the mean of the indicative price range reported in the issuing firm‘s 
IPO registration statement.  This belief serves as a reference point against which the 
gain or loss from the outcome of the IPO can be assessed.  The offer price for an IPO 
routinely differs from this reference point, either because the investment bank 
‗manipulated‘ the decision-maker‘s expectations by low-balling the price range, or in 
reflection of information revealed during marketing efforts directed at institutional 
investors.  Empirically, offer prices appear to only partially adjust (Hanley (1993)) in 
the sense that large positive revisions from the reference point are associated with 
large initial price increases from the offer price during the first day of trading. 
 
Decision-makers in IPO firms are further assumed to distinguish between losses 
associated with ‗money left on the table‘ in the form of positive initial returns and the 
perceived gains or losses reflected in the difference between the first-day closing 
price and the mean of the indicative price range.  Applied in the context of the 
prospect theory value function, this form of mental accounting (Thaler (1980) and 
(1985)) leads to gains and losses being valued separately (segregated) or jointly 
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(integrated), depending on which yields the highest net value. The convexity of the 
value function for negative wealth changes implies that decision makers will 
integrate two related losses.  Concavity of the value function in the positive domain 
implies that two related gains will be segregated.  Whether the combination of a loss 
and a gain will be integrated or segregated depends on their relative size.  If the 
perceived gain exceeds the underpricing loss, the decision-maker is satisfied with the 
IPO underwriter‘s performance. 
 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2004) use the structure suggested by Loughran and Ritter‘s 
(2002) behavioural perspective to test whether the CEOs of IPO firms make 
subsequent decisions consistent with a behavioural measure of their perception of the 
IPO‘s outcome.  Specifically, they investigate whether CEOs deemed ‗satisfied‘ with 
underwriter‘s performance according to Loughran and Ritter‘s argument, are more 
likely to hire their IPO underwriters to lead-manage later seasoned equity offerings.  
Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters 
for the secondary equity offerings when they are deemed ‗satisfied‘ with the IPO 
underwriter‘s performance.  Underwriters also appear to benefit from behavioural 
biases in the sense that they extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving 
‗satisfied‘ decision-makers.  
 
Although Loughran and Ritter‘s (2002) application of prospect theory can rationalise 
why IPOs with unexpectedly strong demand are underpriced more, they do not 
explain why issuers choose underwriters with a history of severe underpricing in the 
first place.  As Ritter (2003a) argues, the presumably perceived importance of 
analyst coverage gives some prestigious underwriters the ability to attract issuers 
even though in the 1990s these underwriters underpriced offerings substantially 
(Rajan and Servaes (1997), Michaley and Womack (1999) and Bradley, Jordan, and 
Ritter (2003)). 
 
Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) attribute IPO anomalies to investor sentiment in 
the sense that a class of investors are at times irrationally exuberant about the 
prospects of IPOs.  Stocks underperform in the long run when this enthusiasm fades.  
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) argue that investors often predict future 
uncertain events by taking a short history of data.  Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
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(1998) model such representativeness heuristics to develop a model for investor 
sentiment in which investors extrapolate past good performance into the future 
leading to overreaction.  This naivety propels stock prices to unduly high levels, 
despite this is gradually corrected over longer horizons when past growth rates fail to 
repeat themselves.  Chan (2013), using a sample of 2,444 IPOs that were completed 
in the US stock market over the period 1994-2004 finds that retail sentiment is 
positively related to the return volatility of IPOs on the first trading day.  In 
particular, this is strongest over the internet period of 1999-2000.  Moreover, he finds 
that over optimism amongst sentiment investors during the bubble period results in a 
negative relation between retail demand and long-run post-IPO price performance.  
Derrien (2005) finds that retail investors‘ book-building demand in France is 
positively related with first-day return and negatively related with 18-month post-
IPO abnormal returns.  Dorn (2009) shows that IPOs that are aggressively bought by 
retail investors in the German pre-IPO market are associated with high first-day 
returns and poor 6-month post-IPO abnormal returns.  Cornelly et al (2006) using 
data from pre-IPO market for a large sample of European IPOs find that when the 
pre-IPO market price is high (implying that retail investors are optimistic) the 
aftermarket price is positively related and the long-run price performance is 
negatively related with the pre-IPO market price.  Bradley et al (2009), studying US 
IPOs over the period 1993 to 2003 find that a strong positive relation exists between 
the proportion of retail trades and open–to–close returns on the first trading day.  
Finally, McGuiness (2009) finds that retail sentiment in Hong Kong IPOs is 
positively related to the first day return.     
  
Recently, a growing body of literature has focused on the impact of cultural 
differences on financial measures.  Within this research stream, Costa et al. (2013) 
examine whether Hofstede‘s (1980) cultural factors can help explain the large cross-
sectional variation in global IPO underpricing.  They find a significant relationship 
between initial IPO underpricing and several cultural dimensions defined by 
Hofstede.  Griblatt and Keloharju (2001) examine the impact of distance, language, 
portfolio and culture on portfolio holdings.  They conclude that investors prefer 
nearby firms, same-language firms and same culture firms.  Kwok and Tadesss 
(2006) as well as Aggarwal and Goodell (2009) show that culture influences the 
formation of a country‘s predominant financial system.  In particular, they find 
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countries are more likely to have bank-based financial systems where the culture is 
characterised by greater degrees of uncertainty avoidance.  
 
C. The ‘Hot Issue’ market phenomenon  
 
Over the past 40 to 50 years, a recurring pattern of cycles in both the volumes and 
the average initial returns of IPOs has been observed.  This pattern is referred to as 
the ‗hot issue‘ market phenomenon.  The ‗hot issue‘ markets, which are the periods 
with unusually high initial returns, are found to be associated with increasing volume 
of IPOs.  On the other hand, the ‗cold issue‘ markets, with relatively low initial 
returns, tend to occur toward the end of the high IPO volume periods. Ibbotson and 
Jaffe (1975) first documented the pattern for the 1960-70 periods.  Ritter (1984) 
confirmed the persistence of the pattern for the 1960-82 period.  He finds an 
unusually high 48.4% average initial return during the ‗hot issue‘ market in 1980-
1981 while reports a relatively low figure of 16.3% for the ‗cold issue‘ market in the 
remaining 1977-82 period. 
 
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) extended the sample period to 1960-1987 and 
reconfirmed the phenomenon. They also found a clear relationship between the 
average initial return and the number of offerings: severe underpricing of IPOs 
appears to lead heavy volume periods of new offerings by approximately six to 
twelve months.  Market climate not only affects the number of successful offerings, 
but also the amount and the variability of IPO underpricing.  Kooli and Suret (2002) 
report that when the market is ‗hot‘, the level of underpricing may double or even 
triplicate.  If market is ‗cold‘, then the level of underpricing would be much lower.   
 
Lowry and Schwert (2002) find a high level of autocorrelation of monthly average 
first-day returns between 1960 and 1997, which increased during the Internet boom 
in the late 1990s.  They confirm a significant positive relation between initial returns 
and future IPO volume and note that, “…increased numbers of companies go public 
after observing that IPOs are being underpriced by the greatest amount”.  They 
associate the cycles in initial returns with the investment bankers‘ learning process.  
Because the registration periods of many IPOs overlap, the information that 
underwriters learn during one firm‘s registration period will contribute to the first-
Chapter1 – The price performance of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 1997-2002 
 
43 
 
day returns of many IPOs.  Also Hoffman-Buchardi (2001) find that the IPO market 
is subject to dramatic swings.  They report that the price of one firm serves as a 
feedback mechanism to other IPOs since it can reveal information about certain 
common value factors about the prospects of a specific industry and therefore change 
the value of other firms. 
 
The prospect theory explanation of the partial adjustment phenomenon (Loughran 
and Ritter (2002)) addresses the phenomenon of ‗hot issue‘ markets in a similar 
fashion.  It predicts that all IPOs that are in the ‗road show‘ stage of going public 
when there is an overall market rally, will have higher expected underpricing because 
offer prices are not raised as much as they could be.  Because of the length of the 
bookbuilding period, which can take from four weeks to four months, the first day 
returns of these IPOs will be correlated. 
 
Shiller‘s (1990) ‗impresario‘ hypothesis can also explain the positive autocorrelation 
in IPO activity and initial returns reported in the literature.  Hot markets appear when 
underwriters exploit a segment thought to be ripe for a ‗fad‘.  Even though many 
investors may be unwilling to follow a ‗fad‘, they may find it profitable to follow 
positive feedback investment strategies (Rajan and Servaes (1993)).  Acting this way, 
they may actually have caused the positive autocorrelation themselves.   
 
In the more general setting of ‗fads‘ described by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), fads 
occur in hot issue periods when investors are especially overoptimistic about the 
growth potential of the firms that go public, induced by the ‗Impresario‘, the 
investment bank taking the company public.  Firms time their IPOs in precisely these 
periods in order to take advantage of ‗windows of opportunity‘ (Market Timing 
Hypothesis).  It follows that hot markets for IPOs should be concentrated in certain 
industry classes, dominated by specific underwriters and that IPO activity should 
come from those companies for which issuing equity is always the least favoured 
choice of financing.  Moreover, companies with the largest initial returns should 
have the lowest subsequent aftermarket returns.  Pagano et al. (1998) find that while 
IPOs cluster following high industry valuations, investment and profitability of IPO 
firms decrease after their issues.  Similarly, Alti (2006) finds that while hot IPO 
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firms issue substantially more equity than cold IPO firms, they do not invest more ex 
post. 
 
There have been few theoretical explanations for the ‗hot issue‘ market phenomenon. 
Based on the argument that riskier issues tend to be underpriced to a greater extent, 
Ritter (1984) offers a hypothesis that the periods where more risky firms go public 
may have higher initial returns.  Ritter (1984), using Rock‘s model (1982) argues that 
riskier firms are difficult to value and as such, uninformed investors will be more 
uncertain of the aftermarket price.  Hence, riskier firms will have higher average 
initial returns.  This hypothesis, based on the ‗changing risk composition‘ of the IPO 
market, is not strongly supported by data. Ritter (1984) finds that although there is 
some evidence that the ‗hot issue‘ markets are associated with riskier offerings, the 
factor of changing risk composition explains only a little fraction of the amplitude in 
the average initial return cycles. He finds that the hot issue phenomenon appears only 
for natural resource issues and is not clearly visible for non-natural resource IPOs.  In 
general, Ritter (1984) claims that the hot issue phenomenon may be a result of firms 
from high-risk industries entering the market, thereby leading to higher initial 
returns. 
 
More recently, Yung et al. (2008) argue that the key features of ‗hot‘ IPO markets 
follow from time variation in adverse selection.  In particular, they maintain that 
exogenous shocks to investment opportunities cause time-varying adverse selection 
in the IPO market.  Positive shocks lead to more firms going public since an increase 
in capital productivity leads to greater demand for capital and hence more activity in 
IPO markets.  Their model predicts two main testable implications.  First, that cross-
sectional variance in long-run returns is much higher for firms that issue during hot 
markets.  Secondly, IPOs issued during ‗hot‘ markets are more likely to delist than 
those in cold markets.   
 
D. The long-run (under)performance of Initial Public Offerings  
 
The study of the long-run performance of IPOs is important for several reasons. First, 
as Ritter (1991) asserts, the existence of long-run systematic price patterns raises 
questions concerning aftermarket efficiency. Second, from an investor‘s perspective, 
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if the long-run underperformance anomaly exists, active trading strategies may take 
place.  In other words, investors fortunate enough to be allocated shares at the IPO 
should sell them almost immediately as the trading is started. Third, there is 
considerable variation in the measures of abnormal returns and the statistical tests 
that empirical researchers employ to detect long-run abnormal stock returns. 
 
Using a sample of 1,526 IPOs that went public in the U.S. during 1975-84, Ritter 
(1991) finds that after 3 years of going public, these firms significantly 
underperformed market indices and a set of comparable firms matched by industry 
and size.  Excluding an average initial return of 14.32% as measured from the 
offering price to the market price at the end of the first day of public trading, the 
IPOs in his sample produced an average 3-year holding period return of 34.37%. 
However, a control sample of matching firms, paired by industry and market value, 
produced an average total return of 61.86% during the same 3-year holding period.  
 
The long-run underperformance of IPOs is found to continue after the three-year 
period examined by Ritter (1991).  Yi (1992), using the same IPO sample as in 
Ritter, finds that the underperformance continues until six years after going public. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) use a larger sample of IPOs (4,753 issues between 1970 
and 1990) and find that the poor stock performance extends to five years after issue, 
with no further underperformance in the sixth year.  
 
Various studies with international data generally suggest that the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs is a global phenomenon although there are several studies 
that concluded the opposite thus making the issue of long run performance disputable 
(see Appendix B).  Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) report a three-year abnormal 
return of –46.5% for Australian IPOs during 1976-89 period.  Aggarwal, Leal and 
Hernandez (1993) find that the IPOs in Brazil and Chile underperformed a 
benchmark by 47% and 24%, respectively, by the end of three years after issue.  
Kiymaz (2000) finds a positive long-term (over) performance of IPOs in the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange of 44.1%. 
 
Before these empirical studies were conducted, two theories that ‗predicted‘ the 
long-run underperformance of IPOs were advanced. Miller (1977) asserts under 
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certain conditions (no short selling) that in an IPO, the main buyers are the investors 
that are most optimistic about future prospects of the IPO firm. Due to uncertainty 
about the valuation of an IPO, there will be a range of different valuations given by 
the optimistic and pessimistic investors. Since the shares will tend to be purchased by 
the optimistic investors, the offering price will be higher than the ‗fair‘ price. As time 
passes on and more information becomes available, the stock price will approach 
(will decrease to) the ‗fair‘ price. Thus, Miller (1977) predicts that IPOs, especially 
the riskier issues, will underperform in the long run.  
 
Shiller (1990) provides another explanation for the poor long-run performance of 
IPOs.  He argues that the IPO market is subject to fads and that investment banks act 
as the ‗impresarios‘ promoting the issue. One way to attract investors would be to 
underprice the new issues. As with Miller‘s model, Shiller‘s ‗impresario‘ hypothesis 
predicts that IPOs will underperform in the long run.  In particular, the size of 
underperformance is expected to be related, positively, to the size of underpricing. 
Although Ritter (1991) finds some evidence for this relation, results in Yi (2001) 
suggest that the initial return is generally not a significant factor in explaining the 
long-run returns.  
 
The focus of the empirical studies discussed in the previous section has mainly been 
on the average long-run performance of IPOs. In an effort to shed some light on the 
puzzling finding with further empirical studies, some researchers have started to 
examine possible factors that may affect the cross-sectional variation in IPO long-run 
returns.  Ritter (1991) reports that younger firms and firms that went public in the 
high volume years of the early 1980s had the most serious underperformance. He 
finds that older firms going public in light-volume years of mid- to late 1970s had 
performed as well as the benchmark.  Teoh, Wong and Rao (1995) find that IPO 
firms that had high discretionary accounting accruals were associated with the largest 
negative abnormal stock returns.  Brav and Gompers (1997) find that venture capital-
backed IPOs outperform non-venture capital-backed IPOs when returns are 
computed on an equal-weighted basis. They also find that the difference in returns is 
largely due to severe underperformance of small firms.  
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There have been several studies that examined the reputation of the lead underwriter 
as a significant factor in explaining the long-run returns of IPOs. Carter, Dark and 
Singh (1998) report that the IPOs underwritten by the investment banks with the 
highest reputation do not underperform the NASDAQ index while those 
underwritten by less prestigious underwriters severely underperform the index during 
the first three years after issue.  Furthermore, Beatty and Vetsuypens (1995) find 
evidence that the investment banks are penalized for underwriting IPOs that had poor 
long-run performance.  
 
Another factor that seems to be significantly related to the long-run performance of 
IPOs is the earnings before going public as evidenced in Yi (2001).  Consistent with 
Ritter‘s (1991) results, Yi finds that IPOs as a whole underperformed a market index 
and control firms over a three-year period after going public. However, the IPO firms 
that had positive earnings per share (EPS) at the time of offering seem to have fared 
better than the firms that went public with negative EPS. As a concluding remark, 
based on the broad empirical findings discussed above, especially the high initial 
return and poor long-run performance of IPOs, one can argue that investors may 
have been too optimistic about future prospects of these new public firms. That is, 
the disappointing long-run returns are only the rational and inevitable results of the 
rather irrational run-up in prices in the initial period.  This is further supported by 
Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) who attribute long-run underperformance of 
IPOs to the presence of a class of irrationally exuberant investors.  Stocks eventually 
underperform in the long-run when the exuberance dies away.  
 
Khurshed et al (1999) propose that the long-run performance of IPOs is a function of 
pre-IPO factors, including managerial decisions and the firm‘s performance prior to 
going public. 
 
In addition to the above, the academic literature also focuses on other aspects such as 
mechanism design, the compensation of investment bankers, stabilisation activities, 
and the variation of IPO volume across countries. 
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E. Differences across countries in the IPO market 
 
i. Market activity across countries 
 
The volume of IPOs varies substantially from country to country.  La Porta, Lopes-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) report that the number of IPOs varies 
systematically across countries, with countries having a legal system based upon 
British common law having more IPOs.  Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) report 
that market-to-book ratio is the single most important determinant of the decision to 
go public for Italian firms.  Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that the ease of 
going public depends upon the costs of acquiring information in an economy.  They 
argue that each publicly traded firm creates a positive externality by making it easier 
to value comparable firms.  Holmen and Högfeldt (2003) show that in Sweden, firms 
typically issue shares with inferior voting rights in the IPO, and if the shares with 
superior voting rights are eventually sold, they are always sold as a block.    
 
ii. Composition and institutional differences  
 
According to Ritter (2003b), before the 1990s firms going public in Europe, 
especially continental Europe, tended to be much older (median 28 years) than those 
going public in the U.S. (median age 7 years).  Even with the Internet boom (1999-
2000), the age of an IPO in Europe is still high (median of 13 years in a sample of 
1007 European IPOs from 1995 to 2001) compared to the U.S. (median of seven 
years for a sample of 2.178 IPOs during 1996-2000).  Schuster (2003) points out that 
European IPOs are more likely to include secondary shares (shares being sold by 
existing shareholders) in the offering than is true for U.S. IPOs.  In the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, 67 per cent of Portugal‘s and 23 per cent of Germany‘s floatations 
involved only shares sold by insiders.  By contrast, virtually all American IPOs 
involve at least some primary equity, and usually around half sell solely new shares.  
Europe is showing similar signs.  Since 1995, 82 per cent of IPOs in Europe outside 
the UK have raised new capital and secondary-only IPOs have virtually disappeared 
in Germany. 
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As Ritter (2003b) points out, in the late 1990s, several changes were taking place in 
the worldwide IPO market.  For example, the industry sector became more 
important, irrespective of the country of headquarters e.g., Internet sector.   Another 
change was that the new exchanges (e.g., Germany‘s Neur Markt, Italy‘s Nuevo 
Mercato, the Netherlands Nieuwe Markt, Belgium‘s Euro.NM, Belgium and France‘s 
Nouveau Marché) changed the focus on listing requirements from accounting criteria 
such as profitability and assets to corporate governance and disclosure requirements. 
 
F. Alternative mechanisms for pricing and allocating securities 
 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydgqvist (1994) and Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a) 
document that the average first-day return varies systematically with the mechanism 
used to price and distribute IPOs.  The highest average first-day returns come in 
countries where government regulators impose formulas based on accounting 
information for setting the offer price, although the frequency of these constraints is 
declining.  In general, the mechanisms used for pricing and allocating IPOs can be 
categorised as auctions, fixed-price offers and book-building. Although different 
prices are sometimes paid by different investors–sometimes individual investors pay 
less than institutional investors,–uniform price mechanisms in which every investor 
pays the same price are most common. 
 
In auctions, a market-clearing, or slightly below market-clearing price is set after 
bids are submitted.  Since there is little if any excess demand at the offer price, in 
general shares are allocated to all successful bidders.  Auctions have been used in 
many countries including France, Israel, Japan and Taiwan and the USA for pricing 
and allocating IPOs.   
 
A fixed price offer has the offer price set prior to requests for shares being submitted.  
If there is excess demand, shares are typically rationed on a pro rata or lottery basis, 
although frequently requests for large numbers of shares are cut back more than 
requests for moderate numbers. In other words, if there is discrimination in the 
allocation of shares, it is normally done solely on the basis of order size.  Thus, there 
is no way for the underwriter to reward investors who provide information.  In many 
countries with a fixed-price offer, investors must submit the money to purchase the 
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requested shares, without knowing whether they will receive many shares.  Ritter 
(2003) cites the example of tom-com, an IPO in Hong Kong in February 2000 that 
was oversubscribed by 669 times and Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a) who cite the 
example of Denway Investment in Hong Kong, which was oversubscribed 657 times 
in 1993. 
 
As Ritter (2003), Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994), and Chowdhry and Sherman 
(1996a) acknowledge, in general, the longer the time that elapses between when a 
fixed-price offer is set and trading begins, the higher is the average first-day return 
(i.e., underpricing).  Partly this is because the longer the time until completion the 
higher is the probability that market conditions will deteriorate and the offering will 
fail. To reduce the probability of a failed offering, a lower price is set.  Conditional 
on the offer succeeding, the expected underpricing is relatively high.  Chowdhry and 
Sherman (1996a) cite another reason why there is an incentive to underprice IPOs 
even more  (in countries where the full amount has to be paid with the application in 
advance for all the shares bid for).  They argue that the interest earned on the 
subscription funds decreases the cost of underpricing since the issuer earns a 
substantial amount of money on the money deposited by potential investors in the 
bidding account thus a large part of the underpricing will be recouped in the form of 
interest revenues on the float.  
 
Levis (1990) also points out, that in the U.K., investors have to pay for the whole 
amount of their application at least seven days prior to the first day of trading, and 
they may end up receiving just a fraction of the shares, which they applied for.  Levis 
argues that within this framework, investors will not apply for a new issue unless 
they expect that the total potential gains on the new issue at least cover the total 
interest cost.  In other words, the underpricing of the new issue has also had to be 
sufficiently large to cover the possibility of accelerated interest rate cost per share 
received in case of oversubscription. 
 
Book-building – which is also known as firm commitment in the USA – is a 
mechanism in which underwriters canvas potential buyers and then set an offer price.  
A key feature of book-building is that the underwriter has complete discretion in 
allocating shares.  As part of the marketing campaign, a road show is usually 
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conducted to stimulate demand for the company‘ shares.  After stimulating demand, 
underwriters then try to set an offer price at which there is excess demand and 
allocate the securities to investors based on various criteria such as allocating shares 
to buy-and-hold investors and regular investors who were willing to buy shares when 
demand was weak.  This complete discretion allowed by book-building seems to 
have side effects.  Ritter and Xiaoding (2010) argue that the practice of spinning
7
 
affects IPO underpricing. Specifically, he finds that IPOs in which the executives are 
being spun are underpriced about 23% more than other IPOs. 
 
In general, auctions have been associated with low, but positive, average first-day 
returns.  These first-day returns are generally lower than when fixed-price offers or 
bookbuilding is used. 
 
As Ritter (2003b) points out, there has been a decline of fixed-price mechanisms and 
auctions selling IPOs in Europe and simultaneously a growth in bookbuilding.  Fixed 
price offerings have become uncommon in recent years. Jagannathan and Sherman 
(2006) analyse the use of different IPO pricing mechanisms in various countries and 
find that amongst countries that formerly used IPO auctions virtually all have 
abandoned the method. They argue that uniform and discriminatory auctions suffer 
from large fluctuations in the number of auction participants. Moreover, the free 
rider problem and the Winner‘s Curse make price discovery more difficult. As a 
consequence, this might contribute to inaccurate pricing. In addition, fees do not 
differ substantially between the different methods. 
 
France is possibly the only market in the world that a multitude of pricing 
mechanisms exists.  Even so, the fixed price and auction mechanisms have declined 
in France as well as, DeGeorge, Derrien and Womack (2004) argue.  In Europe, 
when bookbuilding is employed, the price range, once set, does not change above the 
                                                 
7 According to Ritter and Xiaoding (2010,  Spinning is the allocation by underwriters of the shares of hot initial 
public offerings (IPOs) to company executives in order to influence their decisions in the hiring of investment 
bankers and/or the pricing of their own company‟s IPO. The term „spinning‟ refers to the fact that the shares are 
often immediately sold in the aftermarket, or „spun‟, for a quick profit, and an IPO is termed „hot‟ if it is expected 
to jump in price as soon as it starts trading. 
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maximum in contrast to the USA, where the price range can change even during the 
pricing meeting, a few hours before trading commences. 
 
Insert Table 1 – Average initial returns by selling mechanism 
 
Biais and Faugeron (2002), Sherman (2004) and Ljungqvist (2005) argue that book-
building is a superior mechanism for selling IPOs relative to auctions.  Their 
argument is that book-building can be viewed as a dynamic auction conducted by 
underwriters, with the advantage that underwriters can use their discretion in 
allocating shares to reward regular investors who provide reliable information about 
valuation to the underwriters.  This reduces the risk for both issuers and investors and 
controls spending on information acquisition thereby limiting either underpricing or 
aftermarket volatility. DeGeorge, Derrien and Womack (2004) also argue that the 
book-building approach is dominating auctions because of advertising-related quid 
pro quo benefits.  Analysing the French market, they find that book-built issues were 
more likely to be followed and positively recommended by the lead underwriters and 
were more likely to receive ‗booster shots‘ post issuance if the price of the shares had 
fallen.  However, as Ritter (2003) points out, the above researchers do not discuss the 
trade-off with agency problems between underwriters and issuers. 
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III. The Cyprus economy  
A. A brief introduction 
 
The economy of the Republic of Cyprus is a relatively novice one.  It counts 53 years 
of life (independence from Great Britain came in August 1960) and its structure has 
changed dramatically since the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the subsequent division 
of the island.  In the 1960s, it was heavily dependent on agriculture, which accounted 
for more than a one-third of GDP.  In the 1970s, and until the mid-1980s, 
manufacturing was the engine of growth, before it was replaced from the late 1980s 
onwards by services, which accounted for 78 per cent of gross value added in 2008.  
Tourism has been the driving force in this development, however, its contribution to 
the economy has declined the last 15 years (from 9.2 per cent in 1995 to 6.5 per cent 
of gross value added in 2008).  The public sector comprises a hefty 18.7 per cent of 
GDP in 2008. 
 
Fig 1 – Comparison of GDP by economic activity 1995 vs. 2008 
 
Source: CyStat 
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As one can clearly observe, the Cypriot economy has been transformed over a period 
of 15 years into mainly a service-based economy with the primary sector almost non-
existent and the Real Estate having become the largest contributor to GDP (from 
15.6% in 1995 to 19.3% in 2008). 
 
Following a classical pattern, growth rates have gradually begun to decline as the 
Cypriot economy was maturing over the years. The average rate of growth had gone 
from 6.1% in the 1980s, to 4.4% in the 1990s to 3.4% from 2000 to 2004. In 2004, 
growth picked up to 3.7%, from 2.0% in 2003.  Unemployment has been fairly 
constant at 3.6% in 2004, while inflation declined to 2.3% in 2004 from 4.1% the 
year before. As in recent years, the services sectors, and tourism in particular, 
provided the main impetus for growth with assistance from the Construction sector 
especially the last five years.  
 
Fig 2 – Cyprus GDP growth 1995-2008 
 
Source: CyStat 
 
Cyprus is classified amongst the high-income countries, with a per capita income of 
CY£9,841 (Euro 16,785) in 2004
8
. It has a standard of living that is even higher than 
                                                 
8 Using the official exchange rate of CY£0.585274 per Euro. 
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some of the former 15 European Union member-states and the performance of the 
economy compares favourably with that of most 27 EU countries (80% of the 27 EU 
countries average).  The Heritage Foundation
9
 ranks Cyprus 24
th
 in the world 
(‗mostly free‘10) based on its index of financial freedom and 12th out of 43 countries 
in the European region, with its overall score being higher than the regional and 
global averages. 
 
These achievements appear all the more striking, bearing in mind the severe 
economic and social dislocation created by the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the 
continuing occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey
11
.  
 
The success of Cyprus in the economic sphere is attributed, inter-alia, to the adoption 
of a market oriented economic system, the pursuance of sound macroeconomic 
policies as well as the existence of a dynamic and flexible entrepreneurial culture and 
a highly educated labour force. Moreover, the economy benefited from the close 
cooperation between the public sector and the social partners. 
 
During the last decade, Cyprus has intensified its relations with the European Union, 
its largest trading partner and the culmination of these efforts was that on May 1
st
 
2004, Cyprus became a full member of the EU.  On the 1
st
 of January 2008, Cyprus 
became a member of the Eurozone. 
 
Insert Table 2 – Cyprus economic indicators 
 
The Cypriot economy demonstrates low levels of capital markets intermediation, 
with a strong, highly concentrated banking system and subsequently, high entry 
                                                 
9 A US-based think tank 
10 Only 7 countries in the world are considered „free‟ while the majority are considered as „mostly unfree‟ and 
„repressed‟.  
11 The Turkish invasion inflicted a serious blow to the Cyprus economy and in particular to agriculture, tourism, 
mining and quarrying: 70 per cent of the island‟s rich producing resources were lost, the tourist industry lost 65 
per cent of its hotels and tourist accommodation, the industrial sector lost 46 per cent, and mining and quarrying 
lost 56 per cent of production. The loss of the port of Famagusta, which handled 83 per cent of the general cargo, 
and the closure of the Nicosia International Airport (the only airport in Cyprus before 1974), in the buffer zone, 
were additional blows. 
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barriers.  In addition to the 10 commercial banks that operate in the island, there is 
also a strong, but unsophisticated Co-operative movement
12
, which currently is not 
supervised by the Central Bank of Cyprus.  The three largest local banks (Bank of 
Cyprus, Cyprus Popular Bank
13
, and Hellenic Bank) account for some 60 per cent of 
the total deposits and 52 per cent of total lending (incl. foreign exchange lending). 
 
The period 1996-2004 is one of unprecedented economic changes and restructuring 
with significant swings in investor psychology.  As a prelude to the country‘s entry 
into the European Union, the economy was slowly liberalised, interest rates were 
gradually allowed to float, capital flows restrictions were progressively lifted, non-
residents were allowed to hold up to 100% of Cypriot assets and Cypriots were free 
to invest abroad
14
.  In March 1996, the Cyprus Stock Exchange was inaugurated and 
the Cyprus capital market was formalised.  Added to these, the role of Cyprus as an 
offshore haven was challenged by EU entry, risking the loss of a sizable chunk of 
income for the state and the private sector services. 
 
On the political side, 1996-2004 was a rather volatile period with ethnic clashes 
taking place (August 1996), tension with Turkey over a Russian mid-range ground 
missile system order (January 1997), and its subsequent deployment cancellation 
(December 1998), the start of EU accession negotiations (July 1999), the start of bi-
communal talks under the auspices of the United Nations (2000).  The culmination of 
the latter was the submission by the United Nations of a comprehensive plan for the 
settlement of the Cyprus problem submitted in November 2002 (called the Anan 
Plan).  The plan was taken to a referendum in April 2004, overwhelmingly rejected 
by the Greek-Cypriot community (76%) and on May, 1
st
 2004, the Republic of 
Cyprus joined the European Union.  
                                                 
12 The Co-operative movement has a 29.53 per cent market share in total lending (including forex) and approx. 
22% of total deposits (2008 figures). 
13 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd has been put into resolution since the 26th of March 2013. 
14 Henry, P.B. (2000) argues that on average, a country‟s aggregate equity price index experiences abnormal 
returns of 3.3% per month in real dollar terms during an eight-month window leaping up to the implementation 
of its initial stock market liberalisation.  The same author (2000) argues that stock market liberalisations lead 
private investment booms by lowering the cost of equity capital.  However, the success of the liberalisation effort 
depends on whether foreign investors believe that the regulatory reforms will be long lasting (Bekaert and 
Harvey (2003a)). 
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As Sapienza et al. (1996) point out, there is a range of economic, legal, institutional 
and cultural differences influencing the environment in which corporate financing 
takes place. One could argue that, the period 1996-2004 is possibly the one with the 
greatest influences in the Cypriot economic and societal fabric since 1974. 
 
B. Tax incentives 
 
Along with the inauguration of the Cyprus Stock Exchange, the government 
encouraged the listing of companies in the CSE and investors to hold shares of those 
companies by introducing tax incentives.  In 1997, through Law 81 (I), tax incentives 
were extended as follows
15
: 
 
Dividends received by individuals from shares listed in the CSE were tax-exempt up 
to CY£1,200 per year (approx. Euro 2000). In addition, 30% of the amount spent for 
the purchase of shares through an IPO (or the value of the holding of the existing 
shareholders) was tax deductible provided that listed shares represented at least 80% 
of the company‘s voting share capital, the shares are listed in the CSE within 3 
months from the issue date and the shareholder maintains possession of the shares for 
at least 12 months from the issue date.  In addition to the above, there was no capital 
gains tax on gains arising from the sale of equity investments. 
 
For prospective issuers, the regime was equally attractive. Companies that performed 
an IPO on the CSE were taxed for the four years following the IPO year with a 50% 
reduced corporate tax coefficient. For profits up to CY£40,000 (approx. €68,344), 
10% instead of 20% and for profits over CY£40,000, 12.5% instead of 25% provided 
that the shares were listed in the CSE within four years from the 10
th
 of July 1998 
and they represented at least 80% of the voting share capital of the company. 
                                                 
15 The Portuguese IPO phenomenon of 1986 and 1987 may be explained by a double „window of opportunity‟ 
resulting both from strong tax incentives, introduced by the new majority Government elected in 1985, for firms 
to offer and list their shares, and also from excessive market demand driven by the investor sentiment that soon 
followed.  A specific tax benefit, introduced in June 1986, allowed a 50% deduction in the tax on profits in the 3 
years following an offering and listing of at least 25% of shares. The tax deduction was reduced in the next 2 
years to 40% and 25%, for the offerings filed in the years 1987 and 1988.  The number of listed firms rose from 
about 20 in 1983 to around 150 in 1987 (Borges, M.R., 2007).   
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Other institutional changes that assisted the investment climate were the fact that the 
maximum permissible percentage that Insurance companies could invest in equities 
increased from 20% to 30%. 
 
An important ramification of the creation of the Cyprus Stock Exchange was the fact 
that the shareholders of companies that were listed on the CSE were exempted from 
capital gains tax.  This was particularly important for companies that had substantial 
assets in real estate and family businesses.  As generations go by, the number of 
shareholders in a family business increases, and their ties to each other and to the 
company loosen.  The fragmentation of the ownership increases the probability that a 
family shareholder wants or needs to sell or to exchange shares.  The valuation of the 
shares often creates hassle; if a company is listed, however, its shares are negotiable 
at any given moment on an open and free market where the prices are public and 
official.  Therefore, being able to monetize one‘s holdings without capital gains tax 
(which stands at 20%) constitutes a significant motive for listing a company. 
 
Hearn (2011) in a study of 63 IPOs over the period 2000-2009 in North Africa 
(Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) finds evidence supporting increased 
participation of family members at board level while contrastingly the wider 
dispersion of family ownership facilitates monitoring and surveillance and mitigates 
underpricing. 
 
One could argue that all the incentives were in place for the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
to increase its listed members through an enhanced equity culture and targeted 
incentives. 
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IV. The Cyprus Stock Exchange 
A. History and background information 
 
The capital market in Cyprus has a history of thirty four years, a relatively short life 
span compared to other European or U.S. bourses.  The initiative to establish an 
organised securities market was taken up by the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (CCCI) in 1979
16
. 
 
The unofficial over-the-counter market was operating under a set of unofficial 
regulations that were drafted by the CCCI in co-operation with the scant brokers and 
the few listed public companies.  Trading was mostly carried out over the phone 
while stock exchange-like meetings, under the auspices of the CCCI were taking 
place three times a week and were followed, at least initially, voluntarily.  The CCCI 
also provided a place where transactions were executed and the transactions were 
manually carried out. In these auction-type meetings, all brokers convened to arrive 
at a single market price for traded securities (there were neither specialists nor 
official market makers). 
 
Typically, these market prices set at each centralised meeting served as benchmarks 
for market price levels until the next such meeting.  However, the absence of a 
continuous, high-volume auction market and of a regulated competitive environment 
                                                 
16 The Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry is a private corporate body functioning under special law and 
is financially independent, free of any influence by the state. The Chamber is funded by its members' subscription 
fees and through income generated from a number of services it provides.  The CCCI is the union of Cypriot 
businessmen, the interests of whom it promotes by submitting to the government and the Parliament the members' 
positions on matters in which they are involved, while, through its participation in tripartite bodies and 
committees, it conveys and promotes the views of the business community.  The Cyprus Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry was founded in 1927 and in 1963, a new structure was adopted, which remains in operation to date, 
under the name of: „Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry‟. The CCCI is the federation of the local 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCIs) which operate in Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and 
Paphos. The local CCIs have a geographical coverage of their respective districts. The Nicosia CCI covers also 
the districts of occupied Kyrenia and Morphou.  The membership of the CCCI exceeds 8,000 enterprises from the 
whole spectrum of business activity. Affiliated to it are more than 140 Professional Associations from the trade, 
industry and services sectors. 
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left open the possibility that quoted prices might deviate from the underlying 
fundamental value for many securities.  Rumours, manipulations by certain traders, 
overreaction by mainly unsophisticated investors and a herd-like mentality, may have 
exacerbated momentum trading strategies and resulted in positive autocorrelation in 
stock market prices, especially in the early period.  Despite substantial inefficiencies 
in the market in the earlier period, taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities was 
limited by relatively high transaction costs (commission fees in excess of 1 per cent 
each way) and limits on short selling.  A spot settlement system was employed. 
 
The Cypriot capital market started to develop gradually due to the expansion of a few 
public companies, notably the three main banks (Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Popular 
Bank
17
 and Hellenic Bank), and the establishment of new ones as well as the 
establishment of organised brokerage firms.  The expansion of the Cyprus economy 
in accordance with the increase of per capita income together with the improvement 
of all economic indicators, also contributed towards the formalisation of the 
securities market.  Thus, a more active market for securities was developing in the 
early 1990s.  Parallel to the increase in the frequency of auction-type meetings, the 
number of brokerage firms also increased substantially.   
 
The biggest players were financial services companies/brokerage houses of the three 
major banks (namely, CISCO, owned by Bank of Cyprus, Laiki Investments, owned 
by Cyprus Popular Bank and Hellenic Bank (Investments), owned by Hellenic Bank) 
and some individual brokers who entered early on
18
.  A large increase in the daily 
price variance was observed in the early 1990s as compared to the late 1980s, 
consistent with a substantial improvement in market efficiency. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Ex Marfin Popular Bank.  Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd is currently under resolution following the 
events of March 2013 and the subsequent Eurogroup decisions which almost led to the collapse of the Cypriot 
Banking Sector. 
18 In the Cypriot capital markets there are no investment banks in the true meaning of the word i.e., institutions 
that finance themselves predominantly from the securities markets and not by taking deposits.  The companies 
that existed were mainly brokers, with limited balance sheet capabilities and the only companies that had the 
„muscle‟ to underwrite securities in a mass scale were the subsidiaries of the main high street banks. 
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The basis for the development and establishing of the regulated securities market was 
set by the “Law for the development of the securities market in Cyprus and for the 
establishment and operation of the Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE)", that was 
approved by the House of Representatives in April 1993.  In July 1995, the Cypriot 
House of Representatives passed the regulations for the stock exchange function and 
supervision.  The Cyprus Stock Exchange came into life on the 29th of March 1996, 
by virtue of the Cyprus Stock Exchange Laws and Regulations. 
   
The CSE is a legal entity in the form of a corporate body.  It is governed by the 
Council (which is appointed by the Council of Ministers) and is supervised by the 
State through the Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC). The Cyprus 
Securities and Exchange Commission was established in accordance with article 
eight (8) of the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (Establishment and 
Responsibilities) Law of 1996 as a public corporate body.  
 
The Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission is administrated by a five member 
Board
19
 that is appointed by the Council of Ministers and mainly monitors the 
operation of the CSE and regulates the activities of all the CSE players.  Until the 
end of 1999, the CySEC was understaffed (4 employees).  Today it employs 42 
people.  During the period March 1996 to April 2000, the supervisory role of the 
Cypriot capital markets was given by the state to the Cyprus Stock Exchange.  In 
order for the CySEC to apply fines it had to have the consent of the CSE.  On April 
20
th
 2000, the Law of the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission was passed 
with which the new CySEC was established, with full regulatory authority to oversee 
the Cyprus Stock Exchange and apply fines to market participants. 
 
The CSE is an order-driven, multiple price, and continuous auction market with no 
market makers or specialists.  The trading is realised through a computerised trading 
system.  The main index of the CSE is the CSE General Price Index that reflects 
approximately, 93 per cent of the trading activity and 96 per cent of the overall 
capitalisation
20
.  In November 2000, the FTSE/CyCSE 20 was constructed with the 
                                                 
19 On the CySEC board, there is always a representative of the Central Bank of Cyprus who has no voting rights. 
20 The General Index ceased to exist on the 31st of December 2005.  It was replaced with the New General Index 
that reflects the stocks of the Main and Parallel Markets of the CSE. 
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co-operation of the CSE, the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange in 
order to monitor closer the market.  In March 2002, a co-operation agreement was 
announced between the Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE) and the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE), which includes provision for the setting up of a Cyprus derivatives 
market.  In May, 2003, the CSE announced its participation in the FTSE Med 100 
Index which was officially launched in June of the same year. It consists of 100 
stocks from the Athens, Tel Aviv and Cyprus stock exchanges (weighted 56.55%, 
42.55% and 0.89% respectively).  
 
In June, 2004, the CSE, within the framework of upgrading its services and 
harmonizing with the international capital markets, completed a major development 
programme which was included in the CSE strategic plan.  Specifically, it announced 
a package of new measures including the creation of three separate markets: the 
Main, Parallel and Alternative markets; in addition, it also announced the creation of 
separate markets for government and corporate bonds and mutual funds
21
.  The three 
markets were implemented in September 2004 and with them, a set of new indices
22
. 
 
B. Review of the market 1996-2004 
 
During the first three years of its operations, the CSE attracted little interest, with 
average daily trading volumes around CY£250,000 (approx. Euro€427,000) and the 
index ranging from 74 to 105 points (base of 100).  During this period, political 
concerns over the divided island‘s future reinforced investor cautiousness (ethnic 
clashes, missile system deployment and bi-communal talks).  In 1999
23
, after almost 
three years of subdued activity, the Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE) soared roughly 
eightfold only to lose 90 per cent of its value in the following six-year period 
(notably the CSE General Index rose from 97 points on January 1
st
 1999 to 852 
                                                 
21 Despite the fact that a law was passed in April of 2004 concerning the operation of Mutual Funds in Cyprus, 
no mutual fund has yet to be listed on the Cyprus Stock Exchange as the law is tax inefficient and therefore, no 
promoter is interested in setting up one.  
22 The decision on market classification was taken on the 6th of September 2004, based on FTSE International 
23 The year 1999 was an important one for Cypriot investor psychology as it signalled the end of a threat from 
Turkey which derived from the possible deployment of a Russian missile system.  It also began with a major 
acquisition by a commercial bank of two large insurance companies.  In March of the same year, accession talks 
began with the EU. 
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points on 29
th
 of November 1999 (closing 837.5% higher than the beginning of the 
year)
24
, gradually descending back to 103 points by September 30
th
 2001). 
 
More than 250 firms applied for listing in the CSE within a period of 18 months, four 
times the number that was already traded on the CSE up to that time
25
.  IPOs in 1999 
and 2000 were routinely oversubscribed many times over.  This boom-and-bust 
cycle, between 1999 and 2001, saw the index follow a textbook bell-shaped curve, 
rising from 90 points at the end of 1998 to over 800 points near the end of 1999, only 
to plunge back to less than 100 points by the end of 2001 (see figure 1 below).  
During 2002 and 2003 the market continued a long-term decline, with brief spurts of 
growth, reaching a level of 80 in late 2003. In 2004, the market remained becalmed, 
with the index unable to break out of the range 80-90. 
 
Fig 3 - The General Index of the CSE from January 1997 to November 2005 
 
 
Source: CSE 
                                                 
24 The whole market valuation was estimated at 255% of the country‟s GDP for the year. 
25 It is worth mentioning that during the period 2000-2004, 87 firms withdrew their listing application from the 
CSE and a further 46 applications for listing were rejected by the authorities.   Thus, bringing the total number of 
companies attempting a listing but not succeeding eventually, to a staggering 133 firms. 
Peak of CSE Index 
on 29th of November 
1999 
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This boom dragged numerous Cypriot households in the CSE
26
.  Antoniou et al 
(2004) in their second survey of assets and debts of Cypriot households find that the 
participation rate of the population in direct stock owning in 2002 reached 51.4 per 
cent compared to 25.3 per cent in 1999.  Moreover, they find that the largest increase 
in direct stock holding participation was reported among those with less than 
CY£5.000 reported annual income (from 8.80 per cent in 1999 to 30.70 per cent in 
2002).  They also find that stockholding participation increased for all age groups, 
even for households above 70 years (from 10.4 per cent in  1999 to 20.3 per cent in 
2002).  They also find that one third of the Cypriot households in 2002 owned stocks 
directly in only one company (42.4 per cent in 1999). The authors attribute this 
behavioural aspect mainly to the establishment of the Co-operative Society‘s 
investment company, ‗Demetra‘27, in which almost all clients of the Co-operative 
sector bought shares. Especially elderly households, who had been banking with the 
Co-operative sector all their lives, trusted the newly established company and 
invested in large numbers in its stock. 
 
Whilst the primary market was experiencing great demand, the secondary market 
was beginning to show signs of fatigue and soon the bubble imploded, causing 
severe losses to many investors and driving psychology vertically down. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26Several notable international newspapers such as The Economist (Oct 21st 1999) and Time International (Sep 
13th 1999) noted that the CSE was on its way to becoming a large bubble which would eventually implode 
devouring many people‟s life savings. 
27Demetra Investment Public Ltd , a closed-ended fund which was set-up in 2000 by the Co-operative movement, 
was the largest IPO in Cypriot history with a primary offering of CY£200 million (approx. Euro 342 million). 
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Fig 4 – The Cypriot IPO market 1997-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSE, the author 
 
It is interesting to note that even more sophisticated investors (e.g., foreign 
institutional investors) could not possibly counterbalance such overvaluation because 
of regulation prohibiting short-selling
28
.  Cyprus Stock Exchange statistics show that 
the trading volume by foreign investors at the time was less than 10 per cent of the 
total stock market trading volume
29
. 
 
A study into the causes of the CSE crash, released by the House of Representatives 
in June 2002, implicated a number of actors and systemic flaws but offered little 
consolation to the island's thousands of small investors.  Another study by the 
Central Bank of Cyprus helped explain the relatively mild impact of the CSE crash 
on the Cypriot economy at large.  According to this study, most investors used their 
own funds to invest in the CSE (as opposed to borrowed funds), and they had no 
                                                 
28 Also there were not any derivative-type instruments present in the CSE for risk management. 
29 Foreign investors are still largely absent from the Cyprus Stock Exchange mainly as a result of the lack of 
satisfactory Custodian regulation. 
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pressing need for the money invested
30
.  Moreover, the study claimed that most 
investors sustained only paper losses, and they have not substantially modified their 
consumption patterns. 
   
Fig 5 – CSE market capitalisation 1997-2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSE, the author 
 
In an attempt to mitigate the problems created by the huge drop in the CSE index, 
several actions were taken by the Cypriot government.  An expert team was called 
from Greece to examine the problems and suggest corrective actions.  Suggested 
measures (not necessarily implemented) included approving legislation for the 
creation of open-ended mutual funds, setting up an administrative agency to mitigate 
differences between banks and investor-debtors
31
, setting up a ‗guarantee‘ fund 
managed by a foreign organisation to ensure the stability in the CSE, investing 
money from public pension funds in the CSE, improving the quality of financial 
                                                 
30 Others claim that a lot of money from the grey economy was invested on the CSE, and therefore the reason for 
the relatively mild impact on the economy and the banking system. 
31 The three local banks lent approx. €400 million during the period 1999-2001, mainly to retail investors, 
through investor-account schemes. When the Cypriot Stock Market eventually collapsed, and these accounts were 
packed with losses, the banks sued their investor-clients to recover their monies and investors countersued the 
Banks for negligence (these schemes were set-up in the form of discretionary fund management). Such cases are 
still tried in court, even though many of them have been settled or won by banks.   
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reports provided in the prospectuses of start-ups, and lastly, approving a corporate 
governance code for firms that are listed in the CSE.   However, local investor 
confidence had already been shaken to the core.  Even though most of the underlying 
weaknesses in the system have been rectified over the last eight years, mainly as a 
result of new legislation
32
, local retail investors remain largely on the side lines. 
 
C. Going public in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 1996-2004 
 
i. Prevailing regulatory and institutional framework 
 
In terms of institutional and regulatory framework, one can observe two distinct time 
periods in the CSE primary market.  The period that is prior to the enactment of the 
new legislation for financial services firms in August 2001 (i.e., March 1996 to July 
2001), and the period after that (August 2001 to December 2004).  The period March 
1996 to July 2001 is characterised by certain important regulatory and institutional 
deficiencies that possibly contributed to the development of the hot IPO market of 
1999–2000.  These are the following: 
 There was no explicit or implicit recourse to underwriters, auditors or any 
other counsel/advisor of an issue against misrepresentation or misuse of 
information surrounding IPOs making the threat of costly litigation less 
critical as a factor that could affect the pricing of Cypriot IPOs. No due 
diligence whatsoever was undertaken for IPO candidate firms by underwriters 
in the period March 1996 to July 2001 as this was not a requirement.   
 No criteria for corporate governance existed.  As a result a number of 
advisors (mostly legal) were part of corporate boards that they were advising 
for listing, thus laying the grounds for possible conflicts of interest. 
 No regulations for market participants regarding inside information and the 
users of that kind of information existed. 
                                                 
32 With the new legislation which was voted in April 2009, the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission was 
given more powers to oversee the key players in the market.  As a result of this upgrading, the new council of the 
CySEC (appointed in July 2001) issued a circular in August 2001 that due diligence (both legal and financial) 
was compulsory for listing new companies in the CSE.  From 1996 to August 2001, permission for listing shares 
in the CSE was granted by the CSE authorities with the concordance of the CySEC. With the new legislation, the 
CySEC was the only authority to approve listing particulars and prospectuses in the CSE. 
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 No lock-up agreements were allowed for shareholders in IPOs. 
 Stabilisation activities by underwriters were not allowed in the IPO 
aftermarket. 
 No formal market-making framework existed. 
 Short selling was not allowed33. 
 No rules existed for analysts‘ professional conduct. 
 No definition of institutional investors (professional investors) existed34. 
 No rules for ‗Chinese walls‘ in financial services companies existed. 
 Allocation of shares was at the discretion of the Board of Directors of an 
issuer from 29
th
 of March 1996 to 27
th
 of October 2000, when it became 
compulsory to allocate shares to all participants and if oversubscribed, then 
follow a pro-rata allocation
35
. 
 No professional certification existed for people working in investment banks 
(except for brokers – who also acted as fund managers, investment bankers, 
investment advisors etc.). 
 By submitting the IPO application, underwriters were committed to a stand-
by underwriting agreement.  The CSE insisted that the proposed share price 
of the IPO was fixed at the time of applying for a listing or shortly afterwards 
and not just before final approval was granted.  The price could not be 
revised, thus it was limited to the price set out in the prospectus.  Effectively, 
the investors could only bid on the quantity of shares they would buy, not on 
the price of the shares (i.e., no price adjustment existed to regulate excessive 
demand – fixed price selling mechanism). 
 There was a significant time-lag between issue date and the first day of 
trading which averaged 5 to 6 weeks (ranging from 14 days to 105 days).  
This time-lag may have influenced the risk profile and costs of IPOs 
                                                 
33 It is worth mentioning that even today, short selling is not allowed and the concept of the Market Maker is 
absent from the CSE. 
34 In February 2001, a new law was enacted to forbid the collection of monies from investors that applied 
through irrevocable applications in order to participate in an IPO.  Companies that were not listed by a certain 
period of time in the CSE were forced to return these funds to the investors.  This created market havoc. 
35 According to the Law 136(I)/2000, article (e), the board could not disqualify any investor from the offering.  
Until mid-2000, in the case of oversubscription of an IPO, firms would also keep the interest on the monies of the 
investors, which in certain cases amounted to significant sums. 
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 There was also significant time lag between application date and listing date 
which averaged over the period of the sample 317 days. 
 From March 1996 to most of 2001, security titles in the CSE were not 
dematerialised
36
. This created extreme bureaucracy and significant loss in 
transaction time for investors and authorities alike
37
. 
 From CSE‘s inception (1996) to July 2001, prospectuses were approved by 
the CSE with the consent of the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission 
(CySEC).  After July 2001, CySEC was the only approving authority. 
 Up and until September 2004, there was only one market for all listed shares 
in the CSE
38
. 
 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that when stock markets are relatively 
small, information conveyed through stock prices is less accurate, which generally 
decreases the advantages of pending for public capital. As the stock market grows, 
however, the accuracy of information generally improves, yielding greater incentives 
for going public decisions. Martell and Stulz (2003) argue that countries that 
liberalise their equity markets have dramatic positive returns in the year following 
the liberalisation, but these dramatic returns are followed by poor returns, raising the 
question whether stock prices overreact to equity-market liberalisations.  Equity-
market liberalisations decrease the cost of capital in two ways. First, Henry (2000) 
shows that liberalising countries experience unusually high share returns before 
liberalisation date, which is when investors learn that a liberalisation will take place. 
Second, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) show that dividend yields (a good proxy for the 
cost of capital) fall after liberalisation. Martell and Stulz (2000) argue that in the 
long-run, the ability of firms to benefit from an equity-market liberalisation depends 
on corporate governance and the protection of investor rights. The success of the 
liberalisation is determined by the extent to which foreign investors buy shares, 
either new or existing.  As investor protection improves, ownership by controlling 
                                                 
36 In April 2001, the law that enacted the formation of the CSE Central Depository was voted.  However, it would 
take more than 2 years to be completed. 
37 In September 1999, the Cyprus Stock Exchange closed for a month to allow time for brokerage houses, 
investors and firms alike to sort out the mess that was created with the share transfers that took place the 
previous months. 
38 The Parallel and Alternative Markets were created in September 2004 together with the new General Index of 
the CSE. 
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shareholders falls, outside shareholders can own more shares, and firms can raise 
more capital from foreign investors. 
 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) using a large-level dataset of 2920 IPOs covering a 
wide range of 21 countries having different institutional and legal frameworks show 
that the quality of a country‘s legal framework, as measured by its level of investor 
protection, the overall quality of its legal system and its level of legal enforcement 
reduces the level of underpricing significantly.  On a similar tone, Hopp and Dreher 
(2007), using a dataset of more than 500 country-year observations from 29 
countries, find that increased protection of shareholders and greater accounting 
transparency contribute negatively to variations in underpricing.  They also find that 
underpricing is higher when majority shareholders have more leeway to repress 
minority owners.  Moreover, they argue that problems of asymmetric information 
can be resolved when countries enforce disclosure.  
 
La Porta et al. (1997) show that the number of IPOs is positively related with 
investor rights, the legal origin and the law and order tradition of a country.  Chiou et 
al (2010) examine 4916 stocks from 37 countries and find that stronger investor 
protection leads to a decrease in investment risk.  Giannetti and Simonov (2006) 
empirically demonstrate that minority and other investors who generally enjoy only 
security benefits are reluctant to invest in companies with weak investor protection.  
 
Banerjee et al (2011) using a sample of 8700 IPOs from 36 countries around the 
world over the period 2000 to 2006, study the impact of country-level information 
asymmetry, investors‘ home-country bias, effectiveness of contract enforcement 
mechanisms and accessibility of legal recourse on IPO underpricing.  They find 
evidence that IPO underpricing is higher in countries with higher level of 
information asymmetry, lower level of home-country bias, less effective contract 
enforcement mechanism and easier access to legal recourse for investors. 
 
The economic significance for firms operating in a poor legal environment is 
important as it raises their cost of capital through greater underpricing.  La Porta et 
al. (2002) document that investors are willing to pay more for financial assets when 
being better protected by the legal system. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) analyse 
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the impact of investor protection on the going public decision. They show that firms 
would be larger, more valuable, and more plentiful, dividends  would be higher (and 
diversion of profits lower), ownership concentration would be lower,  and  stock  
markets  would  be  more  developed  in  countries  with  better  protection  of  
shareholders.  
 
Clearly, the above regulatory and institutional deficiencies of the Cypriot capital 
markets had a negative effect on the primary market and the quality of services 
offered since they hindered the proper functioning of the capital markets.  After the 
enactment of the Financial Services Law in 2002, a number of regulatory 
deficiencies were rectified following a report prepared by Greek consultants 
commissioned by the state.  However, since 88% of the sample‘s IPOs were listed by 
August 2001 (and no company that was eventually listed on the CSE applied for a 
listing after the year 2000), it is imperative that such a distinction is made. 
 
ii. Procedure for listing in the CSE 
 
Each company that seeks a listing must satisfy inter-alia some basic requirements, 
the most important of which are: 
 The issuer must have the right to issue the proposed category of titles in 
accordance with the company's Memorandum and Articles of Association. 
 The expected market value of the proposed issue must be in excess of 
CY£600.000
39
 (or approx. Euro 1 million).   
 There must be no restrictions in the transferability of the titles listed.   
 The issuer must have published audited accounts for at least the three years 
preceding the application
40
. 
                                                 
39From March 1996 up until December 2000, the total equity to be listed should be at least CY£600.000 
(approximately €1.0 million).  In addition, the main shareholder should not own more than 70% of the equity 
capital and at least 25% of the equity capital should be dispersed to the wider public (which, however, was not 
defined explicitly).  For companies applying after January 2001 then the total equity to be listed should be at 
least CY£2.000.000 (approximately €3.5 million) and the main shareholder should not own more than 60% of the 
equity capital and at least 35% of the equity capital should be dispersed to the wider public.   
40This requirement of having at least three years of audited accounts halted a number of start-ups from listing.  
There was another requirement along these lines emanating from the Companies Act Chapter 113, which 
required 5 years of balance sheet figures for firms to sell shares to the public restricting even more, younger 
companies to list. 
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 The prospective issuer must be able to demonstrate that it has adequate 
working capital before the issue
41
. 
 The issuer must safeguard that existing shareholders will enjoy pre-emption 
rights in every subsequent issue. 
 The issuer must make a commitment to list all the titles of the same category 
that have already been issued, or will be subsequently issued. 
 
According to CSE Regulation 60, issuers could list their shares on the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange in one of the following ways: 
a. By offer for sale – through the placement of shares that had already been 
issued 
b. By public offer for sale to the public of titles which have already been issued, 
or allocated 
c. By public offer for subscription for the purchase of titles which have not been 
issued yet or allocated 
d. By private placement – an offer is made to specific investors for the sale of 
shares that have already been issued or are about to be issued. 
 
In the case where the offer for sale to the public was chosen, then the issue had to be 
fully underwritten by at least one underwriter which had to be approved by the 
Council of the Cyprus Stock Exchange.  Underwriting meant that the underwriters 
must stand by to purchase the unsold portion of the issue at the offer price less their 
fees
42
.  For their assistance the underwriters receive a fee for underwriting and 
distributing the IPO.  
 
The offer price
43
 is set by the lead manager of the issue who was also the lead 
underwriter
44
.  The approach used to arrive at the offer price is one that utilises the 
                                                 
41Having said that, no comfort letter was required from the auditors as this is the practice in other bourses. 
42 The CSE did not grant its approval for a listing until an underwriting agreement was in place, properly signed 
by all parties. 
43 The great majority of IPOs in the CSE were executed through a fixed-price offering.  In a fixed-price offering, 
shares are offered to all categories of investors, private and institutional, at a single and unchangeable price set 
in advance by the underwriter and filed in the introduction prospectus. Investors submit their applications for 
shares at the fixed price and rationing rules (possibly random but most often pro rata) are used to allocate 
shares. Fixed price offerings exist in all European countries except Austria, Greece, Finland and Spain. Specific 
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price-earnings multiplier.  That is, after determining the appropriate price-earnings 
(P/E) ratio of the issuing firm given its comparison to its peers, and after projecting 
its future earnings per share (EPS), the offer price is estimated as the product of the 
P/E ratio and the EPS.  The prospectus includes comparative data on the issuing 
firm‘s and its industry‘s P/E ratios45 and the firm‘s EPS forecasts46 so that investors 
can form an independent opinion of the pricing of the issue. 
 
After the offer price was set, the offering period was specified during which 
investors were invited to subscribe to the new issue.  Sometimes, the offering period 
might take place several weeks after the offer price was set.  The offering period 
usually lasted four to five weekdays, but for slow subscriptions it was possible to 
allow an extension of the offering period.  If the offer was heavily oversubscribed, 
the subscription period finished as early as at the end of the first subscription day or 
the next. 
 
To make sure that an investor was allocated the desired amount of shares, investors 
usually subscribed for a multiple of the number of shares they really wished to buy
47
. 
Then the final allocation was done on a priority basis.  The allocation rule was 
described in the public announcement that calls investors to subscribe as well as in 
the prospectus.  Investors subscribed at the bank branches or stockbrokers as 
specified in the offering announcement.  Following the successful offering of the 
issue, formal listing and public trading of the issue occurs about a month after the 
end of the offering period. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
terminology is used in the UK, where any IPO for which shares are offered to the public, either through a fixed-
price offer or through an auction, is called an „offer for subscription‟ if new funds are raised and „offer for sale‟ 
if not. 
44 If more than one underwriters were present then they set the price jointly 
45 In practice, due to lack of data from issuers in same or similar sectors, the P/E ratios employed were those of 
all the other IPO firms preceding the particular IPO.  
46 After the CySEC issued a circular on due diligence and the responsibilities of underwriters and issuers alike in 
July 2001, most of the issuers refrained from using projections in their prospectuses and the valuation was based 
on trailing P/E ratios i.e., ratios based on audited EPS. 
47 Many investors subscribed to IPOs through various names such as their spouses, companies, and children so 
that they raise the possibility of being allocated more shares than if they had applied on their own. 
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Most of the IPOs in the CSE also included a sizable private placement portion, 
whereby, shares were offered to a group of investors including suppliers, clients, 
personnel and other parties.  The number of shares offered in the private placement 
was added to the existing number of shares in the calculation of the shareholder 
dispersion rule of 25%. 
 
Nearly 95 per cent of all IPOs in the sample are family-owned
48
.  There have been no 
privatizations in Cyprus. 
 
Fig 6 – Boom and bust in the CSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSE 
  
                                                 
48 Family-owned IPOs are defined as firms exclusively controlled by a family of by private persons before going 
public. 
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V. Research design 
A. Sample selection procedure 
 
In this section of the chapter, the description of the sample including descriptive 
statistics is presented.  Moreover, the data sources are mentioned, the process of 
gathering the data as well as the criteria for selecting the companies in the sample are 
laid out.   
 
i. Selection criteria – sample period 
 
During the period 1997-2002 a total of 124 firms were listed in the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange, out of which 79 are included in the final sample.   This period was chosen 
for the following reasons: 
 The CSE was inaugurated on the 29th of March 1996 and the first IPOs took 
place in 1997 (the first IPO of a non-investment company took place in 
August 1997). 
 The period 1999-2001 is characterized by a ‗flood‘ of new listings and 
abnormal returns, largely in the primary, but also in the secondary market.  
From 2002 and up until the end of 2006 (November) there were no IPOs in 
the CSE. 
 The period 1997-2002 is characterized by a significant amount of 
socioeconomic changes as well as changes in the political, legal and fiscal 
front which inevitably imparted on investor psychology and stock market 
economics. 
 
The criteria employed in selecting the companies comprising the sample are based 
both on local constraints as well as on international practice.  These are as follows: 
a. The companies must have been listed in the CSE over the period January 
1997 to December 2002. 
b. The companies listed employed the method of initial public offering to the 
public, with opening and closing dates of the offering period for new shares. 
c. Investment companies (both closed-ended and private equity) and overseas 
companies are excluded from the sample. 
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d. The companies in the sample must not be delisted from the CSE at least for a 
period of 12 months from the date of listing. 
 
Applying these criteria to the population, the number of companies forming the 
sample becomes 79, which represents 64% of the total number of companies listed 
on the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period.  Table 3 below shows the screening 
process that was followed to arrive at the final sample. 
 
Despite the relatively small sample size, Gasbarro et al. (2003) argue that in other 
emerging market IPO studies the sample size is also small. For example, both 
Hameed and Lim (1998) and Omran (2005) employ a sample size of 53 firms to 
assess IPO issues on the Singaporean and the Egyptian stock markets respectively.  
Other studies also employ small sample sizes for example, Lyn and Zychowicz 
(2002) and Dawson (1987) who consider 33 and 21 new issues on the Hungarian and 
Malaysian stock markets respectively.  Paudyal et al (1998) employ a sample of 61 
IPOs to study the first-day returns of Malaysian IPOs. Hearn (2011 and 2012) in 
examining sub-Saharan and North African IPOs also uses small samples.  In his 2011 
paper Hearn, using a sample of 62 IPOs from across North African countries, he 
examines the performance effects of family ownership and influence on board 
structure and its composition of firms that have undergone an IPO.  In his 2012 
paper, he employs a sample of 62 IPOs from across Sub-Saharan Africa to study the 
impact of board governance features and the presence of foreign, indigenous high 
society executives and board diversity on levels of IPO underpricing.   Agathee et al. 
(2012) employ a sample of 44 IPOs to assess the characteristics of the hot and cold 
IPO markets on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius.  There are also other studies such 
as Procianoy and Cigerza (2007), who consider 29 new issues on the Brazilian 
market.   
 
Insert Table 3 – Sample selection 
 
 
Chapter1 – The price performance of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 1997-2002 
 
77 
 
Table 4 below shows the distribution of the 79 IPOs according to their industrial 
sector
49
. 
 
Insert Table 4 – IPOs per industrial sector 
 
ii. Procedure for collecting data 
 
The first step in collecting the data was to establish the data space which comprised 
all the listings in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period January 1997 to 
December 2002.  These were collected from the Annual Fact Book of the CSE.  In 
addition to these data sources, a proprietary source of information was the data bank 
of a leading investment bank in Cyprus which the author has access to, providing the 
date of application of listing of every single IPO.  This data was double-checked and 
verified with the CSE.  Then, each and every prospectus was carefully reviewed by 
the author and data were hand-picked to obtain the underwriters, auditors, legal 
advisors, board of directors, offering price, operating age, total assets, net assets, 
sales/turnover, debt, equity, total funds raised, issue costs, and method of listing. 
 
The second step in the process was to collect the closing prices for each company in 
the sample for the 1
st
, 5
th
, 10
th
, 30
th
, 60
th
 and 90
th
 day of trading as well as the 
corresponding General Index price level from the CSE data bank.  In addition, the 
price data for each IPO in the sample were gathered over a 12-, 24- and 36-month 
period on a daily-basis, from the date of listing and the corresponding CSE General 
Index price level.   
 
B. Methodology 
 
A total of 79 IPOs listed in the CSE are examined by using standard event study 
methodology (78 for long-run performance as one is delisted/acquired within 12 
months of its listing).  Event study methodology is based on acceptance of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  The theory states that the value of a security is 
equal to the discounted value of its all future cash flows and this value includes all 
                                                 
49 The industrial sectors are presented as classified at the time of the sample by the Cyprus Stock Exchange. 
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information about the firm. Security market line formulation is used in event studies 
to compute market adjusted stock returns. If unexpected information becomes 
available for market participants, the value of a security changes to reflect the value 
of new information. The firm value affected by new information could be captured 
by abnormal returns (McWilliams and Siegel (1997)). 
 
IPO returns are analysed for two time periods, namely, short (1
st
, 5
th
, 10
th
, 30
th
, 60
th
 
and 90
th
 day of trading) returns, and long-run returns, namely 12-month, 24-month 
and 36-month returns. 
 
i. Regression model 
 
The summarised model is as follows: 
 
ADRAWj,t = β0  + β1UNDj,t + β2AUDj,t + β3LNTALj,t + β4STDRTNSj,t + β5LNAGEj,t + 
β6OWNERj,t + β7LEVERj,t + β8ROEj,t + β9LNPBTj,t + β10SGROWTHj,t + β11LNGRPj,t 
+ β12PROJj,t + β13OFPRj,t + β14UNDPRTj,t + β15ICOSTSj,t + εj,t   (1) 
 
where, 
 
Dependent Variable 
 ADRAWj,t is the First-Day Raw Returns for firm j at time t 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Advisor/issue-certifier:UNDj,t is a dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter 
is one of three prestigious underwriters and zero otherwise. 
AUDj,t is a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the 
auditor is one the big five and zero otherwise. 
 
Market/institutional: LNTALj,t is the natural logarithm of the number of days from 
application date to listing date. 
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STDRTNSj,t is the standard deviation of raw returns that an 
IPO company registers the first twenty-one (21) days of 
listing. 
Issuer specific: LNAGEj,t is the issuer operational age as measured by the 
natural logarithm of the number of years of incorporation to 
the IPO date.  
OWNERj,t is the percentage of shares retained by pre-IPO 
shareholders. 
LEVERj,t is the bank debt to shareholders‟ funds ratio of the 
firm based on last audited accounts in the prospectus. 
 ROEj,t is the return of equity of the IPO firm as calculated by 
the audited profits after tax of the year before listing and the 
shareholders‟ funds (net assets). 
LNPBTj,t is the average pre-tax profits (or losses) for the last 
three years before the firm‟s listing. 
SGROWTHj,t is the sales growth exhibited by the IPO firm the 
year before the listing and the year before that. 
 
IPO-specific: LNGRPj,t is the size of the issue as measured by the natural 
logarithm of gross proceeds (no. of shares sold times the 
offering price). 
PROJj,t is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the 
prospectus of the IPO firm contains financial projections. 
   OFPRj,t is the offering price of the IPO. 
UNDPRTj,t is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 
one if there is participation of the underwriter in the IPO 
firm‟s equity capital prior the offering. 
ICOSTSj,t is a variable denoting the total direct costs 
(expressed as a percentage of the total funds raised) incurred 
for listing 
 
εj,t  = error term for firm j at time t 
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ii. Definition of the dependent variables 
 
1. Initial Period Returns 
 
The initial (first day) raw return of an IPO is defined as: 
 
       (
              
      
)       (2) 
 
where, 
 
Pinitial is the first day closing price of IPOj and Poffer is the offering price as set in the 
approved prospectus. 
 
Raw initial return, which is calculated by equation (2) above, is ideal in a market that 
there are no opportunity costs, and no time lag between the closing day and the first 
day of trading in the stock exchange. During this period major changes in market 
conditions could occur, and much information can be revealed. This will have as a 
result the initial return measured to be a result of changes in market conditions rather 
than initial mispricing by the underwriters. So the raw initial return is adjusted for 
market changes. 
 
The initial return is adjusted for market changes taking into account movements of 
the Cyprus Stock Exchange General Index between the closing date and the first day 
of trading. 
 
The first day adjusted return for an IPO is defined as:  
 
            (
                 
      
)   (
                 
      
)    (3) 
 
where, 
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Iinitial is the value of the CSE General Index on the first day of trading and Ioffer is the 
value on the last day of the offering period. 
 
Equation (2) above would apply more to perfect market conditions, where there is no 
time gap between the last day of application and the listing date, no opportunity cost 
and when no transaction costs exist. The market return is calculated for the period 
between the closing date of the offering period to the listing date. 
 
Therefore, calculated returns have taken into account changes in market conditions 
from the closing offer date for applications to the first trading day. This time gap in 
many developed countries is usually short but for the sample tested it ranges from 28 
days to 105 days. During this period many changes may happen in market conditions 
causing deviations in the observed premium measured by equation (2). Therefore, the 
raw initial return derived by equation (2) is adjusted for market changes by taking 
into account movements of the Cyprus Stock Exchange General Index between the 
closing date of offer and the first trading day of the IPOs as shown by Equation (3).  
 
Due to the length of the time lag between the closing date of the offer period and the 
first trading day of the IPO, adjustments will take into account both the changing 
market conditions and opportunity costs of the money deposited with the application. 
In the cases whereby shares are undersubscribed, the applicant is allocated the 
amount of shares applied for “…the adjustment for market changes would take into 
account the effect of the opportunity cost of capital” (Uddin (2001)). In the case 
shares are oversubscribed then rationing should be applied and there is an 
opportunity cost lost for the money deposited with the application. 
 
Table 5 below shows the descriptive statistics for the initial returns at various points 
of time after the listing. 
 
Insert table 5 – Initial price performance by year of issuance 
 
As it can be observed, average raw returns are positive over the period 1997-2002 
across all time periods.  In fact, the momentum that was created in 1999 in the 
primary market was so strong that high returns carried through until 2001.  Even 
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ninety days after listing, CSE IPOs offer on average exceptional raw and adjusted 
returns for the period 1997-2002 (70.93% and 89.42% respectively).  Adjusted 
returns are positive until 2001 for four out of the five time periods in table 5 above.  
Specifically, as shown in Panel E, 90
th
-day adjusted returns for 2001 turn slightly 
negative (-1.28%), whereas, raw returns delve well into negative territory (-27.53%).  
This demonstrates the fact that the secondary market returns were rapidly 
deteriorating at a rate which was faster than the returns of the primary market (newly 
listed companies) and this becomes more pronounced during the period 2000-2001. 
 
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from table 5 is that the average first 
day raw returns in 1999 are a multiple of over 4 times those for the whole period 
(1997-2002).  This allows us to employ the term ‗hot issue period‘ for 1999.  
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) first coined this term when examining a sample of US 
IPOs over the period 1960-1970 to describe the difference in first day returns that 
existed between certain time periods and the average of the whole period.  If one 
excludes 1999 data from the sample, then the mean (median) raw and adjusted initial 
returns for the period 1997-2002 become 75.30% (16.47%) and 81.18% (18.97%) 
respectively and these are further reduced to 27.35% (0.96%) and 55.12% (34.51%) 
respectively for the 90
th
 day returns. The standard deviation of raw (adjusted) returns 
is also reduced from 242.3% (241.87%) to 177.71% (177.96%) for first day returns 
and from 211.86% (201.42%) to 152.05% (153.70%) for 90
th
 day returns, 
demonstrating the influence of the ‗hot‘ issue period on the sample data.  If one 
excludes IPOs which raised less than €3 million in gross proceeds, then first day raw 
returns are still quite high at 118.3% and the adjusted first day returns are 124.2%.  
Excluding IPOs with less than €5 million in gross proceeds does not change the 
picture much as first day returns stand at 82.7% and adjusted first day returns at 
88.7%. 
 
The first day returns of CSE IPOs over the period examined are exceptionally high.  
This can be inferred by comparing the first-day returns shown in Appendix A.  Even 
if 1999 is excluded from the data, CSE IPO first-day both raw and adjusted returns 
are the highest in Europe and amongst the highest in the World. Gajewski and Gresse 
(2006), compare the returns of a sample of 2104 European IPOs from 15 European 
countries.  They find mean raw returns of 22.06%.  Although underpricing is 
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observed in every country in the sample, the level of underpricing varies notably 
from one national market to another.  Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland 
and the UK are close to the mean.  In Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden 
and Turkey, underpricing is relatively low whereas in Greece, Germany and Finland 
raw returns are above the mean.  They also find that in New Markets (Nuevo 
Marcato, Neue Markt, etc.) underpricing is greater and this is mainly driven by new 
technology companies and also the average difference in initial returns between 
traditional and growth segments nearly doubles during hot issue periods. 
 
As far as the CSE is concerned, Gounopoulos et al. (2008) examine the underpricing 
of CSE IPOs over the period 1999-2002.  They use a sample of 75 IPOs and find 
mean (median) first day raw returns of 100.49% (7.21%) and adjusted fist day 
returns of 108.63% (18.24%).  The standard deviation of first day raw returns was 
found to be 227.09% and 226.02% for adjusted first day returns. 
 
2. Aftermarket period returns 
 
A methodology similar to Ritter (1991) is employed, whereby periods of IPO 
performance measurement are selected.  The returns in this study are calculated for 
the initial return period (day 1), defined as the offering date, to the first closing price 
listed on the CSE and the aftermarket period, defined as the three years after the IPO, 
exclusive of the initial returns period.  The initial return period is defined to be 
month 0, and the aftermarket period includes the following 36 months, and months 
are defined as successive 21-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. Thus, 
month 1 consists of event days 2-22, month 2 consists of event days 23-43, month 3 
consists of event days 44-64, and so on. 
 
There is a difference of scholarly opinion as to the measurement, however, and this is 
taken into account as well.  Kooli and Suret (2002) argue that one major problem 
with long-run performance of IPOs is the non-standard distribution of their returns. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) claim that many of the common methods used to calculate 
the long-run returns are conceptually flawed and lead to biased test statistics, namely 
new listing, rebalancing and skewness.  Moreover, they showed that the degree and 
the magnitude of the biases depend on the method used to compute the long-run 
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abnormal returns.  Barber and Lyon (1997) and Barber, Lyon and Tsai (1999) 
identify three problems with inference in long-run event studies using BHARs.  
Labelling these problems the new listing, rebalancing and skewness biases, they use 
simulations to examine the impact of those biases on inference when abnormal 
performance is measured using BHARs. Although, Barber and Lyon (1997) provided 
evidence that CARs are less affected by the abovementioned biases than Buy and 
Hold Returns (BHARs), they went on to argue that they prefer the latter because it 
measures the investors‘ experience.  Kothari and Warner (1997) also find that long-
horizon BHARs are significantly right-skewed, although CARs are not. 
 
On the other hand, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argued that 
BHARs may overstate the long-run abnormal performance since it can grow with the 
return horizon even when there is no abnormal return after the first period.  They 
argue that the use of CARs is better suited because it yields less spurious rejections 
of market efficiency than do BHARs. That is to say, the abnormal long-run IPO 
performances are sensitive to the methodology employed and hence, there is no 
general consensus on how to measure the long-term abnormal returns.   
 
The Fama and French (1996) three-factor model has become quite popular in 
empirical studies for the USA and other countries. The idea is that  the additional 
factors size and book-to-market may be able to better explain stock returns.  
However, there is no theoretical foundation for these factors yet (Bessler and Thies 
(2007).  Moreover, a number of studies have indicated the limitation of this approach 
(e.g., Barber and Lyon, (1997); Brav, (2000)).  In a study of IPOs at the ‗Neuer 
Markt‘ in Germany, Bessler and Kurth (2005) find only marginal evidence for these 
factors.  In addition, Khurshed et al. (2004) provide evidence for IPOs in the UK that 
long-run returns are not that different under BHARs and  the  Fama  and  French  
approach.  Jeanneret  (2005) provides  similar  empirical evidence for SEOs in 
France. 
 
For the purposes of this study, and to assess the long run performance of newly listed 
firms in the CSE, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) will be employed but Buy 
and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) will also be calculated. 
 
Chapter1 – The price performance of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 1997-2002 
 
85 
 
CARs are defined as: 
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Abnormal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: 
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where, Rit is the monthly return on security i in month t and Rmt is the benchmark 
return for the same period.  The benchmark employed is the CSE General Index as 
this is the only index of the market over the period examined. 
 
Table 6a below shows descriptive statistics for the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs).  These are calculated from the end of the first day of trading (listing) of the 
IPO firms.  CARs are computed for 12-, 24-, and 36-months periods.   
 
The corresponding BHARs are also calculated and these are shown on table 6b 
below. 
 
The holding period return (BHAR) for a single stock is calculated for the period T as 
follows in: 
 
BHARi,T = [(1 + Ri,1 )(1 + Ri,2)…(1 + Ri,T)] – 1   (7)  
 
this can be rewritten as: 
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        ∏ (      )          (8) 
 
where Ri,t is the return of stock i at time t and T is the time period for which the 
BHAR is calculated.  For an equally weighted portfolio of stocks returns are 
calculated as follows: 
 
          
 
 
∑                    (9) 
 
where dBHARp,T is the average BHAR of the portfolio, N is the number of stocks in 
the portfolio and T is the time period for which the BHAR is calculated. In order to 
calculate BHAR, the return of the benchmark is subtracted from the return of the IPO 
stock. 
 
      
 
 
 ∑ [(∏ (      )    )  (∏ (      )
 
   )]
 
     (10) 
 
Insert table 6a – 12-, 24-, and 36-month CARs  
 
Insert table 6b – 12-, 24-, and 36-month BAHRs  
 
Insert table 6c – 3-monthly, 6-monthly, 9-monthly- and 12-monthly CARS  
 
Insert table 6d – 3-monthly, 6-monthly, 9-monthly- and 12-monthly BHARs 
 
As it can be observed from table 6a above, 12-month CARs are positive over the 
period (1997-2002) at 8.72% with a median of 14.23% and standard deviation of 
returns of 49.20%. As time progresses, CARs become negative.  Mean 24- and 36-
month CARs are negative for all years and the whole period as well (-17.64% and -
25.57% respectively for 1997-2002)
50
.  Volatility also increases over the period, 
from 49.20% in 12-month to 78.390% in 36-month CARs.  Even if the data 
associated with year 1999 are ignored (‗hot issue period‘), volatility increases, albeit 
                                                 
50 Ritter (1991) reviews and compares his results with several other studies and concludes that, on average, firms 
exhibit positive returns over comparable benchmarks during their first year of trading and negative returns 
during the following 3 years. 
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at a lower rate.  Moreover, if 1999 is excluded from the sample calculations, CARs 
are higher.  12-month CARs for 1999 are negative (-15.76%), whilst 12-month CARs 
for 1997-2002 with and without 1999 are positive (8.72% and 11.52% respectively). 
 
Looking a table 6b, 12-month BHARs are negative over the period (1997-2002) at -
4.28%, a median of -0.73% standard deviation of 42.11%.  BHARs are in negative 
territory both in 24- and 36-month periods.  Specifically, 24-month mean (median) 
BHARs stand at -22.96% (-12.62%) and 36-month BHARs at -25.07% (-15.30%) 
respectively.  Volatility rises from 12-month to 24-month BHARs, but declines for 
36-month BHARs.  Overall, BHARs are consistent with the results found with 
CARs. 
 
Looking at tables 6c and 6d, monthly CARs and monthly BHARs are positive for 3-, 
6-, and 9-months across all time periods.  The standard deviation of the returns in 
1999 is on average the highest amongst the rest of the years for both CARs and 
BHARs in the first 12 months. 
 
Ritter (1991) argues that companies listed in ‗hot‘ periods perform considerably 
poorer in a period of up to 3 years following their listing than other companies.  In 
his opinion, these results call into question the informational efficiency of the IPO 
market and provide evidence concerning the Schiller (1990) hypothesis that equity 
markets in general and the IPO market in particular, are subject to fads that affect 
market prices. He concluded that markets and in particular IPOs are affected by 
investors‘ high expectations.  Kringman, Shaw and Womack (1999) also argue that 
‗extra hot issues‘ underperform the rest of the IPOs in the long-run.  Looking at table 
6a one can observe that CARs in 1999 are worse than the average of the period for 
all three time periods (12-, 24-, and 36-month periods). 
 
The above empirical evidence is in line with the majority of academic literature, 
whereby, IPOs underperform in the long term.  For example, in the US, Loughran 
and Ritter (1995), Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000), Ritter and Welch (2002), Ritter 
(1991), Clark (2002).  In Canada, Jog and Shrivastava (1995), Kooli and Suret 
(2002), the UK, Levis (1993), Khurshed, Mudambi and Goergen (1999), Austria, 
Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993), Brazil, Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez 
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(1993), Germany, Ljungqvist (1997), Japan, Cai and Wei (1997), China, Su (2004), 
Poland, Aussenegg (2000), Singapore, Hin and Mahmood (1993), Finland, Keloharju 
(1993) and Chile, Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993). 
 
iii. Definition of the independent variables 
 
In this section a description of the independent variables employed in the regression 
model is given together with explanatory notes regarding their hypothesised 
relationship with the dependent variable(s).  The independent variables are grouped 
into four (4) categories namely: 
 
1. Advisor/issue certifier specific. 
2. Market and institutional specific. 
3. Issuer specific. 
4. IPO specific. 
 
The reason for this classification is to emphasise the effect of each group of variables 
on the dependent variable and provide a distinctive and at the same time-collective 
categorisation for the explanatory power of each variable.  The independent variables 
are classified as follows: 
 
1. Advisor/issue-certifier specific variables 
x1 = Underwriter/Investment bank reputation (binary variable) (UNDi) 
x2 = Auditor reputation (binary variable) (AUDi) 
 
2. Market and institutional specific variables 
x3 = The natural logarithm of the number of days from application date to listing 
date (LNTALi) 
x4 = The standard deviation of raw returns that an IPO company registers the first 
twenty-one (21) days of listing (STDRTNSi) 
 
3. Issuer specific variables 
x5 = The issuer operational age as measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of years of incorporation to the IPO date (LNAGEi) 
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x6 = The percentage of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders (OWNERi) 
x7 = The bank debt to shareholders‘ funds ratio of the firm based on last audited 
accounts in the prospectus (LEVERi) 
x8= is the return of equity of the IPO firm as calculated by the audited profits after 
tax of the year before listing and the shareholders‘ funds (net assets) (ROEi). 
x9= is the natural logarithm of the average pre-tax profits (or losses) for the last 
three years before the firm‘s listing (LNPBTi). 
x10= is the sales growth exhibited by the IPO firm the year before the listing and 
the year before that (SGROWTHi). 
 
4. IPO specific variables 
x11 = The size of the issue as measured by the natural logarithm of gross proceeds 
(LNGPRi) (no. of shares sold times the offering price). 
x12= Whether the prospectus of the IPO firm contains projections (PROJi) 
(dichotomous or binary or dummy variable). 
x13= The offering price of the IPO (OFPRi). 
x14= The participation of the underwriter in the IPO firm‘s equity capital 
(UNDPRTi) before the offering (dichotomous or binary or dummy variable). 
x15= is a variable denoting the total direct costs (expressed as a percentage of the 
total funds raised) incurred for listing (ICOSTSi). 
 
Advisor/issue-certifier specific variables 
UNDi is a dichotomous (binary or dummy) variable taking the value of one (1) if the 
underwriter is one of the three (3) reputable underwriters in the sample, and zero 
otherwise. Reputable underwriters are categorised according to the combination of 
the following three parameters: (a) they are subsidiaries of the largest commercial 
banks in Cyprus and consequently the best capitalised in the market (Michaeley and 
Shaw (1994) (b) the number of public offerings each of them has dealt with during 
the period of the sample (Agathee et al (2012), (c) the total market capitalisation of 
the IPOs listed, (d) their years of operating in the market (and their prior experience 
with listings) and (e) the number of clients that they have.  Taking into account the 
above, a measure is constructed of underwriter reputation similar to Banerjee et al. 
(2011) which is decile-reputation rank of underwriters‘ market share over the period 
1997 to 2002.  Taking in mind all the above considerations, three financial services 
Chapter1 – The price performance of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 1997-2002 
 
90 
 
firms (Laiki Investments, CISCO and Hellenic Bank (Investments)) among fourteen 
(14) are found to be the prestigious underwriters in the Cyprus Market.  These three 
underwriters together have listed 49.4% of the total number of IPOs in the sample 
which correspond to 85% of the sample‘s total gross proceeds.  Ljungqvist, Nanda 
and Singh, (2006) argue that more experienced banks that are more active in the IPO 
market can obtain investors‘ co-operation easily than less active underwriters, due to 
higher reputation. 
 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Beatty and Welch (1996) and Carter et al (1998) report that 
a prestigious underwriter can help the issuer achieve a higher price for its shares, 
which means accepting a smaller IPO discount than the average i.e., reputable 
underwriters are associated with smaller underpricing and higher longer run 
performance.  Nanda and Yun (1997) and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) point out 
to the sensitivity of underwriters‘ reputation in overpricing IPOs, thus yielding 
negative first day returns. 
 
Results are, however, highly sensitive to the period studied.  Beatty and Welch 
(1996), who use data from the 1990s, show that the sign of the relation between 
underwriter reputation and initial returns has flipped since the 1970s and 1980s, such 
that more prestigious underwriters and are now associated with higher underpricing 
sparking an on-going debate about the causes of this shift.  Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) argue that part of the ‗shift‘ in the relation between prestigious underwriters 
and underpricing may be due to endogeneuity biases and taking into account these 
biases the sign flips back to being negative even in the 1990s.  Carter, Dark and Sapp 
(2010) study a sample of 6,686 IPOs over the period 1981 to 2005.  They find that 
the IPOs marketed by the more reputable underwriters were more likely to fail or be 
failing in the post-1980s period, but were still better than those of less reputable 
underwriters.  They also find that the characteristics of the firms marketed by more 
reputable underwriters did not appear to change substantially from decade to decade.   
 
H01: It is hypothesised that prestigious underwriters are associated with lower 
underpricing i.e., a negative (positive) relationship between this variable and first 
day IPO returns (long term returns) exists. 
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AUDi is also a dichotomous (binary or dummy) variable taking the value of one (1) if 
the auditor is one of the big five
51
 reputable auditors, and zero otherwise.  In total, 
twenty seven (27) accounting firms participate in the sample, but the big five audited 
57% of the total sample.   According to Michaely and Shaw (1995) the ability of a 
firm to convey quality through the selection of the auditor is similar to that of the 
selection of the firm‘s underwriter. Carpenter and Strawser (1971) document that a 
significant number of US firms going public switched from a regional to a 
‗nationally known‘ auditor. Menon and Williams (1991) find evidence that generally 
supports the hypothesis that investment bankers and their clients have a preference 
for credible auditors for the IPO.  Investment bankers have a preference for credible 
auditors since they rely on audited financial statements in certifying the value of the 
firm and determining whether to underwrite the offering (Balvers, McDonald and 
Miller (1988)).  Beatty (1989) provides support that there is an inverse relationship 
between auditor reputation and IPO initial return.  Also, Titman and Trueman‘s 
model (1986) implies a negative relationship between audit quality and the riskiness 
of new issues.  Hogan (1997) finds evidence from a sample drawn during the early 
1990s that there is a benefit in hiring a reputable auditor in reducing the extent of 
underpricing.  Balvers, Mcdonard and Miller (1988) found that IPO underpricing is 
inversely related to auditor reputation.  They suggest that the use of prestigious 
auditors (and underwriters) reduce the information asymmetry problems between 
issuers and potential investors by adding credibility to a firm‘s financial statements 
and signalling low risk to investors in the secondary market. 
 
H02: It is hypothesised that a negative (positive) relationship exists between auditor 
reputation and first day IPO returns (long term performance). 
 
Market and institutional specific variables 
LNTALi is the natural logarithm of the time period (in days) 0from the date of 
application to the date of listing on the CSE.  Loughran et al ((1994), (table updated 
                                                 
51 The big five accounting firms at the time were PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst and Young (EY), 
Deloitte and Touche (DT), KMPG and Arthur Andersen.  After Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
on 3rd of December 2001, Arthur Andersen imploded following the admission in front of US Congress by its CEO 
that Arthur Andersen made an error with Enron‟s audit.  It was barred from conducting audits after August 2002.  
Eventually, the Arthur Andersen audit business was bought by Deloitte and Touche.  
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in March 2013) suggest that the longer the time period between setting the offer price 
and listing, the greater will be the underpricing level, conditional on the offer not 
being withdrawn. Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) report that the time between the 
IPO announcement day (that is, the date of prospectus) and the first day of market 
trading affects the underpricing level. Su and Fleisher (1998) find a positive 
relationship between the average initial returns of IPOs and the time gap between 
issue and flotation dates in their sample for the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Uddin 
(2008) in examining Malaysian and Singaporean IPOs (2008) finds that the listing 
time lag is an important factor in explaining IPO initial returns.  Tian and Megginson 
(2005) find that time lag in Chinese IPOs is one of the factors explaining extreme 
underpricing observed in Chinese IPOs. 
 
The longer the time of floatation, the more uncertainty is associated with the offer. 
However, it could be argued that the same variable is a proxy for the available 
information for a new issue given the fact that the longer the time delays the more 
the information diffusion to the investor public.  In other words, the increase of 
available information reduces the probability of wrong risk appraisal concerning the 
issue and as result the need for underpricing becomes less (How, Izan and Monroe 
(1995) and How and Howe (1994)).   
 
As it has already been mentioned, the CSE demanded from issuers and underwriters 
alike, that the price of the offering was fixed at application submission.  The great 
majority of the firms that went public, especially over the period 1999-2002, 
undertook private placements as soon as they submitted their application to the 
authorities (sometimes even before, utilising a window of the law
52
).  The private 
placement in many cases constituted the bulk of the funds raised. Thus, many 
investors were locked in for a long period of time including the underwriters, which 
usually invested in the private placements of their IPO-firm clients. As time was 
passing by, more info became available to investors, the market changed direction 
                                                 
52 The Companies‟ Act, Ch.113, allowed companies to issue new shares to investors and collect the monies, by 
submitting an information memorandum to the Registrar of Companies office.  This Information Memorandum 
did not abide by CSE laws and regulations.  Later on, they just filed a prospectus with the CSE in order to list 
these shares in the CSE.  Alternatively, they could also apply for an IPO regulated by the CSE/CySEC 
authorities, therefore issue effectively twice to investors. 
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and the initial excitement subsided.  One could argue that this extensive time lag 
alleviated the winner‘s curse from many IPOs as more investors were becoming 
aware of information that was not available at the time of filing (e.g., financial 
results, results of private placement, quality of management, etc.).  One could also 
argue that the initial excitement slowly eroded.   
 
H03: It is hypothesised that a negative (negative) relationship between time span of 
application for listing date to actual listing date and first day IPO returns (long term 
returns) exists. 
 
STDRTNSi, is the standard deviation of raw returns that an IPO firm registers the 
first twenty-one (21) days of listing.  This variable is a measure of ex-ante risk and 
has been tested extensively in the literature (e.g., Ritter (1984) and (1987), Clarkson 
and Merkley (1994), Finn and Highan (1988), Prabhala and Puri (1999), Kazantzis 
and Levis (1995), Kazantzis and Dylan (1996), Aussenegg
53
 (2006), Gotzageorgis 
(2004), and Wasserfallen and Wittlader (1994)). 
 
H04: It is hypothesised that a positive (negative) relationship between this variable 
and first day raw IPO returns (long term returns) exists. 
 
Issuer specific variables 
LNAGEi is the natural logarithm of one plus the operating history of an IPO firm 
prior to going public. Firm age is a firm-specific control variable that measures the 
difference between the foundation year of the firm and the year of introduction. 
Ritter (1984) argues that there is a positive relationship between the level of 
underpricing and the ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the firm. Older firms 
have a longer history and have more information available to the public. They have a 
longer track record of published financial data and are more likely to be screened by 
financial intermediaries and financial press.  Overall, older firms create less ex-ante 
uncertainty about firm value and the level of underpricing will therefore be lower for 
older firms.  This is empirically confirmed by Su and Fleisher (1999), Loughran and 
                                                 
53 Aussenegg employs 42 days instead of 21. 
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Ritter (2004) and Chahine (2008), who all find a negative relationship between firm 
age and the level of underpricing. 
 
H05: It is hypothesised that there is a negative (positive) relationship between the 
level of first day returns (long term returns) and the age of the company. 
 
OWNERi, measures the percentage of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders. 
Wasserfallen and Wittleder (1994) call it the ‗insider retention ratio‘ and they posit 
that the higher this ratio the higher the willingness of the former owners to carry the 
risk of the firm after the IPO.  Allen and Faulhaber (1989) report that one can see the 
best information about a company‘s future prospects by the fraction of shares given 
by owners after the IPO.  Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Hansen and Torregrosa 
(1992) extend the above study and find an inverse relationship between the 
proportion of shares given by owners and the initial average returns.  Hingorani et al 
(1997) in a study for the Czech firms suggest that low given holdings by insiders can 
signal that the firm possesses valuable assets. According to them, ‗insiders by virtue 
of their international advantage are more likely to own shares of companies when 
they expect the firm to generate high returns‘.  Bradley and Jordan (2001) argue that 
the smaller the number of shares that a company is allocating to investors in an IPO, 
then the higher the first day returns, reflecting the demand imbalance that would be 
created in the primary market.  Jain and Kini (1994) find a positive linear 
relationship between ownership and the change in firm performance. The more 
shares the owners retain, the better the firm performance and consequently, this 
would reflect in the share performance.  Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik 
(1991), suggest that the retained proportion of ownership of an IPO is a signal to 
potential investors regarding management‘s faith in future returns.  They find a 
negative relationship between IPO underpricing and retained ownership.  
Conversely, an earlier study by Beatty (1989) failed to find the same relationship for 
US IPOs.  Also, Chen and Strange (2004) find that underpricing is negatively related 
to equity retention for the Chinese market. 
 
H06: It is hypothesised that there is a negative (positive) relationship between 
ownership retention rates with first day IPO returns (long term returns). 
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LEVERi is the ratio of bank debt to shareholders‘ equity ratio of an IPO firm based 
on the last audited accounts in the prospectus.  The higher the debt to equity ratio, the 
greater is the implied ex-ante risk of the IPO firm and therefore the greater the 
returns.  Riskier firms tend to have a large debt to equity ratio (>50%). 
 
H07: It is hypothesised that there exists a positive (positive) relationship between the 
debt to equity ratio and first day IPO returns (long term returns). 
 
ROEi is the return of equity of the IPO firm as calculated by the audited profits after 
tax of the year before listing and the shareholders‘ funds (net assets).  Wasserfallen 
and Wittleder (1994) argue that return on net worth is a measure of the firm‘s quality 
related to ex ante uncertainty.  Firms with high ROEs are also expected to perform 
better in the long term than firms with poor ROEs.   
 
H08: The higher the return of equity the lower the ex-ante uncertainty and the lower 
the first day returns (negative relationship). The higher the return on equity, the 
better the long-term price performance of the IPO firm i.e., a positive relationship is 
hypothesised. 
 
LNPBTi is the natural logarithm of the average pre-tax profits (or losses) for the last 
three years before the firm‘s listing.  This is again a variable which assumes a better 
quality firm the higher the profits are.  The profits are averaged so that any possible 
earnings ‗management‘ effects are smoothened out.  This variable has been 
employed also by Khurshed et al (1999). 
 
H09: The more profitable a company is before listing, the lower its ex ante 
uncertainty and therefore the lower is the first day return (underpricing) i.e., it is 
hypothesised that a negative relationship exists with first day returns. The higher the 
firms profitability the better is its long-run performance after the IPO i.e., it is 
hypothesised that a positive relationship exists between the two variables when it 
comes to long-term returns. 
 
SGROWTHi is the sales growth exhibited by the IPO firm the year before the listing 
and the year before that.  Smith and Watts (1992) argue that high growth companies 
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have lower levels of bank debt and this is due to the fact that they are deemed as 
risky by bankers.  On the other hand, high growth companies may be deemed by 
investors and underwriters alike as having better prospects and therefore, less risk. 
 
H10: It is hypothesised that a positive (negative) relationship exists between the sales 
growth of the IPO firm and its first day returns (long term share price performance). 
 
IPO specific variables 
LNGRPi is the natural logarithm of the gross proceeds of the issue (i.e., the issue 
price times the number of shares offered in the IPO) used as a proxy for ex-ante 
uncertainty. (Miller and Reilly 1987), (Clarkson and Simunic 1994) and (McGuiness 
1992) use the total gross proceeds raised from the offer as a proxy for ex-ante IPO 
uncertainty.  Ritter (1984) and Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) provide support for a 
negative relationship between the size of an issue and the size of the firm and the 
initial premium. Further, Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the smaller the offering 
the more risky the company and the higher the degree of the uncertainty for high 
initial premium. 
 
H11: It is hypothesised that a negative (positive) relationship between the size of the 
issue and first day IPO returns (long term returns) exists. 
 
PROJi is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if financial projections 
are included in the prospectus of the IPO firm and 0 if there are no projections.  IPOs 
worldwide use prospectuses to publish financial forecasts based on their 
management‘s confidence in an accurate prediction.  Disclosure of management 
earnings forecasts is optional in many markets as was in the CSE over the period of 
the sample.  Again this is a variable that tests the ex-ante risk of the issue (Clarkson 
and Merkley (1994)). 
 
H12: It is hypothesised that where management earnings forecasts are disclosed, 
underpricing will be less.  It is also hypothesised that a positive relationship between 
this variable and long term returns.  
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OFPRi denotes the corresponding euro value of the offering price of the IPO.  
Fernando, Krishnamurthy and Spindt (2004) argue that new listings that take place 
with a small offering price deter institutional investors whilst attracting retail 
investors (contrary to those which are listed with a relatively high offering price).   
Underpricing is then employed to reward these investors (retail) for the information 
that they provide to underwriters during the pre-marketing of the issue.  Tinic (1988) 
employed the offering price as a variable to demonstrate his ‗legal avoidance 
hypothesis‘ in that smaller (and riskier) companies tend to use small offering prices.  
On the other hand, Blume and Husic (1973) and Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that 
the offering price can predict the future share returns at least as well as the beta 
coefficient.  Therefore, the smaller the offering price the higher the risk and the 
greater the long term returns. Fernando, Krishnamurthy and Spindt (2002) find that 
institutional ownership rises (and retail ownership declines) with the IPO price level, 
lending support to a prediction from prior studies that retail investors prefer low 
prices and institutional investors prefer high prices.  Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) 
argue that in India, where the pricing mechanism is transparent, underwriters set the 
IPO prices high in the presence of favourable uninformed demand and positive 
general market conditions. The majority of the investors in the CSE were retail 
investors and this is something that underwriters knew well. 
 
H13: It is hypothesised that a negative (negative) relationship between the offering 
price of an IPO and the first day returns (long term returns). 
 
UNDPRTi is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 to denote that the 
main underwriter(s) participates in the capital of the IPO firm before this is listed.  
The participation of an insider in the equity capital of the IPO company gives 
comfort to investors and this has an effect of decreasing the ex-ante risk profile. 
 
H14: It is hypothesised that a negative (positive) relationship between this variable 
and first day IPO returns (long term returns) exists. 
 
ICOSTSi is the variable denoting the total direct costs (expressed as a percentage of 
the total funds raised) incurred for listing. The costs of floatation include 
underwriting fees, accounting fees, legal fees, auditing fees, printing and regulators 
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fees.  Khurshed et al (1999) hypothesise that with higher IPO proceeds, the quality of 
the IPO firm becomes better (because larger IPOs are often made by more 
established firms and so there is less risk about the true quality of the firm) and hence 
the proportion of costs of the funds raised decreases. 
 
H15: The higher the cost of floatation expressed as a percentage of the funds raised, 
the worse is the quality of the IPO firm the higher is the risk and therefore the higher 
is the first day return. Also, the higher the costs of floatation as a percentage of the 
funds raised, the worse is the long-term performance i.e., it is hypothesised that a 
positive (negative) relationship between the two variables exists. 
 
Table 7 below summarises the variables that are employed in the regression models 
and their expected relationship (sign) with respect to first day raw returns and CARs. 
 
Insert table 7 – Variable expected signs in regression models 
 
iv. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 8 below shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables as these 
are described in (ii) above.   
 
Insert table 8 – Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
 
The mean offering price of the 79 IPOs in the sample is estimated at €1.06 (which 
corresponds to Cyprus Pounds £0.62) and the median is €0.85 (which corresponds to 
Cyprus Pounds £0.50 – which is the price mostly employed by the IPO firms during 
the period examined). The standard deviation is €0.68 (Cyprus Pounds £0.40), the 
maximum price is €5.13 (Cyprus Pounds £3.00) and the minimum price is €0.31 
(Cyprus Pounds £0.18).  These offering prices in US IPOs would be classified as 
‗penny stocks‘ which are riskier than conventional IPOs. 
 
The mean gross proceeds from the IPO sample firms in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
over the period 1997-2002 is €8.1 million with a standard deviation of €14.4 million.  
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This size of issues is obviously much smaller than the mean of gross proceeds of 
European IPOs and much smaller than that of US listings. 
 
The average age of the IPO firms at the date of listing is 17.4 years and the median is 
14 years with a standard deviation of 11.2 years and a maximum and minimum of 56 
years and 4 years respectively.  The median age of Cypriot IPOs is closer to the 
European average and higher than the US IPOs average age.  Ritter (2003b) reports 
that, before the 1990s, firms going public in Europe, especially continental Europe 
tended to be much older than those going public in the USA.  For example, 
Vandemaele (2003) reports a median age of twenty-eight (28) years for 220 IPOs on 
the French Nouveau Marche between 1984 and 1995 compared with the median age 
of seven (7) years reported by Loughran and Ritter (2002) for 6,149 US IPOs from 
1980 to 2000.  Even with the explosion of internet and technology-related firms 
going public in the 1999–2000 period the median age of European firms going public 
is higher than that in the USA. Schuster (2003) reports a median age varying from 13 
years in France to 31 years in Spain for IPOs from 1988 to 1998. Giudici and 
Roosenboom (2002) report a median age of 13 years for 1,007 European IPOs during 
1995–2001, whereas Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) report a median age of seven 
years for 2,178 US IPOs during 1996–2000. 
  
CSE IPOs employ the fixed price method of setting the price of the offering.  By 
fixed price mechanisms, one refers to contracts where the offer price is set relatively 
early, before much information about the state of demand is known.  Loughran et al. 
(1994) shows that this tends to result in a high level of underpricing. Fixed price 
offerings have become uncommon in recent years in many European countries 
(Ritter (2003b), Gajewski and Gresse (2006) and Boutron et al. (2007)). The use of 
fixed price mechanisms combined with the long period from application to listing 
obviously results in rising market risk which in effect, is unloaded upon the 
underwriters
54
.  
 
                                                 
54 The Cyprus Stock Exchange demanded that every IPO application included a priori the offering price of the 
IPO and a brief valuation note.  No application was accepted without a hard quoted offering price and this could 
not change later on. Underwriters had no means of hedging their risk since the offering could not be recalled, 
and short-selling was not allowed (no mechanism existed). 
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Therefore, apart from the mean number of days between last day of offer and listing, 
one needs to examine also the average number of days from application to actual 
listing.  The average number of days from last day of offer to listing is 28 with a 
median of 26 and standard deviation of 13 days.  The maximum is 105 days and the 
minimum 14 days.  In the US, this time period is typically a few hours
55
 whereas in 
Greece the average is 35 days with a standard deviation of 12 days (Gotzageorgis 
(2004)). The mean number of days from application to actual listing is 319 days with 
a median of 252 days and a standard deviation of 208 days.  The maximum and 
minimum are 1016 days and 54 days respectively.  This time span rises as time goes 
by i.e., as applications were rising in number so was the number of days 
demonstrating the bottleneck that was being created at the approving authorities (see 
fig. 7). 
 
The mean percentage of ownership held by the initial owners of a CSE IPO firm in 
the sample is 65.7% with a median of 68.3%, maximum of 75%. minimum of 38% 
and standard deviation of 6.9%.  This demonstrates that Cypriot owners on average, 
kept the control of their firms at reasonably high percentage levels. 
 
Prestigious underwriters as per definition given above, underwrote on average 49.4% 
of the sample IPOs, and the big five auditors audited on average 57% of the sample 
IPOs.  Underwriter participation in CSE IPO firms prior to their listing is extensive, 
with the mean participation level at 78.5%.  Also, the majority of the firms in the 
sample are using financial projections in their prospectuses with the mean number of 
firms reaching 55.7%. 
  
The mean (bank) debt to equity (Leverage) of the IPO firms in the sample stood at 
88.6%, with a median of 64.4% and a maximum and minimum of 358.9% and 0% 
respectively. 
 
The IPO firms in the sample had a mean standard deviation of returns during the first 
21 days of listing of 19.1%, with a median of 8.3%, a maximum of 138.2% and a 
minimum of 0%, demonstrating the high levels of volatility that existed. 
                                                 
55 The pricing meeting between the IPO firm and the underwriters usually takes place during the afternoon before 
the day of listing. 
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The mean direct costs of the issue of a CSE IPO firm stand at 6.5%, with the median 
at 5.4% and maximum and minimum at 45% and 1.3% respectively. 
 
The mean return on equity for the sample is 37.9% with a median of 22.8%, a 
maximum of 733.9% and a minimum of 0%.  The average profit before tax of the 
three years prior to listing is €1.05 million, with a median of  €545.8k and a 
maximum and minimum of  €9.78 million and €44.2k respectively. 
 
The mean growth in revenues exhibited by the IPO firm between the year before the 
listing and the year before that stands at 81.8%, with a median of 25.1% and 
maximum of 2,484.3% and a minimum of 0.6%.   The mean size (turnover) of the 
CSE IPOs over the period 1997-2002 in the sample is €13.76 million with a median 
of €6.96 million, a maximum of  €104.56 million and a minimum of €151.60k.  The 
average size in terms of total assets was found to be €17.82 million, with a median of 
€7.92 million, a maximum of €119.46 million and a minimum of €447.60k.  The size 
variable and the age variable are employed in several academic studies as ex-ante 
risk proxies for IPOs. 
 
v. Comparison of key variables with other studies 
 
Table 9 below shows some descriptive statistics for the sample of 79 IPOs over the 
period January 1997 and December 2002 (a period of six years) compared with other 
countries and regions.  Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Gounopoulos et al 
(2008)), Cypriot IPOs are on average underpriced. What is remarkable though, is the 
level of both raw (unadjusted) and adjusted underpricing, which stands at 124.25% 
and 129.20% respectively, which is the highest observed in a European Country and 
certainly one of the highest in the world as it can also be compared from the table 
shown in appendix A.   
 
Insert table 9 – Selected descriptive statistics 
 
The median raw underpricing is 17.86% demonstrating that the positive skewness of 
the distribution of first day‘s returns, is also consistent with other studies (see 
Appendix A).  The maximum return is also astonishing (1226%).  If 23 IPOs with 
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returns that are greater than 200% are excluded, then the mean raw initial return and 
mean adjusted initial return stand at 22.95% (median 3%) and 28.73% (median 
11.38%) respectively
56
.  If 10 IPOs are excluded from the sample with initial raw 
returns over 300% then the average first day raw and adjusted returns drop to 45.58% 
(median 7.12%) and 50.91% (median 14.24%) respectively, which is still one of the 
highest in Europe. 
 
The median age of the IPOs during the period examined is 14 years which is 
‗younger‘ than other European IPOs, but ‗older‘ than U.S. IPOs57.  The mean gross 
proceeds are €8.1 million (CY£4.74 million58) whilst the median gross proceeds are 
€3.6 million (CY£2.1 million).  This indicates that the size of IPOs in the CSE is 
much smaller than both European and US IPOs.    
 
Fig 7 – Number of days required from application to approval of prospectus of 
CSE IPOs 
 
Source: CSE, the author 
                                                 
56 Ritter et al (2013) in their citation for CSE IPOs of Gounopoulos et (2006) exclude a number of IPOs that 
raised less than US$1 million in order to arrive at an „adjusted‟ mean first-day return of 23.7%. 
57 According to Ritter (2003b), before the 1990s firms going public in Europe, especially continental Europe, 
tended to be much older (median 28 years) than those going public in the U.S. (median age 7 years).  Even with 
the Internet boom (1999-2000), the age of an IPO in Europe is still high (median of 13 years in a sample of 1007 
European IPOs from 1995 to 2001) compared to the U.S. (median of seven years for a sample of 2.178 IPOs 
during 1996-2000). 
58 All IPOs in the sample raised new equity in Cyprus Pounds.  Cyprus entered the Eurozone on the 1st of January 
2008 with an official parity of 1€=CY£0.585274. 
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What is quite notable though is the time span required for listing approval
59
.  The 
mean time is 319 days (almost one calendar year) and the median is 252 days.  Also, 
the average time between applying for a listing and approval of the prospectus is 276 
days which represents 9 months of waiting time with the minimum and maximum 
being 23 days and 982 days (almost 2.7 years).  The time for approval rises as time 
progresses in the sample reflecting the inefficiencies of the institutional setting and 
the authorities‘ inability to deal effectively with the backlog of applications that piled 
up especially during Q1 of 2000. 
 
Looking at table 9, this time span is probably the longest on record and obviously is a 
factor that must be taken into account when trying to examine underpricing of IPOs 
in the CSE (see figure 7)
60
.  Moreover, the time between the last day of offer and 
listing is comparatively long at 28 days (median of 26 days), with a minimum of 14 
and a maximum of 105 days.  The average time increases year after year after 1999 
reaching 41 days in 2002.  This means that underwriters and investors undertake on 
average a whole month of market risk before being able to offload the shares from an 
IPO.  Given the volatility of the CSE at the time and the fact that underwriters were 
not allowed to exercise market making operations (e.g., Greenshoe option), nor did 
they have any other means of hedging their risks (such as short selling or financial 
options) such period of time is long enough to expose all parties to the whims of a 
highly volatile market with all the (negative) consequences that such a market may 
have.  In this respect, Cyprus offers a unique setting to study the CSE IPO 
phenomenon given the inefficient institutional framework that existed at the time, the 
CSE small size and young age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 This period represents the time from official application for listing on the CSE to the first day of listing. 
60 Uddin (2001) found that IPO stocks in Malaysia are listed about 119 days after filing the offer price while in 
China is about 305 days (Tian and Megginson (2006)). 
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Fig 8 – First day performance of CSE IPOs 1997-2002 
 
Source: CSE, the author 
 
There are a few more interesting observations that can be made from tables 8 and 9.  
The return on equity of CSE IPOs is quite high.  Specifically, the mean return on 
equity for the sample is 37.9% with a median of 22.8%.  Moreover, CSE IPO firms 
seem to exhibit very high revenue growths the year prior to the IPO.  In particular, 
the mean sales/revenue growth figure is 81.8% with a median of 25.1%.  Also, IPO 
firms seem to be relatively levered, with mean leverage ratio (bank debt to 
shareholders‘ funds) at 88.6% (median of 64.4%).  The mean offering price is €1.062 
(or CY£0.62) and a median of €0.854 (or CY£0.50).  CSE IPOs in general, employed 
low offering prices in order to produce more shares for liquidity purposes and lure 
more retail investors. 
 
In table 10 below, IPOs are segmented depending on the time of their floatation, their 
gross proceeds and their age. 
 
Insert table 10 – Selected descriptive statistics 
 
Looking at Panel A of table 10 above, one could yield three important conclusions, 
namely, (1) new listings generated much higher average initial returns during 1999 
than in 2000, (2) as time goes by, the magnitude of initial returns decreases 
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considerably, and (3) the level of adjusted mean initial returns remains positive for 
2001 (unlike raw returns that becomes negative for the rest of the period).   
 
The momentum in (abnormal) first day adjusted returns that started in 1999 was 
enough to last for 3 years (1999-2001).  It is interesting to note that all companies 
that were listed over the period 1999-2002 filed their applications for listing over the 
period 1999-2000.  No firm that was eventually listed in the CSE over the sample 
period filed for an IPO after September 2000
61
.  Specifically, 29% of the companies 
in the sample filed for an IPO in March of 2000. This could be an indication that 
Cypriot enterprises observed a window of opportunity opening up in the CSE and/or 
it could also be related to the fact that in October 2000, new stricter laws and 
regulations that amended the existing CSE legislation were introduced
62
.   
 
These were laws/regulations that had to do mainly with private placements and the 
placement of shares to investors prior to an IPO.  The laws/regulations made it much 
harder for companies to collect funds pre-IPO (so called ‗private placements‘).  
Thus, as the secondary market of the CSE was deflating much faster than the primary 
market, investors that received private placements of shares in IPOs (the primary 
market) were ‗protected‘ from this rapid decline, and actually made a positive 
(adjusted) first-day return relative to the General Index up to and including 2001.  
However, as the liquidity was drying out fast from the market, the returns in the 
primary market began to catch up with the secondary market and eventually they 
tumbled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 In September 2000, market sentiment began to change rapidly in a negative manner. 
62 These laws were being prepared before October 2000.  Actually, the Cypriot parliament closes in June and 
opens up in October every year.  Therefore, most probably, it was known to certain circles that stricter rules 
would be enforced in the capital markets. 
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Figure 9 – IPO Applications for Listing across time 
 
Source: CSE, the author 
 
Figure 9 above demonstrates that there was clearly a ‗window of opportunity‘ that 
companies took advantage of in the CSE at the time.  The clustering of applications 
during the first quarter of 2000 is commendable. 
 
In Panel B of table 10, IPOs are segmented according to their Gross Proceeds which 
is a proxy for their size.  Close inspection of table 10, Panel B discloses that if one 
excludes the very small IPOs (less than €1.0 million in gross proceeds), a negative 
relation exists between size and return: the higher the gross proceeds are, the lower 
the magnitude of first day returns becomes.  Moreover, the standard deviation of raw 
initial returns declines with rising size (excluding the bracket of less than €1.0 
million in gross proceeds) meaning that risk is reduced as size increases. 
 
In Panel C of table 10, IPOs are segmented by Age which is the number of years the 
company has been in operation before the year of listing.  Companies which 
approach the capital markets to raise external equity capital at an early stage of their 
life cycle are considered more risky than firms which have been in operation for a 
longer time.  The results are consistent with expectations.  Firms that have been in 
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operation for 8 years or less, report the highest initial return (231.01%), whereas the 
lowest degree of underpricing is observed by firms which have been in operation for 
over 35 years (31.4%).  The standard deviation of first day returns also becomes less 
and less as the age of the IPO firms rises, indicating that the variability in returns 
becomes smoother and so is the valuation uncertainty of the corresponding IPO firms 
(risk is decreasing with rising age). 
 
Table 11 below reports initial return measures for IPOs segmented by industrial 
sector.  As indicated, the firms going public during the sample period are not evenly 
distributed amongst the various industrial sectors.  Trading, Manufacturing and firms 
classified in the ‗Others‘ sector are heavily represented (59% of the sample) 
compared to the other sectors.  As table 11 reveals, there is a cross-sectional 
variation in the initial performance of IPOs amongst different industries. All 
industrial sectors except Building Materials and Construction Companies (-11.1%) 
and Hotels (-23.9%) generate considerable positive first day average returns.  In 
particular, Fish Culture IPO firms generate the highest mean first day returns 
(597.5%), followed by firms in the Information Technology sector (428.3%), 
whereas, new issues in Insurance Companies sector generate the lowest positive 
return (5.0%). 
 
Insert table 11 – Descriptive statistics by industrial sector 
 
In table 12 below, the correlations for all the variables are shown together with the 
associated t-statistic and the corresponding probability (p) and in table 13 the 
covariance matrix for the coefficients of the regression is shown.   
 
Insert table 12 – Correlation table 
 
Insert table 13 – Covariance coefficients 
 
As figure 10 below shows, IPOs 8 to 33 enjoyed uninterruptedly abnormal first day 
returns.  Time-wise, this happened between July 1999 and September 2000 listings.  
The market then begun to display signs of fatigue which accelerated in the last 
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quarter of 2000 and through 2001 and 2002.  No firm that was eventually listed over 
the period 1997-2002 applied for a listing after September 2000
63
. 
 
Figure 10 – Raw and adjusted return for CSE IPOs 1997-2002 
 
 
v. Long-run returns 
 
Table 14 below shows how CARs vary with gross proceeds.  12-month CARs are 
positive across all gross proceeds brackets.  Two years after the IPO, 24-month 
CARs become negative with the exception of the bracket €1.0 million<GP<€3.0 
million.  Three years after the IPO, all CARs are negative.  The worst performers in 
years 2 and 3 in terms of CARs are the smaller issues, namely those IPOs with less 
than €1.0 million in gross proceeds.  The medians of the larger bracket IPOs in terms 
of gross proceeds (i.e., those over €10 million), despite their lower first day 
performance, demonstrate a better performance two and three years after the IPO 
than the rest of the pack.  
                                                 
63 In fact no company that was eventually listed in CSE by December 2004 filed an application after September 
2000. 
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Insert table 14 – CARs and gross proceeds 
 
In table 15 below, it can be observed that 12-month CARs are the mirror image of 
raw initial returns i.e., the greater the age of the IPO firm, the better its 12-month 
CARs and the worse its average first-day raw returns are.  The risk of younger IPOs 
is also reflected in their long term returns.  The standard deviation of returns for 12-, 
24-, and 36-month CARs decreases with increasing age (with a marginal increase for 
the ‗young adult‘ group).  It is also worth noting that whilst 12-month mean CARs 
are positive for all age groups, 24- and 36-month mean CARs are negative for all age 
groups. 
 
Insert table 15 – CARs and age 
 
Tables 16(a), (b) and (c) below show the correlations amongst the dependent and 
independent variables and tables 17(a), (b) and (c) show the covariance of the 
coefficients. 
 
Insert tables 16 (a) – Correlations for 12 months CARs (CAR12) 
 
Insert tables 16 (b) – Correlations for 24 months CARs (CAR24) 
 
Insert tables 16 (c) – Correlations for 36 months CARs (CAR36) 
 
Insert tables 17 (a) – Covariance coefficients for CAR12 
 
Insert tables 17 (b) – Covariance coefficients for CAR24 
 
Insert tables 17 (c) – Covariance coefficients for CAR36 
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VI. Regression results 
 
In this section the empirical findings are presented, that arise as a result of applying 
the methodology described, in section (V) above. 
 
A. Initial returns 
 
The regression model (equation 1) was run for 79 observations. Table 18 reports 
coefficient estimates. 
 
Insert table 18 – Results of multiple regression for raw initial returns 
 
The model shows high prediction accuracy with adjusted R
2
 (Ŕ2) of 83.9%.  This 
compares favourably with other research with similar sample sizes such as Omran 
(2005) with Ŕ2 = 63.6%, Hameed (1998) with Ŕ2 = 58.0%, , Hearn (2011) with  Ŕ2 = 
45.0% and Procianoy and Cigerza (2007) with Ŕ2 = 54.0%.   
 
Moreover, the relatively high value of the F-statistic demonstrates the statistical 
significance of the all the coefficients in the sample.  The residuals of the sample are 
not normally distributed as evidenced by the Jarque-Bera test.  This is expected as 
the raw initial returns found in this study are positively skewed, with high kurtosis 
(leptokurtic) (see table 8).  All standard error coefficients are adjusted for White 
heteroscedasticity.   
 
Centred Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)
64
 (see table 19) are calculated to 
demonstrate the level of collinearity that exists amongst regressors.  As table 19 
                                                 
64 Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are a method of measuring the level of collinearity between the regressors of 
an equation.  VIFs show how much of the variance of a coefficient estimate of a regressor has been inflated due 
to collinearity with the other regressors.  They can be calculated by dividing the variance of a coefficient estimate 
by the variance of that coefficient had other regressors not been included in the equation.  There are two forms of 
the Variance Inflation Factor, namely centred and uncentred.  The centred VIF ratio is the ratio of the variance 
of the coefficient estimate from the original equation divide by the variance from a coefficient estimate from an 
equation with only that regressor and a constant. The uncentred VIF is the same but with no constant.  The 
centred VIF is numerically identical to 1/ (1-Ř2) where Ř2 is the R-squared from the regression of that regressor 
on all of the other regressors in the equation.  Usually, the critical value of Ř2 is 0.9 which means a centred VIF 
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shows, the centred VIFs are much lower than 10 which is cited by Kutner et al 
(2005) as a cut-off point. 
 
Insert table 19  – Variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
 
Table 18 shows the results of the multiple regression.  Gross Proceeds (LNGRP), the 
time between application and listing (LNTAL), the ratio of bank debt to 
shareholders‘ equity (LEVER), the standard deviation of the raw returns of the first 
21 days of trading (STDRTNS) and the return on shareholders‘ equity (ROE) are all 
statistically significant variables.  Moreover, 11 variables are found to have the 
predicted sign whereas four have the opposite sign.  These are the offering price 
(OFPR), return on equity (ROE), the natural logarithm of average profit before tax 
(LNPBT) and the sales/revenue growth (SGROWTH). 
 
More specifically, the advisor/issuer-certifier variables (UND and AUD) are found 
to have a negative sign each, which is in accordance with academic literature (e.g., 
Megginson and Weiss (1991), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001)), whereby prestigious underwriters and auditors are associated 
with lower underpricing.  However, both are not statistically significant variables. 
 
Market and institutional-specific variables (LNTAL and STDRTNS) are quite 
significant in the case of CSE IPOs over the period examined.  Both LNTAL (p-
value<0.01) and STDRTNS (p-value<0.01) are statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  Raw returns rise as LNTAL shortens and this is in line with expectations since 
the shorter the time span between application and listing, the less is the dissipation of 
information content to investors and therefore, the greater the ex-ante risk. 
 
STDRTNS relates positively to initial returns demonstrating its ex ante risk 
predictive ability i.e., IPOs with high variability in returns during the first 21 trading 
days following listing, reveal a higher risk-information content which translates to 
higher returns.  The fact that this variable is so (statistically) important demonstrates 
that returns in the primary market were much affected by market psychology.  As 
                                                                                                                                          
of 10 (Source: Belsley, D.A., 1991, Conditioning Diagnostics – Collinearity and weak data in regression, Wiley, 
New York) 
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long as the IPO market returned these spectacular returns, IPOs that followed would 
repeat the performance until the secondary market caught up with the primary market 
returns. 
   
Amongst issuer-specific variables, LEVER (p-value<0.05) is statistically significant 
at the 5% level, indicating that IPO firms with a high degree of bank debt (leverage) 
exhibit higher first-day returns which is in line with the ex-ante risk signalling 
content of this variable. Durukan (2002) finds a positive relationship, albeit not 
statistically significant.   
 
Return on Equity (ROE) (p-value<0.1) is also found to be statistically significant at 
the 10% level.  However, the sign of this variable is found to be opposite to the one 
predicted.  Specifically, it is found to be positive meaning that the highest the return 
on equity, the highest the first day return.  This could be the result of investors being 
attracted to profitable IPO firms thus creating excess demand and consequently, 
higher first day returns.  It could also be that investors view high ROE firms as more 
risky and thus demand a premium return for that risk (alternatively, underwriters 
view high ROE firms as more risky and underprice these IPOs more especially in the 
absence of due diligence). 
 
Average three-year profit before tax (LNPBT) is found to be insignificant and with 
the opposite sign from that predicted.  The reasons could be the same as those for 
return on equity. 
 
Sales growth/revenue (SGROWTH) is found to be statistically insignificant and also 
with the opposite sign from the predicted one. This could mean that high growth 
companies are deemed to have better prospects and therefore, are less underpriced. 
 
The initial raw returns rise with a lower percentage of shareholding by the initial 
owners (OWNER) which is also in line with the theory of ex ante uncertainty. 
However, it is not statistically significant.  Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) find 
similar evidence. They find that industrial IPOs that have higher retained ownership 
are significantly more underpriced. 
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The age of the IPO firm (LNAGE) is also in line with its expected hypothesis i.e., the 
‗younger‘ the company, the greater its risk and therefore the higher the underpricing 
(negative coefficient).  This variable is also found not to have any statistical 
significance.  Jelic et al (2001) also find the same result, Kazantzis and Levis (1995), 
Loughran and Ritter (2002), How (1999), Kiyimaz (2000), and Chan, Wang and Wei 
(2003), albeit for all the above is not statistically significant. 
 
Gross proceeds (LNGRP) (p-value<0.05) is found to be statistically significant at the 
5% level amongst IPO-specific variables.  It also verifies the ex-ante uncertainty 
theory.  The greater the gross proceeds of an IPO, the less is the risk and 
consequently, the smaller the underpricing of the issue (Kazantzis and Levis (1995)).  
 
The dichotomous variable UNDPRT coefficient has a negative sign, as hypothesised 
i.e., the participation of the underwriter in the IPO firm‘s capital before listing 
provides comfort to investors reducing the perceived ex ante risk and underpricing.  
However, the statistical significance of this variable is negligible. 
 
The offering price (OFPR) variable coefficient is positive, which contradicts what 
has been hypothesised.  Specifically, it shows a positive (though not statistically 
significant) relationship with first day raw returns meaning that the higher the 
offering price the greater is the underpricing.  Beatty and Welch (1996) find that low 
priced offerings are underpriced significantly less in a sample of 823 firms over the 
period 1992-1994.  Brennan and Hughes (1991) argue that managers with favourable 
private information about their firms have an incentive to split their firm‘s shares in 
order to reveal the information to investors.  Applied to the IPO context, issuers 
might choose to set a low price to encourage information production.  This 
information production is undertaken by intermediaries which in the case of IPOs are 
the underwriters. Underpricing comes as a compensation for these efforts. 
 
Total direct costs of floatation of CSE IPOs average 6.45%.  Ritter et al. (1996) using 
a sample of 1767 US IPOs  show that average direct costs for US IPOs are 11% of 
the gross proceeds.  Underwriter gross spreads (incl. selling and management fees) 
average 7.31% whilst other expenses are 3.69%.  Underwriter spreads in Europe are 
much lower than the US.  Torstilla (2003) reports spreads of 4%, 3% and 2.5% in 
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Germany, France and Belgium respectively.  In CSE IPOs, underwriter fees 
comprise 25% to 40% of the total direct costs of the issue.  This means that they are 
much lower than the US and European fees indicating the severity of the competition 
that exists in the sector.  The variable ICOSTS is found to have the predicted sign 
albeit statistically insignificant. 
 
Overall, market and institutional specific variables seem to weigh considerably on 
the initial returns of CSE IPOs.  This is expected as the unique institutional setting of 
the Cypriot capital markets affected the interaction between the various parties in an 
IPO (advisors/certifiers, investors, issuers and the authorities alike).  Moreover, the 
results demonstrate that advisors/certifiers had no statistically significant effect or 
influence on first day raw returns, as tough competition amongst them 
(predominantly on the pricing front) as well as investor ignorance render no 
competitive advantage to them. 
 
B. Long-run returns 
 
The regression model was run for 78
65
 observations, with Cumulative Average 
Returns for 12-, 24- and 36-month periods (CARs)  being the dependent variables. 
Tables 20(a), 20(b) and 20(c) report coefficient estimates. 
 
Insert tables 20(a) - Regression results for CAR12 
 
Insert tables 20(b) - Regression results for CAR24 
 
Insert tables 20(c) - Regression results for CAR36 
 
The model is run for three sets of CARs, namely, 12-, 24-, and 36-month CARs.  The 
longer the time period examined, the better the predictive ability of the model 
becomes.  The 36-month CARs regression run demonstrates satisfactory predictive 
accuracy (considering the fact that predicting the future is not feasible) with adjusted 
R
2
 (Ŕ2) of 16.33%.  This compares satisfactorily with other research such as 
                                                 
65 78 IPOs are employed for long-run performance (instead of 79 which is the original sample) as one is 
delisted/acquired within 12 months of its listing) 
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Roosenboom, Goot and Martens (2000) with Ŕ2 = 24%, Kooli and Suret (2002) with 
Ŕ2 = 5%, Ritter (1991) with Ŕ2 = 7%, How (1999) with Ŕ2 = 5%, Khurshed, 
Mudambi and Goergen (1999) with Ŕ2 = 8%, and Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston  
(1998) with Ŕ2 = 19%.   
 
Moreover, the F-statistic is significant at the 5% level (and at the 10% level for 24-
month CARs, whilst for 12-month CARs is not significant).  The hypothesis that the 
residuals of the sample are normally distributed cannot be rejected as evidenced by 
the Jarque-Bera test.  All standard error coefficients are adjusted for White 
heteroscedasticity.   
 
Centred Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) (see table 21 (a), (b), and (c)) are 
calculated to demonstrate the level of collinearity that exists amongst regressors.  As 
table 21 (a) and (c) show, the centred VIFs are much lower than 10 which is cited by 
Kutner et al (2005) and Belsley (1991) as a cut-off point.  Table 21(b) contains a 
value which is close to 10 (ROE). 
 
Insert tables 21(a) - Variance inflation factors for CAR12 
 
Insert tables 21(b) - Variance inflation factors for CAR24 
 
Insert tables 21(c) - Variance inflation factors for CAR36 
 
Table 20 (a), (b) and (c) show the results of the multiple regression for the three time 
periods namely, 12-, 24-, and 36-month CARs.  The offering price (OFPR) is found 
to be statistically significant in all three regressions. Moreover, the standard 
deviation of the raw returns of the first 21 days of trading (STDRTNS), and the 
direct costs of the issue as a percentage of the gross proceeds (ICOSTS) are found to 
be statistically significant in the 24-, and 36-month CARs regression models.  Eight 
out of fifteen variables in the 12-month model are found to have the predicted sign, 
13 out of 15 in the 24-month model and 11 out of 15 in the 36-month model.  
    
Specifically, the advisor/issuer-certifier variables i.e., UND and AUD are found to 
have the correct sign except in the 36-month model where, the coefficient of UND 
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has a negative sign.  Prestigious issue-certifiers/advisors are associated with IPOs 
that perform better in the long run.  Both variables are found to be not statistically 
significant in any model. 
 
Market and institutional-specific variables (LNTAL and STDRTNS) are found to 
have the correct signs except LNTAL in the 12-month CARs model.  Despite the fact 
that LNTAL is found to have high statistical significance in the case of Initial 
Returns, in the case of long-run performance it is not statistically important.  On the 
other hand, STDRTNS continues to be statistically significant for long-run returns 
(except for 12-month CARs).  Long-run returns of IPOs are expected to relate 
negatively with the time taken from application to listing.  The longer the time 
period, the more information revelation takes place, and the less is the risk and 
consequently, the return. STDRTNS relates negatively to long-run returns 
demonstrating the fact that high (or ‗hot‘) risk-return IPOs turn ‗cold‘. 
 
In 12-month CARs, Issuer-specific variables have opposite signs from those 
predicted except ROE.  With 36-month CARs, the signs have reversed except for 
LNAGE and OWNER which, however, are not statistically significant. This means 
that the greater the owner percentage in the firm, the lower is the long-run return.  An 
explanation for this could be the fact that high owner percentage means less liquid 
shares, which means that there is not an active market in the particular stock, making 
it illiquid and irrelevant to investors.  How (1999) found a similar result for one-year 
returns, although not statistically significant.  Also, Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) 
find that the coefficient of ownership is negatively related to returns for one-, two-, 
and three-year returns. 
 
LNAGE has a negative sign in all three models contrary to the hypothesis made, 
albeit, statistically insignificant. 
 
LEVER is negative in the 12-, and, 24-month models and positive in the 36-month 
model as hypothesised albeit statistically insignificant, with leveraged firms being 
riskier and thus offering higher returns to investors. 
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ROE is positive across all models as hypothesised and significant at the 5% level in 
the 36-month CARs regression. Thus, firms with higher returns on shareholders‘ 
equity offer better long-run returns.  Therefore, one could argue that ROE is an ex 
ante measure of ex post long run performance of CSE IPOs. 
 
LNPBT has a negative coefficient in the 12-month model and positive sign as 
expected in the 24-, and 36-month models as hypothesised.  Profitable firms offer 
better returns in the long-run. In all three time horizons examined, this variable is 
statistically not significant. 
 
The sales growth variable (SGROWTH) has a positive coefficient in the 12-month 
model and negative in the 24-, and 36-month models as hypothesised.  In the 36-
month model it becomes statistically significant at the 1% level.  High growth 
companies in the CSE that undertook a listing over the period 1997-2002 appear to 
exhibit poor returns three years after their listing. 
 
The inclusion of projections in the prospectus (PROJ) by IPO firms is not statistically 
significant insofar as longer term returns are concerned.  Moreover, the variable has a 
positive coefficient as hypothesised in 12-, and 24-month models but a negative 
coefficient in the 36-month model. 
 
The issue costs (ICOSTS) are found to be statistically significant in the 24- and 36-
month models (10% and 1% level respectively), and the coefficient of the variable 
has a negative sign as hypothesised meaning that issues with lower direct costs as a 
percentage of the total gross proceeds perform better in the long-run signalling their 
quality to investors (e.g., Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Prabhala and Puri (1998) and 
Bloch (1989)). 
 
Gross proceeds (LNGRP) has the predicted sign in all three models but is found not 
to be statistically significant. 
 
The dichotomous variable UNDPRT coefficient has a positive sign, as hypothesised 
i.e., the participation of the underwriter in the IPO firm‘s capital before listing 
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improves long-run returns.  However, this variable is not statistically significant in 
any case.   
 
The offering price (OFPR) variable coefficient is found to be negative in all three 
models, which agrees with what has been hypothesised i.e., penny stocks/riskier 
stocks will perform better in the long run. The variable is also found to be 
statistically significant in all three models (5% at the 12-month model and 1% at the 
24-, and 36-month models respectively).  
 
Long-run returns of CSE IPOs seem to be more influenced by issuer-specific 
variables and not so much by market and institutional specific variables.  The ‗hot‘ 
issue market of 1999-2001 was greatly affected by market and institutional specific 
factors as well as investor psychology.  However, the longer-term seems to be 
affected by issuer specific variables which, however, their influence was not such as 
to prevent IPO investors from suffering significant underperformance 3 years after 
the IPO. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
Initial Public Offerings in the Cyprus Stock Exchange were quite popular at the 
change of the millennium.  The novice at the time, Cyprus Stock Exchange, offered 
investors unprecedented initial returns, but also poor long-run performance for those 
who bought IPO shares at the end of the first day of trading. 
 
Analysing a sample of 79 IPOs that took place in the CSE over the period 1997-
2002, the following are found: 
 
a. The existence of ultra-high returns. 
b. The existence of a hot issue period. 
c. Long-run under-performance of IPOs over a three-year period. 
d. Significant institutional deficiencies. 
 
Specifically, it is found that IPOs in the CSE offered investors initial (first day) 
returns that are amongst the higher in the World even after adjusting for the hot issue 
period of 1999.  IPOs ‗younger‘ in age, offered higher returns than ‗older‘ ones.  
Also, smaller IPOs as measured by the size of gross proceeds perform better than 
larger IPOs.  Moreover, IPOs in the Fish Culture and Technology sectors offered 
investors the highest initial returns. 
 
It is also found that Cypriot firms exploit a ‗window of opportunity‘ that was opened 
in the market for listing (56% of the companies in the sample filed an application for 
listing over a 3-month period).  However, the high inefficiencies that existed and 
continuous changes that took place in the regulating and institutional framework of 
the market as reflected predominantly by the large time span between application and 
listing (probably the longest in the World), had as a result huge delays in listing.  
Consequently, IPOs were caught up by the declining returns in the secondary market 
and the majority of them after the third quarter of 2000 opened below their offer 
price. 
 
Chapter1 – The price performance of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 1997-2002 
 
120 
 
The variables gross proceeds, time from application to listing, capital structure of the 
IPO firm (leverage), standard deviation of returns 21 days after the listing, and return 
on shareholders‘ equity are found to provide a highly explanatory model of raw 
initial returns.  
 
Also, Cypriot IPOs are observed to underperform in the long-run as the majority of 
IPOs in academic studies do.  Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) are calculated 
for three time periods, namely, 12-, 24, and 36-months.  CARs are found to be 
negative for all years in the sample period in the 24-, and 36-month periods.  In the 
12-month period, average CARs over the sample period are all positive. Mean Buy 
and Hold Returns (BHARs) are found to be negative in all time periods.  They are 
also increasing (negatively) from 12- to 36-months.  Looking at CARs, IPOs in the 
‗hot‘ issue period have worse performance than the rest of the pack which confirms 
that findings of many researchers that IPOs in ‗hot‘ periods have a worse 
performance than the rest in the long-run. 
 
The variables standard deviation of returns 21 days after the listing of  the IPO, 
capital structure of the IPO firm (leverage), return on equity of the IPO firm prior to 
listing and sales growth prior to listing are found to offer a satisfactory explanatory 
model of 36-month cumulative average returns. 
 
The institutional and market aspects of the Cypriot capital markets affected the CSE 
IPO returns in a manner that produced astonishingly high returns. Future research on 
IPOs in the CSE could focus on those IPOs that took place after 2002 and compare 
them with those before so that inferences can be drawn on the impact of the 
introduction of better institutional and market frameworks to regulate the market. 
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Abstract 
Earnings management is pervasive in most publicly listed firms as this is 
documented in the extant academic literature.  The literature reviewed also shows 
that it is difficult to detect and accurately measure earnings management since 
managers engaged in the practice employ technically sophisticated approaches so 
that investors can hardly identify possibilities of earnings management in the 
financial statements that are presented in the IPO prospectus.  In this chapter a 
sample of 46 IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange is studied, that took place over the 
period 1997 to 2002 in order to establish whether they employed income increasing 
accruals before the IPO which later reversed direction.  It is found that CSE IPOs 
employed income increasing accruals prior to the IPO.  This comes as no surprise as 
the institutional and regulatory framework could allow this to happen.  Moreover, the 
components of accruals and especially Creditors have a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with first-day returns.  The components of accruals and 
especially creditors and depreciation and to a lesser degree inventory are found to 
have a statistically significant relationship with long-term price performance. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In this chapter of the thesis, the existence of Earnings Management (EM) is 
investigated in a sample of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-
2002 and its connection with underpricing and long-run share price performance.  
EM cannot be directly measured.  A number of methods have been used in the 
academic literature to obtain proxies for EM.  The problem that exists with these 
methods vis-a-vis the Cyprus Stock Exchange is that the latter is a relatively novice 
exchange (inaugurated in March 1996) and there is just not sufficient number of 
firms listed over the aforementioned period to accommodate the application of 
models such as the Jones (1991) or the modified Jones (1995) to separating managed 
and unmanaged discretionary accruals. 
 
Towards this end, various yardsticks are employed that can reveal the existence of 
EM and at the same time, they can be measured.   
 
Firms have strong incentives to engage in earnings management during the IPO 
process.  Going public allows firms to tap external funds for future development, to 
provide an exit for founders and venture capitalists, to attract publicity, or to take 
advantage of investors‘ temporary mispricing.  No matter why a firm chooses to go 
public, its private owners always benefit from a high price of IPO shares. Therefore, 
an IPO firm is very likely to engage in earnings management so as to report good 
performance and obtain a higher valuation and consequently, more IPO proceeds. 
 
Firms also have the opportunity to manage earnings around IPO.  Accounting 
principles allow firms‘ management to have some level of discretion in summarizing 
and reporting business activities.   For example, managers have the flexibility in 
choosing the estimates for expected lives and salvage values of fixed assets, 
obligations for pension benefits, the amount of deferred taxes, and losses from bad 
debts.  They also have the freedom to choose one from a few acceptable accounting 
methods for reporting the same transaction, such as LIFO or FIFO for the inventory 
valuation method, the straight-line or accelerated schedule for the depreciation 
method.  In addition, managers can exercise certain discretion in working capital 
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management that involves, for instance, inventory level, timing of goods shipments 
or purchases, and receivable policies.  Moreover, managers can choose to make or 
defer expenditures, such as R&D, advertising, and maintenance. Since IPO firms 
tend to be relatively small and with little publicly available information before 
listing, investors have to rely heavily on issuers‘ disclosures.  Due to the high level of 
information asymmetry, the IPO process is more susceptible to earnings management 
because it is easier for managers to manipulate earnings using the abovementioned 
discretions. 
 
Quite a number of studies have investigated earnings management of IPO firms, 
especially in the U.S.A.. Consistent with the above arguments, these studies 
document that there are abnormally high discretionary accruals in the year before and 
the year of IPO.  There is also evidence that abnormal accruals in the IPO year are 
associated with the post-IPO long-run stock underperformance.  However, no similar 
study has been done in Cyprus yet.  The aim is to fill this void by studying the 
earnings pattern around IPOs for a sample of Cypriot IPO firms during the period of 
1997-2002 to shed light on whether entrepreneurs of these IPO firms actually 
manage their earnings.    
 
The aim is to examine earnings and other relevant variables of these firms over a 
period of six(6) years, i.e., from three years before the IPO to two years after (plus 
the IPO year).  The following issues are studied:  First, the aim is to determine if 
there is big increase of earnings proxied by return on total assets (ROA), return on 
total assets net of cash (ROANoC), and return on sales (ROS) in the year before the 
IPO (year t-1).  The second aim is to find out if any earnings management pattern is 
related to accounting accruals. Moreover, the relationship of earnings management 
with short- and long-run price performance of the IPO is investigated. 
 
As it has already been established in a previous chapter of this thesis, the IPO 
process in the CSE over the period of the sample was characterised by certain 
institutional features and deficiencies.  For example, the company directors of a firm 
in Cyprus would be primarily liable if the information published in the prospectus is 
inaccurate (under the Companies Act), whereas in U.S. it is the underwriters who 
would be mainly liable.  This should reduce the incentives for earnings manipulation 
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in IPO in Cyprus. At the same time though, there was neither due diligence 
requirements from the authorities nor the investors.  Given that investors rely heavily 
on financial reports for information on IPO firms, this may encourage entrepreneurs 
to engage more in earnings management.  Third, unlike the rule-based accounting in 
the US (GAAP), Cyprus‘s accounting system is principle-based (IAS).  On the one 
hand, principle-based accounting may give management more room to manage 
earnings.  On the other hand, it also empowers auditors to question the integrity of 
the accounting numbers no matter how insignificant that number is. 
 
Due to the relatively young age of the Cyprus Stock Exchange and the Capital 
Markets in Cyprus in general at the time, the various players were inexperienced vis-
a-vis the IPO process and outcomes of their actions (or rather their lack of action). 
This ‗cocktail‘ of inexperience, inadequate institutional framework, and limited 
equity culture provided many incentives to those that had the motives to manage 
earnings. 
 
CSE IPO firms are found to employ income increasing accruals prior to the IPO and 
that these accruals reverse at year t2.  This is also reflected in profitability measures 
(ROS, ROA, ROANoC) that peak in the year before the IPO (t-1) and decline 
thereafter.  It is also observed that both discretionary accruals and total accruals have 
a positive relationship with first day returns meaning that possibly investors‘ rate of 
adjustment of IPO valuations for the presence of income increasing accruals is less 
than that of underwriters‘.  Moreover, the components of accruals and especially 
Creditors are found to have a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
first-day returns.  Also, the components of accruals and especially creditors and 
Depreciation and to a lesser degree Inventory have a statistically significant 
relationship with long-term price performance with the expected signs. 
 
In summary, the findings of this chapter suggest that earnings management did 
actually took place in CSE IPO firms over the period of the sample, through income 
increasing accruals.  CSE IPO earnings management seems to be part of wider 
institutional and procedural inefficiencies that existed in the IPO process at the time.  
This is the first complete study of earnings management of CSE IPOs over a 
turbulent period that was marked by the collapse of investors‘ confidence, great 
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losses, political upheaval and ultimately the decline of the CSE index.  Therefore, a 
major contribution of this thesis is that it sheds light on the practices of issuers at the 
sample period. 
 
In part II of this chapter of the thesis, the extant literature on earnings management is 
reviewed followed by part III which describes the prevailing regulatory and 
institutional framework of going public in the Cyprus Stock Exchange.  This is 
followed by part IV which presents the research design, and part V which is the data 
analysis including the empirical results.  The chapter ends with part VI which is the 
conclusion. 
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II. Literature review 
A. Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide an in-depth review of the academic literature on the subject 
of earnings management. The review will first define earnings management drawing 
from various definitions found in the extant literature and discuss incidences where 
earnings management is practiced by managers as well as the motives behind 
earnings management.  
 
By reviewing the literature on the subject it is evident that, earnings management is 
pervasive in most publicly listed firms as mentioned by Lo (2008). It is one of the 
ways that managers employ to enhance their own reputation as well as their firms‘ 
reputation. Through earnings management, managers are able to reflect future firm 
potential for growth, stability, and viability and this attracts investors and persuades 
stakeholders to invest more in the firm. Earnings management as discussed by Xiong 
(2006) covers the negative aspect of a firm's economic performance and this is one of 
the managerial motives particularly when issuing equity or debt capital. Earnings 
management is thus common in firms that are about to issue fresh capital using an 
IPO.  The main focus of this chapter is earnings management and how this is related 
to IPOs, accruals management and moreover, how it influences the pricing of IPOs. 
Academic researchers including Nagata and Hachiya (2007), Jackson (2004), and 
Seger (2008) have argued that earnings management influences the pricing of a 
firm's IPO in the capital markets. 
 
B. Discussion on Earnings management 
 
Earnings management is one of the areas that have received considerable attention in 
academic literature in so far as the management of a firm's performance and the 
management performance evaluation is concerned. As defined by Beneish (2001), 
earnings management is the process by which managers of a firm take deliberate 
steps (while sticking to GAAP) to achieve a desired reported earnings level. 
Managing earnings is an intervention in the process of external financial reporting 
and is purposeful; it is focused on achieving a specific private gain and is thus not a 
 Chapter2 – Earnings management and IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 1997-2002 
 
128 
 
neutral operation process. The process occurs when managers use judgment in 
structuring transactions and reporting financial data so as to alter the financial 
accounts. This is achieved by either misleading stakeholders regarding the firm's 
economic performance or influencing the contractual outcomes, which depend on the 
reported accounting numbers. In support of Beneish's definition, Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) define earnings management as the process by which managers utilize 
judgment in financial reporting with a specific intention that they desire to achieve 
through the process. 
 
According to Beneish (2001), there are various ways in which managers modify the 
reported earnings in firms to meet their desired benefits; this is the main determinant 
of the accounting choice selected by firms. It is possible that such management 
occurs in the accruals and not in the earnings component of cash flow. In financial 
reporting, the main focus is always on components and measures of earnings. 
Accrual accounting allows for recording of financial effects on an entity's 
transactions while the other events associated with cash are recorded in their period 
of occurrence rather than when the cash related to the events, transactions and 
circumstances is received. Healy and Wahlen (1999) further argued that accrual 
accounting uses deferral allocation procedures, and accruals whose objective is to 
link revenues, gains, expenses, and losses with the period of transactions so as to 
reflect an entity's performance in that period rather than merely listing cash outlays 
and receipts. Matching of revenue and costs, amortization and allocation, decrements 
and increments in liabilities and assets, losses and gains, expenses and revenues is 
the main essence of accrual accounting in performance measurement for entities 
(Dechow et al. (2010)). 
 
As mentioned by Dechow et al (2000) investors can assess the economic 
performance of an entity by using the basic accounting principles like revenue 
matching and recognition. Beneish (2001) further mentions that earnings 
management is a real and unobservable component of accruals and in most cases 
investors cannot unravel the effect that earnings management has on the reported 
earnings. One of the key challenges in earnings management is that investors are not 
able to observe it and measure it directly as a component of accruals.   
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Earnings management actions range from the legitimate managerial activities to 
illegitimate management actions that result in fraud. Virtually, all managerial actions 
affect earnings and thus constitute earnings management. Some of these activities are 
legitimate discretionary choices that influence economic transactions and cannot 
amount into fraud since the financial statements reflect true and fair view of the firm. 
However, in cases where managers involve themselves in activities such as tax 
evasion, this amounts into fraud. As long as accounting judgment and choices 
conform to the established standard frameworks such as IFRS and GAAP, the 
activities are deemed legitimate and not amounting into fraud (Lo (2008)). Therefore, 
earnings management has much to do with the quality of earnings.  
 
i. Perspectives on earnings management 
 
Two perspectives of earnings management are (a) the opportunistic perspective and 
(b) the information perspective. The opportunistic perspective argues that managers' 
intention is to mislead investors while the information perspective holds that 
managerial discretion is to reveal to investors the private expectations concerning the 
firm's future cash flows (Beneish (2001)).  The definition given by Beneish shows 
that earnings management is primarily done to hinder deteriorating performance and 
thus enhances a signal in the reported earnings.  
 
Rangan (1998) added that managers that have frequent external financial reporting 
requirement, report earnings conservatively so as to enhance reputational signalling 
effects and benefit in subsequent equity offerings. Frequent issuers in this case refer 
to firms that have more than one offering in seasoned common stock within a two-
year period. However, there is also a wealth of academic research that demonstrates 
that earnings management is primarily exercised to reveal relevant information on a 
firm's performance.  It is often unclear in the extant literature whether earnings 
management is directed towards concealing deteriorating financial performance and 
thus misleading investors or its main purpose is to allow managers discretion in 
informing the public and investors alike about a firm's earnings (Beneish (2001)).  
For a number of definitions on earnings management please see appendix C. 
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ii. Earnings management in Continental Europe and in Anglo-Saxon countries 
 
Earnings management was in the past deemed a characteristic of Anglo-Saxon 
countries since there was so much empirical and practical evidence from these 
countries. These countries were also the first to adopt accounting standards as a way 
to address financial problems that were faced by accounting information users. The 
main differences in the institutional backgrounds are traced to the traditional 
perception on the role of financial markets and the legal systems in capital provision. 
Anglo-Saxon countries have common law system and they value the capital 
provision role of financial markets. According to Blom (2009), common law 
countries resolve information asymmetry through public disclosures and are 
characterized by equity and debt markets that have diverse investors, strong investor 
protection, and high litigation risk. Accounting information in these countries is 
focused on meeting investors' needs; this reduces managers' determination to manage 
earnings due to the fear of high litigation risks if such activities are identified. 
Continental Europe is mainly comprised of code-law countries where capital markets 
place less demand for public disclosures and are less active as intermediaries. 
Investors in these countries are represented closely in firms' corporate governance 
allowing communication to play a critical role in solving information asymmetry. 
 
In these code-law countries, accounting information is focused on minimizing the 
costs related to politics, dividends, and taxes (Blom (2009)). As a result, the 
accounting standards applied in these code-law countries increase managers' 
discretion to decide when economic losses and gains are included in the accounting 
income. In the context of Continental Europe, most firms are family-controlled with 
heavy reliance on debt financing and stock exchange markets that are controlled by 
companies that have a few shareholders. Creditor-oriented accounting in Continental 
Europe places emphasis on capital preservation and thus the balance sheet is more 
important than the income statement. Wide and dispersed companies' ownership in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries have pushed for disclosure requirements that are focused 
on reducing information asymmetry. Development of regulatory bodies and the role 
of regulators have played a critical role in influencing these environments. 
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Code-law countries like Germany and Switzerland are characterized by lower 
investor protection rights as compared to common law countries (e.g., UK and USA). 
In an effort to protect private control benefits, firms use earnings management as a 
way of concealing their performance from outsiders. Code-law countries' accounting 
offers greater opportunities and incentives to smooth and minimize income 
fluctuations than common law countries. Blom (2009) added that different audit 
environments have different levels of influence on earnings management. National 
differences in the audit environments strongly affect earnings management. Benefits 
involved in earnings management outweigh costs of such activities in countries that 
have weak investor protection; this makes earnings management vary from one 
jurisdiction to another. Reliance on the international capital markets also affects 
earnings management. Firms that are cross-listed in different countries' stock 
exchanges, practice less earnings management. Companies with foreign exchange 
listings face a multitude of restrictions and are thus exposed to higher litigation risk. 
Such restrictions give these firms a greater incentive to remain more transparent. 
Quality of earnings is thus enhanced when a firm is cross-listed in a renowned 
international stock exchange. 
 
Although stock exchanges and other institutions have been developed in Continental 
Europe, these institutions are yet to assume practical importance since the 
governments are yet to allocate to them adequate resources as compared to countries 
like the United States (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005)). In addition, there have 
been less stringent accounting rules, which makes it difficult to know when 
accounting estimates are abusive. These traditional ownership structures have 
affected the stock market features. Non-owner managers choose income-increasing 
reporting alternatives while owner managers hardly do that since they have less fear 
of claims from shareholders or hostile takeover. Managers with no ownership are 
likely to opt for earnings management to mask poor performance so as to satisfy the 
shareholders. Financial markets have been globalized and this has increased foreign 
investment in Continental Europe creating a new trend of development of disclosure 
and reporting practices. Countries like Germany and Switzerland have now adopted 
GAAP and IFRS as their accounting standards. While the German stock exchange 
market has allowed for optional adoption of either GAAP or IFRS, it has made it 
mandatory for publicly listed companies to apply either US GAAP or IFRS. 
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According to Blom (2009), studies have shown that value relevance is high for 
earnings that are prepared under IFRS and US GAAP than those prepared under 
German GAAP. He further argues that German firms are identified to engage in 
significantly higher income smoothing than US firms. 
 
iii. Incidence of management of earnings 
 
Earnings management is a widespread aspect in publicly listed companies and it is 
critically essential for enabling firms to face pressure in meeting analysts' 
expectations (Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009)). Where they expect their competitor 
firms to be also managing earnings, relative review of a firm's performance leads 
managers to earnings management. Earnings management occurs more often than 
what is revealed by court actions. It is not, however, clear whether the process is 
pervasive or not and this makes it implausible for firms to face similar motivations in 
managing earnings. It is more likely that earnings management will be found in firms 
where performance is either good or bad. Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) concluded a 
study on UK firms that engage in earnings management and its related activities. The 
study focused on voluntary accounting disclosures and its provisions, debt covenants 
violation, compensation management, debt and equity capital needs as they relate to 
earnings management. Their study examined how earnings management is linked to 
meeting or exceeding financial analysts‘ forecasts.  
 
According to the study, findings showed that firms that have high leverage ratios and 
low profitability tend to employ earnings management. The study also shows that 
firms with debt and equity capital needs that are close to violating debt covenants are 
more inclined to manage their earnings. In addition, the study argued that earnings 
management is employed to improve financial performance and thereby reinforce 
compensation. In this manner, the firm meets or exceeds earnings forecasts of 
financial analysts. From the study, one can infer that those firms with voluntary 
accounting disclosures are less inclined to earnings management practices.  Iatridis 
and Kadorinis (2009) argue that firms use earnings management in an effort to 
optimize stock price performance. Earnings management allows managers to issue 
equity and debt capital successfully. They further argue that managers resolve to 
earnings management to avoid breaching debt covenants whose impact would be 
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negative on the company's credibility and market reputation. Exceeding, or at least 
meeting financial forecasts by analysts, is one of the necessities in a manager's effort 
to retain prosperity and credibility. 
 
According to the same researchers, managers offer voluntary accounting disclosures 
to inform stakeholders about the ability of their firms to meet business and financial 
targets. Informativeness and size of accounting information disclosed differs from 
one company to another.  Firms are likely to disclose good information as opposed to 
bad information. This information influences a firm's share price thus maximizing 
managerial compensation. Voluntary accounting is also chosen to reduce potential 
contractual, political, and litigation costs. Voluntary accounting disclosures allow 
managers to demonstrate superior financial performance. They further minimize 
information asymmetry and thereby improving communication between investors, 
lenders and managers.  
 
Financial analysts also value highly firms that offer voluntary accounting disclosures. 
In an effort to inform and sooth stakeholders concerns on their firms' viability and 
future plans, managers often voluntarily disclose information that could be 
quantitative or qualitative (Brau and Johnson (2009)). Their main objective in this 
case is to provide explanations and clarifications to the concerned and interested 
parties regarding financial performance and eliminate their doubts on possible 
impediments on their firms‘ future financial progress and growth. 
 
iv. Earnings management Incentives 
 
Incentives for managing earnings can be categorised into two main groups, namely 
those derived from Positive Theory and those derived from Capital Market 
Incentives. 
 
Positive theory incentives 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) proposed three hypotheses that are based on Positive 
Theory. This theory focuses on the internal contractual reasons that make firms 
manage earnings.  One of these hypotheses is the Bonus Plan hypothesis that 
discusses the role of different accounting choices in managers' compensation plans. 
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To align managers' goals with those of shareholders, managers are provided with 
compensation that is based on performance and is additional to regular salaries. 
Managers thus have incentives to choose accounting methods and accounting 
estimates that improve their compensation. The Debt Covenant hypothesis shows 
that managers‘ earnings management incentives depend on debt covenants. Creditors 
impose restrictions on share repurchases, issuance of more debt and dividend 
payments. These restrictions are expressed through accounting ratios that managers 
employ with the intention to manage earnings in order to meet these requirements. 
The last hypothesis is the Political Cost hypothesis that examines the role of 
accounting in political processes. Political processes add costs to firms that make 
excessive profits (e.g. monopolies). Such firms may face pressure to reduce their 
prices and as such their managers have incentives to manage earnings downwards so 
that they can be seen to be less profitable and avoid political attention. 
 
Capital market incentives 
Investors and analysts use accounting information to value share prices. This gives 
managers an incentive to influence their firms' short-term share price by 
manipulating accounting information. Some of the incentives to report high earnings 
come from customers' willingness to pay high prices, and suppliers and lenders 
willingness to give better terms. Meeting an earnings benchmark is the most common 
capital market incentive. This benchmark for example can be previous period 
performance. Managers have incentives to meet the simple earnings benchmark in 
order to avoid losses, meet analysts' expectations and report increases in their 
quarterly earnings. 
 
v. Managers' motives in earnings management 
 
Debt covenants violation 
Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) argued that debt covenants violation implies that the 
volatility of major accounting measures such as liquidity and earnings raises 
bankruptcy risks. Debt covenants in a firm indicate that corporate performance is 
poor and this has negative implication on a company's stock behaviour, its credibility 
as well as the managers' reputation. To avoid undesirable effects as well as abide by 
debt covenants, managers are challenged to ‗massage‘ accounting numbers to lessen 
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the possibility of violation in these covenants. To do this, managers make use of 
income-increasing accounting accruals that are mostly discretionary (those accruals 
that a company has a discretion to decide whether they will be termed as accruals or 
not). Managers thus influence the reported earnings to improve compensation 
benefits as well as their reputation (Dechow et al. (2010)). Where managers' 
compensation is based on earnings targets, they tend to adopt accounting methods 
that are income-increasing so as to optimize their total emoluments.  
 
Where earnings are below a certain lower bound or are above a certain upper bound 
as designated by a bonus plan, firm managers select accounting methods that are 
income-increasing (Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009)). Sometimes managers may use 
discretionary accruals to strengthen a firm's value and not necessarily to enhance 
managerial compensation. Accounting-based contracts are likely to make managers 
act opportunistically by adopting income-increasing policies so as to reinforce their 
compensation (Dechow et al. (2010)). The same authors argue that in order to 
address managerial opportunism, it is advisable to include a large number of 
outsiders in the firm's board of directors, employ a strong commitment for audit, 
closely inspect the CEO, ensure strict compliance with the auditing and account 
regulations ensuring independence of the procedures of audit, and reinforcing 
investor protection mechanism.  
 
vi. Debt and equity issues 
 
Managers often engage in earnings management when they are about to issue debt or 
equity capital. The main intention here is to report earnings during the period of the 
issue such that they can achieve lower capital costs. Earnings management is often 
done when the firm is about to embark on an initial public offering (IPO). This has 
been referred to by Seger (2008)) as ‗cooking‘ of books. Where the offering is 
particularly large, there are high possibilities that managers will embark on earnings 
management prior to the IPO (Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009)). Earnings management 
at such a time is inclined to enable the firm to easily obtain financing and do so with 
better terms. Earnings management allows managers to inject optimism into the 
financial estimates and thus achieve market premiums that are more favourable. One 
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of the motives for earnings management is therefore to prepare the way for an 
attractive IPO that is to be issued in a company's near future. 
 
vii. Exceeding or meeting financial forecast of analysts 
 
Another key motive of earnings management involves the meeting or exceeding of 
forecasts made by financial analysts
66
 (Healy and Wahlen (1999)). Failure to attain 
investors' expectations and analysts' forecasts could prove detrimental in terms of a 
firm's capital accessibility, management compensation, prospects, and future 
potential. Firms with good reputation, superior governance mechanisms, volatile 
earnings, high institutional ownership and high growth prospects demonstrate strong 
incentives for earnings management and thus influence positively analysts' forecasts 
(Healy and Wahlen, (1999)). The cost associated with meeting financial analysts' 
forecasts through earnings management is compensated through high stock returns 
that are likely to be achieved. According to Nagata and Hachiya (2007), meeting 
financial analysts' forecasts is important in enhancing a firm's stability and viability 
as well as ensuring capital market access and facilitating a firm's growth potential. 
Surpassing analysts' earnings forecasts thus reinforces and preserves a firm's 
reputation, financial standing, and image together with that of its managers.  
 
viii. Earnings management under GAAP framework and IFRS framework 
 
According to Blom (2009), consideration of hidden reserves would show no 
difference in management of earnings behaviour between IFRS and German GAAP 
adopters. However, if hidden reserves are excluded from their research, then they 
find that voluntary IFRS-adopters seem to practice earnings management more than 
they did under German GAAP. IFRS execution increases volatility, which in turn 
increases risk leading to increased costs. IFRS implementation thus offers an 
incentive to manage earnings using accruals. This finding implies that GAAP 
mitigates against earnings management more effectively than IFRS does. However, 
the results are further influenced by the industry or firm size, firm financing and 
                                                 
66 Firms that have their actual earnings above the forecasted per share earnings are deemed to have exceeded 
analysts' forecasts. 
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profitability. IFRS requires that liabilities and assets are valued against their fair 
value and this increases volatility and subjectivity of earnings. According to Blom 
(2009), IFRS is too complex and rigid and this leads to financial statements that are 
difficult to understand. 
 
IPO firms work within the GAAP framework that is issued by FASB (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board) to help firms to legally manage their accruals and 
report healthy financial statements. Accounting manipulation is often executed to 
reflect strong earnings. This has been referred to by Brau and Johnson (2009) as 
‗window-dressing‘. According to Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b), the accrual 
accounting system under GAAP provides managerial discretion that recognizes the 
timing and the amount of expenses and revenues. This argument is supported by 
Levitt (1998) where he argued that accruals gives managers some flexibility that 
enable them to manage earnings of subsequent periods by creating 'cookie-jar' 
reserves, thus eroding earnings and financial reporting quality. The findings of this 
research shows that while IFRS may allow for more earnings management, GAAP 
may also allow for earnings management implying that earnings management may 
occur in both frameworks at varying levels. 
 
ix. Lock-up agreements and earnings management in IPOs (Initial Public 
Offerings) 
 
Lock-up arrangements (also known as ‗lock-ups‘) exist when underwriters and 
existing shareholders agree that their holdings should not be sold for a specified time 
after the date they are offered without a prior written consent by the underwriters. 
Lock-ups generally restrict the volume of shares to be traded for an IPO and thus 
affect the excess returns that shareholders earn in early trading (Hogan and Olson 
(2006)). The amount of owners' equity retained by shareholders reduces the volume 
of shares issued and thus affects the excess returns on trading. The higher the volume 
retained the lower the excess returns. Lock-up agreements differ; some firms go for 
absolute date lock-ups, others go for relative date lock-ups, and still others go for 
staggered or single lock-ups. Potential factors that influence a firm's selection of 
lock-up contracts include signalling, agency problems, information asymmetry and 
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certification issues. Certification and information asymmetry provide strong evidence 
of firms‘ choice of lock-ups. 
 
x. Engagement of certifying agents in IPOs 
 
Firms that are preparing to issue equity through an IPO often employ underwriters, 
auditors, and law firms who assist them through the IPO process. Other firms work 
with venture capitalists that provide them with guidance and also to enable them 
effectively run the IPO (Brau and Johnson (2009)). This group of specialists is 
mainly hired as certifying agents (CAs).  A study conducted by Brau and Johnson 
(2009) shows that there is a statistically significant and negative correlation between 
earnings management in an IPO firm and the presence of the aforementioned CAs. 
The study examines whether CAs attempt to improve a firm's quality and also to 
establish whether CAs mitigate earnings management in issuing firms. The study 
acknowledges empirical support of the signalling hypothesis arguing that IPO firms 
self-select CAs for their IPOs. Although the study did not identify support for post-
engagement earnings management mitigation by CAs, it showed that CAs upon 
engagement do not have huge impact on earnings management in the IPOs. 
 
Prior to the IPO, managers engage in earnings management and this affects the 
pricing of IPOs. Insiders of firms who plan to issue shares through an IPO, often 
window-dress aggressively in order to acquire a high offer price for their personal 
shares (Roychowdhury (2006)).  Accruals management during the IPO process is 
deemed opportunistic (Beneish (2001)). According to Roychowdhury (2006) lower-
quality firms often ‗window-dress‘ their financial results when they want to issue 
new capital through an IPO. The study also shows that aggressive earnings 
management is harmful to the firm in the subsequent performance period. This view 
is supported by Brau and Johnson (2009) where they argue that firms with an 
aggressive attitude towards earnings management are likely to suffer delisting in the 
future.  They further argue that window dressing has negative impact on an IPO 
firm's share price long-run performance. Those firms that manage their accruals 
aggressively before the IPO encounter worse performance in the long-run. 
Subsequent underperformance of IPO firms is attributed to analysts' forecasts that are 
upwardly biased based on ‗window-dressed‘ earnings. Firms often manipulate 
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earnings upwardly prior to share issues; these managerial actions often have their 
market repercussions and consequences on the firm's performance in the future. 
 
Prestigious underwriters, auditors, venture capitalists, and lawyers have reputation 
incentives in certifying issuing firms of high quality. The result of these CAs actions 
is the reduction of an IPO initial underpricing and the increase of its long-run returns 
(Brau and Johnson (2009)). One way in which a firm influences the perception of 
investors and stakeholders alike is by hiring prestigious CAs. High quality firms 
select prestigious CAs so that they can signal investors their quality. The second way 
through which a firm uses CAs to influence the success of its IPO is through post-
engagement mitigation whereby CAs mitigate the extent of window-dressing as may 
be revealed in the prospectus. According to Brau and Johnson (2009), potential 
window-dressing and asymmetry in information gives high-quality firms incentives 
to signal high quality. Engaging high quality and prestigious auditing firms, venture 
capitalists, and underwriters is often done to reflect the firm's quality either through 
signalling or mitigation. These CAs may work as watchdogs to mitigate window 
dressing in the prospectus. This is referred to as post-engagement mitigation theory 
and its argument is that window dressing has a negative correlation with a CAs 
prestige since prestigious CAs would not risk their reputational capital by permitting 
poor and low quality firms exercise window-dressing. CAs ensure that the IPO 
issuing firm has drawn the line clearly in its financial statements. 
 
xi. Post-engagement mitigation o f  earnings management  
 
After engagement, a CA works directly with the IPO issuing firm in preparation of 
the IPO prospectus. Certification occurs after the CA has managed to mitigate 
aggressive management of earnings. For instance, if a firm hires a prestigious CA 
and during the drafting of the IPO prospectus the CA realizes that the firm had 
aggressively managed its earnings so that it can appear financially healthy, the CA, 
in his desire to maintain intact its reputational capital, may advise the firm to be 
conservative in managing its earnings thus mitigating the degree of the firm's 
window-dressing in its IPO prospectus (Brau and Johnson (2009)). 
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xii. Signalling 
 
Equity issue signalling has been referred to by Brau and Johnson (2009)) as 
signalling theory where high quality firms use prestigious CAs to reflect their high 
quality in the investor public. A high quality firm as measured by earnings 
management has a low level of accruals, particularly discretionary accruals. Such a 
firm may choose a high profile CA to signal quality prior to the IPO. Investors may 
look at CAs to discern between low and high quality issuers. Sometimes, signalling 
theory is couched with the possibility of pre-engagement mitigation where the issuer 
clings to ex ante expectations on earnings management allowed by CAs. Under pre-
engagement mitigation (mitigation of earnings management prior to engagement of a 
CA), the IPO firm does not act conservatively through its prospectus to signal 
investors but rather increases the probability of a high-prestige CA working with the 
firm. Window-dressing under pre-engagement mitigation presents a threat that makes 
most prestigious certifiers to decline working with the issuing firm since their 
primary objective is to preserve their reputational capital. 
 
The IPO issuing firm looks forward to managing its earnings. Prestigious 
underwriters possess valuable reputational capital that could be leveraged by the IPO 
firm to certify the firm's quality and thus attract more investors. Prestigious 
underwriters possess incentives that back up issuers but they also risk losing this 
reputation in case of firms that have managed their earnings. How investment banks 
perform has a great impact on these firms' market share. Significant damage of a 
particular IPO firm reputation has substantial damage on the investment bank's 
reputational capital that far outweighs the penalties imposed by legal and regulatory 
authorities. The next category of CAs is auditors who are engaged to attest the firms' 
financial statements. Prestigious auditors also have a high reputational capital to 
endorse and therefore aim at auditing high quality firms. As mentioned by Hribar and 
Collins (2002), auditors have a strong reputation that influences a firm's credibility as 
far as earnings are concerned. High quality auditors thus consistently minimize IPO 
underpricing or in other words, mitigate asymmetric information. 
 
Prestigious law firms also have significant reputation that carries additional merit. 
This makes them carry out price adjustments in pre-IPO price before certifying in 
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order to secure their reputation (Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003)). Venture 
capitalists screen, monitor, and certify IPOs to reduce asymmetric information and 
ensure that the appropriate quality is certified. This certification process assists 
investors to verify firms' quality by looking at the CA who has been employed in the 
IPO prospectus. Use of a prestigious and high profile CA may indicate that earnings 
management is reduced in the IPO issuing firm (Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003)). 
The challenge, however, is that there are many other firms that would be raising 
equity through an IPO and are not engaged in earnings management and due to the 
costs involved in engaging high profile CAs, they use cheap CAs who are also of 
high integrity. This therefore leaves the investor with no way of identifying whether 
the firm has engaged in earnings management or not. 
 
xiii. Detecting and estimating earnings management in IPOs  
 
According to Lo (2008), there is a wide body of academic knowledge about the 
existence of earnings management in publicly listed companies. However, Lo 
highlighted that detecting earnings management is remarkably difficult. This view 
has been supported by (Healy and Walhen (1999)) who suggested that the difficulty 
in detecting earnings management has primarily been due to the fact that those 
involved must first estimate the earnings prior to detecting the effects of managing 
earnings. 
 
As mentioned by Healy and Walhen (1999), the technical difficulty in detecting 
earnings management is drawn from an ex-post perspective. Fundamentally, those 
managing earnings hope to do that without the possibility of being detected. 
Managers with sophisticated earnings management skills are likely to be successful 
in managing earnings with little or no detection since they engage in elaborate plans 
of concealment that enable them to evade detection. People involved in financial 
reporting are well educated, experienced, and intelligent and are guided by 
professional codes that are explicit and an ethics code that is often implicit. It is 
obvious that investors, regulators, and lawyers will not detect major differences that 
may arise in financial reports (Nagata and Hachiya (2007)). This implies that 
earnings management involves elaborate technical skills for it to gain the desired 
benefits. 
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Sometimes managers as mentioned by Lo (2008) make IPO financial statements 
completely non-comparable with the shadowed financial statements as a way of 
camouflaging earnings management. Firms with financial statements that are 
completely non-comparable are likely to be successful in hiding earnings 
management. However, Seger (2008) argued that it is possible for potentially 
affected parties and CAs to identify earnings management by watching the operating 
cash flow against the company's real earnings. Where the earnings exceptionally 
exceed the operating cash flow, the financial statements are likely to be reflecting 
earnings management. 
 
According to Lo (2008), boards of directors and managers are protected by the so-
called ‗business judgment rule‘ in Law, which makes it hard to find them liable in 
case of bad business decisions.  This is in contrast to accruals management and other 
accounting manipulations, which are subject to accounting standards as a benchmark 
and are thus subject to auditors examination as well as examination by potential 
forensic accountants and courts.  As suggested by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a), 
reported earnings comprise of cash flow from operations and accruals. By 
decomposing accruals into long-term and current components and evaluating these 
components separately one can examine whether there is possibility of management 
of earnings (Hribar and Collins (2002)). Current accrual adjustments include short-
term liabilities and assets that are used in running the day-to-day business operations. 
In instances where managers are foreseeing an IPO issue, they can increase the 
current accruals by advancing revenue recognition with credit sales or by delaying 
expenses recognition through low bad debts provision or deferring expenses 
recognition after cash has been advanced to suppliers by the firm. Long-term 
accruals adjustment include long-term net assets, which can be improved by 
decelerating depreciation, or reducing deferred tax, which is the difference between 
recognized tax expense in the financial reports and the actual tax expense paid. 
Long-term accruals could also be increased by realizing unusual gains (Phillips, 
Pincus and Rego (2003)).  
 
As mentioned by Teoh, Wong, and Rao, (1998c), managers succeed in managing 
earnings through the IPO process since they hardly publicize accrual adjustments 
and this makes it hard for investors to deduce discretionary accruals. Some of the 
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accruals adjustments are expected and are actually necessary to investors. A good 
example is the case of fixed-asset intensive firms which mostly record high 
depreciation. Rapidly growing firms also record higher revenues than cash sales. 
This makes it important for one to decompose a firm‘s accruals into their two 
components, namely discretionary and non-discretionary in order to evaluate and 
measure earnings management. Such a model can only be applied by specialists in 
the financial markets and investors may not have the knowledge or the expertise in 
that area making it inevitable for them to go by what is shown in the IPO prospectus. 
  
A study carried out by Xiong (2006) suggested a different method of measuring 
earnings management that CAs could use before certifying the IPO in order to detect 
and amend any possibilities of earnings management. These methods include the 
total discretionary accruals method, single accruals method, and the total accruals 
method. However, these methods may not be applicable to many investors due to 
limitation in expertise and could therefore be of use to CAs who wish to preserve 
their reputation capital and/or secure investors. 
 
xiv. Potentially affected parties in earnings management 
 
In the case of IPO firms, stakeholders who could potentially be affected by earnings 
management include inter-alia various financial statement users including bond 
investors, equity investors, trade unions, bankers, regulators, customers, competitors, 
and suppliers. The main group that is affected directly is obviously the investors who 
are willing to purchase a company‘s equity capital. Investors tend to overpay for a 
firm's shares in which managers are engaged in earnings management. This explains 
why the future share price performance of such firms often performs poorly in the 
long-run (Bagnoli and Watts (2000)). This view finds resentment particularly 
amongst investors who believe in capital markets' efficiency. It is therefore advisable 
for investors to anticipate earnings management. This would enable them to discount 
the information provided vis-a-vis the IPO price. It is important for investors to know 
that IPO markets do not operate in a similar manner as secondary markets do. There 
is a significant difference in their degree of efficiency (Bagnoli and Watts (2000)). 
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A few of these potential imperfections as named by Lo (2008) include short-sale 
constraints. In the secondary market, efficiency is attained through balancing of 
sellers and buyers as well as the price that adjusts the balance. Existing short-sellers 
and shareholders often counter-balance the limited number of share buyers or what is 
referred to as short-sale constraints. In the IPO market, sellers comprise of company 
insiders and the IPO price is determined by investment banks for the underwritten 
issues. Any uncertainty about share value and informational transformation is 
constrained by limited selling activity since the IPO subscribers are often susceptible 
to the Winner's Curse (Bagnoli and Watts (2000)). Demand and supply of IPO shares 
is not necessarily balanced implying that managing earnings in order to improve the 
perceived share value could potentially succeed. 
 
xv. Different models developed on earnings management measurement 
 
Most commonly used models in earnings management are the modified Jones and 
the standard Jones model.  The Jones model argues that two variables, that is the 
level of gross plant, property and equipment (GPPE), and revenue changes (ΔREV) 
account for the unmanaged accruals that occur in firms' economic transactions. Gross 
ΡPE determines the depreciation expense while revenue changes affect working 
capital accruals. The Jones model regresses total accruals with GPPΕ and revenue 
changes to arrive at coefficients that can be employed to estimate unmanaged 
accruals (Xiong (2006)). The modified Jones model focuses on controlling a firm's 
both credit policies and economic transactions. Total accruals are thus regressed on 
GPPE and revenue changes, which are adjusted for changes regarding a firm's 
receivables. 
 
According to (Blom (2009)), DeAngelo's model takes into account the total accruals 
in a given time as the difference between net income and operating cash flows 
reported during that period. This is given as ACj = NIj - CFj with AC representing the 
company's total accruals, NI as net income, CF as the operating cash flow during the 
specified period (Deumes (2007)). The model compares the total accruals during the 
period with total accruals in the benchmark period and assumes that the deviations in 
the two periods reflect earnings management. The Friedlan model adjusted 
DeAngelo's model; to incorporate growth that influences specific aspects of business 
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including accruals (Friedlan (1994)). The model assumes that changes in total 
accruals in two selected time periods comprise of changes arising from growth and 
changes arising from management's incremental discretion (Deumes (2007)).  
Friedlan‘s model deals with non-stationarity, deflating variables by sales. 
 
C. Critical view 
 
A large number of academic researchers have given insightful views concerning 
earnings management. The various definitions of earnings management provided by 
different researchers including Beneish (2001) and Healy and Wahlem (1999) have 
demonstrated agreement amongst them on what earnings management is in business 
and financial terms. One of the issues that are identifiable from the literature 
reviewed is the common view that earnings management takes place in IPO firms 
(Fan (2007)). As mentioned by Nagata and Hachiya (2007), earnings management 
determines the pricing of an IPO and managers engage in it in order to influence the 
views of investors by making the IPO attractive. This view is supported by Seger 
(2008) who argue that IPOs often provide pervasive evidence for management of 
earnings. Other researchers like Teoh, Wong, and Welch (1998b) argue that IPO 
firms often report excess earnings in their cash flow statement by including unusual 
high accruals that are deceptive to investors. 
 
According to Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009), some of the motivating factors in 
managing earnings include inter-alia the successful completion of debt and equity 
issues, debt covenants violation and exceeding or meeting forecasts made by 
financial analysts amongst other factors. Dechow et al. (2010) support this view 
arguing that managers looking forward to issue an IPO desire to present an attractive 
business investment opportunity to investors and to improve their company's image 
as well as their own image. These managers endeavour to present a good picture 
insofar as earnings are concerned vis-à-vis their company.  Brau and Johnson (2009) 
demonstrate how IPO firms go about issuing new equity and how they involve CAs 
in the process. In their study, they argue that CAs hardly engage in certification of 
the IPO prospectus where they are positive that managers have been involved in 
earnings management. This is because their core objective in carrying out the 
certification task is to preserve mainly their  own reputation capital. 
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The literature reviewed also shows that it is difficult to detect and accurately measure 
earnings management since managers engaged in the practice employ technically 
sophisticated approaches so that investors can hardly identify possibilities of 
earnings management in the financial statements that are presented in the IPO 
prospectus. According to Xiong (2006), earnings management is almost impossible 
to measure for most investors and even CAs, and it requires specialized skills. She 
further suggests various models that could be used in measuring earnings 
management including the single accruals method, the total accruals method, and the 
total discretionary accruals method. In addition to the aforementioned methods, 
Teoh, Welch and Wong, (1998) have suggested a model of decomposing accruals 
into short-term and long-term accruals, which would enable investors to identify any 
unusually high level of accruals and thus the possibility that managers have 
aggressively been involved in managing earnings. In support of the view, Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) have suggested that those involved in investigation of earnings 
management must evaluate the accruals management and examine any possibilities 
of managing earnings. To explain how managers succeed in managing earnings, Lo 
(2008) argues that managers are often secured by the business judgment rule that 
allows them not to become liable in case of improper business decisions. 
 
Most academics agree that IPO firms mostly engage in earnings management and 
that the time of an IPO provides researchers with the best opportunity to detect any 
such possibility. However, the findings of the study by Rangan (1998) have refuted 
most academics' view where they argue that discretionary accruals do not necessarily 
arise from earnings management but rather from changes in the firm's working 
capital, which is predominant in IPO firms. Findings of Fan (2007) further support 
this view arguing that discretionary accruals may not necessarily imply managerial 
opportunism since they are endogenous to IPOs. This view supports the thought that 
the information perspective in earnings management is actually more pronounced as 
compared to the opportunistic perspective. However, if the views and findings of 
these two researchers were to be followed, the methods suggested in detecting and 
measuring earnings management as well as most research findings on IPOs and 
earnings management would be biased or refuted (Fan (2007)).  
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However, the majority of the literature reviewed confirms that earnings management 
in IPOs is common and is therefore an important field of research since the 
knowledge derived significantly assists investors. According to the findings of Seger 
(2008), earnings management in the time around an IPO issue is driven by 
managerial self-interest. The results are that managers lower a firm's future earnings 
while making inferior the post-issue share price performance. Seger (2008) further 
suggests that investors and CAs should further investigate environmental factors for 
the pervasiveness of management of earnings. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
This section of the chapter has explored the literature on various aspects of earnings 
management including its occurrence, motivating factors, incidences, how the 
earnings management practice is related to the IPO process, how it can be detected 
using different models and the casualties of this practice. As mentioned by Seger 
(2008), the IPO process provides one of the best opportunities for the management of 
earnings. The study conducted by Dechow et al. (2010) has provided a clear view on 
the proxies, the determinants as well as the consequences of managing earnings. The 
study has highlighted those parties affected by the activities of earnings management 
and has particularly highlighted investors as the potential victims of this practice. To 
show how CAs play their role in certification, Brau and Johnson (2009) have shown 
how prestigious CAs including law firms, venture capitalists, auditors and 
underwriters are employed by IPO firms to signal quality to investors and how they 
mitigate earnings management to preserve reputation capital of their firms and 
expertise. 
 
The review further shows that IPO firms should not be mechanically valued on the 
basis of the reported accounting variables since the variables could be managed by 
the IPO firms during offer price determination. The findings by Teoh, Wong and Rao 
(1998) further show that investors are largely unable to understand and therefore 
detect or measure earnings management and this limits them from identifying the 
managers activities in ‗cooking‘ the financial statements that accompany IPO 
prospectuses. The literature reviewed indicates that opportunistic behaviour and 
earnings management can be costly and should therefore be detected around the 
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process of an IPO. This can be predicted mainly by using discretionary accruals and 
the results can assist investors to avoid such IPO firms. Finally, the literature review 
shows that regulators and setters of accounting standards who have interest in the 
earnings management behaviour must emphasise investor protection rules in respect 
of the firms‘ opportunistic behaviour. 
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III. Going Public in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
A. Prevailing regulatory and institutional framework 
 
In terms of institutional and regulatory framework, one can observe two distinct time 
periods in the CSE primary market.  The period that is prior to the enactment of the 
new legislation for financial services firms in August 2001 (i.e., March 1996 to July 
2001), and the period after that.  The period March 1996 to July 2001 is characterised 
by certain important regulatory and institutional deficiencies that possibly 
contributed to the development of the hot IPO market of 1999–2000.  These are the 
following: 
 There was no explicit or implicit recourse to underwriters, auditors or any 
other counsel/advisor of an issue against misrepresentation or misuse of 
information surrounding IPOs making the threat of costly litigation less 
critical as a factor that could affect the pricing of Cypriot IPOs. 
Consequently, no due diligence whatsoever was undertaken for IPO candidate 
firms by underwriters in the period March 1996 to July 2001 as this was not a 
requirement by authorities or investors alike.   
 No criteria for corporate governance existed.  As a result a number of 
advisors (mostly legal) were part of corporate boards that they were also 
advising for listing, thus laying the grounds for possible conflicts of interest. 
 No regulations for market participants regarding inside information and the 
users of that kind of information existed. 
 Lock-ups were not allowed for shareholders in IPOs. 
 Formalised stabilisation activities by underwriters were not allowed in the 
IPO aftermarket (e.g., Greenshoe option). 
 No formal market-making framework existed. 
 Short selling was not allowed67. 
 No rules existed for analysts‘ professional conduct (e.g., no silent periods). 
 No definition of institutional investors (professional investors) existed68. 
                                                 
67 It is worth mentioning that even today, short selling is not allowed and the concept of the Market Maker is 
absent from the CSE. 
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 No rules for ‗Chinese walls‘ in financial services companies existed. 
 Allocation of shares was at the discretion of the Board of Directors of an 
issuer from 29
th
 of March 1996 to 27
th
 of October 2000, when it became 
compulsory to allocate shares to all participants and if oversubscribed, then 
follow a pro-rata allocation
69
. 
 No professional certification existed for people working in investment banks 
(except for brokers – who also acted as fund managers, investment bankers, 
investment advisors, analysts etc.). 
 By submitting the IPO application, underwriters were committed to a stand-
by underwriting agreement.  The CSE insisted that the proposed share price 
of the IPO was fixed at the time of applying for a listing or shortly afterwards 
and not just before final approval was granted.  The price could not be 
revised, thus it was limited to the price set out in the prospectus.  Effectively, 
the investors could only bid on the quantity of shares they would buy, not on 
the price of the shares (i.e., no price adjustment existed to regulate excessive 
demand – fixed price selling mechanism). 
 There was a significant time-lag between issue date and the first day of 
trading which averaged 5 to 6 weeks (ranging from 14 days to 105 days).  
This time-lag may have influenced the risk profile and costs of IPOs. 
 There was also significant time lag between application date and listing date 
which averaged over the period of the sample 317 days. 
 From March 1996 to most of 2001, security titles in the CSE were not 
dematerialised
70
. This created extreme bureaucracy and significant loss in 
transaction time for investors and authorities alike
71
.  It also laid the grounds 
for legal action against a number of brokers. 
                                                                                                                                          
68 In February 2001, a new law was enacted to forbid the collection of monies from investors that applied 
through irrevocable applications in order to participate in an IPO.  Companies that were not listed by a certain 
period of time in the CSE were forced to return these funds to the investors.  This created market and legal havoc. 
69 According to the Law 136(I)/2000, article (e), the board could not disqualify any investor from the offering.  
Until mid-2000, in the case of oversubscription of an IPO, firms would also keep the interest on the monies of the 
investors, which in certain cases amounted to significant sums. 
70 In April 2001, the law that enacted the formation of the CSE Central Depository was voted.  However, it would 
take more than 2 years to be completed. 
71 In September 1999, the Cyprus Stock Exchange closed for a month to allow time for brokerage houses, 
investors and firms alike to sort out the mess that was created with the share transfers that took place the 
previous months. 
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 From CSE‘s inception (1996) to July 2001, prospectuses were approved by 
the CSE with the consent of the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission 
(CySEC).  After July 2001, CySEC was the only approving authority. 
 Up and until September 2004, there was only one market for all listed shares 
in the CSE
72
. 
 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that when stock markets are relatively 
small, information conveyed through stock prices is less accurate, which generally 
decreases the advantages of pending for public capital. As the stock market grows, 
however, the accuracy of information generally improves, yielding greater incentives 
for going public decisions. Martell and Stulz (2003) argue that countries that 
liberalise their equity markets have dramatic positive returns in the year following 
the liberalisation, but these dramatic returns are followed by poor returns, raising the 
question whether stock prices overreact to equity-market liberalisations.  Equity-
market liberalisations decrease the cost of capital in two ways. First, Henry (2000) 
shows that liberalising countries experience unusually high share returns before 
liberalisation date, which is when investors learn that a liberalisation will take place. 
Second, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) show that dividend yields (a good proxy for the 
cost of capital) fall after liberalisation. Martell and Stulz (2003) argue that in the 
long-run, the ability of firms to benefit from an equity-market liberalisation depends 
on corporate governance and the protection of investor rights. The success of the 
liberalisation is determined by the extent to which foreign investors buy shares, 
either new or existing.  As investor protection improves, ownership by controlling 
shareholders falls, outside shareholders can own more shares, and firms can raise 
more capital from foreign investors. 
 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) using a large-level dataset of 2,920 IPOs covering a 
wide range of 21 countries having different institutional and legal frameworks show 
that the quality of a country‘s legal framework, as measured by its level of investor 
protection, the overall quality of its legal system and its level of legal enforcement 
reduces the level of underpricing significantly.  On a similar tone, Hopp and Dreher 
(2007), using a dataset of more than 500 country-year observations from 29 
                                                 
72 The Parallel and Alternative Markets were created in September 2004 together with the new General Index of 
the CSE. 
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countries, find that increased protection of shareholders and greater accounting 
transparency contribute negatively to variations in underpricing.  They also find that 
underpricing is higher when majority shareholders have more leeway to repress 
minority owners.  Moreover, they argue that problems of asymmetric information 
can be resolved when countries enforce disclosure. La Porta et al. (1997) show that 
the number of IPOs is positively related with investor rights, the legal origin and the 
law and order tradition of a country.  Chiou et al (2010) examine 4,916 stocks from 
37 countries and find that stronger investor protection leads to a decrease in 
investment risk.  Giannetti and Simonov (2006) empirically demonstrate that 
minority and other investors who generally enjoy only security benefits are reluctant 
to invest in companies with weak investor protection.   
 
The economic significance for firms operating in a poor legal environment is 
important as it raises their cost of capital through greater underpricing.  La Porta et 
al. (2002) document that investors are willing to pay more for financial assets when 
being better protected by the legal system. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) analyze 
the impact of investor protection on the going public decision. They show that firms 
would be larger, more valuable, and more plentiful, dividends  would be higher (and 
diversion of profits lower), ownership concentration would be lower,  and  stock  
markets  would  be  more  developed  in  countries  with  better  protection  of  
shareholders.  
 
Clearly, the above regulatory and institutional deficiencies of the Cypriot capital 
markets had a negative effect on the primary market and the quality of services 
offered since they hindered the proper functioning of the capital markets.  After the 
enactment of the Financial Services Law in 2002, a number of regulatory 
deficiencies were rectified following a report prepared by Greek consultants 
commissioned by the state.  However, since 88% of the sample IPOs were listed by 
August 2001 (and no company that was eventually listed on the CSE applied for a 
listing after the year 2000), it is imperative that such a distinction is made. 
 
Moreover, the framework described above rendered fertile ground for earnings 
management since IPO firms and their owners had incentives to boost valuations. 
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B. Procedure for listing in the CSE 
 
The procedure for listing in the CSE over the sample period meant that each 
company that sought a listing should satisfy inter-alia some basic requirements, the 
most important of which were: 
 The issuer should have the right to issue the proposed category of titles in 
accordance with the company's Memorandum and Articles of Association. 
 The expected market value of the proposed issue should be in excess of 
CY£600,000
73
 (or approx. Euro 1 million).   
 There should be no restrictions in the transferability of the titles listed.   
 The issuer should have published audited accounts for at least the three years 
preceding the application
74
. 
 The prospective issuer should be able to demonstrate that it has adequate 
working capital before the issue
75
. 
 The issuer should safeguard that existing shareholders will enjoy pre-emption 
rights in every subsequent issue. 
 The issuer should make a commitment to list all the titles of the same 
category that had already been issued, or would have been subsequently 
issued. 
 
According to CSE Regulation 60, issuers can list their shares on the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange in one of the following ways:  
a. By offer for sale – through the placement of shares that have already been issued 
b. By public offer for sale to the public of titles which have already been issued, or 
allocated 
                                                 
73From March 1996 up until December 2000, the total equity to be listed should be at least CY£600.000 
(approximately €1.0 million).  In addition, the main shareholder should not own more than 70% of the equity 
capital and at least 25% of the equity capital should be dispersed to the wider public (which, however, was not 
defined explicitly).  For companies applying after January 2001 then the total equity to be listed should be at 
least CY£2,000,000 (approximately €3.5 million) and the main shareholder should not own more than 60% of the 
equity capital and at least 35% of the equity capital should be dispersed to the wider public.   
74This requirement of having at least three years of audited accounts halted a number of start-ups from listing.  
There was another requirement along these lines emanating from the Companies Act Chapter 113, which 
required 5 years of P&L figures for firms to sell shares to the public restricting even more, younger companies to 
list. 
75Having said that, no comfort letter was required from the auditors as this is the practice in other bourses. 
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c. By public offer for subscription for the purchase of titles which have not been 
issued yet or allocated 
d. By private placement – an offer is made to specific investors for the sale of 
shares that have already been issued or are about to be issued. 
 
In the case where the offer for sale to the public was chosen, then the issue had to be 
fully underwritten by at least one underwriter which had to be approved by the 
Council of the Cyprus Stock Exchange.  Underwriting meant that the underwriters 
must stand by to purchase the unsold portion of the issue at the offer price less their 
fees
76
.  For their assistance the underwriters receive a fee for underwriting and 
distributing the IPO.  
 
The offer price
77
 is set by the lead manager of the issue who was also the lead 
underwriter
78
.  The approach used to arrive at the offer price is one that utilises the 
price-earnings multiplier.  That is, after determining the appropriate price-earnings 
(P/E) ratio of the issuing firm given its comparison to its peers, and after projecting 
its future earnings per share (EPS), the offer price is estimated as the product of the 
P/E ratio and the EPS.  The prospectus includes comparative data on the issuing 
firm‘s and its industry‘s P/E ratios79 and the firm‘s EPS forecasts80 so that investors 
can form an independent opinion of the pricing of the issue. 
 
                                                 
76 The CSE did not grant its approval for a listing until an underwriting agreement was in place, properly signed 
by all parties. 
77 The great majority of IPOs in the CSE, were executed through a fixed-price offering.  In a fixed-price offering, 
shares are offered to all categories of investors, private and institutional, at a single and unchangeable price set 
in advance by the underwriter and filed in the introduction prospectus. Investors submit their applications for 
shares at the fixed price and rationing rules (possibly random but most often pro rata) are used to allocate 
shares. Fixed price offerings exist in all European countries except Austria, Greece, Finland and Spain. Specific 
terminology is used in the UK, where any IPO for which shares are offered to the public, either through a fixed-
price offer or through an auction, is called an „offer for subscription‟ if new funds are raised and „offer for sale‟ 
if not. 
78 If more than one underwriters were present then they set the price jointly 
79 In practice, due to lack of data from issuers in same or similar sectors, the P/E ratios employed were those of 
all the other IPO firms preceding the particular IPO.  
80 After the CySEC issued a circular on due diligence and the responsibilities of underwriters and issuers alike in 
July 2001, most of the issuers refrained from using projections in their prospectuses and the valuation was based 
on trailing P/E ratios i.e., ratios based on audited EPS. 
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After the offer price was set, the offering period was specified during which 
investors were invited to subscribe to the new issue.  Sometimes, the offering period 
may be several weeks after the offer price is set.  The offering period usually lasts 
four to five weekdays, but for slow subscriptions it is possible to allow an extension 
of the offering period.  If the offer is heavily oversubscribed, the subscription period 
finishes as early as at the end of the first subscription day or the next. 
 
To make sure that an investor was allocated the desired amount of shares, investors 
usually subscribed for a multiple of the number of shares they really wished to buy
81
. 
Then the final allocation was done on a priority basis.  The allocation rule was 
described in the public announcements that called investors to subscribe as well as in 
the prospectus.  Investors subscribed at the bank branches or stockbrokers as 
specified in the offering announcement.  Following the successful offering of the 
issue, formal listing and public trading of the issue usually occurred about a month 
after the end of the offering period. 
 
Most of the IPOs in the CSE also included a private placement portion, whereby, 
shares were offered to a group of investors including suppliers, clients, personnel and 
other parties.  The number of shares offered in the private placement was added to 
the existing number of shares in the calculation of the shareholder dispersion rule of 
25%. 
 
Historical financial statements in the accounts of CSE IPO companies were adjusted 
according to CSE regulations and the relevant accounting reporting standards 
relevant to public reporting engagements on historical information.  Cyprus 
companies officially adopted IFRS on the 1
st
 of January 2005 for consolidated 
accounts but a number of firms also adopted IFRS voluntarily before.  
 
 
  
                                                 
81 Many investors subscribed to IPOs through various names such as their spouses, companies, children so that 
they raise the possibility of being allocated more shares than if they had applied on their own. 
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IV. Research Design 
A. Sample selection procedure 
 
In this section of the chapter, the description of the sample including descriptive 
statistics is presented.  Moreover, the data sources are mentioned, the process of 
gathering the data as well as the criteria for selecting the companies in the sample are 
laid out.   
 
i. Selection criteria – sample period 
 
During the period 1997-2002 a total of 124 firms
82
 were listed in the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange, out of which 79 were included in the final sample for short- and long-term 
price performance investigation (see chapter 1 of this thesis).   This period was 
chosen for the following reasons: 
 The CSE was inaugurated on the 29th of March 1996 and the first IPOs took 
place in 1997. 
 The period 1999-2001 is characterized by a ‗flood‘ of new listings and 
abnormal returns, largely in the primary, but also in the secondary market.  
From 2002 and up until November of 2006 there were no IPOs in the CSE. 
 During the period 1997-2002, Cypriot society is characterized by a significant 
amount of socioeconomic changes as well as changes in the political, legal 
and fiscal front which inevitably imparted on investor psychology and stock 
market economics. 
 
The criteria employed in selecting the companies comprising the sample for this 
chapter are based both on local constraints as well as on international practice.  These 
are as follows: 
a. The companies must have been listed in the CSE over the period January 
1997 to December 2002. 
                                                 
82 It is worth mentioning that during the period 2000-2004, 87 firms withdrew their listing application from the 
CSE and a further 46 applications for listing were rejected by the authorities.   Thus, bringing the total number of 
companies attempting a listing but not succeeding eventually, to a staggering 133 firms. 
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b. The companies listed employed the method of initial public offering to the 
public, with opening and closing dates of the offering period for new shares 
(companies which placed already issued shares have already been excluded 
from the sample). 
c. Investment companies (both closed-ended and private equity) and overseas 
companies are excluded from the sample. 
d. The companies in the sample must not have been delisted from the CSE at 
least for a period of 12 months from the date of listing. 
 
In addition to the above criteria which narrow the sample down to 79 IPO firms, the 
following criteria for selecting the final sample to test the earnings management 
hypothesis which is developed at a later stage are employed.  The following cases are 
excluded: 
 Financial services companies in general (including insurance companies). 
 Companies that have undergone considerable restructuring before going 
public i.e., firms that their financial statements at t0 and t-1 are not directly 
comparable. 
 Companies that changed their accounting year-end. 
 Companies for which there are not sufficient accounting data to perform 
relevant tests including, balance sheet items such as creditors, debtors and 
inventory and also income, sales and cash flow items from profit and loss and 
cash flow statements respectively. 
 Companies that their IPO date took place at t1 instead at t0 (see figure 11)
83
. 
 
Applying the above criteria to the sample of 79 IPOs in the CSE over the research 
period (1997-2002), a final sample of 46 is reached, which represents 37% of the 
total number of companies listed on the CSE over the same period.  Table 22 below 
shows the screening process that was followed to arrive at the final sample. 
 
Insert Table 22 – Sample selection 
 
                                                 
83 For a small number of CSE IPOs (13), the time that lapsed between the last year of audited accounts in the 
prospectus (t-1) and the IPO date is more than one year (i.e., 365 calendar days).  This means that they were 
listed at t1. 
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Table 23 below shows the distribution of the 46 IPOs according to their industrial 
sector
84
. 
 
Insert Table 23 – IPOs per industrial sector 
 
ii. Procedure for collecting data 
 
Data were hand-picked by the author from the prospectuses of IPO firms as well as 
their annual accounts which were retrieved either in hardcopy or in electronic form
85
.  
IPOs in the CSE were obliged by law to present in prospectuses three years of 
balance sheet and cash-flow statement data and five years of P&L data.  Therefore, 
the most one can go back without sacrificing any data from all three financial 
statements is three years. 
 
B. Methodology 
 
i. The IPO financial reporting timeline and benchmarks 
 
The usual timeline with respect to financial reporting in IPOs in developed countries 
is shown in figure 11 below. The fiscal year of the IPO is defined as year t0. Year t0 
is the year that firms go public so for part of the year firms are privately held and for 
part they are publicly owned.  The length of the public and private parts is variable.  
A list of the studies that measure discretionary accruals in year t–1 or in year t0 is 
shown in figure 11 below. Many studies on earnings management of IPO firms use 
the first annual audited report following the IPO (i.e., year t0) for their analysis. A 
smaller number use the last annual report prior to the issue (year t–1), i.e., the audited 
financial statements in the prospectus.  Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that if 
companies opportunistically attempt to influence the selling price of their stock, then 
                                                 
84 The industrial sectors are presented as classified at the time of the research period by the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange. 
85 Annual accounts especially for the early years (1997-2000) are not easily available as these companies used 
predominantly hard copies at the time.  Electronic means were widely employed after 2003. 
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they will try to manipulate the financial statements available to investors before and 
not after the issue, and that therefore year t–1 statements must be examined.  
 
Year t0 statements are published after the offering, which is too late to influence the 
selling price. On the other hand there are logical and practical reasons to examine 
year t0 financial statements. If the issue occurs towards the end of the fiscal year, 
investors might give more weight to the unaudited reports up to the issue date than to 
the annual reports of the prior year. Then, if investors‘ focus is on year t0 unaudited 
reports, and if the issuing IPO firm attempts to influence the issue price by inflating 
its reported earnings, it will apply the discretion to the latter reports.  It is then 
reasonable to believe that the issuing firm will not rush to reverse the discretionary 
accruals because doing so in close proximity to the issue date will most probably 
attract the attention of the regulators, and that therefore year t0 should be examined.  
 
Another argument for focusing on year t0 statements is that it is common practice for 
the original shareholders to commit to hold (lock up) their shares for 180 days after 
the issue.  If the original shareholders‘ goal is to influence the stock price when the 
lock-up expires so they can sell their holding at an inflated price, then they will apply 
their discretion to year t0 statements. Moreover, if the goal is to influence the 
statements of year t0, IPO firms might have an incentive to lower the reported 
earnings in year t–1 so that the year-to-year improvement is larger.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that firms manage both years (i.e., t-1 and t0) 
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Figure 11 - The typical timeline of IPOs 
Lock-up  Year 0‘s  
IPO period  earnings are 
date ends  announced  
 
Time 
 
Fiscal year -1 Fiscal year 0 Fiscal year 1       Fiscal year 2 
Pre-IPO During IPO Post-IPO  
 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998)  
Teoh, Welch and Rao (1998) 
Ducharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2001) 
Roosenboom et al. (2003) 
Ducharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2004) 
Fan (2007) 
 
As shown in figure 11 above, firms go public during year t0.  The last set of annual 
audited financial statements provided in the prospectus, are those for the year t-1.       
As far as CSE IPOs are concerned over the period examined, one needs to note the 
following important differences with IPOs in other developed (mainly) markets: 
 there were no shareholders‘ lock-ups,  
 due diligence was not obligatory (actually no one conducted due diligence – 
not before August 2001 that became compulsory after CySEC regulation) 
 most of the companies that were eventually listed had already issued, through 
private placement, shares and received substantial funds from investors 
before the IPO.  In almost all IPOs, investors participated at the same 
effective price as the investors in the private placement did.  Therefore, the 
price was set well before the IPO for most of the firms. The CSE demanded 
that the offering price was set in the prospectus when applying and could not 
be changed. 
 A number of owners/issuers guaranteed the IPO price to certain investors for 
various reasons (e.g., purchasing an asset and paying with IPO shares, or 
being a creditor and getting paid with IPO shares, or rewarding employees). 
 
Friedlan (1994) 
Ducharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2001) 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006)  
 
t-1 t-2 
t0 t+1 
t+2 
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In this thesis, it is hypothesised that CSE IPO firms managed earnings prior to listing 
as the prospectus was the only official document available to underwriters and 
investors, (a few of which had already invested in these companies through private 
placements and also for prospective investors who were about to invest in the IPO
86
).  
Therefore, earnings management will be investigated with reference/benchmark time 
t-1 and both pre-IPO and post-IPO time frames will be examined i.e., t-3 and t-2 and t0, 
t1 and t2 respectively.  
 
ii. Model specification 
 
1. Detecting earnings management 
 
It is widely accepted that the price at which shares of an IPO are sold to the investor 
public has a significant wealth effect on the issuers of the securities.  A higher 
offering benefits issuers in two ways.  Firstly, shares retained by the owners are 
worth more and secondly, more cash is received for the secondary shares sold
87
. 
Initial public offerings differ from other equity transactions in that in an IPO there is 
no market price available to investors to refer to when issuers and underwriters set 
the price.  Therefore, it becomes obvious that the price will be set on evaluation 
based on information that basically is derived from the financial statements found in 
the prospectus
88
.  Academic evidence indicates that IPOs are priced using input from 
financial statements (DeAngelo 1986; Block 1986; Perez 1984, Hughes, 1986; 
Krinsky and Rotenberg, 1989; Ducharme et al, 2004).   
 
The use of accounting information in conjunction with comparable firm multiples is 
widely recommended in valuing IPOs (Titman and Trueman, 1986; DeAngelo, 1986; 
Kim and Ritter, 1999).  Ronen and Yaari (2008) argue that earnings are valuable in 
                                                 
86 For many investors, the prospectus is likely to be the most cost-efficient means of obtaining information about 
an IPO.  The prospectus is the only official document that can be distributed by the issuers before the listing, and 
because most IPO firms are small, often little information is readily available from other sources for investors to 
evaluate; and a large part of the prospectus is the financial statements. 
87 By having a higher share price issuers who issue new shares only can own a larger share of a fixed sized pie or 
own the same share of a larger pie if they decide to sell a specified fraction of the firm i.e., sell existing shares. 
88 Rao (1993) reports that there is almost no news coverage of firms in the years before the IPO.  This scarcity of 
information about the issuer forces investors to rely heavily on the prospectus. 
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three counts.  First, they pass the ‗market test‘. When savvy investors consider 
buying the share of an IPO, they demand to know earnings so that they can use them 
to evaluate the price.  Secondly, they argue that earnings form a base line for future 
assessments to judge the firm‘s growth.  Thirdly, they argue that earnings are 
important in providing investors grounds to pursue litigation if they believe that they 
have been misled.   
 
It becomes apparent that earnings are quite relevant in an IPO.  Given the fact that 
there exists an informational asymmetry between the various parties in an IPO, with 
issuers and underwriters being at an advantageous position vis-à-vis the investors, 
one can reasonably assume that earnings are manipulated/managed to influence 
investors.  Several studies have examined earnings reporting around IPOs.  Aharony 
et al. (1993), Friedlan (1994), Ducharme (1994), Teoh et al (1998a) and Teoh et al. 
(1998b), Roosenboom et al. (2003), all report empirical evidence that suggests 
earnings are managed in anticipation of going public. 
 
However, the legal environment for IPOs imposes costs on issuers for 
misrepresenting their firms‘ prospects.  Ducharme et al. (2001) argue that at least 
three(3) types of costs are associated with the manipulation of reported earnings, 
namely, litigation costs, diminution of personal and corporate reputations, and loss of 
future accounting flexibility. 
 
The earnings management instruments used for manipulating reported numbers 
consist of (a) real operating decisions (e.g., asset sales and change in R&D 
expenditure) and (b) pure financial reporting decisions (e.g., changes in accounting 
method such as changing from accelerated depreciation to straight-line depreciation 
and accrual choices).  Young (1999) argues that accrual choices are widely employed 
because they are relatively low cost mechanism by which managers can affect 
reported numbers and are by nature opaque.  Friedlan (1990) states that using 
accounting policy to manage accounting information of IPOs is not effective since 
underwriters and auditors can easily undo its effects. Investors who have the means 
and wish to incur the costs, can adjust accounting policies given the requirements for 
disclosure of accounting policies and information.    
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In contrast, accruals appear to be a more subtle accounting tool and therefore, 
provide for a more effective method for managing earnings and ultimately the IPO 
offer price.  Changes in accruals are more difficult to detect than changes in 
accounting policies since changes in accruals are not the subject of disclosure in 
financial statements and do not require a qualification in the auditors‘ opinion.  
Underwriters and auditors may have difficulty detecting changes in discretionary 
accruals as it is not always clear whether observed changes are manipulations or are 
appropriate approaches to reporting events.  DeAngelo (1986) also argues that 
preparers of financial statements have incentives to conceal any accounting 
manipulations.  She argues that greater payoffs accrue to those whose manipulations 
are undetected by the parties who could be adversely affected by them. 
 
Total accruals which consist of discretionary accruals (DA) and non-discretionary 
accruals (NDA) are normally used to measure earnings management.  McNichols 
(2000) refers to this approach as the aggregate accruals approach.  Total accruals are 
decomposed into a discretionary and non-discretionary component
89
. The reason that 
DA have to be estimated from total accruals is because the degree of accruals 
management is not directly observable (Teoh et al., 1998a).  It is difficult for 
investors to infer how much of the accruals are discretionary.  Elgers et al. (2003) 
argue that “…a fundamental issue in assessing earnings management is the 
unobservability of the managed and un-managed components of reported earnings.”      
 
Several alternative models of expected accruals have been employed in the extant 
literature to detect earnings management or abnormal accruals.  Ronen and Sadan 
(1981) investigate the smoothing of ordinary income.  Healy (1985) uses the level of 
total accruals to measure earnings management and requires the assumption that 
NDA are stable over time (i.e., change in total accruals = change in discretionary 
accruals).  By contrast, DeAngelo (1986) model focuses on changes in total accruals.  
The DeAngelo model assumes that NDA follow a random walk, so the change in 
total accruals between the benchmark and test periods is assumed to be discretionary.  
Friedlan (1994) argues that this random walk approach is not valid for IPOs since 
these firms are usually growing and this may affect their accruals.  Friedlan also 
                                                 
89 For a definition of accruals please see Appendix C 
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argues that if growth is ignored, then a change in total accruals which is attributed to 
the firm‘s managers may in fact be due to changes in NDA caused by growth.  
Therefore, his model assumes that the change in total accruals between two periods 
is composed of two components namely, the change due to firm growth and the 
change due to the owners/managers discretion. Friedlan finds evidence that IPO 
firms make income-increasing discretionary accruals in the financial statements 
released in the prospectus before the IPO. 
 
The most frequently used models for separating expected and discretionary accruals 
are the Jones model (Jones, 1991) and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995)
 90
.  The Jones model assumes that two variables, namely, the level of gross 
property, plant and equipment (GPPE) and the change in revenues (ΔREV), account 
for the level of unmanaged accruals occurring due to the firm‘s economic 
transactions.  The level of GPPE determines depreciation expense while ΔREV 
implies changes in working capitals accounts. 
 
The Jones model regresses total accruals on GPPE and ΔREV.  The regression 
provides coefficients that are then used to estimate unmanaged accruals (or NDA).  
The regression residuals are considered to be managed accruals (or DA).  The 
original tests of the Jones and modified Jones models were performed longitudinally 
over firms with sufficient time series data to estimate firm specific coefficients.  
These coefficients were then used to estimate DA for a particular year.  
Subsequently, many studies have estimated these models cross-sectionally (e.g., 
                                                 
90 Although the modified Jones model is the primary method of calculating discretionary accruals in the 
literature, there are a number of concerns with estimates derived from this model.  One of these concerns, which 
is likely to be particularly acute in IPO firms, is the effect of extreme operating performance on estimates of 
discretionary accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) find that the modified Jones model rejects the null hypothesis of no 
earnings management too often in firms with extreme operating performance and propose a performance 
matched model which entails matching a firm suspected of managing earnings with a peer firm in the same year 
and industry with similar operating performance.  Another concern with the modified Jones model that is specific 
to the IPO setting, is the common practice of scaling by prior period assets. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) note 
that studies examining earnings management around the IPO traditionally scale by prior period total assets. 
They point out that this common practice is problematic when estimating IPO-year accruals since prior period 
(i.e. pre-IPO) total assets are relatively small and not representative of the asset base following the IPO. 
Deflating by prior period total assets will therefore tend to produce extremely large estimates of discretionary 
accruals in the year of the IPO (i.e. discretionary accruals in the fiscal year of the IPO will appear large relative 
to prior period total assets). 
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Teoh et al, 1998; DuCharme et al., 2000) and using paired data (e.g., Heninger, 
2001). 
 
Finally, other studies examining the prevalence of earnings management in order to 
avoid reporting losses and/or earnings declines have adopted an additional approach 
to test for earnings management.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examine the 
distribution of earnings changes and reported earnings.  They find a higher frequency 
of firms with slightly positive earnings (or earnings changes) than firms with slightly 
negative earnings (or earnings changes).  This approach is considered more objective 
in terms of detecting the prevalence of earnings management than the other methods 
discussed. Conversely, this approach has failed to disclose the extent of earnings 
management and the specific methods or accruals that are used for earnings 
management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
 
Two hypotheses will be tested as far as earnings management detection is concerned, 
namely: 
 
Pre-IPO (i.e., up to and including t-1) 
H01 - Issuers planning to go public manage their earnings by making income-
increasing accruals in the periods before the IPO.   
 
This is reflected in discretionary accruals (DA) but also in total accruals (TA).  
Moreover, earnings are expected to increase in year t-1 (the benchmark year), because 
as described above, issuers who report higher earnings stand to receive a higher 
valuation for their firm‘s IPO. Of course, earnings could be increasing since IPO 
firms are usually successful and growing firms that seek to capitalise on this aspect.  
Therefore, it is not necessary for issuers to be making income increasing accruals 
before going public to have earnings increases.  However, changes in cash flows 
between periods are informative as to whether changes in earnings are related to 
changes in cash flow or changes in accruals.  It is not possible though to formulate an 
expectation about the direction of the change in cash flow from operations in the 
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periods before the IPO because of the conflicting effects of increased profitability 
and the need for growing firms to invest to support expansion.  
 
Post-IPO (i.e. after t-1) 
H02 – Issuers continue to make income increasing accruals at t0 and t1 which reverse 
after t1, i.e., at t2. 
 
As it has already been established, t0 is the IPO year (which for part of it, the 
company is privately owned and part of it, it is publicly held) and t1 is the first full 
year of an IPO firm as a public company.  Also, a large majority of the CSE IPO 
issuers sold a large chunk of their companies in private placements before the IPO.  
Moreover, a number of them exchanged shares with other IPO owners so that they 
could flip these when listed (cf. barter trade) and a few of them guaranteed the price 
of the shares to a number of investors over a period of time.  Last but not least, as the 
directors of the IPO companies were practically the only liable for the prospectus 
contents at the time of the sample, they were careful not to provoke the authorities 
and/or the investors and thus having a good first financial year (i.e., t1) as a publicly 
listed company was deemed necessary to avoid any trouble with authorities and 
investors alike. 
 
3. Definition of discretionary accruals measure 
 
The estimation of discretionary accruals is based on the model developed by Friedlan 
(1994) and DeAngelo (1986).  The method compares accruals in a test period with 
accruals in a benchmark period and attributes deviations from the benchmark 
measure to accounting discretion.  In order to account for the growth that usually 
exists in IPO firms, total accruals must be proportionally controlled with sales in 
successive periods.  Specifically, the amount of total accruals that is attributable to 
discretion is the difference between total accruals in the test period standardised by 
sales in the test period and total accruals in the benchmark period standardized by 
sales in the benchmark period.  
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Formally, 
 
TACCRjt = NIjt - CFOjt      (11) 
 
where, 
 
TACCRj,t is the managed component of earnings for IPO sample firm j, during time 
period t, which is equal to total accruals. 
 
NIj,t is the reported net income before extraordinary items for IPO sample j, during 
time period t. 
 
CFOj,t is the cash flow from operations for IPO sample firm j, during time period t. 
 
Equation (11) above is also deflated by TAj,t which are the total assets for IPO 
sample firm j, during time period t
91
 and Total Assets net of Cash, TANoCj,t . 
 
Moreover, discretionary accruals are defined as follows: 
 
 
DAtest =
Salestest
TACCRtest -
Salesbenchmark
TACCRbenchmark
    (12) 
 
where, 
 
benchmark period is t-1 and test periods are t-3, t-2, t0, t1 and t2.  Discretionary accruals 
are also deflated by Total Assets and Total Assets Net of Cash. 
 
                                                 
91 We avoid deflating by prior year assets, since this is problematic as Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and 
Armstrong and Foster (2009) point out.  Prior-period total assets, especially prior to the IPO, are relatively 
small and not representative of the asset base following the IPO.  Moreover, in the case of CSE IPOs, since many 
of the IPOs conducted private placements prior to the IPO, it is considered as more appropriate the use of the 
actual year assets as more representative forthe sample calculations. 
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4. Definition of earnings performance measures 
 
Earnings performance measures are employed surrounding t-1 (the benchmark year) 
as return on total assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), to document evidence of 
earnings management for the sample. 
 
PMj, t =
Xj, t
NIj, t
        (13) 
 
where, 
 
PMj,t is the earnings performance measure (ROA or ROS) for IPO sample firm j, at 
time t. 
 
Xj,t is either TAj,t or Salesj,t depending on the earnings performance measure 
calculated.  Return on total assets net of cash (ROANoC) is also calculated 
separately by subtracting the cash and cash equivalents from TAj,t when calculating 
ROA
92
 (i.e., ROANoCjt=Net Incomejt / (Total Assetsjt-Cashjt). 
 
The three earnings performance measures are compared at the benchmark time (t-1) 
with the measures in each of the two preceding years (t-3 and t-2) and each of the 
three succeeding years (t0, t1 and t2).  This is to distinguish between growth and 
earnings management.  IPOs are usually growth firms and therefore, a distinction 
needs to be made for pre- and post- benchmark periods.  Moreover, the benchmark 
period with the average of the rest of the years (t-3, t-2, t0, t1 and t2) are compared as 
follows:   
 
(PMn) = PMtb - Averageof PMtn      (14) 
 
where,  
 
                                                 
92 As it has been documented especially for Asian IPOs, issuers retain large amounts of IPO proceeds on deposit 
after floatation.  As Aharony et al. (2000) suggest a more accurate adjustment would be to subtract the unused 
IPO proceeds.  However, this kind of data is not available. 
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PM is the performance measure tested (ROS, ROA or ROANoC),  
 
n takes the time frame of all (t-3, t-2, t0, t1 and t2) or pre (t-3 and t-2) or post (t0, t1 and 
t2) 
 
and, 
 
tb is the benchmark year (t-1). 
 
5. Definition of components of accruals 
 
Motivated by the work of Dechow et al. (1998) and Barth el al. (2001), accruals are 
disaggregated into major components namely: 
 
a) accounts receivable, (Rec) 
b) accounts payable (Cred) 
c) inventory (Invent)  
d) depreciation (Dep). 
 
According to Barth et al. (2001) aggregate earnings and thus aggregate accruals mask 
the information that is contained in components of accruals.  Therefore, by 
disaggregating earnings into cashflow and the components of accruals enhances the 
predictive ability of earnings relative to aggregate earnings.  
 
Working capital is comprised of stocks and debtors minus creditors.  Therefore, an 
increase in working capital investment will decrease net income at least in the short 
run.  Working capital rises when Stocks and Debtors rise and creditors fall.  On the 
contrary, when working capital investment falls, net income rises at least in the short 
run.  Working capital investment declines when stocks and debtors decline and 
creditors rise.  Therefore, a firm could manipulate earnings by manipulating its 
working capital investments accordingly.  Regarding depreciation, when this 
decreases it affects expenses and therefore, short-run income rises.  Also, increased 
depreciation means increased investments and thus leads to a decrease in short-run 
net income. 
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6. Testing 
 
Univariate tests are conducted for the difference in return on sales (ROS), return on 
total assets (ROA), return on total assets net of cash (ROANoC), net income (NI), 
discretionary accruals (DA), total accruals (TACCR), and cash flow from operations 
(CFO), at various times (t-3, t-2, t0, t1 and t2) with the benchmark time being t-1.  The 
hypothesis of accrual management is then tested by determining whether the change 
in estimated discretionary standardised accruals (DA) is different from zero.  
Equation (14) above is also tested whether is statistically different from zero for the 
variables ROA, ROS, ROANoC, and TACCR between the benchmark year (t-1) and 
the rest of the years t-3, t-2, t0, t1, and t2, all deflated by sales, total assets and total 
assets net of cash. 
 
t- and non-parametric
93
 statistics are employed to test if the mean and median 
respectively of these differences for the sample IPO firms are statistically different 
from zero.  The reason for using also non-parametric statistics is because of the small 
sample size and also the presence of outliers in accruals. 
 
C. Earnings management and short- and long-run IPO stock performance 
 
Empirical studies that focus on the relationship between earnings management and 
IPO performance began to appear in the late 1990s (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et 
al., 1998b; DuCharme et al., 2001, 2004; Roosenboom et al., 2003). Teoh et al. 
(1998a) examine whether issuers of IPOs increase accruals and thereby report 
earnings in excess of cash flows prior to IPOs.  They also examine whether 
discretionary accruals predict the cross-sectional variation in post-IPO long-run stock 
performance.  They find evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals in the 
IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter. 
Moreover, they argue that investors may be misled by high earnings numbers 
reported at the time of IPOs and then put too high a price in the new issue.  They 
suggest that increasing the offer price is the primary incentive for earnings 
management at the time of the IPO. 
                                                 
93 We employ the Wilcoxon sign-rank test statistic 
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Teoh et al. (1998b) study the magnitude of accruals in the IPO year and several years 
after.  They find that IPO companies have on average high positive earnings 
performance and abnormal accruals in the IPO year.  They also find that earnings and 
stock performance are both poor in the long-run.  They report that the post-IPO 
earnings performance is significantly below the industry average, predicted by high 
abnormal current accruals during the IPO year.  In line with Teoh et al. (1998a) they 
find that abnormal accruals in the IPO year predict greater post issue stock return 
performance. DuCharme (2001), also find a significant relationship between 
abnormal accruals and post IPO stock returns.  However, they do not find a 
significant negative relationship between abnormal accruals and post-IPO accounting 
performance. 
 
Roosenboom et al. (2003) was the first earnings management study in Europe.  They 
examine the pattern of discretionary current accruals (DCA) using a sample of Dutch 
IPOs.  Their findings conclude that managers manage their companies‘ earnings in 
the first year as a public company (t0) but not in the years before the IPO.  Their 
result is consistent with earlier findings of Teoh et al (1998a) who also report that 
IPO companies in the US make income increasing accruals in the first year as a 
public company, and Aharony et al (1993) who find little evidence of earnings 
management of US IPOs in the years before going public. 
 
They also investigate the impact of earnings management on the long-run stock price 
performance and find a negative relationship between the size of the DCA in the IPO 
year (t0) and long-run stock price performance over the next three years.  Their 
results indicate that IPO managers who over report earnings in the IPO year 
subsequently suffer poor returns. 
 
DuCharme et al. (2004) study the relation amongst earnings management, stock 
offers, post-offer stock returns and related shareholders lawsuits in IPOs and SEOs.  
They find that abnormal accounting accrual measures of earnings management are 
unusually high around stock offers and tend to reverse subsequently, and are 
inversely related to post-offer stock returns.  They report that abnormal accounting 
accruals are especially high for companies whose offers subsequently attract 
lawsuits.  Sued companies are found to have much lower stock returns as compared 
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to non-sued counterparts.  They suggest that some companies opportunistically 
manipulate earnings upwards before stock issues, thereby exposing themselves to 
litigation. 
 
Nagata and Hachiya (2007) use abnormal accruals as a proxy to measure earnings 
management and examine whether the extent of abnormal accruals has any impact on 
offer price.   They find that offer prices reflect earnings management to some extent.  
IPO firms that manage earnings less aggressively than the average IPO firms in the 
pre-IPO period tend to have higher offer prices.  Their results also show that 
underwriters are more likely to discount the issues when IPO firms manage earnings 
aggressively but fail to report consecutive earnings increases in pre-IPO periods. 
 
Shen at al. (2008) argue using behavioural theory that IPO anomalies (underpricing 
and long-run underperformance) are attributed to investor sentiment.  Ljungqvist et 
al. (2006) argue that a class of investors are at times irrationally exuberant about the 
prospects of IPOs. Stocks underperform in the long-run when exuberance fades.  
Barberis at al. (1998) develop a model of investor sentiment that uses cognitive bias 
of representativeness in which investors extrapolate short past histories of good 
performance into the future, thus overpricing these companies leading to 
overreaction. The authors also argue that past financial performance provides this 
source of sentiment. Their model also relates to conservatism which is the slow 
updating of models in the face of new evidence. 
 
Earnings are an important and integral measure of firm performance and critical to 
the IPO process.  Given that the pricing of a new issue is very closely related to some 
earnings measure, there is good reason for IPO proceeds-maximising issuers to 
deceive investors by opportunistically manipulating earnings through accruals 
management.  Accordingly, investors who focus on past performance would 
overvalue an issue, whereas investors who analyse both an IPO‘s past performance 
and peer performance would adjust for potential manipulation not to overpay.  
Therefore, if investors are all rational then there should be a negative rather than a 
positive relationship between accruals and IPO underpricing.   
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On the other hand, as Beatty and Ritter (1986) posit, underwriters can earn a return 
on their reputations from appropriately pricing new issues.  If underwriters fail to 
adjust for the effect of earnings management they may end up overpricing the IPO 
firm with overstated earnings.  Overpriced IPOs could result in under-subscription 
and conclude with unsold shares, which would substantially damage the 
underwriters‘ reputations. Therefore, they have an incentive to price issues by 
examining the financial statements carefully and underprice the issues when they 
detect the evidence of earnings manipulation.   
 
It follows from the above that the relation between the use of earnings management 
and IPO underpricing is not straight forward. 
 
i. Hypothesis development 
 
1. Short-run performance 
 
The period 1999-2001 in the CSE history, is characterised by irrational exuberance
94
.  
Moreover, underwriters, issuers and investors alike were all inexperienced.  This 
coupled with the lack of sufficient regulatory framework (vis-à-vis due diligence and 
underwriters‘ and other certifying agents recourse) and the short life span of the CSE 
shaped a setting whereby one could argue that underwriters valued these IPOs 
without making any adjustments for the income increasing accruals that may have 
existed.  On the other hand, neither did investors seem to adjust the price in the 
secondary market because of the irrational exuberance that existed which was fuelled 
both from the secondary market and the primary market returns.  Figure 12 below 
aims at explaining this. 
 
  
                                                 
94 The Economist „Med Sea Bubble‟, 21st of October 1999, and Time International „Market Mania‟, 13th of 
September 1999. 
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Figure 12 - A graphical representation of the hypothetical adjustment process in 
CSE IPO underpricing with and without earnings management and with and 
without investor adjustment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assume that OFPRth is the theoretical price that the underwriter will set for IPO firm 
A and OFPRem is the offering price with income increasing accruals present.  
MKTPRth is the theoretical market price of the close of the first day for IPO A and 
MKTPRem is the closing market price of IPO Firm A assuming that investors do not 
adjust their valuations for the presence of income increasing accruals.  Δx and Δy is 
the rate of adjustment due to income increasing accruals by underwriters and 
investors respectively. For Δx to rise then accruals must increase and underwriters 
not adjusting their valuations. For Δy to rise, investors must not adjust/revise their 
valuations for the existence of these accruals, consequently pushing the price 
upwards in the secondary market.  So, as Δx rises then underpricing becomes less 
assuming investors remain rational or Δy0 or Δy<Δx.  As the ‗irrationality‘ or 
incapability of investors to adjust for the accruals present in the earnings of IPO firm 
A rises, so is Δy and consequently MKTPRem and underpricing as well.  Therefore, 
the relationship depends on the rate by which underwriters increase/revise their 
valuation of firm A versus the rate by which investors adjust theirs. Therefore, the 
degree of earnings management affecting the level of underpricing will depend on 
the relative size of Δx vs. Δy. For underpricing to have a positive relation with the 
earnings management variable, underwriters‘ rate of adjustment for IPO valuations 
due to income increasing accruals must be less than that of investors i.e., Δx<Δy.  
Δy
Δx
OFPRth
OFPRem
MKTPRth
MKTPRem
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When investors begin adjusting/revising their valuations at a higher rate than 
underwriters adjust theirs, then, ceteris paribus, the gap closes (i.e., Δy0 and 
Δx>Δy) and the relationship between the first day return and the rate of increase of 
the earnings management variable (accruals) becomes negative i.e., underwriters 
overprice issues. 
 
Examining this rate of adjustment in CSE IPOs one should take into account on the 
one hand, the following: 
 investors‘ irrational exuberance; 
 underwriters‘ learning curve was steeper than investors‘;  
 
and on the other, the following: 
 deficiencies in the institutional framework for listing companies, created very 
long approving times (almost a year) which combined with, 
 fixing of offering prices at application submission; 
 the dissemination of information about IPO firms in the market due to the 
long queue; 
 investors were catching up in the experience curve. 
 
Therefore, taking into account the above, one cannot distinguish between the rate of 
adjustment of IPO valuations due to income increasing accruals that underwriters and 
investors alike possibly exercised and therefore one cannot posit whether there is a 
positive or negative relationship between the earnings management variable and first 
day returns.  Taking into account the above, it is postulated that first day returns do 
not have a straight forward relationship with earnings management. 
 
H03: The relationship between earnings management as this is reflected by the 
earnings management variable and first-day returns is indeterminate.  If Δy>Δx then 
the relationship between the earnings management independent variable 
(discretionary accruals and total accruals) and the dependent variable, which is first 
day returns, is positive.  On the other hand, if Δy<Δx, then the relationship is 
negative. 
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2. Long-run performance 
 
The relationship between the use of earnings management and long-term stock 
performance (12-, 24- and 36-months after the IPO) is less complicated than that in 
the case of short-run underpricing.  The literature on the pricing of discretionary 
accruals in general shows evidence that the market overprices total accruals and in 
the long run this reverses.  Moreover, it is posited that the components of accruals 
will also reverse in sign.  Thus, higher long term performance will be negatively 
related to creditors (accounts payable) and positively related to debtors (accounts 
receivables), inventory and depreciation. 
 
H04: A negative relationship between long-run stock performance and discretionary 
accruals (and total accruals) is expected, where such performance is measured by 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs).  Moreover, a negative relationship between 
long-run stock performance and creditors and positive relationship with debtors, 
inventory and depreciation is expected. 
 
ii. Definition of variables 
 
The regression equation is shown below: 
 
ADRAWjt = βo + β1AUDjt + β2UNDjt + β3LNTALjt + β4STDRTNSjt + β5LEVERjt + 
β6LNGPRjt +  β7OFPRjt  +  β8EMjt-1 + εj  -  (5) 
 
where, 
 
Advisor/issue-certifier specific variables 
AUDj is a dichotomous variable taking the value of one (1) if the auditor is one of 
the big five
95
 reputable auditors, and zero otherwise.  Investment bankers have a 
                                                 
95 The big five accounting firms at the time were PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst and Young (EY), 
Deloitte and Touche (DT), KMPG and Arthur Andersen (AA).  After Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on 3rd of December 2001, AA imploded following the admission in front of US Congress by its CEO 
that Arthur Andersen made an error with Enron‟s audit.  It was barred from conducting audits after August 2002.  
Eventually, the Arthur Andersen audit business was bought by Deloitte and Touche.  
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preference for credible auditors since they rely on audited financial statements in 
certifying the value of the firm and determining whether to underwrite the offering 
(Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988)).  Reputable auditors are associated with 
smaller underpricing and higher longer run performance.  Reputable auditors are also 
strong CAs and as such one would expect less earnings management to be associated 
with firms audited by reputable auditors. 
 
H05: A negative (positive) relationship is hypothesised to exist between auditor 
reputation and first day IPO returns (long term performance). 
 
UNDj is a dichotomous (dummy) variable taking the value of one (1) if the 
underwriter is one of the three(3) reputable underwriters in the sample, and zero 
otherwise. Reputable underwriters are associated with smaller underpricing and 
higher longer run performance.  As is the case with auditors, reputable underwriters 
are also strong CAs and as such, one would expect them to be associated with IPOs 
that do not manage earnings.  Nagata and Hachiya (2007) argue that underwriters are 
more likely to discount the issues when IPO firms manage their earnings 
aggressively. 
 
H06: It is hypothesised that prestigious underwriters are associated with lower 
underpricing and higher long-term returns i.e., a negative (positive) relationship 
between this variable and first day IPO returns (long term returns) exists. 
 
Market and institutional specific variables 
LNTALj is the natural logarithm of the time period (in days) from the date of 
application to the date of listing on the CSE.  This variable is a proxy for the 
available information for a new issue given the fact that the longer the time delays 
the more the information diffusion to the investor public.  In other words, the 
increase of available information reduces the probability of wrong risk appraisal 
concerning the issue and as result the need for underpricing becomes less (How, Izan 
and Monroe (1995) and How and Howe (1994)). 
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H07: It is hypothesised that a negative (negative) relationship between time span of 
application for listing date to actual listing date and first day IPO returns (long term 
returns). 
   
STDRTNSj, is the standard deviation of raw returns that an IPO company registers 
the first twenty-one (21) days of listing.  This variable is a measure of ex ante risk 
and has been tested extensively in the literature. It controls for momentum in the 
market. 
 
H08: It is hypothesised that a positive (negative) relationship between this variable 
and first day raw IPO returns (long term returns). 
 
Issuer specific variables 
LEVERj is the ratio of bank debt to shareholders‘ equity ratio of an IPO firm based 
on the last audited accounts in the prospectus.  The higher the debt to equity ratio, the 
greater is the implied ex-ante risk of the IPO firm and therefore the greater the 
returns.  The highly leveraged firms have an incentive to manage earnings 
aggressively so that they do not jeopardise the success of the public offering.  Watts 
and Zimmermann (1990) suggest that the more levered firm, the more likely that the 
firm‘s managers will choose accounting conventions that increase current income. 
 
H09: It is hypothesised that a positive (positive) relationship between the debt to 
equity ratio and first day IPO returns (long term returns). 
 
IPO specific variables 
LNGPRj is the natural logarithm of the gross proceeds of the issue (i.e., the issue 
price times the number of shares offered at the IPO) used as a proxy for ex-ante 
uncertainty. Miller and Reilly (1987), Clarkson and Simunic (1994 and McGuiness 
(1992) use the total gross proceeds raised from the offer as a proxy for ex-ante IPO 
uncertainty. Ritter (1984), and Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) provide support for a 
negative relationship between the size of an issue and the size of the firm and the 
initial premium. Further, Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the smaller the offering 
the riskier the company and the higher the degree of the uncertainty for high initial 
premium. 
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H10: It is hypothesised that a  negative (positive) relationship between the size of the 
issue and first day IPO returns (long term returns). 
 
OFPRj denotes the euro value of the offering price of the IPO.  Much of the 
literature on earnings management suggests that one of the primary incentives for 
managers to inflate accruals in IPOs is to boost IPO issue price (Teoh et al. (1998a).  
If managers systematically inflate earnings in order to inflate issue price, then other 
things being equal, firms with high levels of accruals are expected to have a higher 
issue price.  The smaller the offering price the higher the risk and the greater both the 
short- and the long-term returns. 
 
H11: It is hypothesised that a negative (negative) relationship between the offering 
price of an IPO and the first day returns (long term returns). 
 
EMj is the variable that controls for earnings management.  Discretionary Accruals 
(DA) are tested as per equation (7) above.  The earnings management measure at the 
benchmark time (i.e., at time t-1) is regressed with returns.  As it has already been 
discussed above in hypothesis H03, it is expected that this variable has a positive 
relationship with short-term IPO share price performance (ADRAW) if Δx<Δy and a 
negative relationship if Δx>Δy.  As far as the long-term returns (CAR12, CAR24 and 
CAR36) are concerned, a negative relationship is expected as discussed in H04.   
TACCRj as EMj is also tested separately as well as the components of accruals, 
namely CREDj, RECj, INVENTj and DEPj.  In all cases Cash flow (CF) is a control 
variable at the benchmark time i.e., t-1.  
 
Therefore, 
 
EMj = (DAj) or (TACCRj) or (CREDj, RECj, INVENTj and DEPj) 
  
Table 24 below summarises the variables that are employed in the Regression 
models and their expected relationship (sign) with respect to first-day raw returns 
and CARs. 
 
Insert table 24 – Variable expected signs in regression models 
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V. Data Analysis 
A. Descriptive statistics 
 
i. Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate tests 
 
In this section, descriptive statistics are presented for the variables used in the 
univariate tests of this study.  Tables 25a and 25b below shows descriptive data for 
the absolute and the deflated values respectively for net income (NI), sales (Sales), 
cash flow from operations (CFO), total assets (TA), total assets adjusted net of cash 
(TANoC), total accruals (TACCR), receivables (Rec), creditors (Cred), inventory 
(Invent), and depreciation (Dep).  The data is given representatively for years t-3 to t2. 
 
Insert Table 25a – Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate tests 
(absolute numbers) 
 
As it can be seen from table 25a, Sales, Total Assets, Total Assets Net of Cash, 
Receivables, Inventory, Creditors, and Depreciation rise in an uninterrupted fashion 
from t-3 to t2.  On the other hand, Net Income rises until t0 and there onwards it 
declines.  TACCR follow a similar path to Net Income.  The median of Cash flow 
from operations declines from t-1 to t1 and then at t2 it rises abruptly.   
 
Insert Table 25 b – Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate 
tests (deflated) 
 
The variables employed in table 25a are deflated with Sales, Total Assets and Total 
Assets Net of Cash to get a better picture of their pattern across time.  As it can be 
seen from table 25b, Part A, Net Income rises until t-1 and declines here onwards.  
Total Accruals also rise from t-3 to t0 and then they change direction (i.e., they 
decline), becoming negative at t2.  The median of Cash Flow from operations 
declines from t-1 to t1 and then changes at t2 when it rises, thus following a different 
course than Net Income.  The components of accruals (i.e., Receivables, Inventory, 
Creditors and Depreciation) do not exhibit any particular pattern in Part A of table 
25b.  Looking at Part B of the same table, one gets similar results for Net Income, 
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Cash Flow from operations, and Total Accruals.  However, one can also see that 
Inventory declines between t-2 and t0 and then starts to rise at t1 and t2.  The median 
of Depreciation also decreases from t-1 to t0 and then rises at t1 and t2.  Panel C shows 
the variables deflated by Total Assets Net of Cash.  This panel is more revealing vis-
à-vis Cash Flow from operations.  Specifically, the median of CFO declines from t-2 
to t1 and at t2 it rises again.  This pattern is again in contrast to that of Net Income, 
which rises from t-3 to t-1 and declines thereafter. 
 
Tables 26a, 26b and 26c below also present descriptive statistics for the 46 firms in 
the sample.  The descriptive statistics shown are the change in net income (NI), the 
change in discretionary accruals, the change in total accruals, the change in cash flow 
from operations (CFO), and the change in the profitability measures of ROS, ROA 
and ROANoC all calculated having as reference point (benchmark) time t-1.  
 
Insert tables 26a - Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate tests 
(deflated by sales) 
 
Insert tables 26b - Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate tests 
(deflated by total assets) 
 
Insert tables 26c - Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate tests 
(deflated by total assets net of cash) 
 
As it can be seen from table 26a, discretionary accruals, net income, total accruals 
and return on sales are all growing pre-IPO.  Interestingly, looking at the winsorised 
means DA and TACCR continue to increase until t1 and then at t2 they decrease. The 
same can be said for TACCR for table 26b and 26c, but not for DA.  DA increases 
until t-1 but decreases afterwards in both tables 26b and 26c. CFO does not seem to 
have a particular path or trend.  Net income rises up until t0 and then declines at t1 
and t2 across all tables.  The profitability measures rise from t-3 to t-1 and decline 
thereafter. 
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The model employed to estimate discretionary accruals (DA) in this thesis is based 
on the assumption that firms seeking an IPO are growing. Evidence supporting this 
assumption is given in table 27 below. 
 
Insert table 27 – Sales growth statistical test 
 
Table 27 above shows that between years t-1 and t0 firms have a mean sales growth of 
33.9% with a median of 22.7%. Moreover, between the same time period, 91.3% of 
the companies in the sample are increasing in size (as evidenced by the increase in 
sales).  The number of companies that increase in size steadily rises from t-3 to t0 and 
thereafter demonstrates steady decline (t0 to t2).  This is reflected by the median of 
the growth rate, but the mean shows steady rise indicating the presence of large 
outliers.  If the variables are winsorized at 95
th
 and 5
th
 percentiles then both the t-test 
and the Wilcoxon test statistics are significant at the 1% level at all time frames. 
 
ii. Descriptive statistics of variables employed in multivariate tests 
 
In this section, the descriptive statistics that are employed in the multivariate model 
of the study are employed. 
 
In Table 28, Panels A to D, the descriptive statistics for the independent variables are 
presented and Panel E shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. 
 
Insert Table 28 – Descriptive statistics of regression tables  
 
Looking at table 28 above, one can observe the high level of underpricing in the 
sample (158.8%) and the long-run underperformance of the IPOs in the sample with 
mean CARs reaching -20.2% three years after their listing.  Moreover, the firms in 
the sample are highly leveraged with a mean of 89.5% and a median of 69.9%.   
Moreover, the offering price mean is €0.920 with a median of €0.854 (or CY£0.50). 
It can also be observed that both Discretionary Accruals (DA) and Total Accruals 
(TACCR) are rising from t-2 to t-1 across all deflators and so are their medians.  In 
addition, the components of accruals (creditors, inventory, and receivables) are also 
rising from t-2 to t-1.  Their medians are also rising across all deflators except in the 
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case of Cred/Sales where the median changes sign (i.e., becomes positive), showing 
that large outliers exist.  Finally, depreciation also seems to be rising when deflated 
by total assets or total assets net of cash but not when it is deflated by sales. 
 
B. Empirical results 
 
i. Univariate tests 
 
In this section, the results of the empirical tests are presented, beginning with the 
univariate tests.  Table 29 below shows the results of the tests for H01 and H02.  It 
presents the results with variables scaled with sales, total assets total assets net of 
cash. 
 
Insert table 29 – Univariate tests for profitability and accruals  
 
The above table shows that the change in ROS is statistically significant at the 1% 
level at all time frames compared to the benchmark time except at t0. ROS rises pre-
IPO and falls after the IPO.  It is interesting to note that 91.3% of the firms in the 
sample have a rising ROS at t-3 (significant at the 1% level) and at t2 this percentage 
drops down to 15.2% (again statistically significant at the 1% level).  Return on total 
assets (ROA) rises before the IPO and drops after (all figures are statistically 
significant at the 1% level except at t-2 when only the parametric test is significant at 
5% level). Moreover, 76.1% of the firms had rising ROA at t-3 versus 10.9% at t2, 
both statistically significant at 1%.  The difference with ROS is that ROA is also 
statistically significant at t0, whereas ROS is not.  ROANoC rises pre-IPO and then 
declines spectacularly in that pre-IPO, at t-3, 82.6% of firms had a rising ROANoC 
compared with 13.4% post IPO, at year t2, all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Net income rises from t-3 up until t0 and then it reverses direction at t1.  A high 
percentage of firms (93.5%) have a rising net income at t-3 and by t2 this percentage 
drops down to 30.4% (both numbers are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% 
level respectively).   
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Cash flow from operations does not seem to have a particular pattern except for the 
fact that at t1 it changes direction from positive at t0 to negative at t1 (and statistically 
important at the 10% level). 
 
In panel B, looking at Discretionary Accruals, one can see that these are rising before 
the IPO.  If one looks for example, at DA deflated by Total Assets, at t-3, 80.4% of 
the firms in the sample had rising discretionary accruals and at t2 this percentage 
drops to 26.10% and are both statistically significant at the 1% level.  At t2, DA 
reverse direction and they fall (significant at the 1% level). The same is also true for 
total accruals (TACCR).  It seems that at times t0 and t1 both discretionary and total 
accruals are statistically indistinguishable from those at t-1.     
 
The above table shows that earnings management probably took place pre-IPO, in 
the financial accounts included in the prospectus and continued at time t0 and t1 
because of various reasons notwithstanding the fear from the regulator, the public 
outcry and also the fact that a number of the owners of these IPO firms had sold 
shares with guarantees.  Of course, one should distinguish the two time periods i.e., 
pre-IPO compared with post-IPO.  The pre-IPO earnings management took place 
presumably to influence the underwriters in their valuations and the post-IPO period 
to influence the share price due to regulatory, legal and possibly contractual 
obligations the owners of the IPO firms had with investors. Overall, the second 
hypothesis (H02) cannot be rejected.  
 
Equation (14) is also tested for ΔROSall, ΔROAall, ΔROANoCall as well as total 
accruals. t-test and the Wilcoxon sign-rank test (non-parametric statistical test) are 
employed to test whether the mean and median of these differences for the 46 firms 
in the sample are significantly different from zero and between them.  If earnings 
management has occurred around the IPO, the profitability measures ΔROSall, 
ΔROAall, ΔROANoCall are expected to be positive and statistically significant. In 
addition to the above tests, the difference in ROS, ROA, ROANoC and TACCR at 
the benchmark time is also compared with another two time periods namely, pre (t-3, 
t-2) and post (t0, t1, and t2) and tested whether the mean and median of these 
differences for the 46 firms in the sample are significantly different from zero and 
between them. 
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Insert Table 30 – Univariate tests for profitability and accruals - pre and post - 
IPO 
 
As it can be seen from Panel A of table 30 above, the difference of ROS at t-1 with 
the average of all the other years is statistically significant at the 1% level and with 
the expected sign (positive).  Also the difference of ROS pre- and post-IPO 
compared with t-1 is also statistically significant at the 1% level with a positive sign.  
Therefore, ROS rises and reaches its peak at t-1.  The same can be said for ROA and 
ROANoC. 
 
Looking at panel B of table 30, one can see that the difference in total accruals 
(TACCR) and the average of the rest of the years (t-3, t-2, t0, t1, t2) deflated by sales, 
total assets and total assets net of cash at t-1 with the rest of the time periods is also 
statistically important at the 5%, 1% and 1% level respectively, with a positive sign 
and also the difference pre-IPO is statistically significant at the 1% level also with 
positive sign.  The difference post-IPO is also statistically significant albeit at the 5% 
level (except for TACCR deflated by total assets where the difference is not 
significant
96
).  The above results point to the direction that total accruals rise before 
the IPO and are highest at t-1.  All the above may imply that firms were ‗grooming 
up‘ before the IPO and this picture reversed after the IPO. 
 
ii. Multivariate tests 
 
In this section of the empirical results, the relationship that earnings management has 
on the short- and long-run price performance of CSE IPOs of the sample is 
investigated. 
 
In tables 31a to 31d the results of the multivariate regressions described above are 
shown.  Each table shows nine regressions.  Regressions one(1) to three(3) employ 
discretionary accruals (DA) as the earnings management independent variable (EM), 
with sales, total assets and total assets net of cash as deflators respectively.  
                                                 
96 When we winsorise Total Accruals at 95th and 5th percentiles the results for the t-test become important at the 
5% level.  
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Regressions four(4) to six(6) similarly employ total accruals (TACCR) as the EM 
variable and regressions seven(7) to nine(9) employ the accruals components namely 
creditors (CRED), inventory (INVENT), receivables (REC) and gross depreciation 
(DEP), again with sales, total assets and totals assets net of cash as deflators 
respectively.  Each regression is also performed with the earnings management 
variable and cash flow from operations at t-1, all winsorised at the 95
th
 and 5
th
 
percentile and the results are shown next to the results of the normal regression. 
 
Insert table 31a – Regression results (first day returns) 
 
Insert table 31b – Regression results (CAR12) 
 
Insert table 31c – Regression results (CAR24) 
 
Insert table 31d – Regression results (CAR36) 
 
1. Short-run performance 
 
Table 31a shows the results of the short-run multivariate regression with ADRAW as 
the dependent variable.  As it has already been mentioned,  there are nine 
regressions, namely, three(3) with DA as the EM variable, three(3) with TACCR as 
the EM variable and three(3) with components of accruals (CRED, INVENT, REC 
and DEP) as the EM variable.  The first three regressions employ DA as the EM 
independent variable.  DA is statistically significant for short-run returns (ADRAW) 
at the 5% and 10% level with positive sign with sales and total assets net of cash as 
deflators respectively.  It is not statistically significant with total assets as deflator.  It 
is also observed that LNTAL and STDRTNS are statistically important at the 1% 
level significance across all three regressions.  LNTAL and STDRTNS carry the 
expected sign (negative and positive respectively). LEVER is also found to be 
statistically significant at the 5% level in regressions one(1) and two(2) and at the 
10% level in regression three(3) with the expected sign (positive).  UND is also 
found to be statistically significant at the 10% level in all three regressions and in all 
three cases carrying the expected sign (negative).  OFPR is also statistically 
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important at the 5% level in regression one(1) and at the 10% level in regressions (2) 
and (3) and also carries the expected sign (negative). 
  
Similar picture is also shown in regressions four(4) to six(6) with TACCR being 
statistically significant at the 10% level, and 5% in regression five(5), all with a 
positive sign. Also Cash Flow from Operations at t-1 is significant at the 10% level in 
regressions (4) and (6) and 5% in regression (5) with a negative sign (expected).    
 
Regressions seven(7) to nine(9) employ the components of accruals as the EM 
variable.  CRED is statistically significant at the 1% level when the deflator is total 
assets and totals assets net of cash (regressions eight(8) and nine(9)) with positive 
sign and in regression seven(7) it is important at the 10% level also with a positive 
sign.  Depreciation is also important at the 10% level of significance when sales is 
the deflator (regression seven(7)), with a negative sign.   
 
In all regressions LNGPR carries the expected sign but it is not statistically 
important.  Also AUD is not statistically important and carries a positive sign (and 
not a negative sign as expected).  R
2
 ranges from 86.23% to 89.34% and adjusted R
2
 
from 82.79% to 85.46%.  All in all, R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 are higher for regressions 
seven(7) to nine(9).  Also, across all regressions, the F-statistic is highly significant 
at the 1% level.  
 
Overall, one can see that that earnings management does affect the short-run IPO 
performance.  Specifically, the higher the accruals, the higher the underpricing 
becomes.  It is also worth mentioning that deflator choice is important.  Sales as a 
deflator seems to produce better results insofar as the earnings management variable 
is concerned.  
 
2. Long-run performance 
 
CAR12 
Table 31b shows the results of the multivariate regression with CAR12 as the 
dependent variable. DA is the EM variable in regressions 1 to 3 and it shows no 
statistical significance. TACCR is also not statistically significant in regressions 4 to 
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6. In regressions eight(8) and nine(9), CRED is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and so is INVENT, which is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
regression eight(8) (deflator is total assets net of cash) both
 
with the expected signs.  
LNGPR is statistically significant at the 1% across regressions 1 to 3 with the 
expected sign (positive).  STDRTNS is not statistically significant across all 
regressions albeit it carries the expected sign (negative).  OFPR is statistically 
important across all regressions at the 5% level (except in regressions (8) and (9) 
where it is important at the 10% level) and carries the expected sign (negative).  
UND is also statistically significant at the 5% level (regressions (2), (3), (5), (6), and 
(9)) and at the 10% level (regressions (1), (4), (7) and (8)) respectively.  In all cases 
it does not carry the expected sign (positive).   
 
Across regressions (3), (6), (8) and (9), the F-statistic is statistically significant at the 
10% level except in regression 8 that is statistically significant at the 5% level.  R
2
 
and adjusted R
2
 range from 30.28% to 44.14% and from 12.85% to 23.83% 
respectively.  R
2 
and adjusted R
2
 are higher in regressions seven(7) to nine(9) i.e., 
when the components of accruals are employed.  
 
CAR24 
In table 31c the results of the multivariate regression with CAR24 and the 
independent variables are shown. Neither DA nor TACCR are statistically significant 
with any deflator except TACRR being statistically important at the 10% level in 
regression four(4) with sales as deflator but not with the expected sign.  The picture 
changes when the components of accruals are introduced as the EM variable.  
Specifically, CRED is statistically significant at the 1% level with the expected sign 
(negative) across regressions seven(7) to nine(9).  Also, DEP is statistically 
important at the 1% and 5% level in regressions eight(8) and nine(9) respectively 
with the expected sign (positive).  Also INVENT is important in regressions seven(7) 
and eight(8) (winsorised) at the 5% and 1% level with the expected sign (positive) 
and REC is also important in regressions seven(7) and eight(8) at 10% and 1% level 
respectively with the expected sign.  LNGPR is statistically important at the 1% level 
of significance across all regressions with the expected sign.  OFPR and STDRTNS 
are also significant at the 10% level, again with the expected signs but not across all 
regressions for OFPR (four(4) regressions out of nine(9)). 
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The F-statistic is statistically significant only in regressions seven(7), eight(8) and 
nine(9) at the 10%, 5% and 10% level respectively (when winsorised earnings 
management variables are employed these values rise to 5%, 1% and 5% 
respectively). Values for R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 range from 24.70% to 43.43% and 
5.87% to 22.85% respectively, with the best values found again in regressions 
seven(7) to nine(9) where the components of accruals are employed as the 
independent earnings management variable.  
 
CAR36 
The results of the multivariate regression of the dependent variable CAR36 with the 
independent variables are shown in table 31d.  These show that DA and TACCR are 
statistically significant in regression two(2) (winsorised) and regression three(3) with 
the expected sign (negative).  Also, TACCR is statistically important in regression 
five(5) and regression six(6) (winsorised), also with the expected sign (negative).  
When the accrual components are employed as EM variable, then CRED 
demonstrates statistical significance at 1% level across all three regressions (seven(7) 
to nine(9)) with the expected sign (negative)).  DEP is also statistically significant at 
the 10% level when total assets and total assets net of cash are employed as deflators 
(regressions eight(8) and nine(9)) again with the expected sign (positive).  Also 
INVENT is statistically important in regressions seven(7) and eight(8) winsorised 
and REC in regression seven(7) and both carry the expected sign (positive).  LNGPR 
and STDRTNS are statistically significant across all regressions, both with the 
expected sign.  
 
The F-statistic of the model is statistically significant at the 5% level in all 
regressions except one(1) and four(4), where it is significant at the 10% level.  It is 
worth mentioning that the winsorised models in regressions three(3), six(6) and 
eight(8) are statistically significant at the 1% level.  The R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 values 
range from 31.47% to 49.24% and 14.33% and 30.79% respectively, with the highest 
being at regressions seven(7) to nine(9) (highest being at regression eight(8)).    
 
The results of the multivariate regressions above show that the earnings management 
variables DA and TACCR are statistically important in the short-run and in the long–
run for CAR36.  The higher the discretionary and total accruals the higher is the first-
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day returns of the IPO.  The statistical significance of these variables drops when one 
looks at long-term returns (mainly CAR12 and CAR24).  The components of 
accruals become better predictors of long-run stock returns.  Especially CRED and 
DEP are consistently important especially when the deflators are total assets and total 
assets net of cash.  It is obvious that the results are deflator sensitive, with Sales 
being a better deflator for the short run and total assets and total assets net of cash 
producing better results for the long-run.  The results of the regressions for the long 
run seem to validate the fourth Hypothesis (H04). 
      
Looking at figure 13 below, based on the results of the multivariate regressions, the 
hypothesis that underwriters adjust IPO valuations faster than investors do, cannot be 
rejected i.e., underpricing rises with rising accruals. 
 
Figure 13 – Underpricing and rate of accruals adjustment management matrix 
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VI. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter of the thesis, it is postulated that that CSE IPO firms, over the sample 
period 1997-2002, managed their earnings by making income-increasing accruals 
before going public. These earnings management actions were more pronounced 
before going public (at t-1 which is the last year of audited accounts in the 
prospectus) and reversed after t1 (which is the first full year of an IPO firm as a 
publicly listed company) i.e., at t2. 
 
One cannot reject the two hypotheses and earnings management cannot be ruled out 
for CSE IPO firms.  Specifically, using both univariate and multivariate tests it is 
observed that Discretionary Accruals (DA) with t-1 as the benchmark time rise within 
the prospectus time frame and pre-IPO (with t-3, and t-2 as test times) and reverse at 
t2.  It is also observed that DA do not differ statistically with DA at t0 and t1 meaning 
that they are probably at the same level at t0 and t1 as they are t-1.  Total accruals 
(TACCR) are also increasing pre-IPO and they are statistically significant and 
reverse at t2.  Moreover, change in profitability measures, namely return on sales 
(ROS), return on assets (ROA) and return on assets net of cash (ROANoC), 
demonstrate significant statistical difference when t-1 is compared with the average of 
the rest of the time frames (t-3, t-2, t0, t1, and t2) and also when compared pre-IPO and 
post-IPO.  
 
Finally, the IPOs price performance (short and long) is regressed against a set of 
independent variables and amongst them a variable for earnings management which 
takes the form of discretionary accruals between t-2 and t-1, and total accruals over the 
same period. The components of accruals are also employed, namely, Creditors, 
Inventory, Receivables and Depreciation in the place of the earnings management 
variable over the same time period.   
 
Discretionary accruals are found to have a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with short-run returns, meaning that as accruals rise, underpricing 
increases.  This can be attributed to the faster adjustment by underwriters of 
valuations to take into account income increasing accruals, and at the same time the 
inability of investors to revise with the same degree and speed their valuations due to 
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the high levels of exuberance that existed in the market as these were manifested by 
the high level of secondary as well as primary returns.  Moreover, components of 
accruals are observed to explain well the long-run stock price performance.  The 
results are sensitive to the deflator employed, with Sales explaining better short-run 
results and total assets and total assets net of cash being better deflators for long-run 
results. 
  
As it can be concluded from the results of the tests, one cannot reject the hypothesis 
that earnings management did actually take place in CSE IPOs over the sample 
period.  Income increasing accruals drove earnings higher before the IPO and 
reversed after the IPO at t2.  Earnings management in CSE IPOs seems to be part of 
wider institutional and procedural inefficiencies that existed in the IPO process 
amplifying the level of first day returns whilst at the same time, enhancing long term 
underperformance.
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Abstract 
Great effort, both theoretical and empirical, has been made to understand managerial 
decision-making in the initial public offering (IPO) process.  Most empirical IPO 
research relies on publicly available stock return data.  However, there is a need to 
extend the literature by examining how well managers‘ motivations for conducting 
IPOs and understanding of the IPO process correlate with existing academic theories. 
With this as motivation, a survey was conducted to determine managers‘ insights into 
the IPO process in a novice stock market such as the Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE). 
Six specific aspects of the IPO process were studied namely, (1) motives for going 
public; (2) the timing of IPOs; (3) criteria for choosing an underwriter; (4) IPO 
underpricing; (5) IPO signalling; and (6) reasons to stay private. Extra insight was 
also attempted to be added by testing managerial behaviour on certain IPO process 
issues.  In some areas, harmony is observed between managers‘ beliefs and academic 
theory. But in other key areas, managers‘ perceptions seem to diverge from 
traditional academic theory.  Cypriot managers‘ overall views are found to coincide 
at large with views of managers in a country (US) with arguably the most advanced 
capital market in the world. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Going public is not an easy process, nor is it without costs. Many companies have 
begun the IPO process only to withdraw the offering, often confused and frustrated 
by the experience.  To improve decision-making – and to mitigate many of the 
uncertainties—managers need a clear picture of the core issues involved in the IPO 
process.  Great effort, both theoretical and empirical, has been made to understand 
managerial decision-making in the initial public offering (IPO) process.  Most 
empirical IPO research relies on publicly available stock return data.  However, there 
is a need to extend the literature by examining how well managers‘ motivations for 
conducting IPOs and understanding of the IPO process correlate with existing 
academic theories. 
 
With this as motivation, a survey was conducted to determine managers‘ insights into 
the IPO process in a novice stock market such as the Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE). 
Six specific aspects of the IPO process were studied namely, (1) motives for going 
public; (2) the timing of IPOs; (3) criteria for choosing an underwriter; (4) IPO 
underpricing; (5) IPO signalling; and (6) reasons to stay private. Extra insight was 
also attempted to be added by testing managerial behaviour on certain IPO process 
issues. 
 
By surveying managers to obtain a real-world perspective of the IPO process, one 
can also compare their beliefs and experiences to both academic theory and the 
findings of empirical research.  One can also compare the responses of managers in 
an emerging market with those of managers in a highly developed market.  Doing so 
allows us to identify the gaps between theory and practice, and to begin to bridge 
those gaps through better communication and more targeted research.  
 
In a number of areas, harmony is observed between managers‘ beliefs and academic 
theory. But in several other key areas, managers‘ perceptions seem to diverge from 
traditional academic theory.  Cypriot managers‘ overall views are found to coincide 
at large with views of managers in a country (US) with arguably the most advanced 
capital market in the world. 
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The main findings from the survey are summarized below: 
 
First, respondents in the survey carried out, provide evidence that the intent of the 
going public decision is mostly to enhance the reputation of their company 
(Maksimovic and Pichler (2001)) as well as to broaden the base ownership 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)) and establish a market price/value for their firm 
(Zingales (1995), Mello and Parsons (2000)).  There is also moderate support for the 
premise that firms aim at creating public shares for use in future acquisitions (Brau, 
Francis and Kohers, (2003), Zingales, (1995)).  Least important motivations are 
funding reasons, especially private equity, and insiders‘ cashing out including 
venture capitalists. 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006), in a survey of 336 CFOs in the U.S. find that respondents 
in their survey identify the creation of public shares for acquisitions as the most 
important motivation for going public together with the establishment of market 
price or value of the firm.  Enhancing corporate reputation is moderately important.  
Least important motivations were found to be minimisation of the cost of capital, 
pecking order of financing and creating an analyst following. 
 
Second, responses suggest that as far as influences on IPO timing are concerned, 
managers rank overall stock market conditions as being the most important factor 
(Lucas and McDonald (1990)), followed by the need for external equity capital for 
growth which is consistent with findings of Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) as well 
as Lowry (2002), and current industry conditions (Pagano et al (1998)).  Managers 
seem to pursue ‗windows of opportunity‘ (Loughran and Ritter, (1995)), but they 
define these windows in terms of overall stock market and industry conditions and 
not by the conditions in the IPO market. 
 
In Brau and Fawcett (2006), respondents take into account overall market and current 
industry stock returns and place less emphasis on the strength of the IPO market 
when considering the timing of their issue.  They also show strong support for the 
need for equity capital to support growth.  
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A small body of academic literature on the relation between underwriter reputation 
and issuer choice focuses on observable factors such as initial and long-term 
underpricing in the IPO market, tombstone rankings, and underwriter market share. 
The responses in the survey suggest that the most important criterion that Cypriot 
managers cite for selecting their lead underwriter is the underwriter‘s overall 
reputation and status (as per Krigman, Shaw and Womack, 2001)), citing the 
underwriter‘s industry expertise, connections and clientele base (both retail and 
institutional).  Managers in the survey seem not to place emphasis on whether the 
underwriter is a bank subsidiary (as per Kanatas and Qi, (1998), Drucker and Puri, 
(2005)) nor do they deem as important the ability of the underwriter to provide 
liquidity.  Spinning is also quite low on their list. 
 
In Brau and Fawcett (2006), respondents select underwriters based on overall 
reputation, quality of the research department and industry expertise and 
connections.  Spinning is also ranked low on their list whilst market making, trading 
desk and liquidity provision services rank as moderately important. 
 
Early researchers on IPO literature, notably Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975), 
documented that when companies go public, the shares they sell tend to be 
underpriced, in that the share price jumps substantially on the first day of trading.  In 
well-developed capital markets and in the absence of restrictions on how much prices 
are allowed to fluctuate by from day to day, the full extent of underpricing is evident 
fairly quickly, certainly by the end of the first day of trading, and so most academic 
studies use the first-day closing price when computing initial underpricing returns.   
 
The majority of the respondents in the survey seem to be informed on underpricing 
expectations whilst a significant minority seem not to be able to distinguish between 
underpricing and overpricing in contrast to the great majority of respondents in Brau 
and Fawcett (2006) survey whereby, they seem to be well versed on the expected 
level of underpricing.  It is observed that Cypriot managers feel that underpricing 
exists primarily to incur the favour of institutional investors.  The desire to widen the 
ownership base was also found to be a moderately important reason for underpricing 
the issue as well as increasing the post-issue trading volume.  The issue of 
compensating investors for taking the risk of the IPO was found to be moderately 
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important and mitigating future litigation by investors is seen by respondents as 
largely unimportant. 
 
In Brau and Fawcett (2006), respondents view the compensation of investors for 
taking the risk of the IPO as the single most important reason for underpricing.  They 
also agree with their Cypriot counterparts that underwriters underprice to incur the 
favour of institutional investors and to widen the ownership base.  Respondents in 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) also view mitigating future litigation as of moderately low 
significance. 
 
Due to asymmetric information between IPO insiders and potential investors, 
Signaling theory continues to be an important component of IPO research.  The 
respondents in the survey cited as the most important signal regarding the value of 
their firm going public the strong historical earnings (Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998)).  The commitment by insiders to a lock-up period (Courteau (1995), and 
Brau, Lambson and MacQueen (2005)), the usage of a top investment bank as 
underwriter and manager of the IPO (Booth and Smith (1996), Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Carter, Dark and Singh (1998)),  and the use of a big-five accounting firm 
(Titman and Trueman (1986), Beatty (1989) and Michaely and Shaw (1995)) were 
also cited as strong signals.  A large first-day share jump (Welch, (1989), Allen and 
Faulhaber, (1989) and Chemannur (1993)) and the issue of free warrants 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)) were cited as moderately positive signals.  The 
selling of insider shares in the IPO (Leland and Pyle (1977)) and the selling of a 
large portion of the firm in the IPO are cited as negative signals. 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) find that CFOs in their survey (especially of large firms) 
view strong historical earnings as the most positive signal in the IPO process.  Using 
a top investment bank is the second-strongest positive signal and committing to a 
long lock-up is the third-strongest positive signal followed by the use of a big-four 
accounting firm.  Selling a large portion of the firm, issuing units (shares with 
warrants), and selling insider shares are all viewed as negative signals. 
 
The analysis of IPO process design reveals that respondents view the threat of 
accusations pertaining to window dressing (accruals management in the IPO 
Chapter3 – A survey on managerial attitudes regarding Initial Public Offerings on the CSE 
 
199 
 
prospectus financial statements) in the prospectus as a moderately important IPO 
issue.  Respondents in Brau and Fawcett (2006) share the same opinion.  The most 
important IPO process design issues in the survey according to respondents is the 
need to carry out financial and legal due diligence. 
 
In Brau and Fawcett (2006), respondents view the use of firm-commitment 
underwriting contract as the most important IPO design issue.  The lock-up period is 
also important.  Concerning window dressing, respondents are not preoccupied with 
potential negative backlash.  As far as unit offerings are concerned, these are not 
considered by respondents as important. 
   
Regarding issues causing the concern in the decision to conduct an IPO, the 
respondents in the survey view the desire to maintain decision-making control as the 
most important factor followed by unfavourable market/industry conditions.  The 
fact that they want to avoid ownership dilution, somewhat contradicts another 
response, whereby the view of widening the ownership base is also cited as an 
important reason for going public.  They also view market/industry conditions, the 
costs/fees of the IPO, and disclosing information to competitors as moderately 
important.   
 
In Brau and Fawcett (2006), respondents view that maintaining decision-making 
control as the primary reason for remaining private.  They are also concerned about 
avoiding ownership dilution as well as unfavourable market and industry conditions.  
They also view disclosure of information to competitors as moderately important. 
 
Questioning the respondents in the survey about other parameters which are known 
empirically to be important within IPO academic conjecture, it is observed that the 
majority of the respondents replied that smaller companies are less likely to go public 
and that younger companies are less likely to go public as well as that riskier 
companies are more likely to go public.  Highly leveraged companies are more likely 
to go public according to the majority of the respondents.  Almost all of the 
respondents‘ replies are fully aligned with the relevant academic literature. 
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Table 32 below shows a comparison between the responses of the survey and the 
corresponding responses of Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey.  Clearly, views seem to 
coincide, though the prioritisation in certain cases differs. 
 
Insert table 32 – Summary comparison of results of the survey with Brau et al 
(2006) 
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows.    Section II gives an overview of 
the research methodology and data.  Sections III-VIII, in turn, review the IPO 
literature used to generate the survey questions and present detailed findings from the 
data analysis.  Section IX summarises the key conclusions. 
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II. Research Methodology 
A. Survey methodology and data sources 
 
One of the main challenges in conducting a survey of IPO firms is to find an 
effective distribution channel to the relevant individuals within the firms, and to 
entice them to complete the questionnaire.  Not only are the potential respondents 
extremely busy individuals, but they are also probably overwhelmed with 
questionnaires from various quarters.  The author of this thesis was fortunate enough 
to have the support of the Cyprus Stock Exchange in this effort.   
 
A letter was formally sent on the 1
st
 of February 2007 by Durham Business School to 
the Director General (CEO) of the C.S.E..  The letter described the survey, the reason 
for the survey and requested assistance in distributing the questionnaire to the listed 
firms.  In parallel mode, the procedure to be followed was  agreed with the C.S.E. 
authorities. 
 
A standardised questionnaire was employed for which each respondent is exposed to 
the same questions and the same system of coding responses.  The aim is to try to 
ensure that differences in responses to questions can be interpreted as reflecting 
differences amongst respondents, rather than differences in the processes that 
produced the answers.   
 
The Cyprus Stock Exchange distributed the questionnaire to all listed companies 
(140 in total
97
) encouraging them to support the research
98
 by replying to the 
questionnaire.   The targeted population of the survey was companies that were listed 
in the C.S.E. after January 1997 till December 2004.  Only four(4) companies that 
were outside this time frame replied and their responses were ignored.   
                                                 
97 It is worth noting that the CSE did not send the questionnaire to companies that were already delisted. 
98 For instance, the email sent by the Director General of the C.S.E. to accompany the survey included the 
following encouragement: “We would greatly appreciate if you could complete the questionnaire and send it by 
the latest the 3rd of May 2007…”  The email also stressed that the research was for the Doctoral Programme of 
Durham University, “…one of the oldest in the United Kingdom”. 
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The original e-mail was sent on the 12
th
 of April 2007, and was followed by two e-
mail reminders from the C.S.E., the first sent on the 7
th
 of May 207 and the last one 
on the 12
th
 of July 2007.  Subsequently, telephone calls were also made by the author 
to all firms.  To increase the response rate, the author promised to provide 
respondents with an early copy of the survey results.  The final responses were 
received over the period from April to September 2007.  Overall, 34 responses were 
received, out of which, 30 were usable surveys for a response rate of 21% from a 
total of 140 companies.  However, if the response ratio is calculated over the number 
of companies contacting an IPO in the C.S.E. over the period 1997-2004 (excluding 
closed-investment companies), then the response ratio rises to 31.3%.   
 
Compared to previously published research in financial economics, the response rate 
of the survey compares favourably with other surveys.  Graham and Harvey (2001) 
survey 4,587 CFOs of which 8.5% respond.  Trahan and Gitman (1995) survey 700 
CFOs and report a 12% response rate.  In a survey of 180 IPO firms that switch 
underwriters between the IPO and SEO, Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) report 
a 34% response rate.  Brau et al (2006) survey 336 CFOs and report a response rate 
of 18.8%. 
  
The survey, which is reproduced in Appendix A, included a preamble assuring 
respondents that their answers would be treated in the strictest confidence.  The 
survey consisted of 8 questions measured on a five-point Likert scale, 6 questions 
using a yes/no/don‘t know response, one open-ended question and two questions 
requiring a specific numerical reply. 
 
B. Survey limitations 
 
While the survey method provides insight directly from decision makers, as 
Aggarwal (1980) argues, the interpretation of survey data presents some limitations.  
Managers of firms were surveyed, so each response was the opinion of one 
individual and might not fully reflect the firm‘s position.  There is also potential 
concern about a non-response bias in spite of the relatively high response rate.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the time period of the survey might not be 
representative of other time periods.  It has been documented that financial 
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perspectives can change depending on the market conditions.  For example, in Welch 
(2000) and his subsequent work, Welch finds that financial economists‘ perceptions 
of the expected equity premium have changed based on market conditions.  
Therefore, to the extent that managers‘ sentiment is market-condition dependent, the 
results of the survey may not be applicable to markets that differ from the sample 
period. 
 
Insert table 33 – Sample representativeness 
 
Insert table 34 – Sample Statistics 
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III. The Going Public Decision – Motivations and timing 
 
In their review of the IPO literature, Ritter and Welch (2002) discuss three broad 
reasons why firms go public.  First, firms need to raise additional external equity for 
capital structure reasons and to fuel growth.  Second, principals desire an increase in 
liquidity.  Third, but not as important as the first two, firms could have non-financial 
reasons, such as prestige, market recognition, analyst coverage, and media attention.   
 
Ritter and Welch (2002) further divide existing theories on the aspect of why firms 
go public into two major groups namely, Life Cycle and Market Timing theories.  
Within each area there exist several articles that take different approaches.  Brau, 
Ryan and DeGraw (2006) outline these in a table which is reproduced below; Panel 
A lists life cycle theories and Panel B lists market-timing theories.  The early articles 
(1963 to 1984) in Panel A do not focus strictly on IPOs, whereas the more recent 
ones (1995-2003) focus on owner liquidity and reputation of IPO firms.  
 
Insert table 35 - Why do firms go public? Some dominant theories 
 
A. Life Cycle theories 
 
Life Cycle theories argue that there exists an optimal capital structure and firms act 
in predictable manners to obtain such optimality.  Firms prefer the cheapest source of 
financing (including opportunity costs) and only acquire expensive financing when 
the cheapest source is exhausted.  Following this line of reasoning, managers could 
conduct an IPO when the firm has reached the point in the life-cycle where external 
equity can help obtain an optimal capital structure (e.g., Scott (1976) and Modigliani 
and Miller (1963)) who do not strictly focus on IPOs, argue that firms conduct a 
public offering when external equity will minimise their cost of capital (thereby 
maximising the value of the company)).  Based on asymmetric information and 
possible stock price misevaluation, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) 
further argue for a pecking order of financing i.e., internal cash flow, debt financing 
and then external equity. 
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The first formal theory of the going public decision appeared in a paper by Luigi 
Zingales (1995).  He observed that it is much easier for a potential acquirer to spot a 
potential takeover target when its shares are publicly listed.  Moreover, entrepreneurs 
realise that acquirers can pressure targets on pricing concessions more than they can 
pressure outside investors.  By going public, entrepreneurs thus help facilitate the 
acquisition of their company for a higher value than what they would get from an 
outright sale.  In contrast, Black and Gilson (1998) point out that, entrepreneurs often 
regain control from the venture capitalists in venture-capital-backed companies at the 
IPO.   
 
Thus, many IPOs are not so much exits for the entrepreneur as they are for the 
venture capitalists.  Brau, Francis and Kohers (2003) using U.S. data examine the 
choice between an IPO and selling the firm to a publicly traded buyer, conditional on 
wishing to sell the company, having no data on companies that stay private.  They 
find that private firms are more likely to choose the IPO route over a takeover, the 
larger their transaction size and the lower the market-to-book ratio in the industry. 
 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) develop the more conventional wisdom that IPOs 
allow more dispersion of ownership, with its advantages and disadvantages.  Pre-IPO 
‗angel‘ investors or venture capitalists hold undiversified portfolios and, therefore, 
are not willing to pay as high a price as diversified public-market investors.  There 
are fixed costs associated with going public, however, and proprietary information 
cannot costlessly revealed.  Thus, early in its life cycle, a firm will be private, but if it 
grows sufficiently large, it becomes optimal to go public. 
 
Public trading per se has costs and benefits.  Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) point 
out that a high public price can attract product market competition.  Public trading, 
however, can, in itself, add value to the firm, as it may inspire more faith in the firm 
from other investors, customers, creditors, and suppliers.  Being the first in an 
industry to go public sometimes confers a first-mover advantage. 
 
Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003) suggest that IPO firms can increase their reputation 
by creating an analyst following. 
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In question 1 of the survey (How important were the following motivations for 
conducting the IPO?), the four most important motivations cited by the respondents 
for conducting an IPO are (a) to enhance the reputation of their company 
(Maksimovic and Pichler, (2001)), (b) to broaden the base ownership of their firm 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)), (c) to establish a market price/value for their 
firm (Zingales, (1995), Mello and Parsons, (2000)) and (d) to create public shares for 
use in future acquisitions (Brau, Francis and Kohers (2003), Zingales (1995)).  The 
least important motivations for conducting an IPO according to the respondents 
were: (a) to allow venture capitalists to cash-out (Black and Gilson (1998)); (b) their 
company has run out of private equity (Miller (1978)); and (c) to allow shareholders 
to sell part of their shares (Dhillon, Raman and Ramirez, (1999), Brau, Li and Shi 
(2005), Ang and Brau (2003)).  Results are shown in table 36. 
 
The combination of the most important cited motives by the respondents in the 
survey points to the grooming of their firms to acquire other companies (or be 
acquired) by raising their reputation (visibility), and placing their shares in an 
environment whereby, their value is established.  The newly established Cyprus 
Stock Exchange provided a ‗prestigious‘ platform whereby listed companies, which 
eyed Europe as their trading platform, could capitalise as a marketing weapon. 
 
During the period 1996-2004, the private equity industry in Cyprus was at its infancy 
and very few companies had private equity investors in their shareholdings. 
Moreover, the level of disintermediation in the Cypriot capital markers was very 
small for non-banking corporates.  Commercial banks filled in the shoes of private 
equity investors and bond investors alike.  Interest rates, both lending and deposit, 
had a legal cap (at 9% and 7% respectively), therefore, risk was not priced 
efficiently.  Moreover, most Cypriot firms, being family firms, are mostly 
undercapitalised (equity-wise) and funds are obtained from banks at large, by 
pledging personal securities of owners.  Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
respondents were not worried about minimising their firms‘ cost of capital nor did 
they pay particular attention to the pricing of debt. 
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Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey 336 US-based Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to 
compare practice to theory in the several areas of the IPO literature, amongst them 
motivations for going public and timing of the IPO.  They find that CFOs identify the 
creation of public shares for acquisitions as the most important motivation for going 
public.  They find that traditional textbooks explanations such as lowering the cost of 
capital (Scott (1976) and Modigliani and Miller (1958)) and the pecking order of 
financing i.e., internal equity, debt financing, and then external equity (Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)) are not amongst the most important reasons for 
conducting an IPO.  They also find that as far as high-tech firms are concerned, these 
view an IPO more as a strategic reputation-enhancing move than as a financing 
decision. 
 
Insert table 36 – IPO motivations 
 
B. Market-Timing theories 
 
Market-timing suggests that firms decide to go public based at least partially on 
market conditions.  Lucas and McDonald (1990) develop an asymmetric information 
model where firms postpone their equity issue if they know they are currently 
undervalued.  If a bear market places too low a value on the firm, given the 
knowledge of entrepreneurs, then they will delay their IPOs until a bull market offers 
more favourable pricing.  In Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993), firms avoid issuing in 
periods where few good-quality firms issue.  The authors find that firms tend to 
increase equity offerings more frequently in expansionary periods.  Lowry and 
Schwert (2002) argue that recent first-day share performance of firms going public 
leads other firms to decide to go public.  Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that market 
timing has large and persistent results on capital structure.  They find that 
fluctuations in market value have very long run impacts on capital structure. 
According to the authors, capital structure is the cumulative outcome of attempts to 
time the equity market.  
 
Other theories have argued that markets provide valuable information to 
entrepreneurs who respond to increased growth opportunities signalled by higher 
prices (Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Schultz (2003)).  Using long-run returns, 
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Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) posit that firms time their IPOs to take 
advantage of windows of opportunity that allow them to get the most attractive 
offering prices. 
 
Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that in addition to the above theories for IPO 
volume fluctuations, a plausible semi-rational theory without asymmetric 
information can also explain cycles in issuing activity.  Entrepreneurs‘ sense of 
enterprise value derives more from their internal perspective, their day-to-day 
involvement with the underlying business fundamentals, and less from the public 
stock market.  Sudden changes in the value of publicly traded firms are not as 
quickly absorbed into the private sense of value held by entrepreneurs.  Thus, 
entrepreneurs adjust their valuation with a lag.  As a result, even if the market is 
driven by irrational public sentiment or the entrepreneur‘s price is driven by 
irrational private sentiment, entrepreneurs are more inclined to sell shares after 
valuations in the public market have increased. 
 
In question 2 (To what extent did the following influence the timing of your possible 
IPO?), the respondents cited as most important influences on their IPO timing the (a) 
overall stock market conditions (Lucas and McDonald (1990), Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Alti, (2006), and Harris and Raviv (2013)), (b) the need for capital for 
growth (Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, (1993)), (c) industry conditions (Pagano et al 
(1998)) and (d) the first-day share price performance of recent IPOs (Lowry and 
Schwert, 2002)).  Results are shown in table 37. 
 
The respondents‘ replies seem to support the window of opportunity hypothesis 
(Loughran and Ritter (1995)).  Moreover, the period 1996-2004 is the European 
Union pre-accession era, and Cypriot firms were gearing up to face the stiff 
competition that would be created from the opening up of the Cypriot economy, thus 
the need for capital for growth.  The fact that almost all the listings that were 
undertaken over the period 1996-2004
99
 dealt with fresh capital rather than the sale 
of shares of existing shareholders demonstrates this argument.  The incumbent 
players in each industrial sector were careful not to allow any firm to take the lead by 
gathering relatively large sums of money from an IPO, thus threatening their leads.  
                                                 
99 The large majority of the IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange took place over the period 1999-2001 
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It is also worth mentioning that all firms that were eventually listed over the period 
2000 to 2004 applied for a listing the first six months of 2000.  Therefore, a ‗window 
of opportunity‘ did actually exist. 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) also argue that CFOs take into account market and industry 
stock returns and place less emphasis on the strength of the IPO market when 
considering the timing of their issue.  Overall, stock market conditions were 
identified by CFOs as the single most important determinant of timing.  They also 
find that venture capital backed firms and firms with smaller insider ownership 
decreases in the IPO, tend to view market timing issues as more important than their 
counterparts. 
 
Insert table 37 – IPO timing  
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IV. Underwriter selection in IPOs 
 
A small body of academic literature on the relation between underwriter reputation 
and issuer choice focuses on observable factors such as initial and long-term 
underpricing in the IPO market, tombstone rankings, and underwriter market share. 
 
The economic benefits to a firm associating itself with high quality underwriters 
appear to be well established. Michaely and Shaw (1994) show that higher 
capitalized (and, by inference, higher quality) underwriters underprice less in the 
period 1984-1988. Beatty and Ritter (1986) show that short-run mispricing by 
underwriters is associated with future market share losses in underwriting fees. 
Dunbar (2000) finds that the IPO underwriters, who underprice the most, providing 
the highest first-day returns for investors, lose IPO market share over time. If the 
amount of underpricing is taken as a proxy for lower quality, then the perception of 
quality appears to be related to underwriters' aggregate market share gains and losses 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Krigman, Shaw and Womack, (2001)). 
 
The implication is that firms engaging less frequently in underpricing, and being of 
presumably higher quality, will extract a higher proportion of the proceeds for the 
company and early investors. Nanda, Yin and Yun, (1995) and Carter, Dark and Sing 
(1998) also report that the excess performance of IPOs underwritten by higher 
quality investment banks is more positive in the long run. 
 
Ljungqvist et al. (2003) infer that in the 1990's, the relationship between underwriter 
prestige and underpricing appears to have reversed. Beatty and Welch (1996) 
demonstrate that higher quality underwriters have underpriced more in the 1990s. 
Kumar, McGee and Womack, (1998) confirm this observation, and find that the most 
prestigious underwriters with the highest market shares typically are associated with 
the hottest, most underpriced IPOs. 
 
Prior research has identified high quality underwriting firms through indirect 
inference. Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter et al. (1998) provide a metric of 
underwriter ‗pecking order,‘ ranking firms by where they appear on the tombstones 
of completed offerings. Megginson and Weiss (1991) link reputation of underwriters 
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to the market share of offerings completed. They implicitly argue that the highest-
quality underwriters will gain the largest offerings and the highest proportion of fees. 
 
One problem with using market share or a proxy like tombstone rankings to measure 
reputation or quality is that the specific tasks for which the underwriter is rewarded 
are undefined or, at best, ambiguous. 
 
In question 3 (How important were the following criteria in selecting your lead IPO 
underwriter), the respondents were asked to rate a list of criteria that they employed 
to select their lead IPO underwriter.  The most important criterion cited for selecting 
their lead IPO underwriter was the underwriter‘s overall reputation and status.  Also 
the underwriter‘s industry expertise and connections were highly rated as well as the 
institutional and retail investor client base of the underwriter (see table 38 for the 
results).   
 
The underwriter‘s reputation for spinning100 and whether the underwriter was a 
subsidiary of their company‘s main commercial bank were cited as the two least 
important criteria.  The latter point is interesting since the three larger local banks‘ 
investment banking subsidiaries had collectively over 60% market share of the IPOs 
over the period 1997-2004.  Having said that, independent (non-bank subsidiaries) 
underwriters had 40% market share which considering the fact that the three main 
local banks had a market share of over 75% of the total corporate loan market, points 
to the fact that firms possibly did not have the commercial bank criterion as a main 
decision factor in selecting their lead IPO underwriter.  Another explanation would 
be the fact that managers/owners of IPO firms did not want their banks to have 
access to the IPO proceeds they gathered so as not to pressure them to settle loans.  
The absence of market makers from the legal and regulatory setting is also reflected 
in the respondents' reply on the same criterion. 
 
Very few underwriters during the 1997-2004 period in Cyprus did have proper 
research departments that employed experienced analysts to follow up companies 
they took public and even so, there was no regulatory framework regarding research 
                                                 
100 The practice of investment banks setting aside portions of IPO shares of companies they take public for top 
executives of other companies in exchange for reciprocating business to the investment banks. 
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analysts‘ professional conduct.  It was only after 2004, that a small number of 
underwriters began forming research departments with truly qualified personnel. 
 
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), using a sample of 572 firms that conducted an 
IPO between January 1993 and December 1995 in the NYSE, survey 62 CFOs and 
ask them to rank various criteria used to select an IPO underwriter.  The respondents 
ranked the underwriter‘s overall reputation and status as the most important reason 
for choosing the IPO lead underwriter followed by the quality and reputation of the 
research department and the underwriter‘s industry/sectoral experience and 
connections.  The respondents also cited as the least important reasons, the retail 
client base of the underwriter and the non-equity related services (e.g., advice on 
M&A, debt).   
 
In this survey, the retail client base of the underwriter was deemed by respondents to 
be an important criterion in choosing the underwriter, the reason being that retail 
investors in Cyprus were very active in the primary market, especially during the 
boom years (1999-2001) and commanded significant amounts of money.  Antoniou 
et al (2004) in their second survey of assets and debts of Cypriot households find that 
the participation rate of the population in direct
101
 stock owning in 2002 reached 51.4 
per cent compared to 25.3 per cent in 1999.  Moreover, they find that the largest 
increase in direct stock holding participation was reported among those with less 
than CY£5,000 reported annual income (from 8.80 per cent in 1999 to 30.70 per cent 
in 2002).  They also find that stockholding participation increased for all age groups, 
even for households above 70 years (from 10.4 per cent in 1999 to 20.3 per cent in 
2002).  They also find that one third of the Cypriot households in 2002 owned stocks 
directly in only one company
102
 (42.4 per cent in 1999). 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2005) argue that CFO responses in their survey show that the 
principal intermediary role (i.e., the ability to provide expertise needed to carry out a 
successful IPO) is the core issue considered in selecting an underwriter.  The three 
                                                 
101 The first law for the creation of mutual funds in Cyprus was enacted in April 2004.  Therefore, investors who 
wanted to get an exposure in Cypriot equities had no other choice but to directly own Cypriot shares. 
102 Demetra Investment Public Limited was a closed-end investment company formed by the co-operative 
movement in Cyprus to protect the leakage in deposits that flowed primarily to the stock market and secondarily 
to the commercial banks as a direct result of retail participation of investors in the IPO craze of 1999-2001. 
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criteria rated as the most important by CFOs in the authors‘ survey in selecting an 
underwriter are: (i) overall reputation, (ii) quality of research, and (iii) industry 
expertise, findings which are in line with Krigman, Shaw and Womack, (2001).  The 
authors also point out that CFOs who select high prestige underwriters attach a 
significantly higher level of importance to these three selection criteria than CFOs 
who opt for low prestige underwriters.  The latter are more concerned about 
valuation promises and fee structure. 
 
In the survey, respondents do not seem to be concerned with valuation promises and 
fee structure. 
 
Insert table 38 – Criteria for selecting lead underwriter   
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V. Underpricing in IPOs 
 
Numerous explanations for underpricing have been advanced. For clarity, eight (8) 
subgroups were formed based on their underlying premise.  
 
The three (3) key parties to an IPO transaction are the issuing firm, the financial 
services firm underwriting and marketing the deal, and investors.  Asymmetric 
information models assume that one of these three parties knows more than the other 
two.  First, asymmetric information between the underwriter and the issuer leads to 
underpricing. Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982) argue that 
underwriters exploit superior market knowledge to underprice issues, minimize 
marketing effort, and ingratiate themselves with buy-side clients. 
 
Second, underpricing exists due to asymmetric information between issuers and 
potential investors. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that investor uncertainty about the 
IPO firm biases offering prices lower than the unknown future market price. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and Spatt and 
Srivastava (1991) argue that underpricing rewards sophisticated investors for 
divulging accurate valuation information during the book-building process. 
 
Third, underpricing occurs because of asymmetric information between informed 
and uninformed investors.  Rock‘s (1986) model, also known as the winner‘s curse, 
is probably the best known asymmetric information model, and is an application of 
Akerlof‘s (1970) lemons problem in the used car market: uninformed buyers will 
withdraw from a market if their informational disadvantage results in their being 
presented with an adverse selection from the quality distribution of goods.  
Therefore, uninformed investors must be compensated for participating in the IPO. 
 
Fourth, underpricing serves as a protection against possible future litigation from 
investors.  Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic (1988) posit that firms intentionally underprice 
their shares as a form of insurance against future liability.  Hughes and Thakor 
(1992) extend Tinic‘s analysis in a game-theoretic setting and specify the conditions 
required for equilibrium underpricing.  Hensler (1995) formalises Tinic‘s model 
using a utility-maximisation single-period model.  Both models similarly predict a 
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positive relation between litigation risk and underpricing.  Lin et al. (2013) test the 
insurance effect of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis using a sample of 13.759 IPOs 
across 40 countries from 1991 to 2011.  They find evidence in support of the 
insurance effect of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis in an international setting.  They 
also find a significant negative relationship between underpricing and the quality of 
law enforcement.  The authors argue that their results suggest that better enforcement 
of the securities laws reduces the level of underpricing.  
 
Fifth, underpricing may serve a marketing function. Welch (1992) models the idea 
that underpricing can cause a domino or cascade effect among investors that raises 
demand for the issue. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that underpricing allows 
for cost savings in other areas of marketing the issue. Demers and Lewellen (2003) 
assert that underpricing brings attention to the stock on the opening day. Boehmer 
and Fishe (2001) demonstrate that underpricing increases the after-issue trading 
volume of the stock.  Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) build upon the 
work of Miller (1977) and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment 
bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market 
for an initial public offering (IPO). Cook et al (2006) argue that investment bankers 
have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market 
for it and consequently, an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment 
investors is important. 
 
Sixth, underpricing broadens the ownership base after the IPO. Booth and Chua 
(1996) propose that underpricing helps ensure a wide base of owners to increase the 
liquidity of the newly public firm.  Brennan and Franks (1997) agree that 
underpricing allows for a wide base of owners but argue that the motivation is to 
entrench management.  Stoughton and Zechner (1998) argue that underpricing allows 
for the creation of a block holder that can increase monitoring. 
 
Seventh, underpricing may facilitate questionable practices. Maynard (2002) and 
Griffith (2004) suggest that underpricing permits spinning.  Aggarwal (2003), Fishe 
(2002), and Krigman, Shaw and Womack (1999) argue that underpricing allows for 
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the practice of flipping
103
 by favored investors. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) 
assert that underpricing enriches friends and family through directed share programs. 
 
The eighth and final explanation is by Loughran and Ritter (2002), who advance a 
behavior theory that suggests issuers are pleasantly surprised with the amount they 
can raise in the lPO (i.e., their new-found personal wealth). Under Prospect theory
104
, 
they are not significantly concerned with underpricing and therefore it exists. 
 
In this study, two underpricing issues are explored, namely expectations and 
explanations.  The respondents were asked to indicate the level of underpricing 
(overpricing) they expected for their IPO and the actual underpricing (overpricing) 
that occurred.  The respondents were asked: “What per cent under/overpricing did 
you expect from the offer price to the first day closing price?‖  The majority of the 
respondents (77%) replied to the question, with a median (mean) expected 
underpricing of 25% (69.35%).  This expectation compares to an actual median 
(mean) underpricing of 16.07% (116.61%)
105
 for the companies that completed an 
IPO over the period 1997-2004.  The respondents‘ feedback provides mixed 
inferences as 30% of the respondents seem not to be able to distinguish between 
underpricing and overpricing
106
 while the rest seem to be informed on underpricing 
expectations. 
 
Regarding explanations, respondents are asked to indicate on a five-point scale 
(1=not important; 5=very important), “To what extent do you feel the following led to 
the level of underpricing you might have expected?”, the results in Table 40 show 
that the majority (68.4%) of the respondents rate as not important the issue of 
mitigating future litigation by investors who claim the offer price was too high.  This 
                                                 
103 The practice of buying the shares in an IPO and then selling the shares immediately after the start of public 
trading of the shares to turn an immediate profit. 
104 Prospect theory formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) asserts that individuals make choices under 
uncertainty by maximising a value function that evaluates wealth changes, rather than an expected utility 
function that ranks choices according to the level of expected utility.  The value function is positive and concave 
in the domain of positive changes and negative and convex in the domain of negative changes. 
105 Excluding outliers, the corresponding numbers are 5.66% and (76.90%). 
106 A glossary of the main terms in the questionnaire was given to respondents as an appendix to the 
questionnaire explaining amongst others the meaning of underpricing and the difference between underpricing 
and overpricing. 
Chapter3 – A survey on managerial attitudes regarding Initial Public Offerings on the CSE 
 
217 
 
is consistent with the fact that between 1997 and 2002 (June) – the period that the 
great majority of the IPOs took place in the Cyprus Stock Exchange – there was no 
legal recourse either to the issuer or the underwriter for matters of mispricing an 
issue.  The majority of the respondents also places small importance on the cascading 
effect and their personal wealth. 
   
Insert table 39 – Expectations for the level of underpricing  
 
Respondents view three (3) rationales as moderately important sources of 
underpricing namely, (1) a desire on the part of the underwriters to incur the favour 
of institutional investors, (2) a desire to widen the ownership base and (3) to increase 
the after-issue trading of the stock.  The low scores on marketing, spinning and 
flipping indicate that respondents generally seem to place a certain degree of 
confidence in their underwriters and the underwriting process. 
 
Insert table 40 - Actual observed level of underpricing 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) in their survey of CFOs find that the latter are well 
informed on underpricing expectations. Moreover, the majority of CFOs believe that 
underpricing serves to compensate investors for taking the risk of the IPO.  CFOs 
also view three other rationales as important sources of underpricing namely, a desire 
on the part of underwriters to incur the favour of institutional investors, a desire to 
achieve a wide base of owners and a desire to increase post-issue trading volume.  
CFOs attribute most underpricing to market uncertainty and the lack of perfect 
information.  
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VI. Signalling in IPOs 
 
Due to asymmetric information between IPO insiders and potential investors, 
signaling theory continues to be an important component of IPO research. Early 
papers, such as Leland and Pyle (1977), argue that selling insider shares and selling a 
large portion of the firm in the IPO served as negative signals to potential investors. 
Since that time, other researchers have used the context of IPOs to advance signaling 
theory. Within signaling theory is the idea of certification. Generally, using 
prestigious underwriters (e.g., Booth and Smith (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990), 
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998)), using a reputable accounting firm (e.g., Titman and 
Trueman (1986), Beatty (1989), Michaely and Shaw (1995)), and having Venture 
Capital backing (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry et al. (1990)) serve as 
strong signals or certification that the firm going public is a good firm. 
 
Three other positive signals are proposed in the literature. First, Welch (1989), Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989), and Chemmanur (1993) model that only good firms can afford 
to dissipate wealth by underpricing. Second, Courteau (1995) and Brau, Lambson, 
and McQueen (2005) model that insiders who commit to a long lock-up period of 
time after the IPO in which insiders agree not to sell personal shares-signal firm 
quality. Third, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) suggest that a history of strong 
earnings signals future strong performance. 
 
In Table 41, the respondents when asked: “What type of signal do the following 
actions convey to investors regarding the value of a firm going public?”, they cited 
as the most important signal the strong historical earnings of an IPO firm
107
, 
followed by the usage of a top investment bank as underwriter and manager of the 
IPO, the commitment by insiders to a lock-up period, the use of a big-five accounting 
firm, a large first-day share jump and the issue of free warrants.  The selling of 
insider shares in the IPO and the selling of a large portion of the firm in the IPO are 
cited as strong negative signals.  The reasons cited as negative signals were actually 
                                                 
107 The CSE regulations basically made the listing of newly incorporated companies or companies with less than 
three years of track record (audited accounts for three years) almost impossible.  An exception was to list 
through the market for project companies.  Only one(1) company was listed through this route. 
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observed in reality as most of the IPO firms did not sell existing shares nor did they 
sell more than 50% of their company‘s total shareholding. 
 
Insert table 41 – Signalling  
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) find that CFOs of large firms view strong historical 
earnings as the most positive signal in the IPO process.  Using a top investment bank 
is the second-strongest positive signal and committing to a long lock-up is the third-
strongest positive signal.  Selling a large portion of the firm, issuing units, and selling 
insider shares are all viewed as negative signals. 
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VII. IPO process design 
 
In this section, a few IPO topics are addressed that have not generated a large amount 
of literature, but are still of interest and are combined in one section for brevity. 
 
First, management‘s concern is investigated regarding the threat of negative accu-
sations stemming from the practice of ‗window dressing‘ in the IPO prospectus.  
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) find evidence suggesting that naïve investors may 
be systematically fooled by earnings management operations of ‗window dressing‘, 
aimed at reporting earnings in excess of cash flows by taking opportunistic positive 
accruals.  There is high information asymmetry between investors and issuers at the 
time of the IPO.  If buyers rely on earnings reported in the prospectus, but are 
unaware that they are inflated by accruals, they will pay too high a price.  They find a 
significant ability of discretionary accruals to predict IPO share underperformance, 
suggesting that as information about the firm is revealed over time, investors may 
recognise that earnings are not maintaining their momentum, and adjust prices.  In 
fact, when inflating accruals firms borrow income from future periods so that 
managers cannot overstate earnings over long periods of time without being detected.   
 
The same results are obtained by Roosenboom, van der Goot, and Mertens (2003) 
who studied a sample of 64 Dutch IPOs over the period 1984 And 1994.  They find 
that IPO firms do manage their earnings during the fiscal year of the issue; moreover, 
companies which lavish on discretionary accruals experience worse long-run stock-
price performance. 
 
Several other studies have documented the use of earnings management related to 
securities offerings in the United States.  Friedlan (1994) shows that IPO firms make 
income-increasing accruals in the most current statements included in the prospectus.  
In contrast, Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993), find little, if any, manipulation in the 
periods preceding the IPO.  Ball and Shivakumar (2008) contrary to popular belief, 
find that IPO firms report earnings more conservatively due to higher quality 
reporting demanded by public firms.  Magnam and Cormier (1997) report that 
Canadian IPOs take deliberate steps to move reported earnings numbers in the first 
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year as a public company toward their voluntary forecast made at the time of the 
IPO.   
 
Li, Zhang, and Zhou (2005) argue that the degree of earnings management is 
inversely related to the quality of an issuing firm.  Low quality IPOs tend to engage 
in more earnings management and are more likely to delist and delist sooner. 
 
Second, the importance of a unit offering
108
 as a process issue is considered.  Firms 
that issue unit IPOs are small, risky, marketed by less reputable underwriters than 
those that market share-only IPOs, and generally are service oriented and high 
technology companies (Schultz 1993; Jain 1994). Barry, Muscarella, and Vetsuypens 
(1991) note that when warrants are granted to underwriters as part of the IPO 
arrangement, they represent a significant component of the aggregate compensation 
and drive up the cost of going public. Schultz (1993) maintains that unit IPOs are 
multistage financing arrangements that lower agency costs by reducing the 
probability that excess cash will be invested in negative net present value projects. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) propose a competing justification for unit IPOs. In 
a world characterized by asymmetric information, they develop a theory in which 
high-risk firms issue units. 
 
In response to the question ―From your perspective, how important were the 
following IPO process issues”, Table 42 shows that certain process issues are 
important to the respondents e.g., (1) the need to carry out financial and legal due 
diligence, (2) placing shares privately prior to the IPO, (3) the offering to include 
free warrants, and, (4) the threat of accusations pertaining to window dressing.   
 
Before June 2002
109
, there was no requirement from the Cypriot authorities for a 
financial and legal due diligence nor was any requirement for a lock-up and the IPO 
underwriters did not have any legal responsibility to investors and issuers alike apart 
from providing comfort letters to cover themselves from misrepresentation.  The 
                                                 
108 When warrants are bundled with equity in an IPO, the security is known as unit IPO.  Practitioners often refer 
to such arrangements as „sweeteners‟ which encourage subscription in IPOs where interest is otherwise low. 
109 In June 2002, the new law concerning financial services companies was enacted and alongside the duties of 
the underwriters in case of new offerings. 
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majority of the respondents replied that the threat of accusations pertaining to 
window dressing in the prospectus was a moderately important IPO process issue. 
 
Insert table 42 – IPO process issues 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2005) argue that CFOs recognise the importance of presenting 
strong earnings in the prospectus, but are not pre-occupied with potential negative 
backlash from window dressing. 
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VIII. Other IPO issues 
 
Each of the previous sections addresses issues pertaining to the process of going 
public.  During the process and even before the decision to go public, it is reasonable 
to assume that firms have certain concerns.  It is these concerns that are explored in 
this section.  In addition, the knowledge of the respondents is examined on a number 
of certain parameters which are known to be important empirically within the IPO 
conjecture. 
 
When asked the question “To what extent did each of the following create concern in 
the decision to conduct an IPO?” the respondents‘ greatest concern was their desire 
to maintain decision-making control, followed by the fact that they wanted to avoid 
ownership dilution and the market/industry conditions.  Disclosing information to 
competitors was also found to be a moderately important concern together with the 
costs/fees of the IPO and the reporting requirements of the C.S.E..  The respondents‘ 
replies also point to the fact that they had no concern being acquired by another firm, 
possibly because they would have never conducted the IPO if they have had to 
forego control of their firms.  Moreover, no IPO took place in the C.S.E. for which, 
the owners sold control of the firm (see table 12 for results). 
 
The majority of the respondents replied that smaller companies are less likely to go 
public.  The majority of the respondents also replied that younger companies are less 
likely to go public as well as that riskier companies are more likely to go public.  
Highly leveraged companies are more likely to go public according to the majority of 
the respondents.  It is interesting to note that only a small minority of the respondents 
firms made a secondary equity offering and an even smaller percentage made a 
secondary debt offering.  Overall, respondents seem to be aligned with academic 
literature on issues such as size, age and risk insofar as IPOs are concerned. 
 
The respondents also commented on the reduction of bureaucracy and the delays of 
the CSE authorities in reviewing IPO applications.  The delay in reviewing 
applications was at very high levels as the average period for a company to list on the 
Cyprus Stock Exchange from the day it applied to the day of listing was a staggering 
337 days.  This delay exacerbated the risk of the underwriters as well as the risk of 
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failure of the IPO.  On the one hand, the underwriters had to provide ‗hard‘ 
underwriting – by law – to the issuers for that part of the issue which was destined 
for the wider public.   
 
The huge delay thus increased their risk since the Cyprus Stock Exchange was on a 
downhill since mid-November 1999.  One can easily wonder why the underwriters 
actually stayed in the ‗game‘ with all the perceived risks looming over them.  One 
possible answer could be the fact that many companies had already executed private 
placements to a large number of investors (mostly retail) and therefore, the 
underwriters could not easily persuade their clients to return the monies to the 
investors so that they could walk away from the IPO.  These private placement 
proceeds in many cases were expended by the issuers long before the IPO.  By taking 
this long to approve a listing, the money was held up in companies that executed 
large private placements and therefore, the investors soon run out of cash as they 
were all waiting for the companies to get listed so that they could liquidate their 
holdings.  Thus, new issues were destined to fail due to the lack of liquidity in the 
primary market.  
 
On the other hand, the companies were caught in a spiral since as market conditions 
worsened their IPO was most probably destined to fail, thus making difficult to find 
the right number of investors to achieve the necessary float. 
 
Insert table 43 – Value signalling 
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IX. Conclusions 
 
Cypriot managers‘ insights into the IPO process are studied. By surveying managers 
to obtain a real-world perspective of the IPO process, one can compare their beliefs 
and experiences to both academic theory and the findings of empirical research.  One 
can also compare the responses of managers in an emerging market with those of 
managers in a highly developed market. 
 
It is found that in some areas, harmony is observed between managers‘ beliefs and 
academic theory. But in other key areas, managers‘ perceptions seem to diverge from 
traditional academic theory. 
 
It is also observed that Cypriot managers‘ overall views coincide at large with views 
of managers in a country (US) with arguably the most advanced capital market in the 
world. 
 
Specifically the summarised key conclusions of the research of this survey are: 
 Cypriot managers cite the enhancement of their firm‘s reputation as the single 
most important motivation for going public.  Grooming of their firms to 
acquire other companies (or be acquired) by raising their reputation 
(visibility), and placing their shares in an environment whereby, their value is 
established seems to be their main motivational frame. 
 The respondents‘ replies seem to support the window of opportunity 
hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter (1995)) seeking to go public at times that 
portends a high stock price.  The window is articulated in terms of the overall 
stock market and industry conditions rather than IPO market conditions. 
 The underwriter selection seems to be driven mainly by the underwriter‘s 
overall reputation and status.  Also the underwriter‘s industry expertise and 
connections were highly rated as well as the institutional and retail investor 
client base of the underwriter. 
 Cypriot managers‘ knowledge on underpricing is mixed as it seems that a 
number of them are not able to distinguish between underpricing and 
overpricing in contrast to the great majority of the respondents in Brau and 
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Fawcett (2006) survey. Cypriot managers feel that underpricing exists to 
incur the favour of institutional investors. 
 Respondents in this survey cite historical earnings as the most important 
positive signal regarding their firm‘s value which coincides with the view of 
respondents in Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey.  Lock-ups and using 
prestigious underwriters are also cited as strong signals also agreeing with 
Brau and Fawcett respondent.  Cashing out by insiders is considered as a 
negative signal, a view which also coincides with that of respondents in Brau 
and Fawcett (2006) survey. 
 Cypriot managers view the need to carry out financial and legal due diligence 
as the most important IPO process design issue.  Similarly to respondents in 
Brau and Fawcett (2006), window dressing is not found to be of particular 
importance. 
 Cypriot managers‘ concern on conducting an IPO seems too focused on the 
desire to maintain decision-making control as well as market/industry 
conditions and avoiding ownership dilution.  Responses in Brau and Fawcett 
(2006) coincide with those in the survey, but placing more importance on the 
avoidance of ownership dilution.  They also agree that maintaining decision-
making control is the most important criterion for conducting an IPO. 
 Cypriot managers seem to understand what type of company usually lists its 
shares, denoting an understanding of key issues of the academic literature.    
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Chapter 4 – Overall summary and conclusions 
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I. Introduction 
 
This last chapter presents an overall summary of the thesis and its conclusions.  The 
chapter is organised as follows: Section II presents a general overview of the study; 
Section III provides a summary of the main results from the three empirical chapters.  
Section IV discusses the implications of the studies; Section V describes the 
limitations of the study; Section VI offers some suggestions for future research and 
finally Section VII summarises and concludes the research.  
 
II. Overall view of the study 
 
The primary aim of this study is to explore the performance of IPOs in the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange and the possible influence of earnings management on these IPOs.  
The study also presents the results of a questionnaire survey of managers of CSE 
listed companies on various aspects of the extant IPO academic literature.  Even 
though similar studies have been the matter of academic research in many developed 
markets, the evidence from novice markets, such as Cyprus, is scant.  The thesis 
provides the first thorough study of IPOs in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over a 
period of six years (1997 to 2002), investigating the short- and long-run performance 
of these IPOs and whether these companies engage in income increasing accruals 
prior to their IPOs.     
 
Cyprus Stock Exchange, a start-up stock exchange, with a relatively new but 
comparably densely market for listed companies, poses an interesting research case.  
In particular, the institutional characteristics that existed in the Cypriot capital market 
over the period 1997 to 2002 e.g., a novice stock exchange, inexperienced market 
participants, lack of investment options available because of various restrictions 
(e.g., capital flows and interest rates), weak legal and institutional framework, 
combined with a number of socioeconomic and political factors at the time makes 
IPOs in the CSE a subject of great interest.  This study contributes to the existing 
knowledge of the performance of IPOs in emerging/novice market stock exchanges 
and earnings management. 
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A total of CY£676.3 mln (€1.15 bn) of fresh equity was raised through IPOs over the 
period 1997 to 2002 with 87.7% raised in the two years 2000 and 2001.  The General 
Index of the CSE rose from 82 units in January 1997 to 852 units in November 1999 
and declining back to 103 units by September 2001.  The market capitalisation of the 
CSE rose from €2.46 bn in 1997 to €20.73 bn in 1999 and declining to €6.67 bn in 
2001.  In order to address IPO performance, this thesis employs a sample of 79 IPOs 
listed in the CSE over the period 1997 to 2002.  The sample represents 64% of the 
total number of firms that were listed over the period.  Earnings management is 
investigated using a sample of 46 IPOs and the questionnaire survey sample consists 
of 30 responses which represents a response rate of 31%. 
 
III. Summary of the results    
 
This thesis has presented 3 empirical studies concerning CSE IPOs, the results of 
which are summarised in this section. 
 
A. The price performance of IPOs in the CSE 1997-2002 
The results regarding the performance of the 79 CSE IPOs are in agreement with the 
existing international evidence.  In particular, the findings show the existence of 
ultra-high returns, the existence of a hot issue period, and long-run under-
performance of IPOs over a three-year period.  Specifically, one can observe that 
IPOs in the CSE offered investors initial (first day) returns that are amongst the 
higher in the World even after adjusting for the hot issue period of 1999.  Also, 
Cypriot firms seem to exploit a ‗window of opportunity‘ that was opened in the 
market for listing. 
 
Moreover, Cypriot IPOs underperform in the long-run as the majority of IPOs in 
academic studies do.  Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) and Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHARs) are calculated for three time periods, namely, 12-, 24, 
and 36-months.  CARs are found to be negative for all years in the sample period in 
the 24-, and 36-month periods (BHARs are also found to be in negative territory for 
the 24- and 36-month periods except for the year 2000 where their mean is 
marginally positive).  In the 12-month period, average CARs over the sample period 
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are all positive.  Moreover, IPOs in the ‗hot‘ issue period have worse performance 
than the rest of the pack which confirms that findings of many researchers that IPOs 
in ‗hot‘ periods have a worse performance than the rest in the long-run. 
 
B. Earnings management and IPOs in the CSE 1997-2002 
Using both univariate and multivariate tests Discretionary Accruals (DA) are 
observed to rise before the IPO and reverse the year following the first full year of 
listing.  The same findings are also reflected in profitability measures. 
 
Analysing the multivariate relationship between short- and long-run IPO returns, 
evidence is found that discretionary accruals have a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with underpricing.  Moreover, evidence is found that the 
components of accruals explain well the long-run stock price performance. 
  
Overall the evidence suggests that the managers of CSE IPOs opportunistically 
advance accruals in an attempt to improve earnings prior to the IPO.  Income 
increasing accruals drove earnings higher before the IPO and reversed after the IPO.  
Earnings management in CSE IPOs seems to be part of wider institutional and 
procedural inefficiencies that existed in the IPO process amplifying the level of first 
day returns whilst at the same time, enhancing long term underperformance. 
 
C. A survey on managerial attitudes regarding IPOs in the CSE 
Surveying managers to obtain a real-world perspective of the IPO process, it is found 
that in some areas, harmony is observed between managers‘ beliefs and academic 
theory. But in other key areas, managers‘ perceptions seem to diverge from 
traditional academic theory. 
 
 Six specific aspects of the IPO process were studied namely, (1) motives for going 
public; (2) the timing of IPOs; (3) criteria for choosing an underwriter; (4) IPO 
underpricing; (5) IPO signalling; and (6) reasons to stay private. Extra insight was 
also attempted to be added by testing managerial behaviour on certain IPO process 
issues.   
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Evidence is found that Cypriot managers‘ overall views coincide at large with views 
of managers in the US, a country with arguably the most advanced capital market in 
the world. 
 
IV. Implications of the study 
 
Several general implications can be drawn out of this thesis for academics, regulators 
and policy makers, investors, professionals such as security analysts and certifying 
agents and companies aiming at listing their shares.  Specifically:  
 The academic community, which could utilise the findings of the study to 
understand better the role of institutional setting on IPO ‗anomalies‘ as well 
as the maturity of stock exchanges on IPO price performance behaviour. 
 Policy makers and regulators alike to assist them in drafting improved laws 
for the future as well as avoiding mistakes of the past.  Specifically, the laws 
must aim at protecting the minority shareholders and making more 
accountable certifying agents and managers of IPO firms.  
 Investors and portfolio managers who will be more educated and informed on 
making better decisions in the future regarding IPOs especially in newly 
formed equity capital markets.  In particular, stock exchanges that lack strong 
institutional framework could offer excellent opportunities for ultra-high 
short-run returns.  Alternatively, investors and portfolio managers will be 
informed so as to avoid long-run losses. 
 Professionals (such as corporate financiers, accountants and lawyers), 
especially those dealing with IPOs who will be able to draw on the findings 
of the study to improve the knowledge and professional practices when 
dealing with issuers.  Principally, certifying agents to become more wary of 
firms that employ accruals aggressively to enhance valuation parameters and 
achieve higher gross proceeds.  
 Prospective issuers to become more educated on matters involving avoiding 
the boosting accruals and consequently IPO valuations as this is a short-lived 
trick of becoming unpopular with market participants. 
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V. Limitations of the study 
 
The results and implications of this study should be considered in the context of the 
following limitations.   
 
First, the sample employed in this study is relatively small compared to studies on 
developed markets. However, as Agathee et al. (2012) and Gasbarro et al (2003) 
argue, the sample size is also relatively small in other emerging market IPO studies 
citing a number of studies.  Moreover, recognising that the size of the sample is 
relatively small, a number of robustness checks were performed to verify the 
sensitivity of the results e.g., reducing the impact of outliers. 
 
Second, this study calculates the first-day stock market performance.  A number of 
studies have argued that in stock exchanges where liquidity is relatively thin, first 
day returns should be calculated after the first week.    In this study, first day returns 
are also calculated for 5-days, 30 days, 60 days and 90 days and they all show that 
the first-day returns remain exceptionally high. 
 
Third, due to its young age, the CSE, at the time of the study, does not have enough 
listed companies to form a control group which researchers can employ to make 
comparisons.  This is needed in earnings management studies when the Jones or 
modified Jones models are employed.  However, as Dechow et al. (1995) 
demonstrated, all the earnings management models have weaknesses.  The model 
employed in this study, despite its weaknesses produces results that provide evidence 
that earnings management is observed.  The model compares accruals in a test period 
with accruals in a benchmark period and attributes deviations from the benchmark 
measure to accounting discretion.  In order to account for the growth that usually 
exists in IPO firms, total accruals are proportionally controlled with sales in 
successive periods.  Specifically, the amount of total accruals that is attributable to 
discretion is the difference between total accruals in the test period standardised by 
sales in the test period and total accruals in the benchmark period standardized by 
sales in the benchmark period. Total accruals are calculated as the difference 
between Net Income before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations. 
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As Graham and Harvey mention (2001) “…Surveys measure beliefs and not 
necessarily actions. Survey analysis faces the risk that the respondents are not 
representative of the population of firms or that the survey questions are 
misunderstood”.  The survey, despite the relatively small sample (140), has a high 
response rate (30%) and provides information on the views of managers in publicly 
listed companies in a novice stock exchange. 
 
VI. Suggestions for future research 
 
While this study is the first comprehensive study of Initial Public Offerings in the 
Cyprus Stock Exchange, the findings suggest a number of avenues for further 
research.  It would be of considerable interest to study the IPOs that were listed after 
2002 so that the effect of due diligence rules and the change of the law making 
underwriters responsible for the price is exposed.  Moreover, it would also be of 
interest to carry out an accounting-based operating performance analysis of the IPOs 
that were listed over the period 1997 to 2002 both pre- and post-IPO.  This would 
provide an alternative analysis as to the reasons of the decline in IPO price 
performance in the long-run. Additionally, a future study could utilize a cross 
country variation in institutional factors aiming to explain differences in the results 
and therefore the impact of certain institutional factors. 
 
Future research may also compare earnings management of IPOs pre- and post- 
enacting of the CySEC law which makes due diligence in IPOs compulsory and 
establishes clearly the responsibilities of underwriters towards investors.  In this way, 
one can show whether earnings management continued or was minimised by 
certifying agents.   
 
VII. Summary and conclusions 
 
Overall the results of this thesis support the existing literature i.e., that IPOs are 
underpriced in the short run and underperform in the long-run over a 36-month 
period.  It is evident that CSE IPOs produced exceptional first-day returns over the 
period 1997-2002.  Cypriot firms exploited a ‗window of opportunity‘ to list their 
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shares.  However, the large inefficiencies and continuous change in the regulatory 
and institutional framework of the market resulted in huge delays in listing which 
ultimately affected performance.  CSE IPOs also underperformed over a 36-month 
period as the majority of IPOs in most academic studies do. Moreover, IPOs in the 
hot issue period have worse performance than the rest of the pack which also 
confirms the findings of many researchers that IPOs in ‗hot‘ periods have a worse 
performance than the rest in the long-run. 
 
CSE IPO firms seem to manage their earnings by making income increasing accruals 
before going public which reverse after listing.  Moreover, there is also evidence that 
discretionary accruals have a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
short-run returns, meaning that as accruals rise, underpricing increases.  Likewise, 
the multivariate results show that there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with the components of accruals and long-run performance.    
 
Through a questionnaire survey of Cypriot managers in CSE listed companies, there 
is evidence that in certain areas there is harmony between these managers‘ beliefs 
and IPO academic theory.  But in several other key areas, there is also divergence of 
views.  All in all, Cypriot managers‘ views coincide at large with views of US IPO 
firms CFOs in similar studies. 
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APPENDIX A - IPO underpricing in the world 
Country Reference Period Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Underpricing 
Argentina Eijgenhuijsen and van der Valk 1991 – 1994 20 +  4.4% 
Australia Lee, Taylor & Walter; Woo; Pham; Ritter 1976 – 2011 1,562 +21.8% 
Austria Aussenegg, Ritter 1971 – 2010 102 +   6.3% 
Belgium Rogiers, Manigart and Ooghe; Manigart; 
DuMortier; Ritter 
1971 – 2006 114 +13.5% 
Brazil Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez; Saito; 
Ushisima 
1979 – 2011 275 + 33.1% 
Bulgaria Nikolov 2004 – 2007 9 + 36.5% 
Canada Jog and Riding; Jog and Srivastava; 
Kyzanowski, Lazrak and Rakita; Ritter 
1971 – 2010 696 +   6.7% 
Chile Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez; Celis and 
Maturana; Ritter 
1982 – 2006 65 +   8.4% 
China Chen, Choi and Jiang; Jia and Zhang 1990 – 2010 2,102 +137.4% 
Cyprus Gounopoulos, Nounis and Stylianides 1999 – 2011 66 +  20.8% 
Denmark Jakobsen and Sorensen;Ritter 1984 – 2011 164 +    7.4% 
Finland Keloharju 1984 – 2006 162 +  17.2% 
France Husson and Jacquillat; Leleux and Muzyka; 
Paliard and Belletante; Derrien and Womack; 
Chahine; Ritter;Vismara 
1983 – 2010 697 +  10.5% 
Germany Ljungqvist; Rocholl; Ritter; Vismara 1978 – 2011 736 +  24.2% 
Greece Nounis, Kazantzis and Thomas; Thamadakis, 
Gounopoulos and Nounis 
1976 – 2011 373 +  50.8% 
Hong Kong McGuiness; Zhao and Wu; Ljungqvist & Yu; 
Fung, Gul, and Radhakrishnan; Ritter 
1980 – 2010 1,259 +  15.4% a 
India Marisetty and Subrahmanyam;Ritter 1990 – 2011 2,964 +  88.5% 
Indonesia Suherman 1989 – 2011 386 +  25.7% 
Iran Bagherzadeh 1991 – 2004 279 + 22.4% 
Ireland Ritter 1999 – 2006 31 + 23.7% 
Israel Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl; Amihud and 
Hauser; Ritter 
1990 – 2006 348  + 13.8% 
Italy Arosio, Giudici and Paleari; Cassia, Paleari, 
and Redondi; Vismara 
1985 – 2009 273 + 16.4% 
Japan Fukuda; Dawson and Hiraki; Hamao, Packer, 
and Ritter; Hebner and Hiraki; Kaneko and 
Pettway;  
1970 – 2011 3,136 +40.2% a 
Jordan Marmar 1999 – 2008 53 + 149% 
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Korea Dhatt, Kim, and Lim; Ihm; Choi and Heo; 
Mosharian and Ng, Cho; Ritter 
1980 – 2010 1,593 + 61.6% 
Malaysia Isa; Isa and Yong; Yong; Ma 1980 – 2009 413 + 62.6% 
Mauritius Bundoo 1989 – 2005 40 +15.2% 
Mexico Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez; 
Eijgenhuijsen and van der Valk 
1987 – 1994 88 + 15.9% 
Netherlands Wessels; Eijgenhuijsen and Buijs;  Jenkinson, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm; Ritter 
1982 – 2006 181 + 10.2% 
New Zealand Vos and Cheung; Camp and Munro; Ritter 1979 – 2006 214 + 20.3% 
Nigeria Ikoku; Achua 1989 – 2006 114 + 12.7% 
Norway Emilsen, Pedersen, and Saettern; Liden; Ritter 1984 – 2006 153 + 9.6% 
Philippines Sullivan and Unite; Ritter 1987 – 2006 123 + 21.2% 
Poland Jelic and Briston; Woloszyn 1991 – 2012 309 + 13.3% 
Portugal Almeida and Duque; Ritter 1992 – 2006  28 + 11.6% 
Russia Ritter 1999 – 2006  40 +  4.2% 
Saudi Arabia Al-Anazi, Foster and Liu 2003 – 2010 76 + 264.5% 
Singapore Lee, Taylor and Walter; Dawson; Ritter 1973 – 2011 591 + 26.1% 
South Africa Page and Reyneke; Ali, Subrahmanyam and 
Gleason; Ritter 
1980 – 2007 285 + 18.0% 
Spain Ansotegui and Fabregat; Alvarez Otera 1985 – 2006 128 + 10.9% 
Sri Lanka Samarakoon 1987 – 2008 105 + 33.5% 
Sweden Rydqvist; Schuster; Simonov; de Ridder 1980 – 2011 406 + 26.1% 
Switzerland Kunz, Drobetz, Kammermann and Walchli; 
Ritter  
1983 – 2008 159 + 28.0% 
Taiwan Chen 1980 – 2006 1,312 + 37.2% 
Thailand Wethyavivorn and Koo-Smith; Lonkani and 
Tirapat; Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti 
1987 – 2007 459 + 36.6% 
Turkey Kiymaz; Durukan; Ince; Kucukkocaoglu 1990 – 2011 355 + 10.3% 
UK Dimson; Levis 1959 – 2011 4,877 + 16.1% 
USA Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter; Ritter 1960 – 2012 12,340 + 16.8% 
 
Source: Loughran, T., J.R. Ritter, and K. Rydqvist, 2004, Initial Public Offerings: International 
Insights, Pacific-Basin Journal of Finance 2, 165-199, updated 1
st
 of March 2013 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/) 
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APPENDIX B -  Long run price performance of IPOs 
Country Study Sample 
period 
Sample 
size 
Window 
(years) 
Return 
Australia 
Austria 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Germany 
 
Germany 
Great Britain 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
The Netherlands 
 
New Zealand 
Poland 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Spain 
Sweden 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
United States 
United States 
United States 
Lee, P.J., S.L. Taylor, and T.S. Walter (1996) 
Aussenegg (2006) 
Aggarwal, R., R. Leal, and L. Hernandez (1993) 
Shaw, D.C. (1971) 
Aggarwal, R., R. Leal, and L. Hernandez (1993) 
Keloharju,  M. (1993) 
Chahine (2004) 
Schlag C., and A. Wodrich (2000) 
Jaskiewicz, P., M. Gonzalez, S. Menendez and D.  
Schiereck (2005) 
Ljungqvist, A.  (1997) 
Levis, Μ.  (1993) 
Thomadakis, Nounis, and Gounopoulos (2010) 
McGuiness, P. (1993) 
Giudici, G., and S. Paleari (1999) 
Cai, J. and K.C.J. Wei (1997) 
Kim, J.B., I. Krinsky, and J. Lee (1995) 
Paudyal, K., B. Saadouni, and R. Briston (1998) 
Doeswijk, R.Q., H.S.K. Hemmes, and P. 
Venekamp (2005) 
Firth, M. (1997) 
Jelic, R., and R. Briston (2003) 
Duque, J., and M. Almeida (2000) 
Lee, P.J., S.L. Taylor, and T.S. Walter (1996) 
Alvarez, S., and V. Gonzalez (2005) 
Loughran,T., J.R. Ritter, and K. Rydqvist (1994) 
Brounen, D., and P.M.A. Eicholtz (2002) 
Kunz, R.M. and R. Aggarwal (1994) 
Drobetz, W., M. Kammermann and U. Walchli 
(2005) 
Kiymaz, H. (1998) 
Brounen, D., and P.M.A. Eicholtz (2002) 
Cusatis, P.J., J.A. Miles and J.R. Woolridge 
(1993) 
Loughran, Τ. (1993) 
Loughran, T., and J.R. Ritter (1995) 
J.R. Ritter (1991) 
1976-89 
1984-93 
1980-90 
1956-63 
1982-90 
1984-89 
1996-98 
1884-14 
1990- 00 
 
1970-90 
1994-02 
1980-88 
1980-90 
1985-95 
1971-92 
1985-88 
1984-94 
1977-01 
 
1979-87 
1991-99 
1992-98 
1973-92 
1987-97 
1980-90 
1984-99 
1983-89 
1983-00 
 
1990-95 
1984-99 
1965-88 
 
1967-87 
1970-90 
1975-84 
266 
57 
62 
105 
28 
79 
168 
163 
153 
 
180 
712 
254 
72 
84 
180 
99 
62 
154 
 
143 
19 
21 
132 
57 
162 
13 
42 
120 
 
138 
24 
146 
 
3,656 
4,753 
1,526 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
2 
5 
3 
 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
5 
3 
3 
1 and 3 
 
5 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
 
3 
1 
3 
 
6 
5 
3 
-51.0% 
-47.4% 
-47.0% 
-32.3% 
-23.7% 
-26.4% 
-9.9% 
-7.8% 
-32.5% 
 
-12.1% 
-8.1% 
-15.4% 
-18.3% 
-2.6% 
-26.0% 
+91.6% 
+9.0% 
-10,0% 
 
-17.9% 
-66.8% 
-2.8% 
+0.8% 
-31.1% 
+1.2% 
+18.9% 
-6.1% 
-7.45% 
 
+44.1% 
-4.53% 
+33.6% 
 
-33.3% 
-30.0% 
-29.1% 
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France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland 
Schuster, J.A. (2003) 1988-98 972 3 -20.5% 
 
 
Source: (a) Jenkinson, T., and A. Ljungqvist, 2001, Going Public: The theory and evidence of how 
companies raise equity finance, Oxford University Press. 
(b) Gajewski, J.K., and C. Gresse, 2006, A Survey of the European IPO Market, Unpublished Working 
Paper, European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI). 
(c) Boulton, E., J.F. Gajewski, C. Gresse, and F. Labegorre, 2007, Are IPOs still a puzzle? A survey 
of the empirical evidence from Europe, Revue de l‟association francaise de finance, 28, 5-41.  
  
Appendices  
 
240 
 
APPENDIX C -  Definitions of earnings management from academic literature 
 
Definition no. 1 
Earnings management studies examine whether managers act as if they believe users 
of financial reporting data can be misled into interpreting reported accounting 
earnings as equivalent to economic profitability. 
Fields, T. Lys, T. and Vincent L., 2001, Empirical Research on Accounting Choice, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 255-307. 
 
Definition no. 2 
Earnings management occurs when managers exercise their discretion over the 
accounting numbers with or without restrictions.  Such discretion can be either firm 
value maximizing or opportunistic. 
Watts, R.L., and Zimmerman, J.L., 1990, Positive Accounting Theory: A ten year 
perspective, The Accounting Review, 65, 131-156. 
 
Definition no. 3 
Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process with the intent of obtaining some private gain. 
Schipper, K., 1989, Commentary on Earnings Management, Accounting Horizons, 3, 
91-102. 
 
Definition no. 4 
Earnings Management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter the financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
Healy, P.M. and Wahlen, J.M., 1999, A review of the earnings management 
literature and is implications for standard setting, Accounting Horizons, 13, 365-
384. 
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Definition no. 5 
Earnings management is the intentional misstatement of earnings leading to the 
bottom line numbers that would have been different in the absence of any 
manipulation. 
Mohanran, P.S., 2003, How to manage earnings management, Accounting World, 
October. 
 
Definition no. 6 
Abnormal accruals occur when management‘s intervention in financial reporting 
process has an impact on total accruals, which does not stem from normal economic 
activities and circumstances. 
Blom, M., 2008, MSc Thesis, Erasmus University. 
 
Definition no. 7 
Earnings management is the use of operating and discretionary accounting methods 
to adjust earnings to a desired outcome. 
Giroux, G., 2004, Detecting earnings management, John Wiley, Chapter 1, page 2. 
 
Definition no. 8 
Earnings management is the product of an executive exercise of judgment by 
managers of organisations through purposeful time-shifting accounting operations 
with the sole intention of manipulating financial statements so as to influence the 
decision-making outcome of users of these statements towards their own goals and/or 
those of their organisations. 
Chandriotis, C.M., November 2013, PhD Thesis, University of Durham 
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APPENDIX D - Accruals and their meaning in earnings management 
 
Accruals arise when there is a discrepancy between the timing of cash flows and the 
timing of the accounting recognition of the transaction.  Recognising revenues is one 
such example.  Revenues may be recognised after customers advance cash and 
before total collection is assured.  The advance creates a liability termed ‗unearned 
revenues‘.  The final payment decreases the asset termed ‗accounts receivable‘.  
 
Reported revenues must equal total cash inflows over a firm‘s lifetime, and 
consequently, total accruals must equal zero i.e., accrued balances of assets and 
liabilities reverse. 
 
Throughout academic literature, there is an effort to distinguish between accruals 
resulting from managed earnings and normal accruals. 
 
Non-discretionary accruals are accruals that arise from transactions made in the 
current period that are normal for the firm given its performance level and business 
strategy, industry conventions, macro-economic events and other economic factors. 
 
Discretionary accruals are accruals that arise from transactions made or accounting 
treatments chosen in order to manage earnings.  Reversals are accruals originating 
from transactions made in the previous period. 
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APPENDIX E - Example Survey 
 
Name:  
Position in the Company now:  
Role in IPO project (if any): _________________________ 
Number of years with the company: ___________________ 
Company name:   
Year of IPO: ____________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for taking the estimated 15-20 minutes to complete this survey.  We 
promise strict confidentiality concerning your responses.  Please answer each of the 
questions to the best of your knowledge.  Words with an asterisk (*) are defined in 
the glossary (see last page of this questionnaire).  
 
 
For questions 1-10, circle the number to the right that best fits your opinion on the 
importance of the issue.  Use the scale shown below to match your opinion. 
 
 
1 Not important 
2 Somewhat unimportant 
3 No opinion either way 
4 Somewhat Important 
5 Very Important 
 
 
For Questions 11-16, please tick the appropriate box that best fits your opinion on 
subject knowledge.   
 
In Question 17, you are free to express your views on any other issue(s) that you may 
feel necessary on the subject matter of IPOs.  
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1. How important were the following motivations for conducting the IPO?  
  
Not    Very  
Important   Important 
 
1. To minimise our cost of capital        1 2 3 4 5 
2. Debt is becoming too expensive        1 2 3 4 5 
3. Our company has run out of private equity*       1 2 3 4 5 
4. To create public shares for use in future acquisitions     1 2 3 4 5 
5. To allow shareholders to sell part of their shares      1 2 3 4 5 
6. To allow venture capitalists (VCs) to cash-out      1 2 3 4 5 
7. To enhance the reputation of our company       1 2 3 4 5 
8. To establish a market price/value for our firm      1 2 3 4 5 
9. To broaden the base of ownership of our firm      1 2 3 4 5 
10. To provide management succession for our firm      1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
2. To what extent did the following influence the timing of your possible IPO? 
                  
             Not    Very 
Important   Important
  
1. Overall stock market conditions        1 2 3 4 5 
2. Industry conditions (conditions in our sector of business)     1 2 3 4 5 
3. First-day share price performance of recent IPOs      1 2 3 4 5 
4. Other good firms were currently going public      1 2 3 4 5 
5. We needed the capital to continue to grow       1 2 3 4 5 
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3. How important were the following criteria in selecting your lead IPO underwriter*?      
              
Not    Very 
Important   Important 
 
1. Underwriter‘s overall reputation and status       1 2 3 4 5 
2. Non-equity-related services (e.g., advice on Mergers & Acquisitions, debt)  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Fee structure           1 2 3 4 5 
4. Pricing and valuation promises        1 2 3 4 5 
5. Underwriter‘s industry expertise and connections      1 2 3 4 5 
6. Market making, trading desk and liquidity provision services    1 2 3 4 5 
7. Institutional investor client base of the underwriter      1 2 3 4 5 
8. Retail client base of the underwriter        1 2 3 4 5 
9. Underwriter has a reputation for spinning*       1 2 3 4 5 
10. Underwriter is a subsidiary of our company‘s main commercial bank   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
4. What per cent under/overpricing* did you expect from the offer price to the first day closing price? ____________% (please write 
up your estimate in percentage terms) 
 
5. What was the actual under/overpricing in your company‘s IPO? __________ % (if you know please write up in percentage terms) 
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6. To what extent do you feel the following led to the level of underpricing* you might have expected? 
 
Not    Very 
Important   Important 
 
1. To mitigate future litigation by investors who claim the offer price was too high  1 2 3 4 5 
2. To compensate investors for taking the risk of the IPO     1 2 3 4 5 
3. To ensure a wide-base of owners        1 2 3 4 5 
4. To create a large block-holder to serve as a watchdog over company management  1 2 3 4 5 
5. To compensate investors for truthfully revealing the price they are willing to pay  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Insiders are willing to underprice because the IPO creates personal wealth   1 2 3 4 5 
7. To increase share price by starting a cascade effect amongst investors   1 2 3 4 5 
8. Underpricing reduces the need for additional IPO marketing costs    1 2 3 4 5 
9. To increase the after-issue trading volume of the stock     1 2 3 4 5 
10. Underwriters underprice to incur the favour of institutional investors   1 2 3 4 5 
11. To increase publicity on the opening day*       1 2 3 4 5 
12. So underwriters can make spinning* possible      1 2 3 4 5 
13. So underwriters can make flipping* possible       1 2 3 4 5 
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7. To what extent do you feel the following led to the actual level of underpricing* observed in your company‘s IPO? 
 
Not    Very 
Important   Important 
 
1. To mitigate future litigation by investors who claim the offer price was too high  1 2 3 4 5 
2. To compensate investors for taking the risk of the IPO     1 2 3 4 5 
3. To ensure a wide-base of owners        1 2 3 4 5 
4. To create a large block-holder to serve as a watchdog over company management  1 2 3 4 5 
5. To compensate investors for truthfully revealing the price they are willing to pay  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Insiders are willing to underprice because the IPO creates personal wealth   1 2 3 4 5 
7. To increase share price by starting a cascade effect amongst investors   1 2 3 4 5 
8. Underpricing reduces the need for additional IPO marketing costs    1 2 3 4 5 
9. To increase the after-issue trading volume of the stock     1 2 3 4 5 
10. Underwriters underprice to incur the favour of institutional investors   1 2 3 4 5 
11. To increase publicity on the opening day*       1 2 3 4 5 
12. So underwriters can make spinning* possible      1 2 3 4 5 
13. So underwriters can make flipping* possible       1 2 3 4 5 
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8. What type of signal do the following actions convey to investors regarding the value of a firm going public?  
 
Negative   Positive 
Signal    Signal 
 
1. Selling insider shares in the IPO        1 2 3 4 5 
2. Selling a large portion of the firm in the IPO       1 2 3 4 5 
3. A large first-day share price jump        1 2 3 4 5 
4. Using a top investment bank as underwriter and manager of the IPO   1 2 3 4 5 
5. Using a big-5 accounting firm*        1 2 3 4 5 
6. Having venture capital (VC) backing        1 2 3 4 5 
7. Having strong historical earnings        1 2 3 4 5 
8. Insiders* commit to a long lock-up*        1 2 3 4 5 
9. Issuing free warrants          1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
9. From your perspective, how important were the following IPO process issues? 
 
Not    Very 
Important   Important 
 
1. The threat of accusations pertaining to window-dressing* in the prospectus  1 2 3 4 5 
2. An offering which includes free warrants alongside the shares issued   1 2 3 4 5 
3. The need to carry out financial and legal due diligence      1 2 3 4 5 
4. Placing shares privately before doing an IPO      1 2 3 4 5 
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10. To what extent did each of the following create concern in the decision to conduct an IPO? 
No    Great 
Concern   Concern 
 
1. The Cyprus Stock Market authorities reporting requirements    1 2 3 4 5 
2. Costs/fees of an IPO          1 2 3 4 5 
3. Desire to maintain decision-making control       1 2 3 4 5 
4. We, as a company, have already enough capital      1 2 3 4 5 
5. Low price of our share         1 2 3 4 5 
6. To avoid earnings per share (EPS) dilution       1 2 3 4 5 
7. To avoid ownership dilution         1 2 3 4 5 
8. We would prefer to be acquired by another firm (rather than list our shares)  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Bad market/industry conditions        1 2 3 4 5 
10. Directors‘ liability          1 2 3 4 5 
11. Disclosing information to competitors       1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
11. Smaller companies are less likely to go public      Yes  No  Don‘t know 
             
 
 
12. Younger companies are less likely to go public      Yes  No  Don‘t know 
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13. Riskier companies are more likely to go public      Yes  No  Don‘t know 
             
 
 
14. Highly leveraged* companies are more likely to go public     Yes  No  Don‘t know 
             
 
 
15. Our company has a made a secondary equity offering since the IPO   Yes  No  Don‘t know 
             
 
16. Our company has a made a secondary debt offering since the IPO    Yes  No  Don‘t know 
             
 
 
17. Please feel free to add any other comments that you may have (e.g., on procedural, legal, regulatory, institutional aspects etc.)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
THANK YOU! 
If you would like a copy of the results once they have been competed then please tick this box      
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QUESTIONNAIRE GLOSSARY 
 
In this section, the terms that are marked with an asterisk (*) in the questionnaire 
are explained.  We do understand that you may be familiar with these terms, but we 
need to define them for clarity reasons. 
 
Private Equity 
When equity capital is made available to companies or investors, but not quoted on a 
stock market.  Private equity can be used to develop new products and technologies, 
to expand working capital, to make acquisitions, or to strengthen a company‘s 
balance sheet.  The buy-out and buy-in of a business by experienced managers may 
be achieved using private equity funding.  Venture capital is, strictly speaking, a 
subset of private equity and refers to equity investments made for launch, early 
development or expansion of a business. 
 
Underwriter 
This is usually an investment bank that administers the public issuance and 
distribution of securities from a company.  An underwriter works closely with the 
IPO company to determine the offering price of the shares and sells them to investors 
via the underwriter‘s distribution network. 
 
Spinning 
The practice of investment banks setting aside portions of IPO shares of companies 
they take public for top executives of other companies in exchange for reciprocating 
business to the investment banks. 
 
Underpricing 
The pricing of an IPO at less than its market value.  Underpricing can be seen as the 
difference between the offer price and the price of the first trading day of an IPO.  It 
is usually expressed in percentage terms. 
 
Opening day 
The first day of trading the shares of an IPO in a stock exchange. 
Flipping 
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The practice of buying the shares in an IPO and then selling the shares immediately 
after the start of public trading of the shares to turn an immediate profit. 
 
Big 5-accounting firms 
Until 2002, these were PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and Young, Deloitte, Arthur 
Andersen and KPMG.  After Arthur Andersen‘s demise, they became the big 4 
accounting firms. 
 
Insiders 
In an IPO, insiders are the owners/shareholders and top management that may have 
shares and/or share options. 
 
Lock-up 
A legally binding contract between the underwriters and insiders of a company 
(owners, company executives, venture capitalists) undergoing an IPO prohibiting 
these individuals from selling any shares of the company for a specified period of 
time.  Lock-up periods typically last 180 days (six months) but can on occasion last 
for as little as 120 days or as long as 365 days (1 year). 
 
Window dressing   
The deceptive practice of using accounting tricks to make a company‘s balance sheet 
and profit and loss statement appear better than they really are. 
 
Leveraged companies  
Companies with a high percentage (over 50%) of bank debt relative to own funds 
(shareholders‘ funds) in their balance sheet.
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Table 1 - Average initial returns by selling mechanism 
       
Country Exchange 
Book-building Book-building 
Fixed-price offering Auction 
 
institutional only with public offer 
 
     
Austria VSE yes no no no  
Belgium Euronext Brussels yes yes no no  
Finland HSE yes yes no no  
France Euronext Paris yes (placement) yes yes Various types organised by the  
     exchange (direct admission, minimum  
     price offer, open price offer)  
Germany Deutsche Börse yes no yes not any more  
Greece ASE yes no no no  
Italy Borsa Italiana yes (with fixed price* no yes no  
  and with open price**)     
Netherlands Euronext Amsterdam yes no yes yes  
Poland WSE yes yes yes yes  
Portugal Euronext Lisbon yes yes yes (offer for sale) yes (offer for sale)  
Spain BME no yes*** no no  
Sweden OMX yes yes yes no  
Switzerland SWX yes yes yes not any more  
Turkey ISE yes no yes yes (sale on the ISE)  
UK LSE yes (placing) yes 
yes  
(offer for sale at fixed price, offer for 
subscription at fixed price 
yes  
(offer for sale by tender offer, offer for 
subscription by tender offer, open offer)  
       
 
* Before 1999, in the Italian book-building procedures, a fixed price was offered to institutions at the end of the marketing period prior to actual order submission. In 1999, this 
practice was  abandoned in favour of the book-building with open price.   
** Since 1999, book-building with open price has been the general practice in Italy. The final price is determined after collecting orders from institutions, so that they do not 
know at which  price they will effectively buy the shares.   
Since 1992, when Royal Decree 291/1992 was published. 
Source: Gajewski, J.F., and C. Gresse, (2006), A Survey of European IPO Market, ECMI Unpublished Working Paper, Brussels.  
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Table 2 - Economic Indicators 
European Union Economy  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
GDP at market prices (€ bn):                 
        - EU (25)  n/a n/a 8,538 9,148 9,519 9,876 10,038 10,525 
        - EU (15) 7,454 7,790 8,203 8,764 9,088 9,417 9,584 10,033 
Real GDP growth (%):                 
        - EU (25) (%) n/a n/a 3.1 3.9 2.0 1.2 1.3 2.5 
        - EU (15) (%) 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.9 1.9 1.2 1.2 2.3 
GDP per capita (€):                 
        - EU (25) (€) n/a n/a 18,700 20,000 20,700 21,400 21,600 22,600 
        - EU (15) (€) 19,000 19,800 20,600 22,000 22,700 23,400 23,600 24,500 
GDP per capita in PPS                 
        - EU (25)  104.9 105.0 105.0 105.0 104.8 104.6 104.4 104.2 
        - EU (15)  115.5 115.4 115.5 115.5 115.5 115.5 115.5 115.5 
Consumer price inflation (HICP) (%) 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 
Unemployment rate EU (25) (%) 10.5 9.9 9.0 8.1 7.6 7.9 9.0 9.0 
Source: Eurostat, ECB  
        
         
Cyprus Economy  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
GDP at current prices (CY₤ bn) 4.57 4.94 5.30 5.78 6.22 6.43 6.88 7.41 
GDP at market prices (CY₤ bn) 5.00 5.25 5.51 5.78 6.01 6.14 6.26 6.52 
Real GDP growth (%) 2.3 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.0 2.1 1.9 4.2 
GDP per capita (CY₤) 6,580 6,929 7,338 7,966 8,380 8,977 9,444 9,787 
                  
Consumer price inflation (%) 3.6 2.2 1.7 4.1 2.0 2.8 4.1 2.3 
Unemployment rate EU (25) (%) 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.6 
Public deficit as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
5.3 4.9 4.5 2.7 2.8 4.5 6.3 4.2 
CSE Market Capitalisation (CY₤ bn) 1.42 2.00 14.67 8.30 5.58 4.37 4.44 4.50 
Source: CyStat, Eurostat 
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Table 3 – Sample Selection 
 
Year Total Investment companies
110
 Overseas companies Placements
111
 
 
Sample 
 
1997 5 3 0 0 2 
1998 6 1 0 0 5 
1999 12 3 1 1 7 
2000 64 21 0 7 36 
2001 27 2 0 5 20 
2002 10 0 0 1 9 
TOTAL 124 30 1 14 79 
 
 
  
                                                 
110 Includes both closed-ended investment companies which are regulated and private-equity type companies.  Three companies in this category raised over €1 billion in total in 1999-2000 and engaged as 
shareholders over 50% of the economically active population. 
111 In a placement, shares are not offered to the public at large via an offering, but rather shares which have already been offered to a number of investors through private placement and are then listed 
(placed) in the Cyprus Stock Exchange. 
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Table 4 – IPOs per industrial sector 
 
Industrial sector Number of IPOs 
 
% of total 
 
Building Materials and Construction Companies 8 10.1 
Financial Services 6 7.6 
Fish Culture 3 3.8 
Hotels 3 3.8 
Information Technology 3 3.8 
Insurance Companies 4 5.1 
Manufacturing companies 13 16.5 
Other Companies 21 26.6 
Tourism Companies 6 7.6 
Trading Companies 12 15.2 
TOTAL 79 100 
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Table 5 – Initial price performance by year of issuance 
  
R A W   R E T U R N S  
 
A D J U S T E D   R E T U R N S 
Year Number Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
  P  A   N   E  L    A  :  F  I  R  S  T    D  A  Y    I  N  I  T  I  A  L    R  E  T  U  R  N  S 
1997 2 9.25% 9.25% 22.07% 
 
8.33% 8.33% 22.31% 
1998 4 18.43% 20.18% 45.37% 
 
17.94% 22.03% 48.40% 
1999 8 558.63% 580.38% 313.89% 
 
555.33% 557.56% 322.88% 
2000 37 149.16% 70.41% 225.80% 
 
158.17% 76.92% 223.94% 
2001 20 -1.56% -1.32% 29.92% 
 
2.21% -0.16% 29.73% 
2002 9 -9.33% -12.54% 15.02% 
 
-6.99% -8.75% 18.66% 
1997-2002 79 124.25% 17.86% 242.31% 
 
129.20% 24.10% 241.87% 
1999 8 558.63% 580.38% 313.89% 
 
555.33% 557.56% 322.88% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 71 75.30% 16.47% 177.71% 
 
81.18% 18.97% 177.96% 
    P  A  N  E  L    B  :  F  I  F  T  H     D  A  Y    R  E  T   U  R  N  S 
1997 2 10.23% 10.23% 23.45% 
 
9.71% 9.71% 25.18% 
1998 4 16.01% 16.96% 45.96% 
 
15.64% 20.82% 48.81% 
1999 8 548.08% 477.96% 345.45% 
 
543.77% 451.13% 352.56% 
2000 36 139.63% 91.59% 192.58% 
 
150.87% 104.21% 190.85% 
2001 20 0.82% -3.07% 33.42% 
 
3.89% -2.79% 34.67% 
2002 9 -18.49% -25.87% 18.35% 
 
-13.21% -20.00% 17.33% 
1997-2002 79 118.30% 19.46% 231.16% 
 
124.33% 30.25% 230.51% 
1999 8 548.08% 477.96% 345.45% 
 
543.77% 451.13% 352.56% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 71 69.88% 15.25% 155.31% 
 
69.88% 15.25% 155.31% 
    P  A  N  E  L    C  :  3 0   T  H     D  A  Y    R  E  T   U  R  N  S 
1997 2 5.45% 5.45% 23.31% 
 
0.64% 0.64% 21.03% 
1998 4 23.04% 29.64% 46.27% 
 
21.28% 32.57% 50.47% 
1999 8 589.94% 529.32% 348.07% 
 
551.04% 545.26% 360.62% 
2000 36 123.29% 73.14% 209.32% 
 
144.83% 96.60% 205.19% 
2001 20 -3.43% -8.31% 33.00% 
 
3.73% 2.37% 36.30% 
2002 9 -39.09% -41.47% 22.35% 
 
-27.90% -30.03% 22.92% 
1997-2002 79 111.91% 17.05% 247.33% 
 
120.66% 25.61% 239.24% 
1999 8 589.94% 529.32% 348.07% 
 
551.04% 545.26% 360.62% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 71 58.04% 7.27% 164.29% 
 
72.17% 21.55% 164.99% 
    P  A  N  E  L    D  :  6 0   T  H     D  A  Y    R  E  T   U  R  N  S 
1997 2 26.91% 26.91% 12.28% 
 
18.33% 18.33% 1.51% 
1998 4 34.55% 46.22% 42.50% 
 
18.66% 29.13% 54.87% 
1999 8 704.69% 627.60% 679.69% 
 
633.10% 456.44% 580.18% 
2000 36 88.18% 64.57% 178.21% 
 
119.58% 90.30% 178.52% 
2001 20 -16.98% -14.06% 31.37% 
 
1.33% 1.92% 31.61% 
2002 9 -35.57% -45.13% 23.07% 
 
-19.59% -28.33% 21.45% 
1997-2002 79 105.62% 14.45% 315.59% 
 
118.12% 39.22% 280.30% 
1999 8 704.69% 627.60% 679.69% 
 
633.10% 456.44% 580.18% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 71 38.12% 10.59% 138.37% 
 
60.09% 31.78% 141.98% 
    P  A  N  E  L    E  :  9 0   T  H     D  A  Y    R  E  T   U  R  N  S 
1997 2 37.54% 37.54% 12.42% 
 
28.56% 28.56% 22.46% 
1998 4 42.82% 55.98% 58.38% 
 
21.93% 40.34% 74.34% 
1999 8 457.65% 484.77% 278.94% 
 
393.79% 350.02% 313.13% 
2000 36 71.11% 24.54% 201.50% 
 
110.60% 68.07% 198.77% 
2001 20 -27.53% -25.36% 30.05% 
 
-1.28% 1.66% 28.70% 
2002 9 -34.86% -42.54% 23.87% 
 
-20.79% -30.50%) 27.29% 
1997-2002 79 70.93% 10.03% 211.66% 
 
89.42% 37.19% 201.42% 
1999 8 457.65% 484.77% 278.94% 
 
393.79% 350.02% 313.13% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 71 27.35% 0.96% 152.05% 
 
55.12% 34.51% 153.70% 
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Table 6a – 12-, 24-, and 36-month CARs  
 
Year Number Mean Median Standard Deviation 
     P  A   N   E  L    A  :  1  2   -  M  O  N  T  H     C  A  R  s 
1997 2 21.80% 21.80% 31.49% 
1998 3 -25.70% -34.60% 49.72% 
1999 8 -15.76% -7.67% 70.29% 
2000 36 25.70% 27.98% 39.49% 
2001 20 -2.57% -0.39% 44.46% 
2002 9 -3.77% -15.88% 62.01% 
1997-2002 78 8.72% 14.23% 49.20% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 11.52% 14.23% 46.08% 
     P  A   N   E  L    B  :  2  4   -  M  O  N  T  H     C  A  R  s  
1997 2 -7.68% -7.68% 59.54% 
1998 3 -20.97% -16.06% 11.23% 
1999 8 -31.99% -27.51% 70.11% 
2000 36 -2.19% -15.94% 63.00% 
2001 20 -36.02% -21.75% 63.00% 
2002 9 -26.92% -5.24% 86.75% 
1997-2002 78 -17.64% -18.19% 65.54% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 -16.00% -17.50% 65.33% 
      P  A   N   E  L    A  :  3  6   -  M  O  N  T  H     C  A  R  s 
1997 2 -26.55% -26.55% 20.55% 
1998 3 -35.92% -37.21% 17.28% 
1999 8 -33.77% -46.69% 121.68% 
2000 36 -12.18% -7.77% 78.04% 
2001 20 -47.45% -33.60% 74.65% 
2002 9 -19.48% -11.07% 63.49% 
1997-2002 78 -25.57% -24.99% 78.39% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 -24.63% -24.82% 73.12% 
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Table 6b – 12-, 24-, and 36-month BHARs 
 
Year Number Mean Median Standard Deviation 
     P  A   N   E  L    A  :  1  2   -  M  O  N  T  H     B   H   A   R  s 
1997 2 28.39% 28.39% 40.99% 
1998 3 -86.01% -88.69% 15.91% 
1999 8 -46.89% -23.13% 75.15% 
2000 36 11.30% 8.66% 21.91% 
2001 20 -3.93% -5.30% 25.88% 
2002 9 -9.51% -24.37% 49.47% 
1997-2002 78 -4.28% -0.73% 42.11% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 0.59% 1.50% 34.22% 
     P  A   N   E  L    B  :  24   -  M  O  N  T  H     B   H   A   R  s 
1997 2 -293.86% -293.86% 77.27% 
1998 3 -137.89% -107.02% 160.14% 
1999 8 -34.41% -19.41% 51.22% 
2000 36 1.10% -5.29% 23.16% 
2001 20 -18.92% -20.59% 24.93% 
2002 9 -19.43% -27.55% 52.22% 
1997-2002 78 -22.96% -12.62% 66.13% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 -21.65% -12.62% 67.80% 
     P  A   N   E  L    C :  36   -  M  O  N  T  H     B   H   A   R  s  
1997 2 -259.74% -259.74% 58.87% 
1998 3 -79.57% -87.57% 67.01% 
1999 8 -28.02% -17.11% 42.97% 
2000 36 1.25% -6.57% 25.99% 
2001 20 -23.57% -25.81% 18.61% 
2002 9 -60.70% -59.84% 29.83% 
1997-2002 78 -25.07% -15.30% 53.24% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 -24.73% -15.30% 54.54% 
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Table 6c – 3-monthly, 6-monthly, 9-monthly-, and 12-monthly CARs 
 
Year Number Mean Median Standard Deviation 
     P  A   N   E  L    A  :  3   -  M  O  N  T  H     C  A  R  s 
1997 2 5.56% 5.56% 26.08% 
1998 3 6.79% 1.58% 13.79% 
1999 8 12.06% 11.05% 43.22% 
2000 36 9.21% 11.98% 24.16% 
2001 20 0.74% 3.83% 27.87% 
2002 9 -11.36% -17.56% 31.98% 
1997-2002 78 4.77% 6.92% 28.22% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 3.94% 6.92% 26.31% 
     P  A   N   E  L    B  :  6   -  M  O  N  T  H     C  A  R  s  
1997 2 10.40% 10.40% 28.04% 
1998 3 6.71% 17.21% 24.57% 
1999 8 -8.58% 0.27% 55.72% 
2000 36 16.06% 16.84% 34.08% 
2001 20 -5.98% -15.51% 34.75% 
2002 9 -8.68% -23.76% 50.72% 
1997-2002 78 4.52% 8.66% 39.14% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 6.02% 9.20% 37.04% 
     P  A   N   E  L    A  :  9   -  M  O  N  T  H     C  A  R  s  
1997 2 14.95% 14.95% 23.46% 
1998 3 -34.09% -49.27% 65.20% 
1999 8 -9.42% -8.47% 61.30% 
2000 36 25.69% 22.82% 38.61% 
2001 20 3.96% 18.14% 30.96% 
2002 9 -0.45% 2.62% 77.29% 
1997-2002 78 10.93% 20.75% 47.39% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 13.25% 21.78% 45.52% 
     
 P  A   N   E  L    A  :  12   -  M  O  N  T  H     C  A  R  s  
1997 2 21.80% 21.80% 31.49% 
1998 3 -25.70% -34.60% 49.72% 
1999 8 -15.76% -7.67% 70.29% 
2000 36 25.70% 27.98% 39.49% 
2001 19 -2.57% -0.39% 44.46% 
2002 6 -3.77% -15.88% 62.01% 
1997-2002 74 8.72% 14.23% 49.20% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 66 11.52% 14.23% 46.08% 
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Table 6d – 3-monthly, 6-monthly, 9-monthly- and 12-monthly BHARs 
 
Year Number Mean Median Standard Deviation 
     P  A   N   E  L    A  :  3   -  M  O  N  T  H     B  A  H  R  s 
1997 2 5.52% 5.52% 27.13% 
1998 3 6.47% 1.86% 14.09% 
1999 8 -7.78% 8.97% 69.31% 
2000 36 6.24% 5.47% 20.93% 
2001 20 3.02% 3.41% 24.00% 
2002 9 -13.97% -21.71% 31.48% 
1997-2002 78 1.63% 2.89% 30.74% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 2.71% 2.52% 23.58% 
     P  A   N   E  L    B  :  6   -  M  O  N  T  H     B  A  H  R  s 
1997 2 12.33% 12.33% 31.06% 
1998 3 4.06% 19.27% 28.27% 
1999 8 -34.64% -15.89% 90.56% 
2000 36 12.28% 9.92% 26.33% 
2001 20 -3.37% -10.92% 25.98% 
2002 9 -6.17% -24.49% 63.02% 
1997-2002 78 1.01% 3.83% 43.35% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 5.09% 5.28% 33.18% 
     
 P  A   N   E  L    A  :  9   -  M  O  N  T  H     B   H  A  R  s  
1997 2 16.85% 16.85% 26.23% 
1998 3 -72.44% -70.39% 132.91% 
1999 8 -28.55% -12.55% 93.69% 
2000 36 16.56% 8.59% 26.89% 
2001 20 1.37% 2.68% 22.94% 
2002 9 3.80% -15.09% 78.45% 
1997-2002 78 3.15% 5.32% 52.73% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 70 6.77% 5.55% 45.63% 
     
 P  A   N   E  L    A  :  12   -  M  O  N  T  H     B   H  A  R  s  
1997 2 28.39% 28.39% 40.99% 
1998 3 -86.01% -88.69% 15.91% 
1999 8 -46.89% -23.13% 75.15% 
2000 36 11.30% 8.66% 21.91% 
2001 19 -3.93% -5.30% 25.88% 
2002 6 -9.51% -24.37% 49.47% 
1997-2002 74 -4.28% -0.73% 42.11% 
1997-2002 (excl. 1999) 66 0.59% 1.50% 34.22% 
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Table 7 – Variable expected signs in regression models 
 
Variable description Variable Category Expected sign
Initial raw returns Long term returns
UND Advisor/issue-certifier (-) (+)
AUD Advisor/issue-certifier (-) (+)
LNTAL Market and Institutional (-) (-)
STDRTNS Market and Institutional (+) (-)
LNAGE Issuer specific (-) (+)
ONWER Issuer specific (-) (+)
LEVER Issuer specific (+) (+)
ROE Issuer specific (-) (+)
LNPBT Issuer specific (-) (+)
SGROWTH Issuer specific (+) (-)
LNGRP IPO Specific (-) (+)
PROJ IPO Specific (-) (+)
OFPR IPO Specific (-) (-)
UNDPRT IPO Specific (-) (+)
ICOSTS IPO Specific (+) (-)
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TABLE 8 – Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Regression Model for First Day raw Returns 
 
LNAGE AUD LNGPR OWNER LNTAL UND LEVER STDRTNS UNDPRT PROJ OFPR ICOSTS ROE LNPBT SGROWTH 
 Mean 2.746 0.570 15.122 0.657 5.581 0.494 0.886 0.191 0.785 0.557 1.062 0.065 0.379 13.003 0.818 
 Median 2.708 1.000 15.093 0.683 5.529 0.000 0.644 0.083 1.000 1.000 0.854 0.054 0.228 13.183 0.251 
 Maximum 4.043 1.000 18.526 0.750 6.924 1.000 3.589 1.382 1.000 1.000 5.126 0.450 7.339 16.096 24.843 
 Minimum 1.609 0.000 10.915 0.380 3.989 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.308 0.013 0.000 0.136 0.006 
 Std. Dev. 0.585 0.498 1.283 0.069 0.613 0.503 0.927 0.256 0.414 0.500 0.685 0.057 0.829 1.935 2.884 
 Skewness 0.081 -0.281 -0.221 -2.124 -0.027 0.025 1.594 2.738 -1.386 -0.229 3.845 4.158 7.630 -3.757 7.563 
 Kurtosis 2.301 1.079 3.780 8.456 3.067 1.001 5.035 10.872 2.921 1.053 20.126 27.610 64.411 25.857 62.723 
                 Jarque-Bera 1.696 13.187 2.647 157.411 0.025 13.167 47.091 302.702 25.317 13.176 1.160.118 2.221.191 13.180.640 1.905.591 12.493.990 
 Probability 0.428 0.001 0.266 0.000 0.988 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                 Sum 216.968 45.000 1.194.630 51.919 440.870 39.000 69.986 15.087 62.000 44.000 83.926 5.096 29.907 1.027.201 64.659 
 Sum Sq.  
Dev. 26.705 19.367 128.395 0.369 29.345 19.747 67.038 5.122 13.342 19.494 36.572 0.254 53.666 292.084 648.733 
                 Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the age of the IPO firm calculated in days from the day of incorporation to the day of listing.  AUD is a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the auditor in the IPO is one of the Big Five.  LNGRP is the natural logarithm of the total Gross Proceeds of the issue.  OWNER is the percentage holding of shares 
that the initial owners retain in the company.  LNTAL is the natural logarithm of the time period between application and actual listing.  UND is a dichotomous variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the underwriter is one of three prestigious underwriters and 0 if not.  LEVER is the ratio of bank debt to shareholders‘ funds.  STDRTNS is the standard deviation 
of market adjusted returns during the first 21 days of listing.  UNDPRT is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the underwriter participates in the capital of the IPO 
company prior to its listing in the CSE.  PROJ is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if in the prospectus there are earnings forecasts and 0 if not.  OFPR is the 
offering price of the IPO expressed in Euro. ICOSTS is the variable denoting the total direct costs (expressed as a percentage of the total funds raised) incurred for listing.  ROE is 
the return of equity of the IPO firm as calculated by the audited profits after tax of the year before listing and the shareholders‘ funds (net assets).  LNPBT is the natural logarithm 
of the average pre-tax profits (or losses) for the last three years before the firm‘s listing.  SGROWTH is the sales growth exhibited by the IPO firm the year before the listing (T) 
and the year before (T-1). 
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Table 9 – Selected descriptive statistics 
Statistic Region/Country112 Mean Median 
First day return (raw) (%) Cyprus 
Greece 
Europe 
USA 
China 
124.2 
50.8 
22.1 
16.9 
247.0 
17.9 
23.9 
6.4 
n.a 
n.a 
First day return (adjusted) % Cyprus 
Greece 
Europe 
USA 
China 
129.2 
46.5 
22.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
24.1 
23.5 
6.5 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Time between application and listing (days) Cyprus 
Greece 
Europe
113 
USA
114 
China 
319 
n.a 
1 to 90 
1 to 85 
305 
242 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
34 
                                                 
112 For first day returns we use data as follows: for Greece we use data from Gotzageorgis (2004), for Europe we use data from Gajewski and Gresse (2006), for the USA we use data from Loughran, Ritter 
and Rydqvist (2011) and Bouis R., (2006) and for China we use data from Tian and Megginson (2005).  For time between application and listing we use data for Europe and the USA from Chowdhry and 
Sherman (1996). 
113 Depending on the country and the method of allocation (i.e., discretionary or non-discretionary). 
114 Depending on the method of underwriting (i.e., best efforts Vs firm commitment) 
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Table 10 – Selected descriptive statistics 
 
Time period Number of 
IPOs 
Mean raw initial 
return % 
Mean adjusted 
initial return % 
Standard 
deviation of raw 
initial returns % 
PANEL A     
1997 2 9.25 8.33 22.07 
1998 4 18.43 17.94 45.37 
1999 8 558.63 555.33 313.89 
2000 36 149.16 158.17 225.80 
2001 20 -1.56 2.21 29.92 
2002 9 -9.33 -6.99 15.02 
PANEL B     
Gross Proceeds 
(Euro m) 
Number of 
IPOs 
Mean raw initial 
return % 
Mean adjusted 
initial return % 
Standard 
deviation of raw 
initial returns % 
GP < 1,0 12 51,42 53,63 148,70 
1,0<GP<3,0 21 178,99 183,24 328,48 
3,0<GP<10,0 30 126,80 134,09 219,10 
GP>10 16 102,24 105,76 208,49 
PANEL C     
Age of IPO Number of 
IPOs 
Mean raw initial 
return % 
Mean adjusted 
initial return % 
Standard 
deviation of raw 
initial returns % 
AGE<8 13 231.01 236.86 368.69 
8<AGE<18 38 144.95 150.40 255.53 
18<AGE<35 19 53.76 60.23 93.89 
AGE>35 9 31.44 29.76 68.55 
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Table 11 – Descriptive statistics by industrial sector 
 
Industrial sector Number of IPOs Mean age of firms in 
sector 
Mean raw initial return 
% 
Mean adjusted initial 
return % 
Standard deviation of 
raw initial returns % 
Building Materials and 
Construction Companies 
8 19.8 -11.14 -0.98 14.1 
Financial Services 6 7.3 126.76 137.23 355.1 
Fish Culture 3 9.3 597.49 605.20 280.3 
Hotels 3 13.0 -23.93 -10.07 20.9 
Information Technology 3 7.3 428.34 433.34 543.1 
Insurance Companies 4 26.3 5.01 7.84 37.9 
Manufacturing companies 13 28.3 96.02 96.75 106.1 
Other Companies 21 14.0 111.94 113.08 214.4 
Tourism Companies 6 18.5 17.71 24.62 33.6 
Trading Companies 12 18.2 165.82 172.37 202.8 
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TABLE 12 - Correlation table              
                 
 
ADRAW  LNAGE  AUD  LNGPR  OWNER  LNTAL  UND  LEVER  STDRTNS  UNDPRT  PROJ  OFPR  ICOSTS  ROE  LNPBT  SGRO
WTH  
                 
ADRAW  1.000                
 -----                 
 -----                 
                 
LNAGE  -0.255 1.000               
 -2.312 -----                
 0.024 -----                
                 
AUD  0.067 0.026 1.000              
 0.586 0.230 -----               
 0.560 0.819 -----               
                 
LNGPR  -0.031 0.086 0.145 1.000             
 -0.273 0.762 1.284 -----              
 0.786 0.449 0.203 -----              
                 
OWNER  -0.018 0.263 -0.078 -0.041 1.000            
 -0.154 2.392 -0.685 -0.358 -----             
 0.878 0.019 0.495 0.721 -----             
                 
LNTAL  -0.543 0.016 -0.119 -0.365 -0.116 1.000           
 -5.677 0.137 -1.048 -3.436 -1.023 -----            
 0.000 0.891 0.298 0.001 0.310 -----            
                 
UND  -0.178 0.195 0.296 0.279 0.204 -0.023 1.000          
 -1.583 1.742 2.717 2.546 1.833 -0.200 -----           
 0.118 0.086 0.008 0.013 0.071 0.842 -----           
                 
LEVER  -0.026 0.093 0.081 0.047 0.169 -0.013 0.038 1.000         
 -0.228 0.820 0.709 0.411 1.507 -0.113 0.338 -----          
 0.820 0.415 0.480 0.682 0.136 0.910 0.736 -----          
                 
STDRTNS  0.891 -0.277 0.134 -0.039 -0.049 -0.390 -0.139 -0.119 1.000        
 17.180 -2.525 1.185 -0.341 -0.433 -3.712 -1.233 -1.049 -----         
 0.000 0.014 0.240 0.734 0.666 0.000 0.221 0.298 -----         
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UNDPRT  0.015 -0.021 0.043 0.046 0.085 0.016 0.147 -0.173 0.049 1.000       
 0.127 -0.184 0.373 0.402 0.745 0.140 1.308 -1.539 0.431 -----        
 0.899 0.854 0.710 0.689 0.459 0.889 0.195 0.128 0.668 -----        
                 
PROJ  -0.027 0.145 -0.003 0.063 -0.127 -0.204 -0.139 0.104 -0.030 -0.219 1.000      
 -0.240 1.288 -0.029 0.555 -1.128 -1.829 -1.229 0.921 -0.263 -1.969 -----       
 0.811 0.202 0.977 0.580 0.263 0.071 0.223 0.360 0.794 0.053 -----       
                 
OFPR  0.057 -0.321 0.130 0.248 -0.525 -0.074 -0.127 -0.069 0.051 -0.229 -0.027 1.000     
 0.500 -2.974 1.146 2.244 -5.411 -0.654 -1.123 -0.609 0.446 -2.062 -0.238 -----      
 0.619 0.004 0.255 0.028 0.000 0.515 0.265 0.545 0.657 0.043 0.813 -----      
                 
ICOSTS  -0.024 -0.055 0.066 -0.525 0.018 0.233 -0.119 0.061 -0.023 -0.002 0.009 -0.224 1.000    
 -0.208 -0.483 0.580 -5.411 0.155 2.098 -1.050 0.538 -0.199 -0.017 0.079 -2.014 -----     
 0.836 0.630 0.563 0.000 0.878 0.039 0.297 0.592 0.843 0.986 0.937 0.048 -----     
                 
ROE  0.106 -0.097 0.123 0.018 -0.022 -0.076 0.109 0.299 0.023 -0.205 0.071 -0.010 -0.005 1.000   
 0.938 -0.852 1.085 0.156 -0.192 -0.672 0.965 2.747 0.200 -1.840 0.621 -0.091 -0.044 -----    
 0.351 0.397 0.281 0.876 0.848 0.503 0.338 0.008 0.842 0.070 0.537 0.927 0.965 -----    
                 
LNPBT  -0.059 0.049 -0.006 0.289 0.042 0.147 0.091 -0.323 -0.021 0.319 -0.242 0.059 -0.168 -0.088 1.000  
 -0.518 0.435 -0.051 2.652 0.366 1.305 0.802 -2.998 -0.181 2.958 -2.189 0.515 -1.499 -0.771 -----   
 0.606 0.665 0.959 0.010 0.716 0.196 0.425 0.004 0.857 0.004 0.032 0.608 0.138 0.443 -----   
                 
SGROWTH  -0.034 -0.195 0.067 0.284 -0.108 0.022 0.027 -0.039 0.012 0.012 -0.071 0.204 -0.133 0.056 0.116 1.000 
 -0.298 -1.748 0.593 2.599 -0.954 0.191 0.234 -0.347 0.109 0.109 -0.621 1.825 -1.182 0.494 1.029 -----  
 0.767 0.085 0.555 0.011 0.343 0.849 0.816 0.730 0.913 0.914 0.537 0.072 0.241 0.623 0.307 -----  
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TABLE 13 - Covariance coefficients            
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary               
Included observations: 79                
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)             
                 
 ADRAW  LNAGE  AUD  LNGPR  OWNER  LNTAL  UND  LEVER  STDRTNS  UNDPRT  PROJ  OFPR  ICOSTS  ROE  LNPBT  SGROWTH  
ADRAW  5.797                
 -----                 
 -----                 
                 
LNAGE  -0.357 0.338               
 -2.312 -----                
 0.024 -----                
                 
AUD  0.079 0.008 0.245              
 0.586 0.230 -----               
 0.560 0.819 -----               
                 
LNGPR  -0.095 0.064 0.091 1.625             
 -0.273 0.762 1.284 -----              
 0.786 0.449 0.203 -----              
                 
OWNER  -0.003 0.010 -0.003 -0.004 0.005            
 -0.154 2.392 -0.685 -0.358 -----             
 0.878 0.019 0.495 0.721 -----             
                 
LNTAL  -0.797 0.006 -0.036 -0.283 -0.005 0.371           
 -5.677 0.137 -1.048 -3.436 -1.023 -----            
 0.000 0.891 0.298 0.001 0.310 -----            
                 
UND  -0.214 0.057 0.073 0.178 0.007 -0.007 0.250          
 -1.583 1.742 2.717 2.546 1.833 -0.200 -----           
 0.118 0.086 0.008 0.013 0.071 0.842 -----           
                 
LEVER  -0.057 0.050 0.037 0.055 0.011 -0.008 0.018 0.850         
 -0.224 0.831 0.715 0.413 1.519 -0.117 0.343 -----          
 0.823 0.409 0.477 0.681 0.133 0.907 0.732 -----          
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STDRTNS  0.546 -0.041 0.017 -0.013 -0.001 -0.060 -0.018 -0.028 0.065        
 17.180 -2.525 1.185 -0.341 -0.433 -3.712 -1.233 -1.045 -----         
 0.000 0.014 0.240 0.734 0.666 0.000 0.221 0.299 -----         
                 
UNDPRT  0.014 -0.005 0.009 0.024 0.002 0.004 0.030 -0.065 0.005 0.169       
 0.127 -0.184 0.373 0.402 0.745 0.140 1.308 -1.527 0.431 -----        
 0.899 0.854 0.710 0.689 0.459 0.889 0.195 0.131 0.668 -----        
                 
PROJ  -0.033 0.042 -0.001 0.040 -0.004 -0.062 -0.034 0.048 -0.004 -0.045 0.247      
 -0.240 1.288 -0.029 0.555 -1.128 -1.829 -1.229 0.926 -0.263 -1.969 -----       
 0.811 0.202 0.977 0.580 0.263 0.071 0.223 0.357 0.794 0.053 -----       
                 
OFPR  0.093 -0.127 0.044 0.215 -0.024 -0.031 -0.043 -0.044 0.009 -0.064 -0.009 0.463     
 0.500 -2.974 1.146 2.244 -5.411 -0.654 -1.123 -0.614 0.446 -2.062 -0.238 -----      
 0.619 0.004 0.255 0.028 0.000 0.515 0.265 0.541 0.657 0.043 0.813 -----      
                 
ICOSTS  -0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.038 0.000 0.008 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.003    
 -0.208 -0.483 0.580 -5.411 0.155 2.098 -1.050 0.536 -0.199 -0.017 0.079 -2.014 -----     
 0.836 0.630 0.563 0.000 0.878 0.039 0.297 0.594 0.843 0.986 0.937 0.048 -----     
                 
ROE  0.211 -0.046 0.050 0.019 -0.001 -0.038 0.045 0.227 0.005 -0.069 0.029 -0.006 0.000 0.679   
 0.938 -0.852 1.085 0.156 -0.192 -0.672 0.965 2.743 0.200 -1.840 0.621 -0.091 -0.044 -----    
 0.351 0.397 0.281 0.876 0.848 0.503 0.338 0.008 0.842 0.070 0.537 0.927 0.965 -----    
                 
LNPBT  -0.273 0.055 -0.006 0.709 0.005 0.172 0.087 -0.571 -0.010 0.252 -0.231 0.077 -0.018 -0.139 3.697  
 -0.518 0.435 -0.051 2.652 0.366 1.305 0.802 -2.988 -0.181 2.958 -2.189 0.515 -1.499 -0.771 -----   
 0.606 0.665 0.959 0.010 0.716 0.196 0.425 0.004 0.857 0.004 0.032 0.608 0.138 0.443 -----   
                 
SGROWTH  -0.234 -0.325 0.096 1.037 -0.021 0.038 0.038 -0.105 0.009 0.015 -0.100 0.397 -0.022 0.133 0.642 8.212 
 -0.298 -1.748 0.593 2.599 -0.954 0.191 0.234 -0.348 0.109 0.109 -0.621 1.825 -1.182 0.494 1.029 -----  
 0.767 0.085 0.555 0.011 0.343 0.849 0.816 0.729 0.913 0.914 0.537 0.072 0.241 0.623 0.307 -----  
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Table 14 – CARs and gross proceeds 
 
 
 
Raw Initial Adjusted Initial
Number Returns Returns CAR12 CAR24 CAR36
P    A    N    E    L      A
Average
0<GP<1.000.000 12 51.42% 53.63% 41.79% (96.78%) (81.97%)
1.000.000<GP<3.000.000 20 189.87% 194.66% 11.93% 3.41% (11.83%)
3.000.000<GP<10.000.000 30 126.80% 134.09% 4.34% (24.10%) (27.13%)
10.000.000<GP<+ 16 102.24% 105.76% 21.27% (13.07%) (29.04%)
TOTAL 78
P    A    N    E    L      B
Median
0<GP<1.000.000 12 (0.89%) 4.06% 36.15% (89.42%) (72.20%)
1.000.000<GP<3.000.000 20 53.02% 49.22% 60.37% (58.59%) (33.41%)
3.000.000<GP<10.000.000 30 30.80% 46.47% 12.51% (17.56%) (26.44%)
10.000.000<GP<+ 16 1.59% 10.05% 38.24% (4.30%) (19.66%)
TOTAL 78
P    A    N    E    L      C
Standard Deviation
0<GP<1.000.000 12 148.70% 151.43% 32.49% 65.80% 69.41%
1.000.000<GP<3.000.000 20 333.10% 334.16% 54.41% 71.48% 82.96%
3.000.000<GP<10.000.000 30 219.10% 220.61% 46.46% 58.55% 84.53%
10.000.000<GP<+ 16 208.49% 197.29% 50.68% 63.16% 72.21%
TOTAL 78
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Table 15 – CARs and Age 
 
 
 
  
Raw Initial Adjusted Initial
Number Returns Returns CAR12 CAR24 CAR36
P    A    N    E    L      A
Average
AGE<8 13 231.01% 236.86% 3.23% (26.60%) (44.69%)
8<AGE<18 38 144.95% 150.40% 6.85% (24.25%) (35.97%)
18<AGE<35 19 53.76% 60.23% 12.48% (1.38%) (11.75%)
AGE>35 8 40.21% 39.12% 17.79% (16.80%) (22.93%)
TOTAL 78
P    A    N    E    L      B
Median
AGE<8 13 32.71% 33.34% 24.88% (17.45%) (69.35%)
8<AGE<18 38 28.06% 33.28% 6.96% (27.96%) (27.36%)
18<AGE<35 19 4.62% 18.14% 12.57% 9.56% (12.02%)
AGE>35 8 19.05% 15.63% 21.88% (21.46%) (17.05%)
TOTAL 78
P    A    N    E    L      C
Standard Deviation
AGE<8 13 368.69% 371.80% 75.05% 74.50% 122.11%
8<AGE<18 38 255.53% 252.39% 42.01% 69.53% 72.15%
18<AGE<35 19 93.89% 94.20% 41.45% 58.22% 73.14%
AGE>35 8 67.67% 69.92% 34.81% 38.79% 48.55%
TOTAL 78
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TABLE 16a - Correlations for 12-month CARs (CAR12) 
           
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary               
Included observations: 78                
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)             
                 
                 
 
CAR12 AUD OWNER UND STDRTNS LNTAL LEVER OFPR PROJ LNGPR UNDPRT LNAGE ICOSTS ROE LNPBT SGRO 
WTH 
CAR12  1.000                
 -----                 
 -----                 
AUD  0.007 1.000               
 0.057 -----                
 0.955 -----                
                 
OWNER  -0.021 0.109 1.000              
 -0.181 0.954 -----               
 0.857 0.343 -----               
                 
UND  0.143 0.288 -0.003 1.000             
 1.258 2.620 -0.029 -----              
 0.212 0.011 0.977 -----              
                 
STDRTNS  -0.113 0.143 0.005 -0.131 1.000            
 -0.992 1.256 0.040 -1.156 -----             
 0.324 0.213 0.968 0.251 -----             
                 
LNTAL  -0.007 -0.107 0.016 -0.008 -0.405 1.000           
 -0.059 -0.939 0.136 -0.069 -3.856 -----            
 0.953 0.351 0.892 0.945 0.000 -----            
                 
LEVER  0.010 0.052 0.063 0.001 -0.098 0.032 1.000          
 0.088 0.451 0.549 0.009 -0.860 0.281 -----           
 0.931 0.653 0.585 0.993 0.392 0.779 -----           
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OFPR  -0.269 0.124 0.135 -0.135 0.056 -0.066 -0.097 1.000         
 -2.438 1.088 1.189 -1.185 0.485 -0.580 -0.849 -----          
 0.017 0.280 0.238 0.240 0.629 0.564 0.399 -----          
                 
PROJ  0.132 -0.013 -0.015 -0.152 -0.022 -0.193 0.076 -0.034 1.000        
 1.162 -0.116 -0.130 -1.341 -0.194 -1.719 0.666 -0.296 -----         
 0.249 0.908 0.897 0.184 0.847 0.090 0.508 0.768 -----         
                 
LNGPR  0.197 0.153 0.145 0.289 -0.044 -0.377 0.073 0.253 0.070 1.000       
 1.752 1.345 1.279 2.630 -0.386 -3.553 0.642 2.284 0.615 -----        
 0.084 0.183 0.205 0.010 0.701 0.001 0.523 0.025 0.540 -----        
                 
UNDPRT  0.133 0.066 -0.067 0.178 0.033 -0.013 -0.108 -0.220 -0.203 0.032 1.000      
 1.169 0.574 -0.586 1.573 0.288 -0.112 -0.949 -1.963 -1.807 0.281 -----       
 0.246 0.568 0.560 0.120 0.774 0.911 0.346 0.053 0.075 0.779 -----       
                 
LNAGE  0.111 0.010 -0.052 0.180 -0.268 0.038 0.043 -0.337 0.131 0.099 0.015 1.000     
 0.973 0.090 -0.458 1.592 -2.427 0.330 0.376 -3.115 1.153 0.866 0.129 -----      
 0.334 0.928 0.648 0.116 0.018 0.743 0.708 0.003 0.253 0.389 0.898 -----      
                 
ICOSTS  -0.098 0.062 -0.099 -0.125 -0.019 0.241 0.048 -0.228 0.004 -0.523 0.009 -0.064 1.000    
 -0.862 0.539 -0.864 -1.101 -0.166 2.167 0.418 -2.042 0.037 -5.356 0.075 -0.557 -----     
 0.391 0.592 0.390 0.275 0.869 0.033 0.677 0.045 0.971 0.000 0.941 0.579 -----     
                 
ROE  0.018 0.127 0.100 0.114 0.020 -0.081 0.328 -0.007 0.074 0.016 -0.218 -0.092 -0.003 1.000   
 0.153 1.113 0.876 1.000 0.177 -0.713 3.028 -0.065 0.650 0.137 -1.944 -0.809 -0.030 -----    
 0.879 0.269 0.384 0.321 0.860 0.478 0.003 0.949 0.518 0.892 0.056 0.421 0.976 -----    
                 
LNPBT  -0.015 0.106 0.158 0.274 -0.123 0.074 -0.115 0.166 -0.255 0.367 0.244 0.269 -0.203 -0.173 1.000  
 -0.130 0.928 1.399 2.487 -1.077 0.646 -1.007 1.466 -2.298 3.435 2.195 2.432 -1.806 -1.529 -----   
 0.897 0.357 0.166 0.015 0.285 0.520 0.317 0.147 0.024 0.001 0.031 0.017 0.075 0.130 -----   
                 
SGROWTH  0.048 0.070 0.102 0.030 0.010 0.018 -0.032 0.206 -0.068 0.283 0.007 -0.194 -0.132 0.055 0.146 1.000 
 0.422 0.616 0.894 0.262 0.090 0.160 -0.281 1.835 -0.596 2.571 0.057 -1.720 -1.164 0.483 1.290 -----  
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TABLE 16b - Correlations for 24-month CARs 
           
                 Covariance Analysis: Ordinary 
              Included observations: 
78 
               Balanced sample (listwise missing value 
deletion) 
             
                  CAR24  AUD  OWNER  UND  STDR
TNS  
LNTAL  LEVER  OFPR  PROJ  LNGPR  UNDPRT  LNAGE  ICOSTS  ROE  LNPBT  SGRO
WTH  
CAR24  1.000 
               
 
-----  
               
 
-----  
               
                 AUD  0.101 1.000 
              
 
0.883 -----  
              
 
0.380 -----  
              
                 OWNER  -0.134 0.109 1.000 
             
 
-1.183 0.954 -----  
             
 
0.241 0.343 -----  
             
                 UND  0.219 0.288 -0.003 1.000 
            
 
1.955 2.620 -0.029 -----  
            
 
0.054 0.011 0.977 -----  
            
                 STDRTNS  -0.137 0.143 0.005 -0.131 1.000 
           
 
-1.205 1.256 0.040 -1.156 -----  
           
 
0.232 0.213 0.968 0.251 -----  
           
                 LNTAL  -0.083 -0.107 0.016 -0.008 -0.405 1.000 
          
 
-0.726 -0.939 0.136 -0.069 -3.856 -----  
          
 
0.470 0.351 0.892 0.945 0.000 -----  
          
                 LEVER  0.034 0.052 0.063 0.001 -0.098 0.032 1.000 
         
 
0.294 0.451 0.549 0.009 -0.860 0.281 -----  
         
 
0.769 0.653 0.585 0.993 0.392 0.779 -----  
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OFPR  -0.344 0.124 0.135 -0.135 0.056 -0.066 -0.097 1.000 
        
 
-3.198 1.088 1.189 -1.185 0.485 -0.580 -0.849 -----  
        
 
0.002 0.280 0.238 0.240 0.629 0.564 0.399 -----  
        
                 PROJ  -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 -0.152 -0.022 -0.193 0.076 -0.034 1.000 
       
 
-0.096 -0.116 -0.130 -1.341 -0.194 -1.719 0.666 -0.296 -----  
       
 
0.924 0.908 0.897 0.184 0.847 0.090 0.508 0.768 -----  
       
                 LNGPR  0.125 0.153 0.145 0.289 -0.044 -0.377 0.073 0.253 0.070 1.000 
      
 
1.098 1.345 1.279 2.630 -0.386 -3.553 0.642 2.284 0.615 -----  
      
 
0.276 0.183 0.205 0.010 0.701 0.001 0.523 0.025 0.540 -----  
      
                 UNDPRT  0.318 0.066 -0.067 0.178 0.033 -0.013 -0.108 -0.220 -0.203 0.032 1.000 
     
 
2.922 0.574 -0.586 1.573 0.288 -0.112 -0.949 -1.963 -1.807 0.281 -----  
     
 
0.005 0.568 0.560 0.120 0.774 0.911 0.346 0.053 0.075 0.779 -----  
     
                 LNAGE  0.137 0.010 -0.052 0.180 -0.268 0.038 0.043 -0.337 0.131 0.099 0.015 1.000 
    
 
1.204 0.090 -0.458 1.592 -2.427 0.330 0.376 -3.115 1.153 0.866 0.129 -----  
    
 
0.232 0.928 0.648 0.116 0.018 0.743 0.708 0.003 0.253 0.389 0.898 -----  
    
                 ICOSTS  -0.115 0.062 -0.099 -0.125 -0.019 0.241 0.048 -0.228 0.004 -0.523 0.009 -0.064 1.000 
   
 
-1.010 0.539 -0.864 -1.101 -0.166 2.167 0.418 -2.042 0.037 -5.356 0.075 -0.557 -----  
   
 
0.316 0.592 0.390 0.275 0.869 0.033 0.677 0.045 0.971 0.000 0.941 0.579 -----  
   
                 ROE  0.017 0.127 0.100 0.114 0.020 -0.082 0.328 -0.007 0.074 0.016 -0.218 -0.092 -0.003 1.000 
  
 
0.151 1.112 0.875 0.999 0.177 -0.713 3.027 -0.065 0.651 0.136 -1.943 -0.810 -0.030 -----  
  
 
0.880 0.270 0.384 0.321 0.860 0.478 0.003 0.948 0.517 0.892 0.056 0.421 0.976 -----  
  
                 LNPBT  0.078 0.106 0.158 0.274 -0.123 0.074 -0.115 0.166 -0.255 0.367 0.244 0.269 -0.203 -0.173 1.000 
 
 
0.678 0.928 1.399 2.487 -1.077 0.646 -1.007 1.466 -2.298 3.435 2.195 2.432 -1.806 -1.532 -----  
 
 
0.500 0.357 0.166 0.015 0.285 0.520 0.317 0.147 0.024 0.001 0.031 0.017 0.075 0.130 -----  
 
                 SGROWT
H  -0.043 0.070 0.102 0.030 0.010 0.018 -0.032 0.206 -0.068 0.283 0.007 -0.194 -0.132 0.055 0.146 1.000 
 
-0.373 0.616 0.894 0.262 0.090 0.160 -0.281 1.835 -0.596 2.571 0.057 -1.720 -1.164 0.483 1.290 -----  
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TABLE 16c - Correlations for 36-month CARs 
          
                 Covariance Analysis: Ordinary 
              Included observations: 78 
              Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion) 
 
            
 
CAR24  AUD  OWNER  UND  STDRTNS  LNTAL  LEVER  OFPR  PROJ  LNGPR  UNDPRT  LNAGE  ICOSTS  ROE  LNPBT  SGRO 
WTH  
CAR24  1.000 
               
 
-----  
               
 
-----  
               
                 AUD  0.101 1.000 
              
 
0.883 -----  
              
 
0.380 -----  
              
                 OWNER  -0.134 0.109 1.000 
             
 
-1.183 0.954 -----  
             
 
0.241 0.343 -----  
             
                 UND  0.219 0.288 -0.003 1.000 
            
 
1.955 2.620 -0.029 -----  
            
 
0.054 0.011 0.977 -----  
            
                 STDRTNS  -0.137 0.143 0.005 -0.131 1.000 
           
 
-1.205 1.256 0.040 -1.156 -----  
           
 
0.232 0.213 0.968 0.251 -----  
           
                 LNTAL  -0.083 -0.107 0.016 -0.008 -0.405 1.000 
          
 
-0.726 -0.939 0.136 -0.069 -3.856 -----  
          
 
0.470 0.351 0.892 0.945 0.000 -----  
          
                 LEVER  0.034 0.052 0.063 0.001 -0.098 0.032 1.000 
         
 
0.294 0.451 0.549 0.009 -0.860 0.281 -----  
         
 
0.769 0.653 0.585 0.993 0.392 0.779 -----  
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                 OFPR  -0.344 0.124 0.135 -0.135 0.056 -0.066 -0.097 1.000 
        
 
-3.198 1.088 1.189 -1.185 0.485 -0.580 -0.849 -----  
        
 
0.002 0.280 0.238 0.240 0.629 0.564 0.399 -----  
        
                 PROJ  -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 -0.152 -0.022 -0.193 0.076 -0.034 1.000 
       
 
-0.096 -0.116 -0.130 -1.341 -0.194 -1.719 0.666 -0.296 -----  
       
 
0.924 0.908 0.897 0.184 0.847 0.090 0.508 0.768 -----  
       
                 LNGPR  0.125 0.153 0.145 0.289 -0.044 -0.377 0.073 0.253 0.070 1.000 
      
 
1.098 1.345 1.279 2.630 -0.386 -3.553 0.642 2.284 0.615 -----  
      
 
0.276 0.183 0.205 0.010 0.701 0.001 0.523 0.025 0.540 -----  
      
                 UNDPRT  0.318 0.066 -0.067 0.178 0.033 -0.013 -0.108 -0.220 -0.203 0.032 1.000 
     
 
2.922 0.574 -0.586 1.573 0.288 -0.112 -0.949 -1.963 -1.807 0.281 -----  
     
 
0.005 0.568 0.560 0.120 0.774 0.911 0.346 0.053 0.075 0.779 -----  
     
                 LNAGE  0.137 0.010 -0.052 0.180 -0.268 0.038 0.043 -0.337 0.131 0.099 0.015 1.000 
    
 
1.204 0.090 -0.458 1.592 -2.427 0.330 0.376 -3.115 1.153 0.866 0.129 -----  
    
 
0.232 0.928 0.648 0.116 0.018 0.743 0.708 0.003 0.253 0.389 0.898 -----  
    
                 ICOSTS  -0.115 0.062 -0.099 -0.125 -0.019 0.241 0.048 -0.228 0.004 -0.523 0.009 -0.064 1.000 
   
 
-1.010 0.539 -0.864 -1.101 -0.166 2.167 0.418 -2.042 0.037 -5.356 0.075 -0.557 -----  
   
 
0.316 0.592 0.390 0.275 0.869 0.033 0.677 0.045 0.971 0.000 0.941 0.579 -----  
   
                 ROE  0.017 0.127 0.100 0.114 0.020 -0.082 0.328 -0.007 0.074 0.016 -0.218 -0.092 -0.003 1.000 
  
 
0.151 1.112 0.875 0.999 0.177 -0.713 3.027 -0.065 0.651 0.136 -1.943 -0.810 -0.030 -----  
  
 
0.880 0.270 0.384 0.321 0.860 0.478 0.003 0.948 0.517 0.892 0.056 0.421 0.976 -----  
  
                 LNPBT  0.078 0.106 0.158 0.274 -0.123 0.074 -0.115 0.166 -0.255 0.367 0.244 0.269 -0.203 -0.173 1.000 
 
 
0.678 0.928 1.399 2.487 -1.077 0.646 -1.007 1.466 -2.298 3.435 2.195 2.432 -1.806 -1.532 -----  
 
 
0.499 0.356 0.165 0.015 0.284 0.520 0.3169 0.146 0.0243 0.001 0.031 0.017 0.074 0.129 -----  
                  
SGROWTH  -0.042 0.070 0.102 0.030 0.010 0.018 -0.032 0.205 -0.068 0.282 0.006 -0.193 -0.132 0.055 0.146 1.000 
 
-0.373 0.615 0.894 0.261 0.090 0.159 -0.281 1.834 -0.595 2.571 0.057 -1.719 -1.164 0.482 1.289 -----  
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TABLE 17a - Covariance Coefficients  for CAR12 
           
 
CAR12  AUD  OWNER  UND  STDRTNS  LNTAL  LEVER  OFPR  PROJ  LNGPR  UNDPRT  LNAGE  ICOSTS  ROE  LNPBT  SGRO 
WTH  
CAR12  0.220                
 -----                 
 -----                 
                 
AUD  0.002 0.246               
 0.057 -----                
 0.955 -----                
                 
OWNER  -0.001 0.004 0.005              
 -0.181 0.954 -----               
 0.857 0.343 -----               
                 
UND  0.033 0.071 0.000 0.250             
 1.258 2.620 -0.029 -----              
 0.212 0.011 0.977 -----              
                 
STDRTNS  -0.014 0.018 0.000 -0.017 0.065            
 -0.992 1.256 0.040 -1.156 -----             
 0.324 0.213 0.968 0.251 -----             
                 
LNTAL  -0.002 -0.032 0.001 -0.002 -0.063 0.370           
 -0.059 -0.939 0.136 -0.069 -3.856 -----            
 0.953 0.351 0.892 0.945 0.000 -----            
                 
LEVER  0.004 0.022 0.004 0.000 -0.022 0.017 0.765          
 0.081 0.445 0.553 0.003 -0.863 0.286 -----           
 0.936 0.658 0.582 0.997 0.391 0.776 -----           
                 
OFPR  -0.086 0.042 0.006 -0.046 0.010 -0.028 -0.058 0.468         
 -2.438 1.088 1.189 -1.185 0.485 -0.580 -0.843 -----          
 0.017 0.280 0.238 0.240 0.629 0.564 0.402 -----          
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PROJ  0.031 -0.003 -0.001 -0.038 -0.003 -0.059 0.033 -0.012 0.247        
 1.162 -0.116 -0.130 -1.341 -0.194 -1.719 0.659 -0.296 -----         
 0.249 0.908 0.897 0.184 0.847 0.090 0.512 0.768 -----         
                 
LNGPR  0.118 0.097 0.013 0.185 -0.014 -0.294 0.082 0.222 0.045 1.639       
 1.752 1.345 1.279 2.630 -0.386 -3.553 0.641 2.284 0.615 -----        
 0.084 0.183 0.205 0.010 0.701 0.001 0.524 0.025 0.540 -----        
                 
UNDPRT  0.025 0.013 -0.002 0.036 0.003 -0.003 -0.039 -0.061 -0.041 0.017 0.163      
 1.169 0.574 -0.586 1.573 0.288 -0.112 -0.961 -1.963 -1.807 0.281 -----       
 0.246 0.568 0.560 0.120 0.774 0.911 0.339 0.053 0.075 0.779 -----       
                 
LNAGE  0.030 0.003 -0.002 0.052 -0.040 0.013 0.021 -0.133 0.038 0.073 0.003 0.333     
 0.973 0.090 -0.458 1.592 -2.427 0.330 0.365 -3.115 1.153 0.866 0.129 -----      
 0.334 0.928 0.648 0.116 0.018 0.743 0.716 0.003 0.253 0.389 0.898 -----      
                 
ICOSTS  -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.002 0.003    
 -0.862 0.539 -0.864 -1.101 -0.166 2.167 0.420 -2.042 0.037 -5.356 0.075 -0.557 -----     
 0.391 0.592 0.390 0.275 0.869 0.033 0.676 0.045 0.971 0.000 0.941 0.579 -----     
                 
ROE  0.007 0.052 0.006 0.047 0.004 -0.041 0.238 -0.004 0.031 0.017 -0.073 -0.044 0.000 0.687   
 0.153 1.113 0.876 1.000 0.177 -0.713 3.034 -0.065 0.650 0.137 -1.944 -0.809 -0.030 -----    
 0.879 0.269 0.384 0.321 0.860 0.478 0.003 0.949 0.518 0.892 0.056 0.421 0.976 -----    
                 
LNPBT  -0.009 0.066 0.014 0.173 -0.040 0.057 -0.128 0.143 -0.160 0.593 0.125 0.196 -0.015 -0.181 1.595  
 -0.130 0.928 1.399 2.487 -1.077 0.646 -1.020 1.466 -2.298 3.435 2.195 2.432 -1.806 -1.529 -----   
 0.897 0.357 0.166 0.015 0.285 0.520 0.311 0.147 0.024 0.001 0.031 0.017 0.075 0.130 -----   
                 
SGROWTH  0.065 0.101 0.020 0.043 0.008 0.032 -0.081 0.406 -0.098 1.044 0.008 -0.322 -0.022 0.132 0.533 8.311 
 0.422 0.616 0.894 0.262 0.090 0.160 -0.280 1.835 -0.596 2.571 0.057 -1.720 -1.164 0.483 1.290 -----  
 0.674 0.540 0.374 0.794 0.928 0.874 0.780 0.070 0.553 0.012 0.955 0.090 0.248 0.631 0.201 -----  
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TABLE 17b - Covariance Coefficients for CAR24           
                 
 CAR24  AUD  OWNER  UND  STDRTNS  LNTAL  LEVER  OFPR  PROJ  LNGPR  UNDPRT  LNAGE  ICOSTS  ROE  LNPBT  SGROWTH  
CAR24  0.416                
 -----                 
 -----                 
                 
AUD  0.032 0.246               
 0.883 -----                
 0.380 -----                
                 
OWNER  -0.006 0.004 0.005              
 -1.183 0.954 -----               
 0.241 0.343 -----               
                 
UND  0.071 0.071 0.000 0.250             
 1.955 2.620 -0.029 -----              
 0.054 0.011 0.977 -----              
                 
STDRTNS  -0.023 0.018 0.000 -0.017 0.065            
 -1.205 1.256 0.040 -1.156 -----             
 0.232 0.213 0.968 0.251 -----             
                 
LNTAL  -0.033 -0.032 0.001 -0.002 -0.063 0.370           
 -0.726 -0.939 0.136 -0.069 -3.856 -----            
 0.470 0.351 0.892 0.945 0.000 -----            
                 
LEVER  0.019 0.022 0.004 0.000 -0.022 0.017 0.766          
 0.294 0.451 0.549 0.009 -0.860 0.281 -----           
 0.769 0.653 0.585 0.993 0.392 0.779 -----           
                 
OFPR  -0.152 0.042 0.006 -0.046 0.010 -0.028 -0.058 0.468         
 -3.198 1.088 1.189 -1.185 0.485 -0.580 -0.849 -----          
 0.002 0.280 0.238 0.240 0.629 0.564 0.399 -----          
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PROJ  -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.038 -0.003 -0.059 0.033 -0.012 0.247        
 -0.096 -0.116 -0.130 -1.341 -0.194 -1.719 0.666 -0.296 -----         
 0.924 0.908 0.897 0.184 0.847 0.090 0.508 0.768 -----         
                 
LNGPR  0.103 0.097 0.013 0.185 -0.014 -0.294 0.082 0.222 0.045 1.639       
 1.098 1.345 1.279 2.630 -0.386 -3.553 0.642 2.284 0.615 -----        
 0.276 0.183 0.205 0.010 0.701 0.001 0.523 0.025 0.540 -----        
                 
UNDPRT  0.083 0.013 -0.002 0.036 0.003 -0.003 -0.038 -0.061 -0.041 0.017 0.163      
 2.922 0.574 -0.586 1.573 0.288 -0.112 -0.949 -1.963 -1.807 0.281 -----       
 0.005 0.568 0.560 0.120 0.774 0.911 0.346 0.053 0.075 0.779 -----       
                 
LNAGE  0.051 0.003 -0.002 0.052 -0.040 0.013 0.022 -0.133 0.038 0.073 0.003 0.333     
 1.204 0.090 -0.458 1.592 -2.427 0.330 0.376 -3.115 1.153 0.866 0.129 -----      
 0.232 0.928 0.648 0.116 0.018 0.743 0.708 0.003 0.253 0.389 0.898 -----      
                 
ICOSTS  -0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.002 0.003    
 -1.010 0.539 -0.864 -1.101 -0.166 2.167 0.418 -2.042 0.037 -5.356 0.075 -0.557 -----     
 0.316 0.592 0.390 0.275 0.869 0.033 0.677 0.045 0.971 0.000 0.941 0.579 -----     
                 
ROE  0.009 0.052 0.006 0.047 0.004 -0.041 0.238 -0.004 0.031 0.017 -0.073 -0.044 0.000 0.687   
 0.151 1.112 0.875 0.999 0.177 -0.713 3.027 -0.065 0.651 0.136 -1.943 -0.810 -0.030 -----    
 0.880 0.270 0.384 0.321 0.860 0.478 0.003 0.948 0.517 0.892 0.056 0.421 0.976 -----    
                 
LNPBT  0.063 0.066 0.014 0.173 -0.040 0.057 -0.127 0.143 -0.160 0.593 0.125 0.196 -0.015 -0.181 1.595  
 0.678 0.928 1.399 2.487 -1.077 0.646 -1.007 1.466 -2.298 3.435 2.195 2.432 -1.806 -1.532 -----   
 0.500 0.357 0.166 0.015 0.285 0.520 0.317 0.147 0.024 0.001 0.031 0.017 0.075 0.130 -----   
                 
SGROWTH  -0.080 0.101 0.020 0.043 0.008 0.032 -0.081 0.406 -0.098 1.044 0.008 -0.322 -0.022 0.132 0.533 8.311 
 -0.373 0.616 0.894 0.262 0.090 0.160 -0.281 1.835 -0.596 2.571 0.057 -1.720 -1.164 0.483 1.290 -----  
 0.710 0.540 0.374 0.794 0.928 0.874 0.780 0.070 0.553 0.012 0.955 0.090 0.248 0.631 0.201 -----  
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TABLE 17c - Covariance Coefficients for CAR36           
                 
 CAR36  AUD  OWNER  UND  STDRTNS  LNTAL  LEVER  OFPR  PROJ  LNGPR  UNDPRT  LNAGE  ICOSTS  ROE  LNPBT  SGROWTH  
 0.635                
 -----                 
 -----                 
                 
AUD  0.009 0.246               
 0.200 -----                
 0.842 -----                
                 
OWNER  -0.009 0.004 0.005              
 -1.474 0.954 -----               
 0.145 0.343 -----               
                 
UND  0.067 0.071 0.000 0.250             
 1.490 2.620 -0.029 -----              
 0.140 0.011 0.977 -----              
                 
STDRTNS  -0.032 0.018 0.000 -0.017 0.065            
 -1.377 1.256 0.040 -1.156 -----             
 0.173 0.213 0.968 0.251 -----             
                 
LNTAL  -0.070 -0.032 0.001 -0.002 -0.063 0.370           
 -1.273 -0.939 0.136 -0.069 -3.856 -----            
 0.207 0.351 0.892 0.945 0.000 -----            
                 
LEVER  0.074 0.022 0.004 0.000 -0.022 0.017 0.766          
 0.925 0.451 0.549 0.009 -0.860 0.281 -----           
 0.358 0.653 0.585 0.993 0.392 0.779 -----           
                 
OFPR  -0.185 0.042 0.006 -0.046 0.010 -0.028 -0.058 0.468         
 -3.143 1.088 1.189 -1.185 0.485 -0.580 -0.849 -----          
 0.002 0.280 0.238 0.240 0.629 0.564 0.399 -----          
                 
PROJ  -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.038 -0.003 -0.059 0.033 -0.012 0.247        
 -0.065 -0.116 -0.130 -1.341 -0.194 -1.719 0.666 -0.296 -----         
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 0.949 0.908 0.897 0.184 0.847 0.090 0.508 0.768 -----         
                 
LNGPR  0.108 0.097 0.013 0.185 -0.014 -0.294 0.082 0.222 0.045 1.639       
 0.926 1.345 1.279 2.630 -0.386 -3.553 0.642 2.284 0.615 -----        
 0.358 0.183 0.205 0.010 0.701 0.001 0.523 0.025 0.540 -----        
                 
UNDPRT  0.061 0.013 -0.002 0.036 0.003 -0.003 -0.038 -0.061 -0.041 0.017 0.163      
 1.687 0.574 -0.586 1.573 0.288 -0.112 -0.949 -1.963 -1.807 0.281 -----       
 0.096 0.568 0.560 0.120 0.774 0.911 0.346 0.053 0.075 0.779 -----       
                 
LNAGE  0.062 0.003 -0.002 0.052 -0.040 0.013 0.022 -0.133 0.038 0.073 0.003 0.333     
 1.192 0.090 -0.458 1.592 -2.427 0.330 0.376 -3.115 1.153 0.866 0.129 -----      
 0.237 0.928 0.648 0.116 0.018 0.743 0.708 0.003 0.253 0.389 0.898 -----      
                 
ICOSTS  -0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.002 0.003    
 -1.216 0.539 -0.864 -1.101 -0.166 2.167 0.418 -2.042 0.037 -5.356 0.075 -0.557 -----     
 0.228 0.592 0.390 0.275 0.869 0.033 0.677 0.045 0.971 0.000 0.941 0.579 -----     
                 
ROE  0.099 0.052 0.006 0.047 0.004 -0.041 0.238 -0.004 0.031 0.017 -0.073 -0.044 0.000 0.687   
 1.323 1.113 0.876 1.000 0.177 -0.713 3.028 -0.065 0.650 0.137 -1.944 -0.809 -0.030 -----    
 0.190 0.269 0.384 0.321 0.860 0.478 0.003 0.949 0.518 0.892 0.056 0.421 0.976 -----    
                 
LNPBT  0.018 0.066 0.014 0.173 -0.040 0.057 -0.127 0.143 -0.160 0.593 0.125 0.196 -0.015 -0.181 1.595  
 0.154 0.928 1.399 2.487 -1.077 0.646 -1.007 1.466 -2.298 3.435 2.195 2.432 -1.806 -1.529 -----   
 0.878 0.357 0.166 0.015 0.285 0.520 0.317 0.147 0.024 0.001 0.031 0.017 0.075 0.130 -----   
                 
SGROWTH  -0.458 0.101 0.020 0.043 0.008 0.032 -0.081 0.406 -0.098 1.044 0.008 -0.322 -0.022 0.132 0.533 8.311 
 -1.772 0.616 0.894 0.262 0.090 0.160 -0.281 1.835 -0.596 2.571 0.057 -1.720 -1.164 0.483 1.290 -----  
 0.080 0.540 0.374 0.794 0.928 0.874 0.780 0.070 0.553 0.012 0.955 0.090 0.248 0.631 0.201 -----  
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TABLE 18 - REGRESSION RESULTS FOR INITIAL RETURNS 
     
Dependent Variable: ADRAW     
Method: Least Squares     
Included observations: 79     
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
LNAGE -0.004 0.214 -0.020 0.984 
AUD -0.318 0.217 -1.464 0.148 
LNGPR -0.186 0.093 -2.004 0.049 
OWNER -1.315 1.889 -0.696 0.489 
LNTAL -1.231 0.310 -3.970 0.000 
UND -0.208 0.247 -0.843 0.402 
LEVER 0.223 0.099 2.263 0.027 
STDRTNS 7.320 0.949 7.714 0.000 
UNDPRT -0.038 0.240 -0.160 0.874 
PROJ -0.360 0.274 -1.315 0.193 
OFPR 0.035 0.152 0.227 0.821 
ICOSTS 0.841 2.079 0.405 0.687 
ROE 0.185 0.102 1.817 0.074 
LNPBT 0.073 0.064 1.147 0.256 
SGROWTH -0.016 0.018 -0.898 0.373 
C 9.612 3.192 3.011 0.004 
     
R-squared 0.870    
Adjusted R-squared 0.839    
S.E. of regression 0.973    
Sum squared resid 59.670    
Log likelihood -101.012    
F-statistic 28.036    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
Mean dependent var 1.242    
S.D. dependent var 2.423    
Akaike info criterion 2.962    
Schwarz criterion 3.442    
Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.155    
Durbin-Watson stat 1.300    
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TABLE 19 - Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
    
Variance Inflation Factors   
Included observations: 79   
    
 Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
LNAGE 0.046 71.810 2.282 
AUD 0.047 4.349 1.607 
LNGPR 0.009 394.537 3.484 
OWNER 3.567 296.432 2.766 
LNTAL 0.096 624.913 3.365 
UND 0.061 4.950 2.191 
LEVER 0.010 3.762 1.585 
STDRTNS 0.900 3.433 1.804 
UNDPRT 0.058 9.188 2.067 
PROJ 0.075 6.695 2.362 
OFPR 0.023 8.766 2.643 
ICOSTS 4.322 4.782 1.803 
ROE 0.010 2.166 1.794 
LNPBT 0.004 141.274 2.612 
SGROWTH 0.000 2.763 2.566 
C 10.190 1970.861                  N.A. 
    
Mean   2.329 
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TABLE 20a - REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CAR12 
     
Dependent Variable: CAR12     
Method: Least Squares     
Included observations: 78     
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
AUD 0.025 0.130 0.194 0.847 
OWNER -0.075 0.860 -0.087 0.931 
UND 0.017 0.137 0.123 0.903 
STDRTNS -0.125 0.254 -0.495 0.623 
LNTAL 0.089 0.128 0.696 0.489 
LEVER -0.038 0.067 -0.562 0.576 
OFPR -0.230 0.107 -2.150 0.036** 
PROJ 0.123 0.128 0.959 0.341 
LNGPR 0.112 0.050 2.262 0.027** 
UNDPRT 0.111 0.141 0.790 0.433 
LNAGE -0.037 0.118 -0.313 0.755 
ICOSTS -0.494 0.755 -0.654 0.515 
ROE 0.017 0.041 0.402 0.689 
LNPBT -0.034 0.052 -0.655 0.515 
SGROWTH 0.005 0.010 0.486 0.628 
C -1.361 1.415 -0.962 0.340 
     
R-squared 0.194    
Adjusted R-squared -0.001    
S.E. of regression 0.472    
Sum squared resid 13.826    
Log likelihood -43.201    
F-statistic 0.995    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.471    
Mean dependent var 0.090    
S.D. dependent var 0.472    
Akaike info criterion 1.518    
Schwarz criterion 2.001    
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.712    
Durbin-Watson stat 2.008    
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TABLE 20b - REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CAR24 
     
Dependent Variable: CAR24     
Method: Least Squares     
Included observations: 78     
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
AUD 0.197 0.179 1.099 0.276 
OWNER -1.149 0.833 -1.379 0.173 
UND 0.022 0.184 0.120 0.905 
STDRTNS -0.500 0.235 -2.127 0.037** 
LNTAL -0.099 0.158 -0.625 0.534 
LEVER -0.001 0.096 -0.013 0.990 
OFPR -0.356 0.122 -2.908 0.005* 
PROJ 0.020 0.171 0.119 0.906 
LNGPR 0.035 0.076 0.462 0.646 
UNDPRT 0.355 0.223 1.593 0.116 
LNAGE -0.098 0.136 -0.718 0.475 
ICOSTS -1.885 1.060 -1.778 0.080*** 
ROE 0.039 0.054 0.720 0.474 
LNPBT 0.025 0.081 0.306 0.761 
SGROWTH -0.006 0.012 -0.550 0.585 
C 0.704 1.725 0.408 0.685 
     
R-squared 0.292    
Adjusted R-squared 0.121    
S.E. of regression 0.609    
Sum squared resid 22.984    
Log likelihood -63.023    
F-statistic 1.706    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.073***    
Mean dependent var -0.183    
S.D. dependent var 0.649    
Akaike info criterion 2.026    
Schwarz criterion 2.510    
Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.220    
Durbin-Watson stat 1.971    
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TABLE 20c - REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CAR36 
     
Dependent Variable: CAR36     
Method: Least Squares     
Included observations: 78     
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
AUD 0.139 0.205 0.679 0.500 
OWNER -1.858 1.839 -1.011 0.316 
UND -0.046 0.208 -0.224 0.824 
STDRTNS -0.766 0.285 -2.688 0.009* 
LNTAL -0.224 0.204 -1.098 0.276 
LEVER 0.022 0.081 0.267 0.791 
OFPR -0.435 0.139 -3.126 0.003* 
PROJ -0.064 0.209 -0.308 0.760 
LNGPR 0.049 0.082 0.599 0.551 
UNDPRT 0.238 0.237 1.001 0.321 
LNAGE -0.155 0.169 -0.916 0.363 
ICOSTS -2.664 1.040 -2.561 0.013** 
ROE 0.172 0.085 2.033 0.046** 
LNPBT 0.046 0.090 0.509 0.613 
SGROWTH -0.055 0.013 -4.366 0.000* 
C 1.785 2.620 0.681 0.498 
     
R-squared 0.326    
Adjusted R-squared 0.163    
S.E. of regression 0.734    
Sum squared resid 33.361    
Log likelihood -77.553    
F-statistic 2.002    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.029**    
Mean dependent var -0.302    
S.D. dependent var 0.802    
Akaike info criterion 2.399    
Schwarz criterion 2.882    
Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.592    
Durbin-Watson stat 1.868    
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TABLE 21a - Variance Inflation Factors for CAR12 
    
Variance Inflation Factors   
Included observations: 78   
    
 Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
AUD 0.017 7.559 2.397 
OWNER 0.741 249.574 1.309 
UND 0.019 8.784 2.926 
STDRTNS 0.064 2.665 1.938 
LNTAL 0.016 381.323 1.784 
LEVER 0.005 8.275 4.045 
OFPR 0.011 11.183 2.058 
PROJ 0.016 5.623 2.796 
LNGPR 0.002 435.691 3.777 
UNDPRT 0.020 10.230 2.505 
LNAGE 0.014 76.361 2.802 
ICOSTS 0.570 3.183 1.824 
ROE 0.002 7.844 5.712 
LNPBT 0.003 350.665 4.619 
SGROWTH 0.000 4.231 3.187 
C 2.004 1,467.772  N.A. 
    
Mean   2.912 
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TABLE 21b - Variance Inflation Factors for CAR24 
    
Variance Inflation Factors   
Included observations: 78   
    
 Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
AUD 0.032 9.573 3.564 
OWNER 0.694 131.720 1.857 
UND 0.034 8.069 2.640 
STDRTNS 0.055 2.978 1.936 
LNTAL 0.025 333.255 2.317 
LEVER 0.009 10.845 5.867 
OFPR 0.015 13.047 3.465 
PROJ 0.029 6.760 2.309 
LNGPR 0.006 601.038 4.680 
UNDPRT 0.050 13.288 4.295 
LNAGE 0.018 57.705 3.507 
ICOSTS 1.124 3.856 2.114 
ROE 0.003 12.792 9.622 
LNPBT 0.006 461.539 6.406 
SGROWTH 0.000 3.102 2.524 
C 2.975 1,285.821  N.A. 
    
Mean   3.807 
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TABLE 21c - Variance Inflation Factors for CAR36 
    
Variance Inflation Factors   
Included observations: 78   
    
 Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
AUD 0.042 8.201 2.467 
OWNER 3.381 411.275 2.192 
UND 0.043 6.368 2.414 
STDRTNS 0.081 3.402 2.023 
LNTAL 0.042 361.299 2.505 
LEVER 0.007 3.430 1.779 
OFPR 0.019 10.769 2.542 
PROJ 0.044 5.602 2.093 
LNGPR 0.007 450.688 6.144 
UNDPRT 0.056 10.964 2.117 
LNAGE 0.029 59.309 3.099 
ICOSTS 1.082 4.422 2.762 
ROE 0.007 3.034 2.401 
LNPBT 0.008 393.362 4.022 
SGROWTH 0.000 4.869 3.594 
    
Mean   2.810 
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Table 22 – Sample selection 
 
Year Total 
sample
115
 
Financial 
services 
companies
116
 
Restructuring Changed 
accounting 
year-end 
Lack of 
data 
IPO 
date 
at t1 
Final 
Sample 
1997 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1998 4 1 1 0 0 0 2 
1999 8 1 0 1 0 0 6 
2000 36 2 6 1 1 1 26 
2001 20 4 0 0 0 6 16 
2002 9 0 0 0 0 6 9 
TOTAL 79 9 8 2 1 13 46 
Source: CSE Fact books 1997-2002, Author analysis 
 
 
  
                                                 
115 This is the sample employed in Chapter 1 of this thesis and it has already been adjusted to exclude closed-ended and 
private equity investment companies, overseas companies and placements. 
116 Includes financial services companies and insurance companies.  Investment companies (both closed-ended and private 
equity-type have already been excluded. 
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Table 23 – IPOs per industrial sector 
 
Industrial sector Number of IPOs % of total sample 
Building Materials and Construction 4 8.7 
Fish Culture 3 6.5 
Hotels 1 2.2 
Information Technology 2 4.3 
Manufacturing  10 21.7 
Other 14 30.4 
Tourism 4 8.8 
Trading 8 17.4 
TOTAL 46 100 
Source: CSE Fact books 1997-2002, Author analysis 
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Table 24 – Variable expected signs in regression models 
This table presents the expected signs of the coefficients of the independent variables in the regression equation:  
Rjt = βo + β1AUDjt + β2UNDjt + β3LNTALjt + β4STDRTNSjt + β5LEVERjt + β6LNGPRjt +  β7OFPRjt  + β8CF + 
β9EMjt-1 + εj 
PANEL A shows all the independent variables except for the Earnings Management variable (EM) that is shown 
in PANEL B. The EM variable takes the form of either (DA), or (TACCR) or (CRED, REC, INVENT and DEP) 
in the regression.  CF is cash flow from operations at t-1 and is a control variable. 
Coefficient Sign for Initial Raw 
Returns (ADRAW) 
Sign for Long term 
returns (CARs) 
PANEL A – Independent variables 
AUD - + 
UND - + 
LNTAL - - 
STDRTNS + - 
LEVER + + 
LNGPR - + 
OFPR - - 
   
PANEL B – Earnings Management variables 
 If Δy>Δx If Δy<Δx  
DA + - - 
TACCR + - - 
CRED + - - 
INVENT - + + 
REC - + + 
DEP - + + 
CF -  + + 
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TABLE 25a - Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate tests (absolute numbers) 
   The table below shows descriptive statistical data for the 46 firms in the sample with annual financial statements hand-picked from their prospectuses at t-3, t-2, t-1, t0, t1, and t2.  
Total Accruals are calculated as: TACCRj,t = NIj,t  – CFOj,t where, TACCRj,t is the managed component of earnings for IPO sample firm j during period t, which is equal to total 
accruals. NIj,t is the reported net income before extraordinary items for IPO sample firm j during period t, CFOj,t is the cash flow from operations for IPO sample firm j during 
period t, TA is total assets, TANoC is total assets adjusted for cash and cash equivalents.  REC are total receivables, CRED are total creditors, INVENT are inventories (stock) and 
DEP is gross accumulated depreciation.  Year t-1 is the benchmark year and is the year of the last audited accounts in the prospectus and year t0 is the IPO year. All figures are in 
Euro.  
  
NI CFO SALES TA TANoC TACCR REC INVENT CRED DEP 
PANEL A - YEAR t-3 
           Mean 
 
269,466 1,181,960 10,581,828 10,669,872 10,200,648 -912,494 2,053,240 1,100,093 2,167,074 1,907,959 
 Median 
 
165,351 405,084 5,390,554 3,413,055 3,231,499 -194,948 903,691 293,316 723,837 561,905 
            PANEL B - YEAR t-2 
           Mean 
 
508,832 748,211 12,879,570 12,509,704 11,861,270 -239,380 2,323,806 1,373,567 2,342,332 2,288,865 
 Median 
 
311,496 275,047 5,610,614 4,293,906 3,383,205 -54,838 1,151,318 429,911 946,688 748,426 
            PANEL C - YEAR t-1 (benhcmark year) 
          Mean 
 
1,289,711 790,110 15,540,293 16,770,163 15,856,861 499,601 3,013,112 1,726,711 2,891,222 2,030,845 
 Median 
 
808,000 413,500 7,166,299 6,360,133 5,813,655 255,910 1,711,577 600,524 1,314,404 842,267 
            PANEL D - YEAR t0 (IPO 
year) 
           Mean 
 
1,755,163 895,057 19,684,133 33,740,651 26,834,840 860,106 5,129,998 2,926,416 3,773,572 3,267,895 
 Median 
 
1,008,605 306,823 10,248,124 13,310,322 10,943,875 476,183 2,294,656 1,227,260 1,570,005 1,032,755 
            PANEL E - YEAR t1 
           Mean 
 
1,170,784 967,797 30,689,709 48,120,465 44,389,974 202,987 6,649,475 4,135,771 4,946,230 4,963,742 
 Median 
 
795,023 72,151 15,698,014 15,994,723 14,003,667 200,270 3,421,505 2,092,001 1,922,003 1,571,621 
            PANEL F - YEAR t2 
           Mean 
 
522,756 2,799,233 34,733,657 46,937,530 43,769,857 -2,276,477 7,106,072 4,095,063 5,740,186 4,473,424 
 Median 
 
267,182 518,705 19,313,349 16,456,379 14,437,807 -565,498 3,065,660 2,242,187 2,187,432 2,014,613 
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TABLE 25b - Descriptive statistics of variables employed in univariate tests (deflated) 
The table below shows descriptive statistical data for the 46 firms in the sample with annual financial statements hand-picked 
from their prospectuses at t-3, t-2, t-1, t0, t1, and t2.  The variables are deflated by Sales, Total Assets and Total Assets Net of 
Cash.  Total Accruals are calculated as: TACCRj,t = NIj,t  – CFOj,t where, TACCRj,t is the managed component of earnings 
for IPO sample firm j during period t, which is equal to total accruals. NIj,t is the reported net income before extraordinary 
items for IPO sample firm j during period t, CFOj,t is the cash flow from operations for IPO sample firm j during period t, TA 
is total assets, TANoC is total assets adjusted for cash and cash equivalents.  REC are total receivables, CRED are total 
creditors, INVENT are inventories (stock) and DEP is gross accumulated depreciation.  Year t-1 is the benchmark year and is 
the year of the last audited accounts in the prospectus and year t0 is the IPO year. All figures are in Euro.  
PART A - DEFLATED BY 
SALES 
       
  
NI CFO TACCR REC INVENT CRED DEP 
PANEL A - YEAR t-3 
        Mean 
 
2.55% 11.17% -8.62% 19.40% 10.40% 20.48% 18.03% 
 Median 
 
3.07% 7.51% -3.62% 16.76% 5.44% 13.43% 10.42% 
PANEL B - YEAR t-2 
        Mean 
 
3.95% 5.81% -1.86% 18.04% 10.66% 18.19% 17.77% 
 Median 
 
5.55% 4.90% -.98% 20.52% 7.66% 16.87% 13.34% 
PANEL C - YEAR t-1 (benhcmark 
year) 
       Mean 
 
8.30% 5.08% 3.21% 19.39% 11.11% 18.60% 13.07% 
 Median 
 
11.27% 5.77% 3.57% 23.88% 8.38% 18.34% 11.75% 
PANEL D - YEAR t0 (IPO 
year) 
        Mean 
 
8.92% 4.55% 4.37% 26.06% 14.87% 19.17% 16.60% 
 Median 
 
9.84% 2.99% 4.65% 22.39% 11.98% 15.32% 10.08% 
PANEL E - YEAR t1 
        Mean 
 
3.81% 3.15% 0.66% 21.67% 13.48% 16.12% 16.17% 
 Median 
 
5.06% 0.46% 1.28% 21.80% 13.33% 12.24% 10.01% 
PANEL F - YEAR t2 
        Mean 
 
1.51% 8.06% -6.55% 20.46% 11.79% 16.53% 12.88% 
 Median 
 
1.38% 2.69% -2.93% 15.87% 11.61% 11.33% 10.43% 
         PART B - DEFLATED BY TOTAL 
ASSETS 
      
  
NI CFO TACCR REC INVENT CRED DEP 
PANEL A - YEAR t-3 
        Mean 
 
2.53% 11.08% -8.55% 19.24% 10.31% 20.31% 17.88% 
 Median 
 
4.84% 11.87% -5.71% 26.48% 8.59% 21.21% 16.46% 
PANEL B - YEAR t-2 
        Mean 
 
4.07% 5.98% -1.91% 18.58% 10.98% 18.72% 18.30% 
 Median 
 
7.25% 6.41% -1.28% 26.81% 10.01% 22.05% 17.43% 
PANEL C - YEAR t-1 (benhcmark 
year) 
       Mean 
 
7.69% 4.71% 2.98% 17.97% 10.30% 17.24% 12.11% 
 Median 
 
12.70% 6.50% 4.02% 26.91% 9.44% 20.67% 13.24% 
PANEL D - YEAR t0 (IPO 
year) 
        Mean 
 
5.20% 2.65% 2.55% 15.20% 8.67% 11.18% 9.69% 
 Median 
 
7.58% 2.31% 3.58% 17.24% 9.22% 11.80% 7.76% 
PANEL E - YEAR t1 
        Mean 
 
2.43% 2.01% 0.42% 13.82% 8.59% 10.28% 10.32% 
 Median 
 
4.97% 0.45% 1.25% 21.39% 13.08% 12.02% 9.83% 
PANEL F - YEAR t2 
        Mean 
 
1.11% 5.96% -4.85% 15.14% 8.72% 12.23% 9.53% 
 Median 
 
1.62% 3.15% -3.44% 18.63% 13.63% 13.29% 12.24% 
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PART C - DEFLATED BY TOTAL ASSETS NET of 
CASH 
    
  
NI CFO TACCR REC INVENT CRED DEP 
PANEL A - YEAR t-3 
        Mean 
 
2.64% 11.59% -8.95% 20.13% 10.78% 21.24% 18.70% 
 Median 
 
5.12% 12.54% -6.03% 27.97% 9.08% 22.40% 17.39% 
PANEL B - YEAR t-2 
        Mean 
 
4.29% 6.31% -2.02% 19.59% 11.58% 19.75% 19.30% 
 Median 
 
9.21% 8.13% -1.62% 34.03% 10.33% 27.98% 22.12% 
PANEL C - YEAR t-1 (benhcmark 
year) 
       Mean 
 
8.13% 4.98% 3.15% 19.00% 10.89% 18.23% 12.81% 
 Median 
 
13.90% 7.11% 4.40% 29.44% 10.33% 22.61% 14.49% 
PANEL D - YEAR t0 (IPO 
year) 
        Mean 
 
6.54% 3.34% 3.21% 19.12% 10.91% 14.06% 12.18% 
 Median 
 
9.22% 2.80% 4.35% 20.97% 11.21% 14.35% 9.44% 
PANEL E - YEAR t1 
        Mean 
 
2.64% 2.18% 0.46% 14.98% 9.32% 11.14% 11.18% 
 Median 
 
5.68% 0.52% 1.43% 24.43% 14.94% 13.72% 11.22% 
PANEL F - YEAR t2 
        Mean 
 
1.19% 6.40% -5.20% 16.24% 9.36% 13.11% 10.22% 
 Median 
 
1.85% 3.59% -3.92% 15.53% 15.53% 15.15% 13.95% 
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TABLE 26a - Descriptive statistics     
The table below shows descriptive statistics for the data in the sample of 46 firms.  The benchmark time is t-1. 
DA is the change in discretionary accruals at time tn adjusted by sales,    
TA is the change in total accruals at time tn adjusted by sales,     
NI is net income before extraordinary items at time tn, adjusted by sales,    
CFO is the change in cash flow from operations at time tn adjusted by sales,     
ROS is the change in return on sales at time tn,      
Winsorization takes place at the 5th and 95th percentile. tn takes the values of -3, -2, 0, 1, and 2 
        
  Mean Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum 
   (winsorized)  Deviation   
PANEL A t-3 vs t-1       
DA*  -0.1382 -0.1311 -0.1014 0.2126 -0.9768 0.2892 
TA**  -0.1856 -0.1507 -0.1196 0.3916 -2.1571 0.3536 
NI  -0.1578 -0.1574 -0.1091 0.1554 -0.6301 0.1115 
CFO  0.0279 -0.0026 -0.0407 0.3445 -0.5495 1.5270 
ROS  -0.0848 -0.0786 -0.0672 0.0951 -0.4880 0.0799 
PANEL B t-2 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0568 -0.0636 -0.0331 0.1960 -0.5584 0.4518 
TA  -0.0794 -0.0801 -0.0345 0.2111 -0.6545 0.4181 
NI  -0.0865 -0.0821 -0.0553 0.1078 -0.5501 0.1014 
CFO  -0.0071 -0.0071 -0.0311 0.1908 -0.5017 0.5590 
ROS  -0.0470 -0.0471 -0.0311 0.0642 -0.2514 0.0838 
PANEL C t0 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0774 0.0175 -0.0094 0.7742 -4.8635 0.8465 
TA  -0.0741 0.0187 0.0048 0.7288 -4.6036 0.7280 
NI  0.0214 0.0198 0.0189 0.0753 -0.1717 0.2697 
CFO  0.0955 0.0046 0.0038 0.7384 -0.5922 4.7544 
ROS  -0.0055 -0.0088 -0.0091 0.0732 -0.1753 0.2846 
PANEL D t1 vs t-1       
DA  0.0572 0.0296 0.0089 0.4417 -0.7122 2.0472 
TA  0.0395 0.0229 -0.0053 0.3396 -0.5832 1.6340 
NI  -0.0595 -0.0488 -0.0077 0.1962 -0.8910 0.1428 
CFO  -0.0989 -0.0965 -0.0266 0.3866 -1.5680 0.6433 
ROS  -0.0975 -0.0935 -0.0487 0.1589 -0.5928 0.0813 
PANEL E t2 vs t-1       
DA  -0.1349 -0.1258 -0.0581 0.2965 -1.2727 0.3444 
TA  -0.1126 -0.0609 -0.0609 0.2614 -1.2681 0.3884 
NI  -0.1048 -0.0842 -0.0302 0.2623 -1.1486 0.1915 
CFO  0.0078 0.0076 0.0105 0.1355 -0.3448 0.3316 
ROS  -0.1513 -0.1285 -0.0745 0.2454 -1.1572 0.1016 
 
*Discretionary accruals is the estimate of the change in total accruals that is due to the exercise of accounting discretion 
by issuers. It is estimated as: 
Discretionary accruals (DA) = Total Accrualst - Total Accrualst-1    
     Salest                                   Salest-1    
**The change in the other variables shown above (Total Accruals, Net Income, Cash Flow from Operations, Return on 
Sales, Return on Total Assets and Return on Total Assets net of Cash) between the benchmark period and the test period 
standardised by sales in the test period is given as: 
Change in variable = Variablet  -  Variablet-1     
 Salest      
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TABLE 26b - Descriptive statistics     
The table below shows descriptive statistics for the data in the sample of 46 firms.  The benchmark time is t-1. 
DA is the change in discretionary accruals at time tn adjusted by total assets,    
TA is the change in total accruals at time tn adjusted by total assets,    
NI is net income before extraordinary items at time tn, adjusted by total assets,    
CFO is the change in cash flow from operations at time tn adjusted by total assets,    
ROANoC is the change in return on total assets at time tn,     
Winsorization takes place at the 5th and 95th percentile. tn takes the values of -3, -2, 0, 1, and 2 
  Mean Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum 
   (winsorized)  Deviation   
PANEL A t-3 vs t-1       
DA*  -0.1133 -0.1202 -0.1053 0.2026 -0.5589 0.5132 
TA**  -0.2732 -0.2429 -0.1633 0.5281 -2.5407 0.6605 
NI  -0.2052 -0.2043 -0.1466 0.1899 -0.7421 0.0496 
CFO  0.0681 0.0530 -0.0369 0.4363 -0.6526 1.7986 
ROA  -0.0546 -0.0498 -0.0396 0.1305 -0.5599 0.2349 
PANEL B t-2 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0673 -0.0714 -0.0371 0.1940 -0.6351 0.4274 
TA  -0.1283 -0.1307 -0.0586 0.2611 -0.6768 0.4014 
NI  -0.0977 -0.0976 -0.0801 0.1028 -0.4127 0.0909 
CFO  0.0306 0.0280 -0.0280 0.2308 -0.3475 0.6493 
ROA  -0.0236 -0.0218 -0.0178 0.0987 -0.3675 0.2757 
PANEL C t0 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0406 -0.0347 -0.0146 0.2169 -0.8098 0.3305 
TA  -0.0031 0.0067 0.0047 0.1578 -0.5769 0.2541 
NI  0.0095 0.0089 0.0098 0.0374 -0.0878 0.1214 
CFO  0.0126 0.0044 0.0039 0.1520 -0.2647 0.5958 
ROA  -0.0504 -0.0479 -0.0373 0.0709 -0.2794 0.0670 
PANEL D t1 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0378 -0.0273 -0.0026 0.2586 -1.0914 0.5565 
TA  0.0011 0.0031 -0.0034 0.2250 -0.9353 0.6943 
NI  -0.0433 -0.0310 -0.0043 0.1594 -0.9059 0.0919 
CFO  -0.0445 -0.0299 -0.0216 0.1843 -0.8785 0.2435 
ROA  -0.1097 -0.0946 -0.0654 0.1739 -1.0363 0.0452 
PANEL E t2 vs t-1       
DA  -0.1276 -0.1301 -0.0657 0.2149 -0.7255 0.3398 
TA  -0.0894 -0.0802 -0.0424 0.1734 -0.7449 0.1733 
NI  -0.0745 -0.0689 -0.0164 0.1648 -0.6874 0.1122 
CFO  0.0149 0.0128 0.0078 0.1145 -0.2408 0.3419 
ROA  -0.1394 -0.1369 -0.0768 0.1553 -0.6259 0.0425 
 
        
*Discretionary accruals is the estimate of the change in total accruals that is due to the exercise of accounting discretion 
by issuers. It is estimated as: 
Discretionary accruals (DA) = Total Accrualst - Total Accrualst-1    
       Total Assetst                Total Assetst-1   
**The change in the other variables shown above (Total Accruals, Net Income, Cash Flow from Operations, Return on 
Sales, Return on Total Assets and Return on Total Assets net of Cash) between the benchmark period and the test period 
standardised by sales in the test period is given as: 
Change in variable = Variablet  -  Variablet-1     
  Total Assetst     
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TABLE 26c - Descriptive statistics    
The table below shows descriptive statistics for the data in the sample of 46 firms.  The benchmark time is t-1. 
DA is the change in discretionary accruals at time tn adjusted by total assets net of cash,   
TA is the change in total accruals at time tn adjusted by total assets net of cash,   
NI is net income before extraordinary items at time tn, adjusted by total assets net of cash,   
CFO is the change in cash flow from operations at time tn adjusted by total assets net of cash,   
ROANoC is the change in return on total assets net of cash at time tn,    
Winsorization takes place at the 5th and 95th percentile. tn takes the values of -3, -2, 0, 1, and 2 
        
  Mean Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum 
   (winsorized)  Deviation   
PANEL A t-3 vs t-1       
DA*  -0.1243 -0.1346 -0.1092 0.2254 -0.6126 0.5568 
TA**  -0.2309 -0.2191 -0.0696 0.5162 -2.0689 0.7379 
NI  -0.4025 -0.2037 -0.0701 1.5563 -10.4761 0.0241 
CFO  0.0877 0.0696 -0.0371 0.4814 -0.6999 1.9278 
ROANoC  -0.0658 -0.0591 -0.0473 0.1436 -0.6008 0.2414 
PANEL B t-2 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0796 -0.0814 -0.0378 0.2164 -0.6940 0.4136 
TA  -0.1561 -0.1500 -0.0588 0.3233 -1.2359 0.4088 
NI  -0.1128 -0.1055 -0.0844 0.1398 -0.7543 0.0926 
CFO  0.0433 0.0355 -0.0370 0.2635 -0.3535 0.7770 
ROANoC  -0.0334 -0.0298 -0.0264 0.1051 -0.4109 0.2697 
PANEL C t0 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0391 -0.0295 -0.0174 0.2677 -0.9709 0.4643 
TA  0.0022 0.0116 0.0107 0.2104 -0.7655 0.4011 
NI  0.0087 0.0104 0.0127 0.0683 -0.2366 0.1964 
CFO  0.0065 -0.0052 0.0029 0.2014 -0.3366 0.6804 
ROANoC  -0.0653 -0.0449 -0.0344 0.1881 -1.2212 0.0864 
PANEL D t1 vs t-1       
DA  -0.0211 -0.0243 -0.0174 0.3509 -1.2898 1.4266 
TA  0.0202 0.0064 -0.0051 0.3238 -1.1325 1.4548 
NI  -0.0558 -0.0346 -0.0055 0.2146 -1.0969 0.1837 
CFO  -0.0761 -0.0307 -0.0307 0.3601 -2.2393 0.2635 
ROANoC  -0.1288 -0.1069 -0.0612 0.2249 -1.2284 0.0534 
PANEL E t2 vs t-1       
DA  -0.1331 -0.1340 -0.0740 0.2302 -0.7491 0.3758 
TA  -0.0911 -0.0856 -0.0471 0.1863 -0.7511 0.2361 
NI  -0.0738 -0.0799 -0.0168 0.2016 -0.6894 0.4995 
CFO  0.0172 0.0231 0.0082 0.1451 -0.4195 0.3874 
ROANoC  -0.1422 -0.1532 -0.0796 0.2063 -0.6344 0.5545 
 
*Discretionary accruals is the estimate of the change in total accruals that is due to the exercise of accounting discretion 
by issuers. It is estimated as: 
Discretionary accruals (DA) = Total Accrualst - Total Accrualst-1    
       Total Assetst           Total Assetst-1   
**The change in the other variables shown above (Total Accruals, Net Income, Cash Flow from Operations, Return on 
Sales, Return on Total Assets and Return on Total Assets net of Cash) between the benchmark period and the test period 
standardised by sales in the test period is given as: 
Change in variable = Variablet  -  Variablet-1     
  
Total Assetst 
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Table 27 – Sales growth statistical test 
The table below shows the growth of CSE IPO firms in the sample where: 
Growth= Salest0   (growth greater than 1 indicates that a firm has increased in size) 
 Salest-1  
We also test the hypothesis that growth between the periods is equal to 1 by employing t- and Wilcoxon statistical tests. 
 Mean Median Number > 1 Percent >1 Minimum Maximum 
t-3 to t-2 1.278**  1.143^ 39 84.78 0.672 4.067 
t-2 to t-1 1.297* 1.225^ 41 89.13 0.934 2.247 
t-1 to t0 1.339* 1.227^ 42 91.30 0.654 3.707 
t0 to t1 1.469* 1.178^ 38 82.61 0.516 5.041 
t1 to t2 1.477*** 1.077^^ 33 71.74 0.159 9.744 
*p-value of two-tailed t-test of whether growth between periods is equal to 1.  ^p-value of Wilcoxon test of whether growth 
between periods is equal to 1. ).  * (^), ** (^^), *** (^^^) denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level for t- 
and (Wilcoxon) tests respectively.  
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Table 28 - Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables    
 Mean Median Standard  
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
      
PANEL A - Independent variables      
AUD 0.696 1.000 0.465 1.000 0.000 
UND 0.565 1.000 0.501 1.000 0.000 
LEVER 0.895 0.699 0.824 3.589 0.000 
LNGPR 15.056 15.082 1.271 17.463 12.454 
LNTAL 5.532 5.501 0.568 6.924 4.443 
OFPR 0.920 0.854 0.235 1.709 0.478 
STDRTNS 0.228 0.104 0.289 1.382 0.000 
      
PANEL B - Earnings management variables deflated by sales   
DA -0.057 -0.033 0.196 0.452 -0.558 
TACCR -0.079 -0.035 0.211 0.418 -0.655 
CRED -0.007 0.003 0.168 0.502 -0.599 
INVENT -0.009 -0.007 0.163 0.671 -0.576 
REC -0.022 -0.027 0.121 0.221 -0.505 
DEP 0.038 0.002 0.102 0.401 -0.081 
CFO -0.007 -0.031 0.191 0.559 -0.502 
      
PANEL C - Earnings management variables deflated by total assets   
DA -0.067 -0.037 0.194 0.427 -0.635 
TACCR -0.128 -0.059 0.261 0.401 -0.677 
CRED -0.026 -0.011 0.082 0.086 -0.486 
INVENT -0.025 -0.011 0.045 0.006 -0.278 
REC -0.038 -0.018 0.059 0.081 -0.196 
DEP -0.002 -0.008 0.043 0.202 -0.075 
CFO 0.031 -0.028 0.231 0.649 -0.348 
      
PANEL D - Earnings management variables deflated by total assets net of cash 
DA -0.079 -0.038 0.216 0.414 -0.694 
TACCR -0.156 -0.059 0.323 0.409 -1.236 
CRED -0.103 -0.035 0.319 0.299 -1.972 
INVENT -0.073 -0.045 0.109 0.014 -0.466 
REC -0.173 -0.085 0.317 0.267 -1.273 
DEP -0.013 -0.028 0.123 0.561 -0.319 
CFO 0.043 -0.037 0.263 0.777 -0.353 
      
PANEL E - Dependent variables      
ADRAW 1.588 0.342 2.602 12.259 -0.196 
CAR12 0.089 0.125 0.435 0.786 -1.035 
CAR24 -0.084 -0.104 0.596 1.209 -1.714 
CAR36 -0.202 -0.250 0.719 1.356 -1.832 
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TABLE 29 – Univariate tests for profitability and accruals 
 
        
This table presents the results of univariate tests with t-1 as the benchmark year and t-3, t-2 and t0, t1, and t2 as the test years.  Year t0 is the IPO year.  Years t-2 and t-3 are the years before the 
benchmark year t-1 and years t0, t1, and t2 are the years after the benchmark year. ROS is return on sales, ROA is return on Total Assets, ROANoC is return on total assets net of cash, NI is Net 
income, CFO is cash flow from operations, DA is Discretionary Accruals and TACCR is total accruals.  The mean and median of each variable relative to t-1 is tested whether is zero. Note: p-
values of t- and Wilcoxon statistics are shown above (the latter in parentheses).  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
    Y  e  a  r  s     r  e  l  a  t   i  v  e     t  o      t-1     
  -2 -1 1 2 3 
PANEL A - PROFITABILITY, INCOME AND CASH FLOW         
            
ΔROS t-statistic -6.046 (0.000)* -4.969 (0.000)* -0.508 (0.614) -4.161 (0.000)* -4.183 (0.000)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -4.795 (0.000)* -4.415 (0.000)* -0.613 (0.540) -4.016 (0.000)* -4.793 (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0 91.30% (0.000)* 82.60% (0.000)* 45.70% (0.659) 23.90% (0.000)* 15.20% (0.000)* 
            
ΔROA t-statistic -2.836 (0.007)* -1.621 (0.112) -4.819 (0.000)* -4.279 (0.000)* -6.086 (0.000)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -2.969 (0.003)* -1.967 (0.049) -4.373 (0.000)* -4.016 (0.000)* -5.275 (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0 76.10% (0.000)* 63.00% (0.104) 80.40% (0.000)* 13.00% (0.000)* 10.90% (0.000)* 
            
ΔROANoC t-statistic -3.106 (0.003)* -2.160 (0.036)** -2.353 (0.023)** -3.884 (0.000)* -4.676 (0.000)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -3.087 (0.002)* -2.519 (0.012)** -3.580 (0.000)* -4.839 (0.000)* -4.796 (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0 82.60% (0.000)* 67.40% (0.030)** 26.10% (0.002)* 10.90% (0.000)* 13.40% (0.000)* 
            
ΔNI t-statistic -6.886 (0.000)* -5.442 (0.000)* 1.927 (0.060)*** -2.056 (0.046)** -2.709 (0.009)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -5.187 (0.000)* -4.888 (0.000)* 2.018 (0.044)** -1.272 (0.203) -2.783 (0.005)* 
 % of obs > 0 93.50% (0.000)* 89.10% (0.000)* 65.20% (0.054)*** 43.40% (0.461) 34.80% (0.054)*** 
            
ΔCFO t-statistic 0.549 (0.586) -0.253 (0.802) 0.877 (0.385) -1.736 (0.089)*** 0.391 (0.698) 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -0.086 (0.932) -0.347 (0.729) 0.248 (0.804) -1.812 (0.069)*** 0.332 (0.739) 
 % of obs > 0 54.30% (0.659) 58.70% (0.302) 54.30% (0.659) 41.30% (0.302) 54.30% (0.659) 
            
NUMBER OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE 46  46  46  46  46  
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    Y  e  a  r  s     r  e  l  a  t   I  v  e     t  o      t-1     
  -2  -1 1 2 3  
PANEL B - DISCRETIONARY AND TOTAL ACCRUALS         
            
DAS t-statistic -4.409 (0.000)* -1.967 (0.055)*** -0.678 (0.501) 0.879 (0.384) -3.088 (0.003)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -4.084 (0.000)* -2.039 (0.041)** 0.149 (0.881) 0.353 (0.724) -2.961 (0.003)* 
 % of obs > 0 78.00% (0.000)* 65.20% (0.054)*** 47.80% (0.883) 56.50% (0.462) 30.40% (0.011)** 
            
DATA t-statistic -3.793 (0.000)* -2.353 (0.023)** -1.271 (0.210) -0.991 (0.327) -4.026 (0.000)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -3.563 (0.000)* -2.330 (0.019)** -1.039 (0.299) -0.773 (0.439) -3.681 (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0 80.40% (0.000)* 60.90% (0.184) 39.10% (0.185) 47.80% (0.883) 26.10% (0.002)* 
            
DATANoC t-statistic -3.739 (0.000)* -2.494 (0.022)** -0.990 (0.327) -0.408 (0.685) -3.920 (0.000)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -3.614 (0.000)* -2.383 (0.018)** -0.680 (0.496) -0.614 (0.539) -3.518 (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0 80.40% (0.000)* 60.90% (0.184) 43.50% (0.461) 45.70% (0.883) 28.30% (0.005)* 
            
ΔTACCRS t-statistic -3.215 (0.000)* -2.549 (0.014)** -0.689 (0.494) 0.788 (0.435) -2.921 (0.005)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -3.536 (0.002)* -2.276 (0.023)** 0.495 (0.754) 0.286 (0.775) -3.274 (0.001)* 
 % of obs > 0 73.90% (0.002)* 60.90% (0.184) 52.10% (0.884) 50.00% (0.997) 30.40% (0.011)** 
            
ΔTACCRTA t-statistic -3.509 (0.000)* -3.333 (0.002)* -1.134 (0.894) -0.034 (0.973) -3.495 (0.001)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -3.67 (0.002)* -2.825 (0.005)* 0.418 (0.676) -0.01 (0.992) -3.392 (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0 73.90% (0.002)* 60.90% (0.184) 52.20% (0.883) 50.00% (0.997) 30.40% (0.011)** 
            
ΔTACCRTANoC t-statistic -3.033 (0.004)* -3.275 (0.002)* 0.072 (0.943) 0.424 (0.674) -3.316 (0.002)* 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test -2.793 (0.005)* -2.859 (0.004)* 0.569 (0.569) 0.146 (0.884) -3.173 (0.002)* 
 % of obs > 0 60.90% (0.184) 60.90% (0.184) 54.30% (0.659) 50.00% (0.997) 30.40% (0.011)** 
            
NUMBER OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE 46  46  46  46  46  
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TABLE 30 – Univariate tests for profitability and accruals pre and post IPO 
    
PANEL A - Profitability ratios   
  t-test Wilcoxon sign-rank test 
    
ROSall statistic 5.919 5.266 
 probability (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  89.13% 
ROSpre statistic 6.488 5.189 
 probability (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  91.30% 
ROSpost statistic 4.354 4.009 
 probability (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  71.74% 
ROAall statistic 5.692 5.550 
 probability (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  93.48% 
ROApre statistic 2.518 2.994 
 probability (0.015)** (0.003)* 
 % of obs > 0  71.74% 
ROApost statistic 5.803 5.474 
 probability (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  86.96% 
ROANoCall statistic 5.606 5.736 
 probability (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  95.65% 
ROANoCpre statistic 2.959 3.387 
 probability (0.005)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  78.26% 
ROANoCpost statistic 5.292 5.343 
 probability (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0  89.13% 
    
No of observations  46 46 
 
 
 
TABLE 30 - Univariate tests for profitability and accruals pre and post IPO 
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PANEL B- Total accruals     
  t-test  Wilcoxon sign-
rank test 
Winsorised 
TACCRSall statistic 2.075  1.945  
 probability (0.044)** (0.000)* (0.052)*** (0.000)* 
 % of obs > 0   58.69%  
TACCRSpre statistic 4.044  3.988  
 probability (0.000)*  (0.000)*  
 % of obs > 0   78.26%  
TACCRSpost statistic 1.142  0.983  
 probability (0.260) (0.051)*** (0.326) (0.169) 
 % of obs > 0   52.17%  
TACCRTAall statistic 3.313  2.775  
 probability (0.002)*  (0.006)*  
 % of obs > 0   60.87%  
TACCRTApre statistic 3.485  3.704  
 probability (0.001)*  (0.000)*  
 % of obs > 0   78.26%  
TACCRTApost statistic 2.601  2.141  
 probability (0.013)**  (0.032)**  
 % of obs > 0   60.87%  
TACCRTANoCall statistic 3.134  2.753  
 probability (0.003)*  (0.006)*  
 % of obs > 0   60.87%  
TACCRTANoCpre statistic 3.547  3.698  
 probability (0.000)  (0.000)  
 % of obs > 0   76.09%  
TACCTTANoCpost statistic 2.214  1.868  
 probability (0.032)** (0.006)* (0.062)*** (0.022)** 
 % of obs > 0   56.52%  
No of observations  46  46  
 
Table 30 (Cont.) 
The table above shows the results for the univariate tests for the variables Return on Sales (ROS), 
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Return on Total Assets (ROA) 
Return of Total Assets Net of Cash (ROANoC) and Total Accruals (TACCR).  These variables are 
tested in three states namely: 
Variableall = Variable t-1 - Average of Variable t-3, t-2, t0, t1, t2  
Variablepre = Variable t-1 - Average of Variable t-3, t-2   
Variablepost - Variable t-1 - Average of Variable t0, t1, t2   
We employ the t-test and the Wilcoxon sign-rank statistic to test whether the mean and median of 
these variables is significantly different 
from zero. Year t-1 is the benchmark year (the year of the last audited accounts of an IPO firm 
found in the prospectus), t0 is the IPO year. 
Years t1 and t2 are the years after the IPO year and years t-3 and t-2 are the years prior to the 
benchmark year t-1. 
 
Appendices F- Tables 
 
TABLE 31a - Regression Results for the Short-Run 
       
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 
          
Intercept 3.017/3.036 2.824/2.793 2.964/2.779 2.979/2.880 2.938/2.759 3.050/2.792 1.798/2.056 2.698/2.696 2.469/2.128 
 (0.005)*/(0.004)* (0,008)*/(0.008)* (0,005)*/(0.009)* (0,005)*/(0.007)* (0,006)*/(0.009)* (0.004)*/(0.008)* (0.081)***/(0.048)** (0,011)**/(0.011)** (0,019)**/(0.041)** 
AUD 1.266/1.294 1.282/1.316 1.205/1.208 1.436/1.308 1.050/1.160 1.067/1.145 1.262/0.847 1.144/1.076 1.130/1.151 
 (0.214)/(0.204) (0,208)/(0.196) (0.236)/(0.235) (0.159)/(0.199) (0.301)/(0.254) (0.293)/(0.260) (0.216)/(0.403) (0.261)/(0.289) (0.267)/(0.258) 
UND -1.849/-2.107 -1.916/-2.077 -1.802/-1.953 -2.137/-2.176 -1.773/-1.921 -1.650/-1.841 -1.806/-1.701 -1.367/-1.300 -1.585/-1.698 
 (0.073)***/(0.042)** (0,063)***/(0.045)** (0.079)***/(0.059)*** (0.039)**/(0.036)** (0,085)***/(0.063)*** (0.108)/(0.074)* (0.080)***/(0.098)*** (0.181)/(0.202) (0.123)/(0.097)*** 
LEVER 2.114/2.057 2.049/1.911 1.922/1.889 1.884/1.997 1.649/1.571 1.483/1.375 2.297/2.924 1.777/2.072 1.695/1.996 
 (0.042)**/(0.047)** (0,048)**/(0.064)*** (0.063)***/(0.067)*** (0.068)***/(0.0534)*** (0.108)/(0.125) (0.147)(0.178) (0.028)**/(0.006)* (0.085)***/(0.046)** (0.098)***/(0.054)*** 
LNGPR -0.890/-0.952 -1.177/-1.096 -1.344/-1.176 -0.677/0.911 -1.373/-1.291 -1.448/-1.326 -0.037/-0.257 -1.401/-1.531 -0.978/-0.705 
 (0.379)/(0.347) (0.247)/(0.281) (0.187)/(0.247) (0.503)/(0.369) (0.178)/(0.205) (0.156)/(0.193) (0.971)/(0.798) (0.171)/(0.135) (0.335)/(0.486) 
LNTAL -3.573/-3.549 -3.251/-3.229 -3.332/-3.171 -3.705/-3.394 -3.269/-3.103 -3.319/3.133 -2.465/-2.778 -2.839/-2.719 -2.807/-2.582 
 (0.001)*/(0.001)* (0,002)*/(0.003)* (0.002)*/(0.003)* (0.000)*/(0.002)* (0.002)*/(0.004)* (0.002)*/(0.003)* (0.019)**/(0.009)* (0.008)*/(0.010)* (0.008)*/(0.015)** 
OFPR -2.676/-2.505 -1.826/-1.848 -1.890/-1.841 -2.602/-2.322 -1.977/-1.776 -2.074/-1.774 -2.439/-2.978 -1.834/-1.383 -1.892/-1.607 
 (0.011)**/(0.017)** (0.076)***/(0.073)*** (0.067)***/(0.074)*** (0.013)**/(0.026)** (0.056)***/(0.084)*** (0.045)**/(0.085)*** (0.020)**/(0.005)* (0.076)*/(0.176) (0.067)***/(0.118) 
STDRTNS 5.740/5.571 4.702/4.703 4.645/4.587 6.619/5.402 4.533/4.529 4.498/4.534 7.622/6.150 5.920/5.772 5.081/5.688 
 (0,000)*/(0.000)* (0,000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0,000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* 
CFO -1.642/-1.302 -1.599/-1.013 -1.744/-0.940 -1.988/-1.231 -2.057/-1.110 -1.994/-1.156 0.906/1.185 -1.026/(0.084) -0.591/0.059 
 (0.109)/(0.201) (0.118)/(0.318) (0.089)***/(0.353) (0.054)***/(0.226) (0.047)**/(0.274) (0.054)***/(0.255) (0.371)/(0.245) (0.312)/(0.933) (0.558)/(0.953) 
DA 2.065/1.807 1.539/1.559 1.714/1.520       
 (0.046)**/(0.079)*** (0.133)/(0.128) (0.095)***/(0.137)       
TACCR    2.155/1.698 1.831/1.514 1.633/1.530    
    (0.038)**/(0.098)*** (0.075***)/(0.139) (0.111)/(0.135)    
CRED       1.825/1.572 2.934/1.482 2.851/1.615 
       (0.077)***/(0.125) (0.006)*/(0.148) (0,008)*/(0.116) 
DEP       -1.918/-2.729 0.425/0.950 -0.098/-0.055 
       (0.064)***/(0.010)* (0.674)/(0.349) (0.923)/(0.957) 
INVENT       -1.422/0.030 -0.485/-0.001 -0.089/-0.024 
       (0.164)(0.978) (0.631)/(0.998) (0.931)/(0.981) 
REC       0.697/0.524 1.717/(1.243) 1.318/0.898 
       (0.491)/(0.604) (0.095)***/(0.223) (0.197)/(0.376) 
R2 87.60%/87.28% 86.37%/86.30% 86.23%/86.23% 88.06%/87.01% 86.52%/86.05% 86.60%/86.23% 89.34%/88.55% 88.55%/87.95% 87.73%/87.66% 
Adj R2 84.50%/84.10% 82.96%/82.88% 82.79%/82.79% 85.07%/83.77 83.14%/82.57% 83.26%/82.79% 85.46%/84.39% 84.38%/83.57% 83.27%/83.16% 
F-statistic 28.264/27.450 25.340/25.210 25.049/25.049 29.499/26.800 25.662/24.685 25.861/25.067 23.052/21.279 21.262/20.071 19.660/19.526 
 (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
          
***denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level    
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TABLE 31b - Regression Results for CAR12        
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 
          
Intercept -2.184/-2.225 -2.278/-2.249 -2.330/-2.306 -2.260/-2.285 -2.315/-2.270 -2.373/-2.296 -1.570/-1.857 -1.685/-1.098 -1.830/-1.279 
 (0.036)**/(0.032)** (0.029)**/(0.031)** (0.026)**/(0.027)** (0.030)**/(0.028)** (0.026)**/(0.029)** (0.023)**/(0.028)** (0.126)/(0.072)*** (0.101)/(0.280) (0.076)***/(0.210) 
AUD 1.267/1.313 1.333/1.308 1.347/1.296 1.285/1.345 1.316/1.312 1.343/1.290 1.034/1.354 1.200/0.995 1.223/1.163 
 (0.213)/(0.198) (0.191)/(0.199) (0.187)/(0.203) (0.207)/(0.187) (0.197)/(0.198) (0.188)/(0.205) (0.309)/(0.185) (0.239)/(0.327) (0.230)/(0.253) 
UND -1.898/-1.941 -2.045/(-2.010) -2.159/-2.127 -1.950/-1.975 -2.049/-1.999 -2.141/-2.114 -1.719/-2.142 -1.914/-1.219 -2.088/-1.669 
 (0.066)***/(0.060)*** (0.048)**/(0.052)*** (0.038)**/(0.040)** (0.059)***/(0.056)*** (0.048)**/(0.053)*** (0.039)**/(0.042)** (0.095)***/(0.039)** (0.064)***/(0.232) (0.045)**/(0.105) 
LEVER 1.141/1.506 1.515/1.522 1.638/1.623 1.405/1.487 1.371/1.373 1.474/1.592 1.627/1.521 1.843/1.122 1.768/1.318 
 (0.166)/(0.141) (0.139)/(0.137) (0.110)/(0.113) (0.169)/(0.146) (0.179)/(0.178) (0.149)/(0.120) (0.113)/(0.138) (0.074)***/(0.269) (0.086)***/(0.196) 
LNGPR 3.992/4.057 3.957/3.967 4.034/4.029 3.929/4.142 4.188/4.092 4.273/3.988 3.002/3.173 2.657/1.885 2.937/2.321 
 (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.005)*/(0.003)* (0.012)**/(0.068)*** (0.006)*/(0.027)** 
LNTAL 0.741/0.839 0.950/0.937 0.984/0.974 0.880/0.881 0.947/0.945 0.974/1.003 0.575/0.904 0.909/0.885 0.748/0.566 
 (0.464)/(0.407) (0.348)/(0.355) (0.332)/(0.337) (0.385)/(0.384) (0.350)/(0.351) (0.337)/(0.323) (0.569)/(0.372) (0.370)/(0.383) (0.460)/(0.576) 
OFPR -2.456/-2.547 -2.278/-2.395 -2.221/-2.309 -2.458/-2.586 -2.298/-2.391 -2.234/-2.287 -2.400/-2.632 -1.798/-2.144 -1.892/-2.042 
 (0.019)**/(0.015)** (0.029)**/(0.022)** (0.033)**/(0.027)** (0.019)**/(0.014)** (0.028)**/(0.022)** (0.032)**/(0.028)** (0.022)**/(-0.013)** (0.081)***/(0.039)** (0.067)***/(0.049)** 
STDRTNS -0.340/-0.386 -0.478/-0.429 -0.507/-0.428 -0.317/0.380 -0.479/-0.455 -0.503/-0.419 -0.622/-0.898 -1.070/-1.245 -0.799/-0.806 
 (0.736)/(0.702) (0.635)/(0.670) (0.616)/(0.671) (0.753)/(0.706) (0.635)/(0.652) (0.618)/(0.678) (0.538)/(0.376) (0.292)/(0.222) (0.430)/(0.426) 
CFO -0.254/-0.262 0.783/0.350 1.179/0.830 -0.241/-0.364 0.497/0.199 0.900/0.899 -0.714/-0.513 0.255/-0.565 0.598/0.313 
 (0.801)/(0.795) (0.439)/(0.728) (0.246)/(0.412) (0.811)/(0.718) (0.622)/(0.843) (0.374)/(0.375) (0.479)/(0.611) (0.801)/(0.576) (0.554)/(0.756) 
DA 0.756/0.504 0.027/0.101 -0.109/-0.070       
 (0.455)/(0.617) (0.979)/(0.920) (0.913)/(0.945)       
TACCR    0.575/0.645 0.362/0.198 0.246/-0.356    
    (0.569)/(0.523) (0.719)/(0.844) (0.807)/0.724)    
CRED       -1.212/-1.504 -3.948/-1.641 -3.368/-1.460 
       (0.234)/(0.142) (0.000)*/(0.110) (0.002)*/(0.154) 
DEP       -0.269/-0.361 0.799/1.700 0.751/1,218 
       (0.789)/(0.720) (0.430)/(0.098)*** (0.458)/(0.232) 
INVENT       0.740/1.415 3.390/1.451 0.343/0.388 
       (0.465)/(0.166) (0.002)*/(0.156) (0.734)/(0.701) 
REC       0.712/0.323 0.226/1.115 0.160/(0.071) 
       (0.481)/(0.749) (0.823)/(0.275) (0.874)/(0.944) 
R2 30.86%/30.24% 30.82%/30.27% 32.05%/31.54% 30.28%/30.48% 31.01%/30.33% 32.12%/31.82% 35.08%/38.65% 44.14%/46.29% 39.65%/40.75% 
Adj R2 13.57%/12.80% 13.53%/12.84% 15.06%/14.42% 12.85%/13.10% 13.76%/12.91% 15.15%/14.78% 11.47%/16.34% 23.83%/26.76% 17.71%/19.21% 
F-statistic 1.785/1.734 1.782/1.736 1.867/1.843 1.737/1.754 1.798/1.741 1.893/1.867 1.486/1.732 2.173/2.370 1.807/1.892 
 (0.105)/(0.117) (0.106)/(0.116) (0.086)***/(0.094)*** (0.116)/(0.112) (0.103)/(0.115) (0.085)***/(0.089)*** (0.179)/(0.104) (0.039)**/(0.025)** (0.088)***/(0.073)*** 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
***denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level  
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TABLE 31c - Regression Results for CAR24        
          
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 
          
Intercept -1.027/-1.071 -1.357/-1.252 -1.377/1.324 -1.158/-1.171 -1.294/-1.249 -1.364/-1.366 -0.749/-0.922 -0.817/0.769 -0.785/0.408 
 (0.311)/(0.291) (0.183)/(0.219) (0.177)/(0.194) (0.255)/(0.249) (0.204)/(0.220) (0.181)/(0.180) (0.459)/(0.364) (0.420)/(0.447) (0.438)/(0.686) 
AUD 1.047/1.180 1.148/1.064 1.130/1.064 1.093/1.271 1.115/1.052 1.123/1.070 0.683/1.339 0.955/0.942 1.019/1.015 
 (0.302)/(0.246) (0.259)/(0.294) (0.266)/(0.0.294) (0.282)/(0.212) (0.272)/(0.300) (0.269)/(0.292) (0.499)/(0.190) (0.347)/(0.353) (0.316)/(0.317) 
UND -1.347/-1.414 -1.407/-1.369 -1.460/-1.443 -1.427/-1.520 -1.402/-1.361 -1.467/-1.472 -1.119/-1.933 -1.474/-0.934 -1.461/1.135 
 (0.186)/(0.166) (0.168)/(0.179) (0.153)/(0.158) (0.162)/(0.137) (0.170)/(0.182) (0.151)/(0.149) (0.271)/(0.062)*** (0.150)/(0.357) (0.154)(0.265) 
LEVER 0.292/0.423 0.381/0.408 0.469/0.499 0.245/0.374 0.406/0.557 0.475/0.757 0.815/0.616 0.759/-0.139 0.741/0.167 
 (0.772)/(0.675) (0.706)/(0.685) (0.642)/(0.621) (0.808)/(0.711) (0.687)/(0.581) (0.638)/(0.454) (0.421)/(0.542) (0.453)/(0.890) (0.464)/(0.868) 
LNGPR 2.707/2.911 2.873/2.735 2.913/2.827 2.804/3.052 2.753/2.656 2.876/2.756 2.018/2.642 1.920/0.051 1.895/0.759 
 (0.010)*/(0.006)* (0.007)*/(0.009)* (0.006)*/(0.008)* (0.008)*/(0.004)* (0.009)*/(0.012)** (0.007)*/(0.009)* (0.052)***/0.013)** (0.064)***/(0.959) (0.067)***/(0.453) 
LNTAL -0.348/-0.420 -0.170/-0.167 -0.130/-0.115 -0.289/-0.371 -0.136/-0.127 -0.113/-0.057 -0.309/-0.463 -0.374/-1.104 -0.408/-1.029 
 (0.730)/(0.677) (0.866)/(0.869) (0.898)/(0.909) (0.774)/(0.713) (0.892)/(0.900) (0.911)/(0.955) (0.759)/(0.645) (0.710)/(0.278) (0.686)/(0.211) 
OFPR -1.586/-1.941 -1.526/-1.687 -1.502/-1.658 -1.638/-2.003 -1.550/-1.693 -1.491/-1.709 -1.341/-2.085 -0.764/-0.581 -0.984/-0.945 
 (0.121)/(0.060)*** (0.136)/(0.100) (0.142)/(0.106) (0.110)/(0.053)*** (0.130)/(0.099)*** (0.145)/(0.096)*** (0.189)/(0.045)** (0.450)/(0.566) (0.332)/(0.352) 
STDRTNS -1.741/-1.822 -1.903/-1.805 -1.938/-1.801 -1.615/-1.820 -1.922/-1.794 -1.933/-1.787 -1.541/-2.087 -2.072/-3.414 -1.952/-2.044 
 (0.090)***/(0.077)*** (0.065)***/(0.079)*** (0.061)***/(0.080)*** (0.115)/(0.077)*** (0.063)*/(0.081)*** (0.061)***/(0.082)*** (0.133)/(0.045)** (0.046)**/(0.002)* (0.059)***/(0.049)** 
CFO 0.373/-0.425 0.959/0.707 1.340/1.127 0.005/-0.763 1.200/0.988 1.390/(1.391 -1.542/-1.002 0.617/-1.837 1.029/0.034 
 (0.712)/(0.673) (0.344)/(0.484) (0.189)/(0.267) (0.996)/(0.450) (0.238)/(0.330) (0.173)/(0.173) (0.133)/(0.324) (0.542)/(0.075)*** (0.311)/(0.973) 
DA 1.034/1.492 0.535/0.199 0.240/-0.048       
 (0.308)/(0.144) (0.596)/(0.843) (0.812)/(0.962)       
TACCR    1.477/1.984 0.105/-0.432 0.095/(-0.758)    
    (0.149)/(0.055)*** (0.917)/(0.668) (0.925)/(0.454)    
CRED       -5.299/-4.115 -4.139/-4.938 -4.415/-3.198 
       (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.000)* (0.000)*/(0.003)* 
DEP       0.053/-1.179 2.920/2.850 2.482/2.332 
       (0.958)/(0.247) (0.006)*/(0.008)* (0.018)**/(0.026)** 
INVENT       0.646/2.098 0.136/2.707 0.061/1.297 
       (0.522)/(0.044)** (0.893)/(0.010)* (0.952)/(0.204) 
REC       1.727/1.084 0.533/2.715 -0.073/0.700 
       (0.093)***/(0.286) (0.597)/(0.010)* (0.942)/(0.489) 
R2 24.88%/25.04% 25.14%/23.93% 26.18%/25.42% 25.67%/26.70% 24.7%/24.10% 26.9%/26.36% 42.41%/48.61% 43.43%/66.15% 40.47%/49.77% 
Adj R2 6.10%/6.30% 6.43%/4.90% 7.72%/6.77% 7.09%/8.38% 5.87%/5.13% 7.61%/7.96% 21.47%/29.92% 22.85%/53.85% 18.82%/31.50% 
F-statistic 1.325/1.336 1.344/1.258 1.419/1.363 1.382/1.457 1.311/1.271 1.412/1.432 2.025/2.601 2.111/5.375 1.869/2.725 
 (0.259)/(0.253) (0.250)/(0.293) (0.217)/(0.241) (0.233)/(0.201) (0.265)/(0.286) (0.219)/(0.211) (0.054)***/(0.015)** (0.044)**/(0.000)* (0.077)***/(0.011)** 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
          
***denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level    
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TABLE 31d - Regression Results for CAR36        
          
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 
          
Intercept -1.030/-1.001 -0.979/-0.948 -1.148/-1.108 -0.902/-0.945 -1.236/-1.276 -1.304/-1.427 -0.492/-0.616 -0.637/0.764 -0.494/0.280 
 (0.310)/(0.324) (0.334)/(0.349) (0.259)/(0.275) (0.373)/(0.351) (0.225)/(0.210) (0.201)/(0.162) (0.626)/(0.542) (0.528)/(0.451) (0.625)/(0.781) 
AUD -0.021/0.107 0.001/-0.205 0.086/-0.043) -0.060/0.091 0.286/0.007 0.243/0.068 -0.480/0.274 -0.075/-0.426 -0.022/-0.143 
 (0.983)/(0.916) (0.999)/(0.839) (0.932)/(0.965) (0.952)/(0.928) (0.777)/(0.994) (0.810)/(0.946) (0.634)/(0.786) (0.941)/(0.673) (0.983)/(0.887) 
UND -0.377/-0.422 -0.644/-0.467 -0.833/-0.717 -0.290/-0.414 -0.725/-0.636 -0.884/-0.888 0.234/-1.113 -0.709/0.344 -0.613/-0.091 
 (0.708)/(0.678) (0.523)/(0.643) (0.411)/(0.478) (0.774)/(0.681) (0.473)/(0.529) (0.383)/(0.381) (0.816)/(0.274) (0.483)/(0.733) (0.544)/(0.928) 
LEVER 1.066/1.149 1.344/1.581 1.595/1.822 1.082/1.148 1.721/2.206 1.901/2.594 1.597/1.398 1.736/0.806 1.641/1.095 
 (0.294)/(0.258) (0.187)/(0.123) (0.119)/(0.077)*** (0.286)/(0.259) (0.094)***/(0.034)** (0.065)***/(0.014)** (0.120)/(0.171) (0.092)/(0.426) (0.110)/(0.281) 
LNGPR 2.375/2.509 2.392/2.283 2.543/2.495 2.376/2.613 2.564/2.616 2.669/2.801 1.720/2.408 1.964/0.056 1.832/0.894 
 (0.023)**/(0.017)** (0.022)**/(0.028)** (0.015)**/(0.017)** (0.023)**/(0.013)** (0.015)**/(0.013)** (0.011)**/(0.008)* (0.095)***/(0.022)** (0.058)***/(0.956) (0.076)***/(0.378) 
LNTAL -0.260/-0.434 -0.359/-0.413 -0.236/-0.342 -0.484/-0.558 -0.342/-0.368 -0.303/-0.282 -0.708/-0.888 -0.869/-1.272 -0.889/-1.298 
 (0.797)/(0.667) (0.722)/(0.682) (0.815)/(0.734) (0.631)/(0.580) (0.734)/(0.715) (0.764)/(0.779) (0.484)/(0.381) (0.391)/0.212 (0.382)/(0.203) 
OFPR -0.483/-0.777 -0.999/-1.024 -0.935/-0.994 -0.641/-0.892 -0.797/-1.061 -0.553/-1.177 -0.404/-1.230 0.005/0.246 -0.239/-0.273 
 (0.632)/(0.443) (0.324)/(0.313) (0.356)/(0.327) (0.525)/0.378) (0.431)/(0.296) (0.584)/(0.247) (0.689)/(0.227) (0.996)/(0.808) (0.813)/(0.787) 
STDRTNS -2.308/-2.429 -2.742/-2.595 -2.713/-2.594 -2.308/-2.478 -2.798/-2.476 -2.710/-2.520 -2.135/2.851 -2.493/-3.887 -2.491/-2.632 
 (0.027)**/(0.020)** (0.009)*/(0.014)** (0.010)*/(0.014)** (0.027)**/(0.018)** (0.008)*/(0.018)** (0.010)*/(0.016)** (0.040)**/(0.008)* (0.018)**(0.000)* (0.018)**/(0.013)** 
CFO 1.516/0.930 2.060/1.836 2.207/2.0.35 1.330/0.729 2.393/2.288 2.235/2.401 -1.377/-0.408 0.714/-0.299 0.769/0.734 
 (0.138)/(0.359) (0.047)**/(0.075)*** (0.034)**/(0.049)** (0.192)/(0.470) (0.022)**/(0.028)** (0.032)**/(0.022** (0.178)/(0.686) (0.480)/(0.767) (0.447)/(0.468) 
DA -1.542/-0.932 -1.603/-2.026 -1.789/-2.210       
 (0.132)/(0.358) (0.118)/(0.050)** (0.082)***/(0.034)**       
TACCR    -0.951/-0.528 -2.016/-2.498 -1.541/-2.487    
    (0.348)/(0.601) (0.051)***/(0.017)** (0.132)/(0.018)**    
CRED       -3.615/-2.419 -6.048/-2.773 -6.354/(-1.541 
       (0.001)*/(0.021)** (0.000)*/(0.009)* (0.000)*/(0.133) 
DEP       0.711/-0.805 1.852/3.408 1.801/1.901 
       (0.482)/(0.427) (0.073)***/(0.002)* (0.081)***/(0.066)*** 
INVENT       0.331/1.700 -0.039/2.227 0.283/1.077 
       (0.743)/(0.098)*** (0.968)/(0.033)** (0.779)/(0.289) 
REC       1.813/0.662 0.300/0.753 0.008/(-0.328) 
       (0.079)***/(0.513) (0.766)/(0.457) (0.993)/(0.745) 
R2 33.00%/30.52% 35.73%/39.23% 38.75%/42.41% 31.47%/29.64% 36.54%/40.89% 36.5%/44.36% 45.28%/43.09% 49.24%/60.66% 44.76%/46.67% 
Adj R2 16.25%/13.15% 19.67%/24.05% 23.43%/28.01% 14.33%/12.04% 20.67%/26.11% 20.63%/30.45% 25.38%/22.39% 30.79%/46.35% 24.67%/27.28% 
F-statistic 1.969/1.757 2.224/2.583 2.530/2.945 1.837/1.685 2.303/2.767 2.299/3.189 2.275/2.082 2.668/4.240 2.228/2.407 
 (0.073)***/(0.112) (0.043)**/(0.021)** (0.023)**/(0.010)* (0.095)***/(0.129) (0.037)**/(0.014)** (0.037)**/(0.006)* (0.030)**/(0.048)** (0.013)**/(0.000)* (0.034)**/(0.023)** 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
          
***denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level    
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Table 32 -Summary comparison of results of the survey with Brau et al (2006) 
   
         1. Going public decision 
A. Motivations 
       Question:  How Important are the following motivations for conducting the IPO? 
    
 
This survey 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
    i To enhance the reputation of our company 
 
To create public shares for use in future acquisitions 
 ii To broaden the base of ownership of our firm 
 
To establish a market price/value for our firm 
  iii To establish a market price/value for our firm 
 
To enhance the reputation of our company 
          
B. Market timing 
       Question: To what extent did the following influence the timing of your possible IPO? 
    
 
This survey 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
    i Overall stock market conditions 
 
Overall stock market conditions 
   ii We needed the capital to continue to grow 
 
Industry conditions (conditions in our sector of business) 
 iii Industry conditions (conditions in our sector of business) 
 
We needed the capital to continue to grow 
  2. Underwriter selection 
       Question: How important were the following criteria in selecting your lead IPO underwriter? 
    
 
This survey 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
    i Underwriter‘s overall reputation and status 
 
Underwriter‘s overall reputation and status 
  ii Underwriter‘s industry expertise and connections 
 
Quality and reputation of the research dpt/analyst 
 iii Institutional investor client base of the underwriter 
 
Underwriter‘s industry expertise and connections 
 3. Underpricing in IPOs 
       Question: To what extent do you feel the following led to the level of underpricing* you might have expected? 
   
 
This survey 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
    i Underwriters underprice to incur the favour of institutional 
investors 
To compensate investors for taking the risk of the IPO 
 ii To ensure a wide-base of owners  Underwriters underprice to incur the favour of institutional 
investors 
iii To increase the after-issue trading volume of the stock  To ensure a wide-base of owners 
   
         4. Signalling in IPOs 
       Question: What type of signal do the following actions convey to investors regarding the value of a firm going public? 
  
 
This survey 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
    i Having strong historical earnings Having strong historical earnings 
   ii Insiders commit to a long lock-up  Using a top investment bank as underwriter and manager of 
the IPO 
iii Using a top investment bank as underwriter and manager of the 
IPO 
Insiders commit to a long lock-up 
   5. IPO Process Issues 
       Question: From your perspective, how important were the following IPO process issues? 
    
 
This survey 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
    i The need to carry out financial and legal due diligence  A firm-commitment underwriting as opposed to a best-
efforts underwriting 
ii Placing shares privately before doing an IPO  The lock-up period to allign management with future 
stockholders 
iii An offering which includes free warrants alongside the shares 
issued 
The overallotment option (Greenshoe) 
  6. Other IPO issues 
       Question: To what extent did each of the following create concern in the decision to conduct an IPO? 
   
 
This survey 
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
    i Desire to maintain decision-making control 
 
Desire to maintain decision-making control 
  ii Bad market/industry conditions 
 
To avoid ownership dilution 
   iii To avoid ownership dilution 
 
Bad market/industry conditions 
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Table 33 - Sample Representativeness 
        
           Panel A consists of the ‗Population‘ of IPOs for the time periods surveyed.  Panel B consists of the sample of firms in which Cypriot managers responded to 
the survey which represents results of 30 managers‘ responses to a survey of managerial IPOs insights into the IPO process.  
 
Panel A: Population 
  
Cumulative Cumulative 
 
Panel B: Sample 
  
Cumulative Cumulative 
Sector Frequency Percent frequency percent 
 
Market Frequency Percent frequency percent 
Other 27 28.1% 27 28.1% 
 
Other 7 24.14% 7 24.14% 
IT 5 5.2% 32 33.3% 
 
IT 2 6.90% 9 31.03% 
Tourism 6 6.3% 38 39.6% 
 
Tourism 0 0.00% 9 31.03% 
Hotels 6 6.3% 44 45.8% 
 
Hotels 3 10.34% 12 41.38% 
Trading 14 14.6% 58 60.4% 
 
Trading 5 17.24% 17 58.62% 
Fish Culture 3 3.1% 61 63.5% 
 
Fish Culture 1 3.45% 18 62.07% 
Manufacturing 15 15.6% 76 79.2% 
 
Manufacturing 3 10.34% 21 72.41% 
B. M. & C. 8 8.3% 84 87.5% 
 
B. M. & C. 5 17.24% 26 89.66% 
Insurance 4 4.2% 88 91.7% 
 
Insurance 0 0.00% 26 89.66% 
Financial Services 8 8.3% 96 100.0% 
 
Financial Services 3 10.34% 29 100.00% 
           Panel A: Population 
  
Cumulative Cumulative 
 
Panel B: Sample 
  
Cumulative Cumulative 
IPO offer year Frequency Percent frequency percent 
 
IPO offer year Frequency Percent frequency percent 
1997 2 2.08% 2 2.08% 
 
1997 1 3.45% 1 3.45% 
1998 4 4.17% 6 6.25% 
 
1998 1 3.45% 2 6.90% 
1999 9 9.38% 15 15.63% 
 
1999 1 3.45% 3 10.34% 
2000 44 45.83% 59 61.46% 
 
2000 13 44.83% 16 55.17% 
2001 25 26.04% 84 87.50% 
 
2001 6 20.69% 22 75.86% 
2002 10 10.42% 94 97.92% 
 
2002 7 24.14% 29 100.00% 
2003 1 1.04% 95 98.96% 
 
2003 0 0.00% 29 100.00% 
2004 1 1.04% 96 100.00% 
 
2004 0 0.00% 29 100.00% 
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Table 34 – Sample Statistics 
The sample consists of 30 completed surveys.  Average age is the number of years from incorporation date, raw underpricing is the difference between 
the offer price and the first day closing price, and adjusted underpricing is the difference between the offer price and the first day closing price adjusted 
for the return of the index from the day of applying to the C.S.E. for listing.  Average proceeds is the amount in Cyprus Pounds (CY£) of the proceeds 
of the issue to the public.  Average approval time is the average time taken by the authorities from application submission to listing.  Underwriter 
prestige is on scale of 0-9 and is based on the market shares of the underwriters in the IPO market. 
  
   
Population Sample 
Mean age (years) 
 
16.90 
 
18.31 
Median age (years) 
 
14.00 
 
14.0 
Raw underpricing 
 
116.12% 
 
89.20% 
Adjusted underpricing 
 
140.85% 
 
133.55% 
Average proceeds (CY£) 7,012.243 
 
7,263.800 
Average approval time (days) 337.0 
 
399.2 
Underwriter prestige (mean) 5.05 
 
6.08 
Underwriter prestige (median) 5.63 
 
5.75 
Number of observations 140  30 
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Table 35 - Why do firms go public? Some dominant theories 
 
Source: Brau, Ryan and Degraw (2006) 
 
Article Theory 
Panel A: Life cycle theories 
Scott (1976), Modigliani and Miller (1963) IPOs facilitate optimal capital structure. 
Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984) IPOs are a natural consequence of the pecking order 
theory. 
Zingales (1995) Firms get a higher acquisition price after an IPO. 
Mello and Parsons (1998) IPOs create a public market for increased founder 
liquidity. 
Dhillon, Raman, and Ramirez (1999), IPOs may allow principals to immediately cash out. 
Brau, Li, and Shi (2005) 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) IPOs allow for optimal dispersion of ownership. 
Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) IPOs give first mover/reputation advantage. 
Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) IPOs allow for the creation of an analyst following. 
Panel B: Market-timing theories 
Lucas and McDonald (1990) Firms postpone IPOs if founders feel they are 
undervalued. 
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) Firms avoid IPOs when few other good firms are 
issuing. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) IPOs occur during windows of opportunity. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) IPOs are more likely after public market valuations 
have increased. 
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Table 36 – IPO motivations 
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of listed companies 
whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean % 4-5
1 To enhance the reputation of our company 3.80 73.33%
2 To broaden the base of ownership of our firm 3.60 53.33%
3 To establish a market price/value for our firm 3.53 56.67%
4 To create public shares for use in future acquisitions 3.50 60.00%
5 To minimise our cost of capital 3.07 40.00%
6 To provide management succession for our firm 2.87 33.33%
7 Debt is becoming too expensive 2.77 30.00%
8 To allow shareholders to sell part of their shares 2.57 23.33%
9 Our company has run out of private equity 2.17 16.67%
10 To allow venture capitalists (VCs) to cash-out 1.40 6.67%
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Table 37 – IPO timing  
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of 
listed companies whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey responses to the Question:
To what extent did the following influence the timing of your possible IPO?
Mean % 4-5
1 Overall stock market conditions 4.37 90.00%
2 We needed the capital to continue to grow 4.17 80.00%
3 Industry conditions (conditions in our sector of business) 3.70 66.67%
4 Other good firms were currently going public 3.33 46.67%
5 First-day share price performance of recent IPOs 3.17 50.00%
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Table 38 – Criteria for selecting lead underwriter   
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of 
listed companies whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
 
  
Survey responses to the Question:
How important were the following criteria in selecting your lead IPO underwriter?
Mean % 4-5
1 Underwriter’s overall reputation and status 4.30 90.00%
2 Underwriter’s industry expertise and connections 4.17 86.67%
3 Institutional investor client base of the underwriter 3.50 50.00%
4 Retail client base of the underwriter 3.43 46.67%
5 Pricing and valuation promises 3.07 33.33%
6 Fee structure 3.00 33.33%
7 Non-equity-related services (e.g., advice on Mergers & Acquisitions, debt) 3.00 26.67%
8 Market making, trading desk and liquidity provision services 2.80 30.00%
9 Underwriter is a subsidiary of our company’s main commercial bank 2.53 33.33%
10 Underwriter has a reputation for spinning 2.03 6.67%
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Table 39 – Expectations for the level of underpricing  
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of 
listed companies whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
   
Survey responses to the Question:
To what extent do you feel the following led to the level of underpricing you might have expected?
Mean % 4-5
1 Underwriters underprice to incur the favour of institutional investors 3.00 36.84%
2 To ensure a wide-base of owners 2.95 31.58%
3 To increase the after-issue trading volume of the stock 2.84 15.79%
4 To increase publicity on the opening day 2.74 15.79%
5 To compensate investors for taking the risk of the IPO 2.68 31.58%
6 To compensate investors for truthfully revealing the price they are willing to pay 2.58 21.05%
7 So underwriters can make flipping possible 2.53 15.79%
8 So underwriters can make spinning possible 2.32 10.53%
9 To increase share price by starting a cascade effect amongst investors 2.26 15.79%
10 To create a large block-holder to serve as a watchdog over company management 2.16 0.00%
11 Insiders are willing to underprice because the IPO creates personal wealth 2.11 10.53%
12 Underpricing reduces the need for additional IPO marketing costs 2.11 0.00%
13 To mitigate future litigation by investors who claim the offer price was too high 1.89 0.00%
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Table 40 – Actual observed level of underpricing  
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of 
listed companies whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
 
 
Survey responses to the Question:
To what extent do you feel the following led to the actual level of underpricing observed in your company’s IPO?
Mean % 4-5
1 Underwriters underprice to incur the favour of institutional investors 3.00 42.11%
2 To ensure a wide-base of owners 2.95 36.84%
3 To increase the after-issue trading volume of the stock 2.84 26.32%
4 To increase publicity on the opening day 2.74 31.58%
5 To compensate investors for taking the risk of the IPO 2.68 26.32%
6 To compensate investors for truthfully revealing the price they are willing to pay 2.58 10.53%
7 So underwriters can make flipping possible 2.53 5.26%
8 So underwriters can make spinning possible 2.32 0.00%
9 To increase share price by starting a cascade effect amongst investors 2.26 10.53%
10 To create a large block-holder to serve as a watchdog over company management 2.16 5.26%
11 Underpricing reduces the need for additional IPO marketing costs 2.11 10.53%
12 Insiders are willing to underprice because the IPO creates personal wealth 2.11 5.26%
13 To mitigate future litigation by investors who claim the offer price was too high 1.89 10.53%
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Table 41 – Signalling  
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of 
listed companies whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey responses to the Question:
What type of signal do the following actions convey to investors regarding the value of a firm going public?
Mean % 4-5
1 Having strong historical earnings 4.70 100.00%
2 Insiders commit to a long lock-up 4.20 80.00%
3 Using a top investment bank as underwriter and manager of the IPO 4.17 86.67%
4 Using a big-5 accounting firm 3.93 66.67%
5 A large first-day share price jump 3.70 66.67%
6 Issuing free warrants 3.53 53.33%
7 Having venture capital (VC) backing 3.43 50.00%
8 Selling a large portion of the firm in the IPO 2.40 16.67%
9 Selling insider shares in the IPO 1.93 10.00%
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Table 42 – IPO Process Issues 
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of 
listed companies whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey responses to the Question:
From your perspective, how important were the following IPO process issues?
Mean % 4-5
1 The need to carry out financial and legal due diligence 3.87 66.7%
2 Placing shares privately before doing an IPO 3.47 46.7%
3 An offering which includes free warrants alongside the shares issued 3.20 46.7%
4 The threat of accusations pertaining to window-dressing in the prospectus 3.20 43.3%
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Table 43 – Other IPO Issues 
Means are based on a five-point Likert scale with anchors of 1= not important to 5=very important.  The sample consists of 30 completed surveys of 
listed companies whose shares were listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
Survey responses to the Question:
What type of signal do the following actions convey to investors regarding the value of a firm going public?
Mean % 4-5
1 Desire to maintain decision-making control 3.80 66.67%
2 Bad market/industry conditions 3.37 46.67%
3 To avoid ownership dilution 3.30 46.67%
4 Disclosing information to competitors 3.20 43.33%
5 Costs/fees of an IPO 3.07 43.33%
6 The Cyprus Stock Market authorities reporting requirements 3.07 30.00%
7 Low price of our share 2.93 20.00%
8 We, as a company, have already enough capital 2.87 16.67%
9 Directors’ liability 2.77 26.67%
10 To avoid earnings per share (EPS) dilution 2.70 23.33%
11 We would prefer to be acquired by another firm (rather than list our shares) 2.13 10.00%
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